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 i 
Abstract 
 
The existing British partnership literature is notoriously polarised.  Two main streams of 
research have emerged.  Early empirical work focused upon trade union representative capacity 
outcomes, in other words does partnership represent a threat or opportunity to the beleaguered 
trade union movement. Many of the conclusions have been negative, suggesting that 
partnership is a dangerous strategy for trade unions.  More recent empirical work has focused 
upon the extent to which partnership offers mutual gains outcomes to employers, trade unions 
and employees.  While much of the research has been pessimistic, various typologies of 
partnership have emerged, suggesting a variety of possible outcomes. However, despite the 
abundance of literature, three particular limitations are noteworthy.  Firstly, few studies 
consider how partnership plays out in different contexts.  Secondly, little attention has been 
given to understanding more about the process of partnership.  Thirdly, there are limitations to 
the way outcomes have been assessed.  Crude use of labour outcomes, such as job losses or pay 
levels may tell us nothing about the quality of employment relations. 
Accordingly, the study has five main objectives.  Firstly, partnership is explored in a variety of 
organisational contexts.  Secondly, particular attention is paid to what partnership means to 
organisational actors.  Thirdly, the study focuses upon two indicators of partnership process: the 
nature of relationships between actors, and the way issues are handled and decisions are made.  
Indeed, it is argued that one cannot fully understand the outcomes without exploring both 
process and context.  Fourthly, outcomes for management, unions and employees are explored, 
as well as wider societal goals.  Finally, the study considers some of the main challenges to 
partnership in the UK.   
Given the nature of the research questions, qualitative methods were thought to be most 
appropriate.  In particular, a case study research design was employed focusing on three 
organisations in the thriving financial service sector, thus offering a very different context to 
traditional IR - and partnership – research in manufacturing and public services.  The study also 
offers insights into partnership in both union and non-union firms.  The bulk of the data was 
obtained through semi-structured interviews with a range of managers, representatives and 
employees in each organisation, as well as interviews with trade union officials.  This was 
supplemented by documentary analysis and non-participant observation.  
 Thus, the thesis makes several important contributions.  Firstly, it offers fresh empirical 
evidence into partnership working in the UK, drawn from a variety of contexts within the 
internationally important financial service sector.  Since the outcomes of partnership are 
difficult to measure the study also considers issues of process which are overlooked in the 
existing research.  Actor relationships and bargaining explored in relation to models of 
integrative and distributive bargaining as proposed by Walton and McKersie (1965).  Decision 
making processes are also explored by developing the analytical framework proposed by Budd 
(2004), which has not been widely employed in British industrial relations research.   The thesis 
therefore offers a different way of evaluating the outcomes of partnership for various 
stakeholders, and avoids conflating union attitudes with employee opinions.  In this way, the 
research transcends the recent advocates/critics stalemate in the literature. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction and overview 
 
Background to the study 
 
Union decline in the UK since 1979 has been dramatic. Purcell (1993) questioned 
whether Britain was experiencing “the end of institutional industrial relations” and  
Howell (1999, 26) also begins his analysis of British IR by stating how “trade unions 
are in crisis”.  Metcalf has asked whether it is a case of “resurgence or perdition” and 
his conclusions are decidedly pessimistic (Metcalf, 2004).  Union membership has 
fallen from a peak of 13 million in 1979 to 5.5 million, and membership is heavily 
skewed towards public rather than private sector workplaces.  . Various explanations of 
membership decline exist including the changing composition of the workforce and 
jobs, the business cycle, the role of the state, employer attitudes, employee reactions, 
and the strategies and structures of unions themselves (Metcalf, 2004).  In addition, 
between 1980 and 2000, the coverage of collective agreements contracted from over 
three quarters to under a third of the employed workforce. This is compounded by 
evidence which suggests that even where unions continue to be recognised, their 
influence is still falling.  Indeed, studies have revealed that the role of trade unions has 
faded over both wage and non-wage issues, with increasing emphasis on consultation 
and information rather than negotiation (Brown et.al, 2000).  Furthermore, WERS 2004 
reveals that union officials spent most of their time not on negotiating terms and 
conditions but in supporting grievances on behalf of individual members (Kersely et.al, 
2006).  As Terry has argued “local union representatives – shop stewards – are not the 
negotiators, the co-authors of „joint rules‟, that we have generally taken them for since 
the late 1960s” (2003, 488).  Even where collective bargaining continues its impact 
appears to have diminished, and 1970s concepts such as ‘joint control’ and ‘rule 
making’ are generally considered to be outmoded.  Few organisations outside the public 
sector still have specific ‘Employee Relations Departments’, and ER is now commonly 
seen to be only one component of the broader HR professionals remit.  Indeed for some 
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“the language has echoes of a historical era that offers few insights into contemporary 
practice” (Emmott, 2005).  Overall, the emphasis has shifted from collective 
institutions such as collective bargaining and trade unions, towards a management 
vogue dominated by more individualistic concepts of employee voice, commitment and 
engagement, and the management of the ‘psychological contract’. 
 
Despite the general context of a decline in collective employment relations, labour 
management co-operation remains a perennial issue in British industrial relations 
research .  Over the last decade interest has focused upon workplace ‘partnership’ 
agreements, which have been a key plank of the New Labour government’s 
employment policy of ‘modernisation’ (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004).   In the 
British context the term partnership remains notoriously ambiguous (Guest and Peccei, 
2001; Terry, 2003), though most would agree that partnership concerns an attempt to 
shift the culture of employment relations away from zero-sum and adversarial 
relationships, towards co-operative employment relations, characterised by mutual trust 
and ultimately mutual gains (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004). 
 
A voluminous literature on partnership has emerged.  Much has focused on whether 
partnership offers a valuable opportunity for the beleaguered trade union movement 
(Terry, 2003), and the extent to which it delivers mutual gains (Guest and Peccei, 
2001).  Ideologically, the debate is polarised: pluralists tend to be more optimistic and 
view partnership as an opportunity (Ackers and Payne, 1998; Knell, 1999), while 
radicals remain decidedly suspicious and believe partnership presents a significant 
threat to unions and their members (Kelly, 2004; Taylor and Ramsey, 1998).  Since 
unitarists believe that conflict is not an inherent or permanent feature of the 
employment relationship, they may take the view that partnership is unnecessary as 
employer and employee interests can be aligned through (human resource) management 
policies.  Empirical evidence is mixed, though most recent empirical studies have been 
critical in tone (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004), suggesting that – despite the mutual 
gains rhetoric - the ‘balance of advantage’ is often skewed in favour of management 
(Guest and Peccei, 2001).  Some recent research, however, has been less fatalistic 
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suggesting that a variety of employment relations outcomes are possible, and that 
partnership may not necessarily hold any single consequence (Heery et.al, 2004, Kelly, 
2004; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004a, 2004b; Wills, 2004).  However, there are several 
significant weaknesses of the current literature.  Firstly, there is the issue of definitional 
ambiguity leading to the risk that researchers are actually comparing very different 
situations under the ‘partnership’ umbrella.  For example the literature identifies 
various different ‘types’ of partnership, such as union/non-union, formal/informal, 
public/sector/private sector, but fails to engage explicitly with the potential implications 
of such a heterogeneity of arrangements.  Studies also explore different sectors with 
very different product/labour market conditions and different industrial relations 
traditions.  Researchers also overlook the importance of process, tending instead to 
favour fairly crude attempts at ‘measuring’ the outcomes, against very high measures of 
success often informed by a romantic historical view of IR where trade unions and 
collective bargaining dominated the industrial relations landscape.  Moreover, good 
process need not necessarily lead to good outcomes and vice versa, because of the 
influence of many other contextual variables such as economic conditions or corporate 
strategy.  Of course outcomes are of interest, but is argued that the impact of 
partnership on the broader regulation of employment relations is equally important 
(Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004).   
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Purpose of the study 
 
The thesis addresses some of these limitations, by presenting the findings of a three-
year research study conducted in the British financial service sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Partnership: context, process and outcomes 
 
It is proposed that, in order to advance the debate, attention must be paid to the context, 
process and outcomes of partnership (Guest and Peccei, 2001; McBride and Stirling, 
2002).  Given the ambiguity of the term context is important in order to ensure an 
instance of partnership can be reliably identified.  Sensitivity to contextual variables is 
also important in order to establish why some arrangements appear to be more 
successful that others.  Partnership is concerned with regulation and governance of 
employment relations (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004), and accordingly little is 
known about the process of decision-making and partnership.  Rather, most research 
has focused upon the outcomes of partnership, but it is likely that outcomes cannot be 
fully understood and reliably interpreted without information regarding both context 
and process. 
 
Context 
Process Outcomes 
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Thus the thesis addresses a number of research questions.  Firstly, how does partnership 
play out in a variety of organisational contexts?  There is a danger of assuming that 
partnership arrangements are homogenous, when clearly the typologies identified in the 
literature suggests that contextual issues are important.  These are likely to include 
union/non-union, formal/informal and greenfield/brownfield arrangements.  Secondly, 
what does partnership actually mean to organisational actors, and what exactly is it 
expected to achieve?  There is the risk that the expectations of IR academics may not be 
the same as those of practitioners and organisational actors.  Thirdly, the research 
explores the process of partnership, and in particular the nature of decision making 
processes and relationships in organisations espousing a partnership approach to 
employment relations.  Does partnership change the way decisions are made and what 
does it mean in terms of the relationships between the key actors?  Fourthly, what are 
the outcomes for management, unions and employees, as well as society more 
generally?  Again, it is worth reiterating at this point that though outcomes are clearly 
of interest, they are notoriously difficult to measure given the plethora of non-HRM/IR 
factors that may also influence outcomes.  Finally, the study considers some of the 
main challenges to partnership in the UK.   
 
Accordingly, case studies were conducted in three diverse banking organisations, 
known as NatBank, BuSoc and WebBank.  This allowed rich contextual data to be 
obtained, and comparisons to be made across a number of variables including: route to 
partnership, IR history, union recognition, company history and corporate governance.  
Equally, focusing on one sector means some other variables are similar, for example 
product market, competitive environment, labour market/process and technology.  A 
particular focus of the study was to understand more about the process of partnership, 
in terms of the nature of relationships between key actors, and the system of decision-
making.  The study then explores the outcomes of partnership as perceived by the key 
actors, and employees in particular.  To evaluate actor relationships and bargaining the 
study draws upon models of integrative and distributive bargaining developed by 
Walton and McKersie (1965).  In order to address the questions of decision making and 
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mutual gains, the study employs the framework proposed by Budd (2004) and asks to 
what extent does partnership balance the objectives of the employment relationship i.e. 
efficiency, equity and voice?  This framework has not yet been employed in British 
industrial relations research.  Thus the thesis makes two key contributions.  Firstly, it 
offers a more holistic evaluation of partnership in terms of context, process 
andoutcomes.  Secondly, the thesis offers a test of the utility of the analytical 
framework proposed by Budd (2004).  The bulk of the data is drawn from over 50 
semi-structured interviews with managers, union officials, employee representatives 
and employees in the period 2004/5. 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters as outlined in the plan below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Structure of the thesis 
PART 3 ANALYSIS 
 
DISCUSSION 
CONCLUSION 
PART 2 EMPIRICAL 
 
CASE STUDY 1 NAT BANK 
CASE STUDY 2 BU SOC 
CASE STUDY 3 WEB BANK 
 
PART 1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
THE PARTNERSHIP PHENOMENON 
METHODOLOGY 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 
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Part one presents the theoretical background to the study.   Chapter two reviews the 
vast literature on partnership.  The chapter begins by examining the controversies 
surrounding the meaning of partnership and considering ‘whether there is such a thing 
as partnership’.  It then considers some of the key influences and interventions 
underpinning the recent interest in the concept, such as the European Social Model and 
US mutual gains literatures.  This is followed by an examination of the public policy 
context and public policy interest in partnership., The chapter then reviews the 
polarised advocates/critics debate as well as more recent empirical evidence which 
appears to present typologies of partnership outcomes.  It concludes by highlighting the 
limitations of the current research including a strong ideological dimension to debates, 
lack of sensitivity to context and heterogeneity of partnership arrangements, as well as a 
tendency to focus on outcomes and to overlook the importance of process. 
 
Chapter three outlines different methodological approaches to research, and in 
particular research approaches in the field of industrial relations.  It then justifies the 
comparative case study research design adopted in the study, as well as the research 
process and data collection.  The study was conducted over a period of four years 
(2003-2007) and involved case study analysis based upon interviews, company 
documents, focus groups and observation.  A fundamental aim of the research was to 
capture process, in terms of both decision making and relationships.  As such a 
qualitative approach was deemed essential.  The study employs of a variant of critical 
incident technique (CIT) in order to capture the realities of the process of partnership.  
In terms of case selection, the research employed an element of purposive sampling in 
that a particular aim was to capture organisations characterised by both similarity and 
dissimilarity.   
 
Chapter four provides essential context to the case studies which follow.  It begins by 
examining the notion of a service economy, and the new service management and 
critical literatures which have emerged in relation to nature of the employment 
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relationship in service work.  It then outlines  ‘firm-in-sector’, approach taken which 
allows organisational developments be placed within the wider context in which the 
organisations operate.  The importance of the UK financial service sector is then 
discussed, before outlining some of the key changes in recent years including changing 
markets, delivery mechanisms, technologies and marketing approaches.  Such changes 
in business models have had significant HR implications in relation to pay, staffing, 
work organisation, skills, and industrial relations.  Finally, to contextualise the call 
centre environments which form the focus of the research, the chapter concludes with a 
brief discussion of the key academic debates in this area. 
 
Part two presents the data obtained from the studies of NatBank, BuSoc and WebBank 
respectively.  Each empirical chapter begins with a company profile and an outline of 
the unit of analysis.  This is followed by a review of employment relations at the 
company and the background to partnership.  The partnership architecture is then 
considered, including the definitions of partnership, structures and processes, and 
actors.  The partnership process is then considered in detail, and  focuses upon the 
nature of actor relationships, and the way issues are handled and decisions are made in 
each case.  The final section of each chapter offers an overall evaluation of some of the 
outcomes, as well as the barriers and challenges.  More specifically, Chapter  five 
presents the data from the first case study undertaken at the NatBank credit card centre 
in North East England.  The NatBank partnership arose following a prolonged period of 
industrial relations turbulence and poor relations with the recognised trade union., 
culminating in a formal partnership agreement between the organisation and the 
recognised trade union being signed in 2000.  The agreement was inspired by the TUC 
‘Principles of Partnership’ and has since been renewed in 2005 for a further five years.   
 
 
Chapter six presents the case of BuSoc undertaken at the BuSoc administration centre 
in the Midlands of England.  This case examines a more evolutionary approach to 
partnership, which was believed to have evolved over a thirty year relationship between 
the Society and the recognised Staff Union.  There is no formal partnership agreement 
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as such, but many of the commitments between the union and the employer - for 
example in relation to employment security, mutual legitimacy and sharing success -
resonate with the principles of partnership.  It is therefore included in the study as a 
prima facie ‘de facto’ case of partnership.  Chapter seven explores the case of 
WebBank undertaken at the main operations centre and headquarters in the East 
Midlands.  This case presents an espoused non-union partnership arrangement between 
management and the in-house Employee Forum.  Again, though there is no formal 
partnership agreement, there is a Commitment Document, based upon the IPA 
principles of partnership and options-based consultation.  This is by far the youngest 
espoused case of partnership presented, as the Employee Forum was only initiated in 
2000, with a commitment to a partnership style of working agreed in 2003.  
 
Part three presents the analysis and conclusions.  Chapter eight presents a discussion 
of the result from the three case organisations, and offers detailed comparisons of 
differences and similarities.  Following a broadly similar structure to the preceding 
three chapters, it begins by exploring the context and theory of the partnership process.  
The chapter then examines the realities of the partnership process in terms of issues and 
decision-making, and actor relationships.  The final section offers an overall evaluation 
of partnership in practice, and the extent to which involves a shift from distributive to 
integrative bargaining, and asks whether partnership helps to balance efficiency, equity 
and voice.  It then presents some of the main challenges to partnership, including a lack 
of a shared understanding, embedding a partnership culture, resistance to adversity, and 
representative efficacy. 
 
Chapter nine presents the conclusions of the study and suggests some implications for 
practice and avenues for future research.  It begins by suggesting the need to appreciate 
the heterogeneity of partnership arrangements in terms of route to partnership, 
corporate governance, union recognition as well as degree of formality.  It then 
identifies three important points regarding the requirements for an enduring partnership.  
Firstly, the need for clear expectations of partnership and the rules of engagement.  
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Secondly, the importance of process, and the extent to which the partnership process 
can accommodate divergent interests.  Finally, actor perspectives on partnership and the 
extent to which outcomes can be considered mutually beneficial is discussed.   
 
Overall the evidence presented in the thesis suggests that the impact of partnership on 
employment relations in Britain is significantly more complex than the existing 
literature suggests.  On balance, the thesis offers some support for the advocates, as 
well as some support for the concerns expressed by the critics.  The research suggests 
that there is a need to pay much more attention to the context and process of 
partnership, as well as the difficult to measure outcomes which have dominated the 
existing literature.  The thesis also demonstrates the utility of the frameworks of Budd 
(2004) and Walton and McKersie (1965)  as useful tools in exploring the subtle 
processes of partnership, in terms of decision making processes and actor relationships.  
Without this, only a partial understanding of partnership can be achieved.  It is 
proposed that different trajectories of experience are possible, and indeed likely.  The 
thesis also makes the point that the voice process is of intrinsic value, and must be 
considered separately from outcomes.  Moreover, outcomes must not be compared only 
with the ‘ideal’ outcome but also with other possible alternatives.  It also suggests that 
the context of contemporary British IR must be borne in mind when deciding whether 
the glass is ‘half-full’ or ‘half-empty’.  Importantly, the study found that in each case 
organisation there was little actor support for adversarial strategies, as well evidence to 
suggest that partnership encourages management to think more strategically and long-
term in relation to their HRM and employment relations policies.  As with other forms 
of participation, “initiatives are probably more limited than the enthusiasts claim, but 
more constructive than the critics admit” (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005, 415). 
 
 
   2 
CHAPTER 
The partnership phenomenon 
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Chapter 2: The partnership phenomenon 
 
“The concept of partnership has become the defining feature of the „new‟ industrial 
relations settlement for the Millennium” (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004b, 410). 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a detailed review of the partnership literature. It begins by 
considering whether there is such a thing as partnership and what – if anything – is 
distinctive about the partnership phenomenon. The chapter then considers the 
intellectual and theoretical influences from European industrial relations and 
developments in the United States.  The chapter then outlines the historical context 
and policymaker views on partnership.  This is followed by a review of the key 
academic debates and current partnership studies to date.  The chapter concludes by 
flagging some limitations of the existing literature and highlights some avenues 
requiring further empirical investigation. 
 
 
Is there such a thing as ‘partnership’? 
 
“The term partnership has become too diffuse to carry much meaning” (Oxenbridge 
and Brown, 2004b, 389) 
 
Since the early 1990s partnership has attracted an enormous amount of attention 
from the New Labour government (DTI, 1998), the Trade Union Congress (TUC, 
1999) and most of the major trade unions including Unison, T&GWU, GMB, 
Amicus and USDAW. Partnership has also been endorsed by other bodies including 
Acas and The Work Foundation. The partnership concept has also attracted a 
voluminous research literature, yet the definition of partnership is still a matter for 
debate (Ackers et.al, 2004; Ackers and Payne, 1998; Dietz, 2004; Guest and Peccei, 
2001; Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004a).  As a result of the “inherent ambiguity” 
(Bacon and Storey, 2000,409), partnership has been described as “an idea with 
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which almost anyone can agree, without having any clear idea what they are 
agreeing about” (Guest and Peccei, 2001, 207), although in reality the concept has 
attracted significant controversy, and support is far from universal. 
 
Academic definitions centre around the idea of “co-operation for mutual gain” and 
“reciprocity” (Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2002).  For Gall (2004) the idea of 
„mutualism‟ – i.e. where a successful employer is able to benefit all involved – is a 
defining feature.  Guest and Peccei (2001) also suggest that trust and mutuality are 
the key components of a genuine partnership agreement.  Rhetorically at least, 
partnership appears to be hinged upon the proposition that, for employers, it can be 
both economically effective and ethically responsible to co-operate with unions and 
employees on issues of strategic organisational change (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 
2004).  For Terry (2003) commitment to business success, a quid pro quo between 
flexibility and employment security, and the representation of different interests are 
key. 
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Table 2.1 
Academic definitions of partnership 
Marchington (1998, 209) Guest and Peccei (1998, 16) 
1.  Operational practices and  processes 
 Direct communication  
 Upward problem solving 
 Financial involvement 
 Representative participation 
2. Values and behaviours 
 Management acknowledge legitimacy of 
employee voice 
 Union commits to organisational performance 
and flexibility 
 Mutual obligation, trust and openness 
3. Complementary HRM features 
 Single status 
 Harmonisation 
 employment security 
employee development and lifelong learning 
1. Values and principles 
 Good treatment of employees now an in 
the future 
 Empowerment: creating the opportunity 
for employee contribution 
 Employee rights and benefits 
 Employee responsibilities 
2. Practices 
 Direct participation by employees in 
decisions about their own work 
 Direct participation by employees in 
decisions about personal employment 
issues 
 Participation by employee 
representatives in decisions about 
employment issues 
 Participation by employee 
representatives in decisions about 
broader organisational  policy issues 
 Flexible job design and focus on quality 
 Performance management 
 Employee share ownership 
 Communication, harmonisation and 
employment security 
3. Outcomes 
 Employee attitudes and behaviour 
 Employment relations organisational 
performance 
 
Others have explored definitional issues in more detail.  Marchington (1998) 
suggests that partnership may be viewed at three levels.  Firstly, as a set of 
operational practices and processes associated with a partnership approach.  These 
include direct communication methods, upward problem solving, financial 
involvement, and representative participation.  Secondly, partnership can be viewed 
in terms of values and behaviours.  This concerns the attitudes of stakeholders and 
includes management acknowledging that employees have a legitimate voice, and 
that they should have influence over some decision making.  Equally, union actors 
are expected to accept management‟s concern with delivering organisational 
performance, as well as the need for flexibility.  Partnership requires that both 
parties value the importance of trust and openness, and a commitment to developing 
a consistent approach to the management of employment relations.  The third 
category concerns complementary HRM features, in other words features which are 
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not necessarily characteristics of partnership per se, but which can be viewed as 
supporting the partnership philosophy.  These include a commitment to employment 
security and investment in employee development and learning. 
 
Guest and Peccei (2001) identify three different conceptualisations of partnership: 
pluralist, unitarist and hybrid.  The pluralist perspective is argued to draw upon 
traditions of industrial democracy and differences of interest and power between 
capital and labour.  In practice this concerns a representative system, normally but 
not necessarily involving trade union representatives, in order to facilitate 
independent employee voice.  This does not exclude the possibility of direct 
participation, but it is not viewed as a central component within this 
conceptualisation of partnership.  A unitarist perspective of partnership, on the other 
hand, seeks to integrate employer and employee interests.  In support of these aims 
attempts may be made to align interests through financial schemes such as profit 
sharing or share ownership.  Alternatively, the focus may be on direct participation 
and involvement in day-to-day activities, and in practice this may relate more to job 
issues rather than wider employment issues.  A hybrid approach combines elements 
of both the unitarist and pluralist perspectives, in the belief that representative and 
direct participation are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.  In more 
practical terms, Guest and Peccei (2001) operationalise partnership in terms of 
values and principles, practices, and outcomes.  In terms of principles, they suggest 
that good treatment of employees, empowerment, employee rights and benefits, and 
employee responsibilities are central.  This accords with the general theme of 
mutuality.  Regarding partnership practices, they isolate eight factors which reflect a 
combination of direct and indirect participation, supplemented by some other HRM 
practices.  In relation to outcomes they identify three particular sets namely, 
employee attitudes and behaviour, employment relations and organisational 
performance.   
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Haynes and Allen (2001) acknowledge a “diversity of interpretation and 
specification” (166), and suggest that the meaning of partnership shifts depending 
upon the particular interests being promoted or the purposes to which it is put.  They 
suggest that the term suggests some kind of economic or social relationship, in 
terms of both some commitment to the success of the enterprise, and some influence 
over its governance.  They suggest that key concepts include the ideas of mutual 
legitimation, commitment to co-operative processes, and joint decision making or 
consultation.  Business success is also central, and normally underpinned by 
commitment by the organisation to a degree of job security in return for employee 
flexibility.  They comment that in reality partnership is a loose label incorporating 
some degree of variation between these common themes.  
 
In practice, partnership is normally characterised by a formal agreement delineating 
the rights and responsibilities of employers, unions and employees.  At the core of 
most agreements is an employer commitment to employment security in return for 
employee commitment to flexibility (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004a).  It is 
important to remember that partnership can be viewed at different levels – for 
example, European, state, economy, sectoral and company level – but in the UK the 
focus is at enterprise level, as it lacks the institutional and legislative support 
afforded in most other Western European nations (Haynes and Allen, 2001; Heery, 
2002; Heery et.al; 2003).  Accordingly, the focus in the UK has been on 
partnerships between employers, employees and normally trade unions within 
individual organisations.   
 
However, academic definitions are inevitably very vague and a useful definition 
“should describe a set of organisational characteristics and practices that, firstly, 
do justice to the idea of managing employment relations in a „partnership‟ manner 
and secondly, are readily observable in order to verify a genuine example in 
practice” ( Dietz, 2004, 4; see also Guest and Peccei, 2001).  To this end, more 
practical definitions are offered by the TUC (1997, 1999) and IPA (1997).  The 
TUC and IPA lists are very similar, although unsurprisingly there is a greater 
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emphasis on the desirability of union presence and the quality of working life in the 
TUC definition  (Coupar and Stevens, 1998; IPA, 1992; TUC, 1997,1999). 
 
Table 2.2 
Defining partnership: the TUC and IPA 
Partnership element IPA TUC Classification 
 A joint declaration of commitment to organisational 
success 
Y Y 
Values 
(Marchington, 
1998) 
Commitment (IPA, 
1997) 
 Mutual recognition of the legitimate role and interests of 
management, employees and trade unions where present 
Y Y 
Values 
(Marchington, 
1998) 
Commitment (IPA, 
1997) 
 Commitment and effort to develop and sustain trust 
between the organisation’s constituencies 
Y -* 
Values 
(Marchington, 
1998) 
Commitment (IPA, 
1997) 
 Means for sharing information [IPA]/Transparency [TUC] Y Y Process 
 Consultation and employee involvement, with 
representative arrangements for an ‘independent 
employee voice’ [IPA]/Transparency [TUC] 
Y Y Process 
 Policies to balance flexibility with employment security 
[IPA/TUC] 
Y Y Outcome 
 Sharing organisational success [IPA] Y - Outcome 
 Adding value [TUC] -* Y Outcome 
 Improving the quality of working life [TUC] -* Y Outcome 
Sources: Dietz (2004), IPA (1997), TUC, (1997,1998). 
 
Despite the clear similarities, the key difference concerns the need for trade unions, 
with the IPA definition open enough to allow for the possibility of partnership in 
non-union contexts. This is evident from their website 
(www.partnershipatwork.com) which lists around 60 union and non-union 
partnership agreements and over 100 case studies.  Understandably, the TUC 
believe trade union presence is essential to partnerships arguing that unions are the 
key to mutual respect, and that “in companies without unions…consultation always 
risks being a sham”, without the independent voice unions provide (TUC, 2002, 5).  
They argue that this voice is essential to act as a counterbalance against the power 
of management (TUC, 2002).  The two models also agree on the need to balance 
flexibility with employment security, although care has to be taken with the 
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definition here; a „stable employment framework‟ is meant rather than a „job-for-
life‟ guarantee” (IPA, 1997,2).  They also agree on the desirability of positive 
employee outcomes although these are defined slightly differently with the IPA 
focusing on „sharing success‟ with the financial connotations, whereas the TUC 
prefers the broader notion of‟ „improving the quality of working life‟ (TUC, 
1999,13). 
 
Partnership is also a term widely used by other policymakers.   A speech given by 
Ian McCartney, Former Minister of State for Competitiveness, to the 1999 AnuMan 
conference, provides some insight into the government definition of partnership.  At 
this event he suggested that partnership concerned a need to recognise and value the 
role of the workforce in any organisation, and that there needs to be agreement on 
both the aims of the business and work culture.  Emphasis was also based upon 
learning and development issues, as well as changing the relationships between 
actors towards a constructive problem solving approach, which respects and 
balances the interests of all parties.  However, there is no explicit statement by the 
government that a trade union intermediary is a necessary component of such 
problem solving.  Joint problem solving is also central to Acas definitions which 
argue that partnership concerns an „interest-based relationship‟, which is not just 
concerned with rights and power, but rather the satisfaction of both mutual and 
different interests.   
 
Having examined in detail the content of academic and practitioner definitions, a 
good test is how the notion of partnership is understood within organisations 
espousing a partnership approach to working.  By way of illustration two 
agreements are outlined below. 
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Table 2.3 
Formal organisational definitions 
Abbey National/ANGU 
Agreement (IPA 2004, May) 
ScottishPower GWD 
(IPA) 
Common themes 
 
 Efficient and effective 
operation of Abbey 
 
 Best interests of 
employees, customers and 
shareholders 
 
 Jointly manage change  
 
 Sound employee relations 
 
 Information sharing and 
consultation  
 
 Business success 
 
 Employment security 
 
 Corporate social 
responsibility 
 
 Open and honest working 
environment 
 
 
 
 Trade union legitimacy 
 
 Joint commitment to 
success 
 
 Best in class 
 
 Fair treatment, mutual 
respect and single status 
 
 Employment security 
 
 Flexibility and team working 
 
 Training and personal 
development 
 
 Information, consultation 
and participation 
 
 Responding to change 
 
 Sharing the success 
 
 Safety, health and welfare 
 
 Environment and 
community relations 
 
 Information and 
consultation 
 
 Business success 
 
 Employment security 
 
 Managing change 
 
 CSR 
 
 Sharing success 
 
 Open and honest 
 
 Efficiency 
Source: IPA Case Study, May (2004); IRS 643, November (1997) 
 
Table 2.3 illustrates how the formal partnership agreements at Abbey National and 
Scottish Power Generation Wholesale Division share many common themes, and 
broadly reflect the definitions espoused by the TUC and IPA.   Although exact 
phrases and wording unsurprisingly varies between the agreements, common 
themes include joint commitments to efficiency and organisational success, open 
and honest relationships, sharing success, information and consultation, corporate 
social responsibility and employment security.   Again, this supports the argument 
that, despite some differences, there is certainly a common core of ideas associated 
with the partnership concept. 
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Theoretically, many of the ideas at the core of partnership definitions reflect the 
analytical framework developed by Walton and McKersie (1965) in their work „A 
Behavioural Theory of Labor Negotiations‟.   Although their primary focus is on 
traditional bargaining and negotiation, some of their concepts can inform broader 
contemporary debates regarding consultation and decision making, as well as the 
nature of the relationships between employers and representative bodies.  In their 
view, a distinction can be made between „distributive bargaining‟ and „integrative 
bargaining‟, and this broadly reflects the key differences between zero-sum and 
positive/varying-sum relationships.  Distributive bargaining has the function of 
resolving pure conflicts of interests. It serves to allocate fixed sums of resources 
(„dividing the pie‟) and hence often has a „win–lose‟ zero-sum quality.  Tactics 
centre on developing the negotiator‟s own relative power, convincing the other party 
of the first party‟s power and resolution, modifying the other party‟s expectations, 
closely guarding information, and preventing the other side from using the same 
tactics.  At the level of interpersonal communication, distributive bargaining 
typically involves strong assertions, selective responses, using the other‟s statements 
tactically, and limited disclosure of feelings and underlying interests. 
 
Integrative bargaining, by contrast, has the function of finding common or 
complementary interests and solving problems confronting both partners. It serves 
to optimise the potential for joint gains - expanding the pie - and hence often has a 
„win–win‟ or varying sum quality. Tactics centre on the exchange of accurate 
information, the exploration of underlying interests, and the use of structured 
problem-solving techniques.  At the level of interpersonal communications, 
integrative bargaining typically involves paraphrasing, active listening, minimising 
defensiveness, brainstorming, and disclosure of feelings and underlying interests.  
Indeed, many of their ideas of the integrative bargaining model appear to resonate 
with the core ideas of partnership as propagated by the TUC and IPA.  For example, 
all of the ideas outlined below are identified by Walton and McKersie (1965) as 
being associated with an integrative bargaining approach: 
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 both parties recognise the legitimacy of the other party 
 both parties identify areas of common interest 
 the focus of bargaining is „problem solving‟ 
 employer willing divulge information 
 both parties share knowledge  
 both parties proactively seek to pursue common goals 
 
In addition, Walton and McKersie (1965) also discuss the importance of social-
psychological issues, and in particular, the attitudes of actors towards each other and 
the relationships between them.  Partnership is not just about decision making, but 
also with the issues of relationships, preferences and attitudes, and this may require 
unions to fundamentally redefine their relationships with employers and their 
membership (Terry, 2003). Walton and McKersie argue that „attitudinal structuring‟ 
and integrative bargaining are generally mutually reinforcing, and that a degree of 
trust and friendliness is a requirement for integrative bargaining to take place.  
Clearly, if actors are to share knowledge and information, and expected to jointly 
devise solutions, a positive relationship is likely to be essential.  Moreover, the 
relationship may improve over time, as the parties work together to identify areas of 
common interest and recognise the legitimacy of the other party.  In the context of 
partnership this would suggest that the nature of the dynamic relationships between 
actors is crucial, in addition to the formal structures in place, and also highlights a 
need to explore such processes in detail. 
 
So, returning to the original question, is there such a thing as partnership?   A 
useful test can be drawn from the field of psychology (see for example Hackman 
and Wageman, 1995).  Campbell and Fiske (1959) identify two dimensions: 
convergent validity and discriminant validity.  The former refers to the degree to 
which there are a common set of prescriptions and assumptions.  The latter refers to 
the degree to which partnership is readily distinguishable from other participation 
initiatives such as HRM, Employee Involvement, Stakeholding or High 
Performance Working.  Only if partnership passes these two validity tests does it 
deserve detailed empirical examination as a separate and distinctive social 
phenomenon.   
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Testing convergent validity 
Partnership appears to pass the convergent validity test. The variety of definitions 
notwithstanding and the different terms used, there is a high degree of agreement in 
the literature regarding the key assumptions and practices of partnership.  The 
discourse employed in contemporary partnership agreements generally also appear 
to resonate with the ideas. Common themes include employee voice, job security, 
job satisfaction and trust. The record is not perfect however, for example 
employment security is at the core of most definitions, but is not part of all 
partnership agreements.  At the core appear to be three main aims: employee 
involvement and participation, the idea of shared objectives, mutual gains and 
reciprocity, and a commitment to the success of the enterprise.  It therefore appears 
that there is a significant degree of convergence among the practitioner and 
academic community as to the basic ideas of partnership, and it may just be how it 
has been sub-divided into categories which differs (Dietz, 2004; Terry, 2003). 
Testing discriminant validity 
To assess the distinctiveness we need to evaluate partnership in relation to some 
other comparison groups, such as Human Resource Management, Employee 
Involvement and High Performance Working, or Best Practice.  Clearly, partnership 
also links back to debates on employee participation, joint-decision-making, 
employee involvement and industrial democracy.  For example Taylor and Ramsey 
(1998, 117) suggest clear similarities between HRM and partnership in terms of the 
focus on the contribution of employee involvement strategies in achieving 
competitive advantage, and the ideas of shared objectives and interests between 
employers and employees.  The definition proposed by Marchington (1998) 
certainly demonstrates how partnership is normally associated with various HR 
concepts, but it appears to be the values and behaviours which differ.  It is suggested 
therefore that the degree to which partnership differs from earlier initiatives is more 
difficult to demonstrate, and critics would question whether partnership actually 
does represent anything new, especially as many of the practices outlined above 
have been around for a long time (see also Wray, 2004, 209).   
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For Ferner and Hyman, prior to 1997 “the notion of social partnership had an alien 
ring to the English” (Ferner and Hyman, 1998, p.xv), thus implying that they do 
believe that partnership does represent something distinctive.   Yet there is the 
danger of caricaturing UK industrial relations as inherently conflict-ridden, when 
actually partnership can be traced back to the philanothropic approaches of Quakers, 
and the paternalism associated with employers such as ICI and John Lewis (Coupar 
and Stevens 1998; Kelly, 2004).  Partnership approaches can also be traced to the 
1940s, with post-war joint regulation demonstrating a renewed commitment to co-
operation and consensus as part of the regeneration effort (Coupar and Stevens, 
1998).  In short, a moderate tradition of trade unionism has to some degree always 
been the norm in the UK even although this moderate tradition was eclipsed in the 
1970s by a period of adversarialism (Ackers, 2002), and even then a national level 
Social Contract was attempted.  Inevitably militancy has attracted much more media 
attention than co-operation, and it is periods of militancy which appear to have left 
the most memorable footprints. 
 
Some are sceptical as to whether contemporary partnership agreements are different 
from traditional recognition agreements (Overell, 2003).  As one Usdaw official 
frankly remarked, “I‟m sure that many partnership agreements are really ordinary 
agreements with the word „partnership‟ stuck on top.  But partnership requires a 
completely new direction” (Usdaw official cited in IRS, 2000).  This statement 
suggests that though not all partnership agreements may be genuine, a true 
partnership requires a shift in mindset rather than just a change in the language used 
in documentation.  Some suggest that partnership may represent a shift in union 
attitudes from “reactive conflict resolution to active and intimate partnership 
relationship re-focused on consensus creation” (Ackers and Payne, 1998, 536), and 
therefore distinctive from 1980s TUC New Realism. The period of partnership has 
also been said to be evidence of a shift from a belief in the superiority of adversarial 
approaches, towards a belief in the superiority of co-operative approaches 
(Marchington, 1998). It has also been suggested that partnership represents a change 
in management attitudes, as managers have begun to acknowledge the 
ineffectiveness of instrumental managerially-driven EI alone, and the need to get 
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unions on board to make it work (Ackers and Payne, 1998; Wilkinson, 2002).  The 
idea of mutuality also contrasts with earlier paternalistic participation innovations 
which tended to be more one way rather than underpinned by the notion of 
reciprocity upon which partnership is based (Marchington, 1998).   
 
Another distinguishing factor are the pluralist undertones (IPA, 1998; TUC, 1999), 
and the notion that a combination of direct employee involvement and 
representative participation is likely to be most fruitful (Tailby and Winchester, 
2005).  In general, partnership in the UK is defined broadly in pluralist terms, i.e. 
how divergent interests can be reconciled.  This contrasts with unitarist HRM/EI 
which focused upon a unity of interests.  Again, the approach corresponds with the 
hybrid approach suggested by Guest and Peccei (2001) referred to earlier, and is 
arguably one of the key distinguishing factors of the current partnership debates.  
There is also an ethical dimension which offers a contrast to previous EI initiatives 
which were solely founded upon principles of business expediency (Ackers and 
Payne, 1998). As Knell (1999, 14) remarks “new partnership models are not 
offering starkly original conceptualisations of the employment relationship, or 
indeed specifying new methods to foster partnership in the workplace…however…a 
range of economic, social, technological and institutional factors are encouraging 
the adoption of new work organisation and labour management approaches which 
are consistent with partnership models (Knell, 1999, 14).  It is this crystallisation of 
ideas which does seem to represent something „different‟ from the past, or as Ackers 
et.al (2004, 41) put it “a distinctive period of some solidity, with its own specific 
dynamics”, different to previous periods of „industrial democracy‟ or „employee 
involvement‟.  
 
Though the specifics remain contested, there appears to be a sufficient level of detail 
to enable us to observe and identify a credible instance of partnership (Dietz, 2004).  
It is argued that the definitions are sufficiently detailed to allow us to identify a 
fairly coherent – if not identical – „core‟ of ideas under the partnership umbrella.  To 
a lesser extent, there is also evidence to suggest that partnership is sufficiently 
distinctive to represent a departure from previous concepts.   In other words, the 
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previous analysis enables us to justify that firstly there is such a thing as partnership, 
and secondly that it is distinctive from other concepts including HRM and EI. 
 
 
Why the interest in partnership? 
 
Having established that there is such a thing as partnership, the following section 
considers why interest in the concept has risen.  It begins by exploring intellectual 
influences from continental Europe and the United States. 
Social partnership and the European social model 
Conceptual similarities are often drawn between the term partnership as it is used in 
the UK, and the European concepts of „social partnership‟, and the „European social 
model‟ (ESM).  Ferner and Hyman define social partnership as (1998, xv-xvi) :  
“What the idea of „social partners‟ implies…is first a societal recognition of 
the different interests of workers and employees, second an acceptance – 
indeed encouragement of the collective representation of these interests; and 
third an aspiration that their organised accommodation may provide an 
effective basis for the regulation of work and the labour market.  Implicit also 
is the notion that encompassing organisations (Olsen, 1982) and centralised 
regulations are the optimal features of an industrial relations system (Ferner 
and Hyman, 1998, xv-xvi). 
Social partnership in Europe therefore demonstrates a clear commitment to 
pluralism.  Hyman (2004) stresses the need to distinguish between social 
partnership and partnership tout court.  He suggests that linguistically social 
partnership is a Germanic invention, as an attempt to replace post-war class struggle 
in favour of social democracy in Austria.  Ideologically, he suggests it has a basis in 
catholic social doctrine.  Geographically, social partnership can be traced to 
countries including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
(Ferner and Hyman, 1998), although the German concept of „Sozialpartnerschaft‟ is 
typically taken to illustrate the concept.  In Germany, freedom of association is 
constitutionally guaranteed (Koalitionsfreiheit), and the role and responsibilities of 
the collective organisation of workers and employers are recognised through the 
legally based autonomy they receive from the state when protecting their members 
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interests through free collective bargaining (Tarifautonomie).  The system is also 
characterised by a high degree of structure of employers organisations and unions, 
collective bargaining at an industry and regional level, and multi-employer 
bargaining regulating the employment relationship.  Indeed, the system has 
effectively extended the bargaining power of unions beyond their modest 
membership levels, and provided unions with a high degree of institutional 
legitimacy as the representatives of all employees (French, 2000) 
 
Crucially, Germany is characterised by a dual system of industrial relations, with 
both a tradition of sector-level bargaining between industry unions and employers 
associations, as well as co-determination via works councils and employee 
representation on  corporate supervisory boards.  Collective bargaining occurs 
between employers and unions at the industry level.  At the establishment level, 
works councils are distinct from unions, and their codetermination, consultation and 
information rights are enshrined in law:  “The employer and the works council shall 
work together in a spirit of mutual trust…for the good of the employees and for the 
establishment” (German Works Constitution Act, 1972 cited in French, 2000).  The 
system is said to promotes consensus, and outlaws strike action.  Works councillors 
are elected by the entire workforce and not just union members, although 
traditionally works councillors have been active union members and have used their 
positions to promote the union agenda. This is complemented by employee 
representation on corporate supervisory boards, giving workers a voice when 
strategic decisions are being made.  Besides the structure of collective bargaining in 
Germany, social partners have also held positions on important policy making 
bodies, most notably in relation to the often admired vocational and educational 
training system (French, 2000).  Thus, the contrasts with the more voluntarist 
British model are stark. 
 
The post-war German system of industrial relations has effectively been conferred 
„model‟ status, described by Marsden as “relatively peaceful industrial relations, 
co-operative and flexible work practices, a highly effective vocational training 
system and a powerful system of employee voice” (Marsden, 1995, 5), although as 
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Hyman (2004) makes clear, social partnership is not a synonym for conflict-free 
industrial relations.  Up until the 1980s the model was also thought to be adaptable 
to the changing economic environment.  However, from the 1990s the challenges of 
unification and increased global competition have resulted in tougher economic 
conditions.  This contributed to low growth rates, record bankruptcies, rising 
unemployment, a shift in the inward/outward investment ratio, and some relocation 
of production overseas.  In industrial relations terms, there has been a fall in the 
organisational levels of unions and employers association, and as such a decline in 
collective bargaining coverage (French, 2000). 
 
Despite the differences between different nations, the European Social Model is 
generally accepted as meaning that trade unions are accepted as legitimate social 
partners, with collective regulation strongly influencing individual contracts, and a 
general framework of employee representation supported by legislation or 
agreements between trade union federations and employers (Tailby and Winchester, 
2005).  Unsurprisingly, British trade union leaders paid greater attention to 
developments in Europe from the late 1980s especially in relation to the social 
dimension of European policies, given the inhospitable domestic political 
environment in the UK under Thatcher (Tailby and Winchester, 2005).  Prior to this, 
UK trade unions had traditionally been suspicious of Europe, believing that the 
British tradition of voluntarism actually afforded them more power. In light of 
employer and government hostility, union interest in the European style industrial 
relations legislation increased.  This included calls for a statutory recognition 
procedure, rights to organise in the workplace, a minimum wage, engagement with 
the European Social Chapter, and collective representation of workers even where 
unions are not present (Howell, 2005).  
 
However, in recent years, the European Social Model has not been without 
criticism. Features of the ESM have been threatened in relation to high 
unemployment, slow economic growth and low cost competition from emerging 
economies.  The recent example of the attempts of the French government to 
introduce the CPE (Contrat première embauche) or „first-job contract‟ is an 
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interesting example of moves to try and address the inflexibility of the French 
labour market.  The policy was designed to make it easier for employers to sack 
employees under 26 during a two year trial period, which the government claimed 
would alleviate youth unemployment.  The controversial law was said to have been 
drafted without any prior consultation with unions or employer organisations, 
contrary to the law stating that the social partners are to be systematically consulted 
on the regulation of social issues (Lefresne, 2006, EIRO online).  
 
Germany has also experienced recurring debates regarding the flexibilisation of 
working time and increasing the working week (Dribbusch, 2004; EIRO online, 
2004).  As unemployment rose to a post war high, Gerhard Schröder introduced a 
series of reforms in 2003 incentivising the long-term unemployed to seek work, and 
encouraging employers to hire low paid part time workers.  Reforms also made it 
easier to hire temporary workers, to offer fixed term contracts and to terminate 
employment.  Employment statistics illustrate attempts to make the labour market 
more flexible.  Part-time working has doubled to 24% since 1991, and low paid jobs 
have increased from 2% in 1975 to 17% in 2005. Fixed term contracts have 
increased from 3% in 1985 to 14% in 2005, and among 15-30 year olds these 
account for 42% jobs.  This had led to concerns that that a two-tier system is now 
evolving, between those with traditional full-time jobs, relatively high pay and legal 
protection, and those with lower pay, fixed-term contracts and no paid holidays 
(Financial Times, 27.10.06).  
 
In Sweden, the 2006 election was won by Frederik Reinfeldt‟s centre-right New 
Moderates alliance, who campaigned on the basis of moderate free market reform.  
Sweden may well be famous for the quality of public services and extensive welfare 
state, but again this has not been without criticism.  Despite the strong economy it 
has been argued that too many young Swedes are unable to secure full-time 
employment, while many older Swedes are out of work claiming generous sickness 
benefit (Financial Times, 18.09.06).  There has also been criticism regarding the 
way Sweden calculates unemployment figures, for example by excluding the long-
term sick or young workers on make-work programmes, leading many to doubt the 
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accuracy of the 6% official figure.  A study by McKinsey for example, estimated the 
true rate of unemployment to be around 15-17% translating into 1 million people 
out of work in a country with a population of 9 million.  Again, criticisms have been 
made of the heavily regulated labour market, where unions exert great influence 
over contracts, have resisted flexible contracts and make it very expensive to 
terminate employment (The Economist, 07.09.06).  In short, for some, the rigidity 
of the European Social Model is beginning to demonstrate acute adverse effects on 
competitiveness. 
 
Interestingly, in the 1990s the European Commission also began to discuss the 
concept of partnership, which they have defined as: 
“The concept of partnership includes…workers and managers in the firm.  The 
renewal of the organisation of work, can only be achieved by the firms 
themselves, involving management workers and their representatives.  This 
could lead towards a partnership for the development of a new framework for 
the modernisation  of the organisation of work, taking account of the interests 
of both business and workers…Such a partnership could make a significant 
contribution to achieving the objective of a productive, learning and 
participative organisation of work (European Commission, 1997, 22). 
There are clear similarities between the EU notion of a new European model (as set 
out in the EC Green Paper Partnership for a New Organisation of Work), as many of 
the concepts resonate with the British notion of partnership (Sisson, 1999), 
especially in relation the quid pro quo between employment security and protection 
versus the need for flexibility.  This contrasts with previous debates under the 
leadership of President Jacques Delors who supported a more legislative 
interventionist approach.  Recent debates, however, have centred around ideas of 
“negotiated flexibility” characterised by the need to deregulate some aspects of the 
labour market to increase competitiveness, as well as the possibilities of more 
flexible working time arrangements (EIRO Online, 1997).  The new model centres 
around the notion of encouraging workplace flexibility in terms of both numerical 
flexibility, as well as flexibility in terms of work organisation and embracing new 
technology.  Training is also viewed as central in terms of responding to 
organisational, economic and technological change.  Moreover, the support for a 
combination of indirect and direct participation also resonates with UK style 
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partnership.  In addition, the „open method of co-ordination‟ (OMC) formally 
adopted at a summit in Lisbon in 2000, proposes a more voluntarist “flexible yet 
structured co-operation among Member States”, as opposed to main focus on the 
use of legislation (EC, 2002, 7), in preference for flexible frameworks of 
benchmarking and peer review rather than compulsory regulation (Sisson, 2005). 
 
In other words, in an environment of global competition, the limitations of the 
European Social Model have begun to appear.  As Sisson explains, “The problem in 
Europe was that legislation and rules of the game put far too much emphasis on 
security and static employment relations” (Sisson, 1999, 458). Table 2.4 below 
suggests that – to some degree – a convergence may be occurring.  On the one hand, 
the traditional European model supporting employee and trade union rights admired 
by British trade unions has started to exhibit weaknesses in terms of 
competitiveness, inflexibility and high unemployment in a tough economic climate. 
 
Table 2.4 
Convergence towards a new European social model? 
Model Key features Outcomes 
The European model 
Strong trade unions 
Collective bargaining 
Legal Regulation 
(Employee rights) 
Security 
Relatively high pay 
Inflexibility; lack of 
competitiveness, unemployment 
The US model 
Weak trade unions 
Little collective bargaining 
Management regulation 
(Management prerogative) 
Insecurity 
Relatively low pay 
Flexibility 
Competitiveness 
Employment 
The ‘new’ European social model 
Flexibility 
Security 
Education and training 
Direct participation 
(empowerment) 
Indirect participation 
(partnership) 
Quality people 
Quality goods and services 
Competitiveness 
‘Good’ jobs 
Source: Adapted from Bach and Sisson (2000, 34-35). 
 
On the other hand the US model of weak trade unions and little collective 
bargaining may offer competitiveness and employment, but is weak in terms of 
delivering low job security and relatively low pay.  The third model, optimistically, 
appears to combine the strengths and weaknesses of the two traditional approaches, 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 32 
much in the same way as Blair‟s „Third Way‟ aimed to combine the strengths of US 
New Democratic neo-liberalism, and European left of centre social democracy 
(Undy, 1999).  It suggests that flexibility, security, training and participation can 
actually be combined to deliver productivity, competitiveness and good jobs.  In 
theory at least the countervailing pressures may actually be reconciled.  It is 
extremely interesting, therefore, that there appears to be a degree of convergence.  
As Sisson remarks: 
 “The fact that it is possible to arrive at a similar position from very different 
starting points seems hardly a coincidence…it combines the best of the „HRM‟ 
and the collective bargaining models…while at the same time minimising many 
of their weaknesses” (Sisson, 1999, 460). 
 
However, it is important to remember that important differences remain between the 
UK and Europe, as well as between European countries, so as not to overstate the 
convergence thesis.  In particular, the British model of corporate governance, 
tradition of voluntarism, and decentralised structure of collective bargaining remain 
important differentiating factors (Waddington, 2003).  As such,  with partnership in 
the UK attention has focused much more upon the workplace level rather than 
neocorporatist peak level social partnership
1
.   Since 1979 the UK had not had a 
tradition of the tripartite co-operation of the IR actors, as the system of state 
intervention collapsed following the „Winter of Discontent‟, strikes, and subsequent 
victory of Margaret Thatcher.  In addition to the national level institutional 
structures of continental Europe, UK interest is also influenced by research in the 
US into „high performance workplaces‟ and the notion of „the mutual gains 
enterprise‟. It is to these influences that we now turn. 
US ‘mutual gains’ literature 
An influential literature has emerged from the United States drawing on the 1980s 
strategic choice literature, proposing that “achieving and sustaining competitive 
advantage for human resources require the strong support of multiple stakeholders 
in an organisation” (Kochan and Osterman, 1994, 223), and Rubinstein and 
                                                 
1
 There have been some peak-level structures e.g. bipartite Low Pay Commission but these are not 
thought to represent „institutionalised social partnership‟ (Brown, 2000). 
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Kochan (2001) argue that unions can actually guide management in decision-
making.   The central argument is that the New Deal system of industrial relations 
devised by Roosevelt in the 1930s in the USA is failing.  Though it was during the 
Great Depression that unions rose to prominence for the first time in the US, 
underpinned by the Wagner Act of 1935, the unionised sector has traditionally been 
overtly adversarial.  Unions have focused their efforts upon distributive issues such 
as wages, hours and working conditions.   They have been reluctant to engage in 
broader issues, and as such there has be limited opportunity of unions and 
employees to participate in decision making.  Management resistance to unions is 
illustrated by attempts to shift establishments from the union to non-union sector, 
either by dis-establishing the union, or moving to the south or west where unions are 
weak (Wheeler, 1993).  In short, the US New Deal system has generally been 
characterised by arms-length adversarialism based upon contract and compliance, 
leaving little scope for active co-operation, and union membership has fallen to 
10%.  As international competition increased in the 1980s issues around labour 
management conflict and labour management cooperation gained increasing 
prominence, evident from the influential work of Kochan et.al (1986), the 
establishment of a Bureau of Labor Management Relations and Cooperative 
Programs, and the 1978 Labor-Management Co-operation Act adopted by Federal 
Congress (Wheeler, 1993).    
 
In the 1990s the debate around labour-management co-operation continued, and is 
often related to the influential „Mutual Gains Enterprise‟ arguments by Kochan and 
Osterman (1994).  They argue that there is a need for employee representation for 
four main reasons.  Firstly, on the grounds that employee representation is an 
important component of a democratic society.  Secondly, the distributive role they 
play especially in relation to workers at the lower end of the wage scale.  Thirdly, 
they argue that unions can assist with workplace change and innovation, leading in 
turn to improved productivity, quality and economic gains (see for example 
Rubenstein and Kochan, 2001).  Lastly, they suggest that further union decline is 
bad news for workers in organised industries such as airlines, paper and steel.  They 
advocate the need for integration of partnership at a strategic, functional and 
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workplace level, and make clear that changes in rhetoric alone will not deliver 
effective outcomes or mutual gains.  Accordingly, partnership will not automatically 
deliver mutual gains unless certain preconditions are met and unless voice is 
sufficiently institutionalised; they do not suggest that the approach is a panacea. 
 
Table 2.5 
Principles guiding the mutual gains enterprise 
Strategic level 
Supportive business strategies 
Top management commitment 
Effective voice for human resources in strategy making and governance 
 
Functional (Human resource policy) level 
Staffing based on employment stabilisation 
Investment in training and development 
Contingent compensation that reinforces co-operation, participation and contribution 
 
Workplace level 
High standards of employee selection 
Broad task design and teamwork 
Employee involvement in problem solving 
Climate of co-operation and trust 
Source: Kochan, T and Osterman, O (1994) The Mutual Gains Enterprise, Harvard Business School 
 
Their model suggests the need to integrate workplace level, functional level and 
strategic level policies.  At the workplace level they suggest selective recruitment, 
attention to job design and career paths, empowerment, and high trust.  They make 
clear that this does not mean organisations will be conflict-free, but that rather 
resolved more effectively and efficiently.  At a personnel policy level, they suggest 
employment security, investment in training, and innovative pay systems.  At a 
strategic level, they propose the need for a compatible business strategy, values, 
management commitment and effective voice for human resources in strategy and 
planning.  Drawing on a range of exemplars to support their argument, they suggest 
that “when these principles are properly operationalised they will come together in 
the form of an integrated business system that, other things being equal, will 
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produce globally competitive business results as well as globally competitive 
standards of living for employees” (Kochan and Osterman, 1994, 58).  Well cited 
examples include developments at New United Motor Manufacturers Inc (NUMMI) 
and the relationship between GM Saturn and the UAW.  Of course, this is not to 
suggest that the pluralist view of the above authors is dominant in the American 
context of union decline, a „fast buck‟ business mentality, and the birthplace of 
unitarist human resource management.  For this reason labour management co-
operation in the US is perhaps best viewed as a last ditch to save unions in a country 
where union membership has fallen to around 10%. Nevertheless it does provide 
another reference point for the UK in addition to the continental influences, and the 
similarities are clear.  It is also important to emphasise their point that such a model 
will not automatically deliver mutual gains; employee voice must be heard and 
institutionalised.  Again, it also needs to be stressed that the focus of such work is at 
the enterprise level. 
 
Some of the other US literature is more difficult to compare because of the use of 
different categories including „high performance workplaces‟ and „high 
performance work organisation‟ (Appelbaum et.al, 2000; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 
1995; Osterman, 2000; Wood and de Menezes, 1998).  However the main 
difference, perhaps, are the more unitarist assumptions which underpin such 
literatures, i.e. the suggestion that there is a chain reaction in terms of high trust 
working, employee commitment and superior organisational performance, and less 
of a commitment to employee representation.  Though this may qualify under 
unitarist definitions of partnership, it contrasts with the dominant UK model, which 
has tended to be founded upon a hybrid of pluralist and unitarist assumptions, and 
has not viewed such interventions as evidence of partnership per se (Guest and 
Peccei, 2001).  This is not to suggest that partnership organisation would not also be 
classed as a high performance workplace, but that a high performance workplace 
need not necessarily meet the partnership criteria. 
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The importance of the public policy context 
 
Having provided an outline of the concept of partnership and the various intellectual 
references points, this chapter now focuses on the contextual factors surrounding the 
development of partnership in the UK context.  As suggested earlier, the notion of 
joint-working and workplace collaboration is not new (Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 
2002; Kelly, 2004b); rather the idea of „enlightened‟ consensual relations draws 
from a long history of modernisation in British industrial relations (Ackers et.al, 
2004; Marchington, 1998).  Indeed, worker participation has been a constant theme 
in British industrial relations and interest has waxed and waned over time (Ackers 
et.al, 2004; Marchington et.al, 1992).  A desire to improve industrial relations can 
be traced back to the Mond-Turner talks of the 1920s through the Whitely 
Commission recommendations of greater involvement through joint industrial 
councils, which became enacted after the Second World War.  Again, poor IR 
resulted in the Donovan Commission‟s recommendations of IR reform in the 1960s, 
and the Bullock Report recommendations for the development of worker directors 
and greater company control for unions in the 1970s (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 
2004a).  For Ramsey (1977) employer interest in co-operation rose and fell 
depending on the dynamic balance of power between labour, capital and the state, 
resulting in „cycles‟ of participation.  Ackers et.al (1992) suggest that this theory is 
too deterministic, and that „waves‟ of participation may be a more appropriate 
metaphor.  They propose that other factors may also be important including factors 
internal to the organisation, as well as external societal factors.  
 
It is widely perceived that there has been a lack of legal foundation of collective 
bargaining in the UK, with government preferring to leave employers and unions to 
decide, but there is a danger of underestimating the role of the state in the British 
model.  Admittedly, there has been no positive right to strike, in preference for a 
system of „immunities‟ protecting unions from liability, but this does not mean the 
government have been inactive. On the contrary, government has played an 
important role as an economic manager, as a legislator, and as an employer (Blyton 
and Turnbull, 2004).  In particular, the notion that British unions have operated in 
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an environment of „collective laissez faire‟, developing as a result of their own 
strength and power, has been challenged by Howell (2005).  He contends that this is 
actually a myth, and that state policy has indeed been very important for many 
industries, and identifies three distinctive historical periods:  industry bargaining 
from the late nineteenth century to the Second World War, workplace bargaining 
from the 1950s to 1970s, and individualised bargaining within unions from the 
1980s. Crucially, he proposes that the state was central to the construction of each 
IR system, for example by removing wages from competition in Phase 1, and 
supporting the shift to decentralised workplace bargaining in Phase 2.  The 
decollectivisation of industrial relations in the 1980s illustrates the extent to which 
unions relied upon state support, when the Thatcher government was hostile to 
collective bargaining and trade unions, and systematically dismantled hitherto taken 
for granted state support.  
 
Table 2.6 
Union representation  in the UK, 1980-2004 
 1980 1984 1990 1998 2004 
Union presence 73 71 54 41 36 
Density 62 58 48 36 34 
Recognition 64 66 53 33 27 
CB - 71 54 41 27 
JCCs 34 34 29 29 25 
Source: Kersely et.al, 2006; Millward et.al, 2000 
 
1980s neo-liberalism led some to question whether Britain was experiencing “the 
end of institutional industrial relations” (Purcell, 1993), and Metcalf has proposed 
that the unions are still facing the question of „resurgence‟ or „perdition‟ (Metcalf, 
2004).  Union membership has fallen from a peak of 13 million in 1979 to 5.5 
million, and is heavily skewed towards public sector membership (60%), rather than 
the private sector (under 20%).  The WIRS/WERS series of data illustrates this 
decline.    In 2004 only 14% workplaces had a joint consultative committee, 
although 25% did not have a workplace level committee but had a committee at a 
higher level in the organisation.  Finally, 42% of employees worked in workplace 
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with a workplace-level joint consultative committee, down from 46% in 1998 
(Kersley et.al, 2006). 
 
Traditional explanations for changes in union membership include changes in the 
business cycle, the role of the state, change attitudes of employers and employees, 
changes in workforce composition, and the strategies of unions themselves 
(Metcalf, 2004).  Membership is still higher than in many other EU countries, 
although it must be remembered that even where unions do have lower membership, 
this underestimates their stronger institutional influence.  In Germany and France 
membership density may only be 23% and 8% respectively, yet bargaining coverage 
is estimated at 92% and 95% respectively.  Conversely, bargaining coverage in the 
US and New Zealand is 18% and 31% respectively (OECD, 1997, 71). 
 
Table 2.7 
Union density in 12 countries 
Countries 2003 (%) 1970-2003 (%) 
USA 12.4 -11.1 
Canada 28.4 -6.5 
Australia 22.9 -27.3 
New Zlnd 22.1* -33.1 
Germany 22.6 -9.5 
France 8.3 -13.4 
Italy 33.7 -3.3 
Finland 74.1 +22.8 
Sweden 78.0 +10.3 
Norway 53.3 -3.5 
Denmark 70.4 +10.1 
UK 29.3 -15.5 
Source: Monthly Labour Review, January, (2006) 
 
The stronger institutional voice of some other European unions notwithstanding, the 
table highlights that trade union decline is a global phenomenon.  Out of the 12 
countries selected for comparison, trade unions have declined in the USA, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Germany, France, Italy, Norway and the UK.  Only in the 
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Scandinavian countries of Finland, Sweden and Denmark has union density 
increased.   
 
Moreover, aggregate statistics reveal little about the realities of union activities at 
the workplace, although specific statistics do provide an indication.  There is little 
doubt that UK trade union influence has been severely curtailed, and led to some 
commentators referring to the development of a „representation gap‟ in many 
workplaces (Towers, 1997).  Besides the pessimistic statistics is the suggestion of a 
decline in union influence even where they are still recognised (Brown et.al, 2000).  
For example union recognition for collective bargaining has become a less reliable 
indicator as studies suggest a „hollowing out‟ of unions even where they are present, 
illustrated by the WERS98 revelation that there are a high level of workplaces with 
union recognition but no collective bargaining coverage (Millward et.al, 2000).  
This trend is again apparent in WERS04 in terms of joint regulation generally, and 
not just pay bargaining (Kersley et.al, 2006, 193-196).  More optimistically perhaps, 
decline in recent years has begun to slow, although again there are stark differences 
between trends in the public and private sector.   
 
 
Public policy and  interest in partnership 
 
Given the bleak environment for unions and a decline in collective employment 
relations generally, it is useful to review the attitudes of various stakeholder bodies 
to partnership including the government, IPA, trade unions, employer bodies and 
employers. 
 
Government and the politics of partnership 
Firstly, interest in partnership did not occur in a political vacuum; indeed 
government endorsement is typically identified as one the major reasons for the 
proliferation of partnership in the late 1990s (Terry and Smith, 2003).   To be fair 
several of the pioneering agreements precede the change of government, and can be 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 40 
traced back to the early 1990s, for example the early agreements at Welsh Water 
(Kelly, 2004b; Thomas and Wallis, 1998; Terry and Smith, 2003).  Kelly (2004b) 
also identifies various „generations‟ of agreements, and suggests 1980s style „no 
strike‟ single union deals may be regarded as „first generation‟ partnership 
agreements.    Despite these caveats, partnership has been a central plank of New 
Labour‟s government commitment to the „modernisation‟ of employment relations 
(Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004a), and most commentators acknowledge their 
importance in relation to the diffusion of the concept after their election on 1 May 
1997.  New Labour and their „Third Way‟ principles supposedly represented an 
alternative to macho-management and traditional arms-length adversarialism, 
questioning the supremacy of market forces and individualism (Stuart and Martinez-
Lucio, 2004a).  Theoretically, this parallels the work of Giddens (1998) who 
claimed to strike a „third way‟ between old style social democracy and neo-liberal 
free enterprise, of importance not only in the workplace, but also in wider society 
generally (Ackers, 2002).  It also accords with the arguments of Hutton (1995) that 
British capitalism has focused upon short-term profit maximisation, at the expense 
of long term investment in the economy and wider social values and cohesion.   
 
In 1997 Blair declared “there is no place for militant trade unionism or uncaring 
management today.  Partnership is the key. That is the only language the New 
Labour government will respect”, and suggested that he offered unions “fairness 
not favours” (DTI, 1998), in other words attempting to balance the interests of both 
business and trade unions, as well as public opinion.  The government also signed 
the EU Social Chapter which the previous Conservative government had been 
unwilling to sign.  In 1998 the Government White Paper „Fairness at Work‟ 
reinforced the message that success was to come from partnership rather than 
militancy: 
 “The White Paper is part of the Government‟s programme to replace the 
notion of conflict between employers and employees with the promotion of 
partnership…already modern and successful companies draw their success 
from the existence and development partnership at work” – Tony Blair (DTI, 
1998) 
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There has also been a shift towards more government regulation, especially in 
relation to individual employment rights e.g. National Minimum Wage, EU 
Working Time Directive and Statutory Union Recognition (see Employment 
Relations Act 1999), information and consultation, and equality/discrimination 
provisions (Ackers et.al, 2004; Dickens and Hall, 2006).  Oxenbridge et.al (2003) 
suggest that the change in government attitudes may have had an important catalytic 
effect in encouraging a less hostile attitude of employers to unions.  It appeared that 
the government were promoting partnership generally, as well as through direct 
encouragement in their role as an employer (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004a).  
The most obvious endorsement was the creation of the Department of Trade and 
Industry‟s Partnership Fund, which offered funding of up to £50,000 for projects 
aimed at improving employment practices and joint-working (Terry and Smith, 
2003).  It has been suggested that given a historic preference for voluntaristic 
structures and abstention, notwithstanding the caveats raised earlier, government 
involvement and endorsement of a particular modus operandi after eighteen years of 
Conservative government “represents a considerable innovation” (Terry and 
Smith, 2003, 5). 
 
On other hand, the government was not interested in creating a corporatist level 
European-style system of social partnership between itself, the TUC and the CBI. 
Possible reasons include not wanting to appear to be too close to the unions, a lack 
of interest from the CBI, the fact the TUC was in a weakened state, and the strength 
of the economy.  The failure of the Social Contract was also probably at the 
forefront of Labour‟s mind.  Though there was little state support for tripartism, the 
government did encourage bi-partism i.e. between the TUC and CBI on issues such 
as the National Minimum Wage and trade union recognition.  The government also 
set up many quasi corporatist ad hoc taskforces in preference to a permanent 
tripartite social partnership structure preferred by the TUC (Undy, 2001), and 
retained the right to modify policy outcomes, normally in the direction more 
favourable to employers (Howell, 2005).  In short, the government was more 
supportive of workplace level partnership but was reluctant to provide a new 
national architecture of statutory support. 
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In 2002, the government published High Performance Workplaces which 
interestingly focused on the efficiency aspects of participation as opposed to the 
ideas of citizenship: 
 “Modern, high performing workplaces…built on the simple insight that 
individuals are more likely to give of their best if they feel valued and are given 
the opportunity to  contribute their ideas; and that people who are well 
prepared for change can help to introduce it, and thereby help secure 
employment within the business” (DTI, 2002, 13, High Performing 
Workplaces). 
Fairness and competitiveness were argued to go hand in hand, although admittedly 
“fairness is in the service  of competitiveness, not the other way round; it is the 
junior partner” (Howells, 2005, 177).  The government also provided union rights 
to have „learning representatives‟ to encourage employee skill development 
especially at the lower end of the labour market, and promoted family friendly 
working.  Family friendly provisions have included improvements to maternity 
leave and pay, the introduction of paternity and adoptive leave, and a duty on 
employers to give „serious consideration‟ to parental or carer requests to work 
flexibly (e.g. in terms of hours, times or location) (Dickens and Hall, 2006). 
 
As an employer, the state has been involved in promoting partnership initiatives in 
the public sector. However, the state has been more of a supportive mechanism than 
as a direct actor (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004b).  Thus while the 1980s were 
heavily influenced by the US neo-liberal model of employment relations, the end of 
the 1990s and the beginning of the new Millennium witnessed some shift towards 
the European Social Model (Ackers et.al, 2004), balancing the opposing forces of 
Europeanisation and Americanisation in British employment relations (Edwards, 
2003; Hyman, 2003).  Again, at the TUC 2004 conference Blair said that he was 
there “to praise social partnership, not to belittle it…the true face of modern trade 
unionism is not to be found in the exception of industrial breakdown, but in the 
broad rule of social partnership and progress”.  In July 2004 the government also 
made commitments at the National Policy Forum in Warwick in the document Full 
Employment and Modern Working in Britain.  These include, inter alia, pledges to 
increase statutory redundancy pay, guarantee four weeks holiday for all, and new 
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childcare schemes.  This cannot be overlooked given the policy of government 
abstention between 1979 and 1997  (Terry, 2003). 
 
However, this is not to say that the government has not been criticised, in particular 
for its minimalist soft touch approach to the implementation of EU Directives on, 
inter alia, information and consultation, working time and fixed-term contract 
workers (Hall, 2006; EIRO online, 2006). Others have highlighted the many 
continuities with the Conservative government in terms of the general policy thrust, 
despite some changes in terms of greater legal regulation (Dickens, 2002; Howell, 
2005; Smith and Morton, 2006; see also Waddington, 2003). 
 
Involvement and Participation Association 
Another key player in the partnership arena has been The Involvement and 
Participation Association, established in 1884 as the „Labour Association for 
Promoting Co-operative Production based on the Co-partnership of the Workers‟, or 
Co-Partnership for short.  They emerged following the upsurge in labour militancy 
across Europe in the 1870s and the birth of the modern labour movement.  
Organisations such as Co-Partnership aimed to counterbalance the Marxist ideals of 
class struggle, with profit-sharing and notions of labour management co-operation 
(Kelly, 2004b).  Again, this reinforces the long history of the notions of cooperation 
and partnership; indeed in 1894 a new periodical, Labour Co-Partnership, was 
launched “to advocate cooperative production based on the co-partnership of the 
workers” (Economic Journal, 1894).  The IPA offer guidance and promoting best 
practice is relation to partnership working, and have been particularly influential in 
policy circles, for example working with the DTI Partnership Fund (Stuart and 
Martinez-Lucio, 2004a) as well as with Acas.  It is noteworthy that Acas have also 
prioritised their advisory work at “helping organisations develop partnership 
approaches, working alongside the DTI Partnership at Work Fund” (Acas, 2003, 
10). Acas advisors and conciliators have helped negotiate both voluntary union 
recognition deals as well as partnership deals (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004c, 174).  
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The IPA also devised „commitments‟ and „building blocks‟ for partnership (IPA, 
1997, 2) 
 Success of the enterprise 
 Building trust and greater employee involvement 
 Recognising the legitimate role of partners 
 Recognition of the company need for flexibility and the employees need 
for employment security 
 Sharing success within the company 
 Informing and consulting staff at the workplace and at company level 
 Representation of the interests of employees 
 
In other words, the idea that partnership in Britain has developed solely at a 
workplace level without any support from external institutional actors is clearly a 
myth. 
 
Trade Union Congress and trade unions 
During the Conservative administration and in the context of decline the TUC 
attempted to reinvent itself under the „New Unionism‟ project, perhaps partly in 
anticipation of a Labour victory.  Central to this campaign was an attempt to re-
brand trade unions as “part of the solution” (TUC, 1997), rather than part of the 
problem.  After the election of New Labour in 1997 the TUC also embraced the 
concept of partnership, realising there was to be was to be no return to the militant 
unionism of the 1970s.  In a nutshell for the TUC “adversarialism was out and co-
operation was in” (Undy, 1999, 641).  This is not to say that there was unanimous 
union support for partnership among unionists.  In particular the National Union of 
Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) and the Associated Society of 
Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) were generally more in favour of a 
militant policy (Undy, 1999), in a similar way to the New Directions supporters in 
the US.  Nevertheless, the Trade Union Congress also developed an interest in 
partnership founded on six principles (TUC, 2002, 2): 
 
 
 
 
  The partnership phenomenon 
 
 
 
 45 
 Shared commitment to the success of the enterprise 
 Recognition of legitimate interests 
 Commitment to employment security 
 Focus on the quality of working life 
 Openness 
 Adding value 
These can be viewed as a mix of aspiration, prescription and practice (Stuart and 
Martinez-Lucio, 2004b).  As John Monks stated in 2002, partnership appeared to be 
the only game in town: 
 “There is no alternative to capitalism that I can see…are we to have US model 
with few rights for workers, the authoritarian model of the East Asian tiger 
economies, or the European model of social partnership…for small countries 
like us I think it [partnership] is the only model.” 
 
Of course, organising can be presented as a possible alternative strategy for unions 
(Heery, 2002), but this has had limited success in the UK.  The TUC also set up a 
Partnership Institute (PI) which acted as a consultancy and training body for 
organisations interested in developing partnership working – “a centre for best 
practice in workplace partnerships, designed to help unions and employers develop 
effective working relationships, which improve productivity, workplace performance 
and the quality of working life for employees”. (TUC, 2003). The Institute was set 
up to offer training and advisory services, facilitate organisational networking, and 
to research and sponsor partnership in the policy debate (TUC, 2002).  Interestingly 
the TUC also engaged with the government‟s High Performance Workplace 
discourse (TUC, 2003). This is important given that previously the TUC has been 
reluctant to engage with „business objectives‟ (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004c), 
again mirroring union reluctance in the US of being perceived to be too close to 
management. 
  
However, trade union interest must be placed in the context of dramatic union 
decline outlined earlier (Terry, 2003).  Perhaps less encouraging is the evidence that 
in some cases partnership has been offered to unions on a „take it or leave it‟ basis 
(Bacon and Storey, 2000; IDS, 2000).  For example at Blue Circle, United Distillers 
and Allied Domeq partnership was „agreed‟ in a context of possible plant closure or 
union de-recognition.  In addition, management at Tesco, National Power and Legal 
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and General are all reported to have considered the option of union de-recognition 
before opting for the partnership route (Kelly, 2004a, 2004b).  In short, many 
partnerships were agreed in the context of union weakness (Wills, 2002), suggesting 
that in several cases the stark choice for several unions may have been „partnership 
or perish‟ (Ackers et.al, 2004). 
  
This point is reinforced by Terry (2003, 468) who states that “it is undeniable that 
partnership reflects union weakness, that at least early on many union 
representatives were deeply suspicious of the partnership approach, and that often 
partnership agreements owe their existence and much of their content to strong 
managerial pressure or the threat of de-recognition”.  Similarly, for Kessler and 
Purcell (2003, 333), “social partnership might simply be interpreted as a pragmatic 
union response to new and more difficult circumstances…where management has 
the power to assert its prerogative it is likely to do so.  Partnership might be seen as 
a „best case‟ managerial strategy in increasingly rare instances of ongoing union 
strength…where management is in a powerful position, it has little need to become 
engaged in partnership agreements”.  This cannot be explained in terms of 
Ramsey‟s cycles of participation as, given the context of union weakness, 
management has no need to attempt to incorporate trade unions (Ramsey, 1977). 
 
Recently, however, the question is whether support among union leaders has started 
to wane, especially with the election of a new „awkward squad‟ of trade union 
leaders such as Bob Crow (RMT) Bill Hayes (CWU), Tony Woodley (T&G) and 
Derek Simpson (Amicus) (Guardian, 12.09.04; Guardian, 19.09.04).  For Derek 
Simpson “Partnership means the gaffer telling you what he‟s doing and that‟s it.  It 
means nowt” (quoted in the Guardian, 14.09.03).  The TUC also withdrew support 
from their Partnership Institute and this was met with rumours that it had been 
“dumped” (Personnel Today 05.04.05), and suggestions that this was symbolic of 
interest in partnership waning especially under the leadership of Brendan Barber, 
following the departure of John Monks to become General Secretary of the ETUC 
in 2003.  A study by Heery (2006) also found that only 20% union officers 
expressed a strong commitment to pursuing labour management partnership, while 
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37% reported that their union was strongly committed to this objective.  Rather 
union officials priorities appeared to be recruiting new members (84%) and 
rebuilding workplace organisation (85%).  Indeed, commitment to partnership was 
the lowest of the seven objectives included in the survey (Heery, 2006), suggesting 
support of union officials for partnership may indeed be waning. 
 
Employer bodies 
Interestingly, support from employer bodies such as the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI), Institute of Directors (IoD) and Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development (CIPD) is less clear, and leads to questions of employer ambivalence 
or disinterest.  For example, commenting on the DTI Partnership at Work Fund, the 
Institute of Directors have stated that, “It is difficult to believe that central 
government funding is required to enable employers and employees to work 
together in harmony for the good of the enterprise” (IoD, 2002, 47).  The CBI have 
also been ambivalent regarding the need for the third party involvement of a trade 
union.  In 1999 Clive Thompson stated how:   
“I believe strongly in partnership between a company and its employees, but I 
fail to see that a union is necessary to make it work.  We mustn‟t fall into the 
trap of thinking partnership must mean unions.  Of course it can, but what‟s 
right for one company is by no means right for all.  By all means let‟s have 
partnerships – partnerships that really are between employers and employees.  
Let‟s have union involvement, but only where companies believe this can 
genuinely add value” (Clive Thompson, CBI President, Financial Times, 
24.06.99). 
 
As John Cridland, Deputy Director of the CBI argued at a seminar on high 
performance working,  it is direct rather than indirect consultation which improves 
employee commitment and performance, and that “direct involvement of staff 
remains the key to progress”. The CBI also vehemently opposed the EU 
Information and Consultation Directive arguing that, “Business sees no need for 
regulation of information and consultation.  On a list of national priorities this 
would come pretty far down” (Cridland, 2004) 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 48 
In short, the CBI has tended to express a strong preference for a voluntary route on 
almost every issue.   This contrasts with the view expressed by Ackers and Payne 
(1998) that perhaps employers are beginning to realise that good ethics make good 
business sense.  More recently the CBI view still appears to oscillate.  Digby Jones 
was quoted in 2004 as commenting at a CBI dinner in Glasgow that trade unions 
were “becoming increasingly irrelevant everyday” (Digby Jones cited in The 
Scotsman, 03.09.04), while in the same year John Cridland proposed that “Unions 
that work with companies to enhance productivity and performance have a 
legitimate role to play” (quote from conference, 24.11.04).  Brendan Barber 
suggested that such comments were “disappointingly Thatcherite”, and at the 2006 
TUC conference there was applause and cheering at the news that Jones had retired. 
 
CIPD support for partnership has also been more cautious stressing that there is no 
one best model of consultation and that the size, history and culture of the 
organisations will determine whether a works council, employee forum, direct 
consultation or partnership will be the most appropriate form (Personnel Today, 
22.07.03).  Nevertheless, the Director General stated in 2003:   
The bottom line is that you have to be competitive whether you are unionised or 
not - the customer imperatives won't let you do otherwise. It means partnership 
really is the only game in town. I hope this new generation of leaders 
understands how little can be bargained for these days." (Geoff Armstrong, 
Director General CIPD, Financial Times, 05.08.02). 
 
Again a recent CIPD report by Mike Emmott argues that “the management agenda 
has shifted irreversibly from the collective relationship to the individual 
[relationship]”, and that the reality is no longer mainly about trade unions.  Rather, 
there has been increased emphasis on issues including direct communication, 
managing change and motivating staff, and a shift from a focus on institutions to a 
focus on building relationships.  He also points out that traditional notions of 
„industrial relations‟ do not really exist outside the public sector, and that “the 
language echoes of a historical era” (16), and proposes that the concept of the 
collective relationship is increasingly unrepresentative of most workplaces, with 
managers increasingly communicating with individual employees, groups and the 
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workplace as a whole.  In short, the CIPD take the pragmatic view that unions may 
be useful where this is what employees want, but acknowledge that many employers 
are now focusing much more on individual issues of the psychological contract 
(Emmott, 2006). 
Employer interest 
Several reasons seem to account for management interest in the notion of 
partnership.  Managements may have realised that they had to bring unions on board 
in terms of decision-making, especially in light of the election of the New Labour 
government (Ackers and Payne, 1998).  This could be as the result of the limitations 
of using direct EI mechanisms alone (Wilkinson, 2002), and the limited success of 
the „tired HRM project‟ (Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2004).  A similar point is made 
by Terry (2003) who questions whether the partnership at Tesco is evidence of 
HRM‟s failure to meet expectations. Other factors have been said to include the 
challenges of privatisation, increased international exposure, and to improve 
productivity and competitiveness (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004b). 
 
Typical motives where partnership agreements have been signed include: financial 
problems, to win public sector contracts, facilitate change, implement quality 
initiatives or harmonise terms and conditions (Brown, 2000; Oxenbridge and 
Brown, 2002, 2004b).  Other reasons may include frustration with adversarial 
management-union relations, awareness of forthcoming European legislation such 
as the ICE Regulations, and to improve employee commitment. Deakin et.al (2004) 
suggest that an economic rationale centred around issues such as enhanced full 
exploitation of enhanced technical complementarities in production, knowledge 
sharing, creation and diffusion, and enhanced organisational learning may also have 
been important.  A more cynical reason, perhaps, is to improve corporate image and 
win PR points, or conversely to avoid the negative publicity de-recognition  or poor 
industrial relations could attract (IRS, 2003; Wills, 2004).  This is especially 
important in the context of service organisations where organisations such as 
Barclays or Tesco would be highly vulnerable to negative media coverage.  Indeed, 
Tesco job adverts in the US for HR professionals in Arizona and California which 
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suggested the post holder would be expected to keep the company „union-free‟ 
quickly attracted the attention of the UK media (Financial Times, 26.05.06).  In 
other words employer interest appears to reflect pragmatism, and where unions are 
already entrenched attempts appear to have been made to make relationships more 
positive and constructive.  As WERS04 confirms, compared to public sector 
managers, private sector managers were more sceptical of the value of trade unions, 
more likely to prefer consulting directly rather than engaging in consultation with 
unions, and were more of the view that decisions are best taken by senior managers, 
and seemed to be less engaged with consultation while making decisions (Kersley 
et.al, 2006)  Although statistics for the number of partnership agreements is difficult 
to obtain for reasons of definitional ambiguity as well as the use of pseudonyms in 
the research literature, a review suggests around 50 exist (Table 2.8), although 
others estimate the true number to be at least 150 (Samuel and Bacon, forthcoming).     
 
Table 2.8 
Partnership agreements in the UK 
Organisation Industry Source(s) 
Abbey National Finance IRS, 04.07.03 issue 779 
Allied Domecq Food and drink Marks et.al, 1998; IPA case study, 2001; Dietz, 2004) 
Appor Ltd Manufacturing Knell, 1999 
Asda Retail Taylor and Ramsey, 1998 
AWE plc Defence IPA case study, Dec 2002 
Barclay’s Bank Finance Gall (2001); Wills (2004) 
Blue Circle Cement IPA 1997 report; IRS, 15.08.97 issue 638 
Borg Warner Vehicle components Knell, 1999; Suff and Williams, 2004; IPA case study, 
2001; Dietz, 2004 
BA Transport Harvey, 2001; Turnbull et.al, 2004 
British Nuclear 
Fuels/Westinghouse 
Nuclear fuel IRS, 04.07.03 issue 779 
Civil Service Public services Beale, 2004; Badigannavar and Kelly, 2004; 
Richardson et.al, 2005 
Co-operative Bank Finance Bacon and Storey (2000) 
Elementis Chromium Chemical Knell, 1999 
Emhart Fastening 
Technologies 
Manufacturing IPA case study, 1998 
FSL Fleet Support Shipbuilding IRS, 15.05.99 issue 680 
Harvey Nichols Retail IRS, 04.07.03 issue 779 
Herga Electric Manufacturing Knell, 1999 
HP Bulmers Food and drink Knell, 1999; IPA case study 1998 
Huhtamaki Packaging IRS, 04.07.03 issue 779 
Legal and General Finance Haynes and Allen (2001), Samuel (2005) 
  The partnership phenomenon 
 
 
 
 51 
Leyland Trucks Motor vehicles Knell, 1999 
Manpower Recruitment agency Heery et.al, 2004 
NCH Voluntary sector IRS, 04.07.03 issue 779 
NHS Public services Munro 2001; Tailby et.al, 2004, Mason et.al, 2003; 
Heaton et.al, 2000; Dietz, 2004 
NatWest Finance Knell, 1999 
Rover (MG Rover) Motor vehicles Scarbrough and Terry, 1997 
Royal Mail Public services Gall, 2004 
Scott Bader Chemicals Knell, 1999 
ScottishPower Utilities IRS, 01.11.97 issue 645; IRS, 13.05.05 issue 823; IPA 
1997 report 
Scottish Widows Finance IRS, 01.11.97 issue 645 
Shelter Voluntary Knell, 1999 
Tesco Retail Haynes and Allen, 2001 
Thames Water Utilities IRS, 15.11.00 issue 705 
Trifast Manufacturing Knell, 1999 
United Distillers 
(Diageo) 
Food and drink Marks et.al, 1999 
Virgin Retail Retail IRS, 04.07.03 issue 779; IRS, 05.05.06 issue 846 
VT Aerospace Aerospace support IRS, 04.07.03 issue 779 
Welsh Water (Hyder) Utilities IRS, 15.11.00 issue 715 
 
Certainly, an environment of workplace change and renewal seems likely to have 
influenced interest in management and union circles vis-à-vis the role trade unions 
can play (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004a).  Agreements have also appeared 
where there has been major industrial conflict leading to an attempt to create more 
co-operative relationships, for example Barclays Bank and Legal and General in the 
finance sector (Kelly, 2004a).  This raises the importance of understanding the 
rationale for partnership, and in particular whether it was a reactive response to a 
critical incident, or whether it was part of a more proactive effort to improve the 
quality of employment relations.  It is also important to remember that not all 
employers have bought in to the idea of partnership, but rather have been stymieing 
campaigns for union recognition in the private sector including Orange, Telewest, 
T-Mobile and BSkyB (Gall, 2004, 2005).  
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Early debates: nirvana or dead end? 
 
This section moves on to explore the key debates which have emerged in the 
partnership literature.  Most commentators acknowledge a polarised debate in the 
literature, regarding firstly the potential of partnership as a union revitalisation 
strategy, and secondly the extent to which the perceived mutual gains are actually 
realisable (Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2004; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004a, 2004b; 
Roche and Geary, 2004; Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004b; Terry and Smith, 2003).   
On the one hand, advocates argue that partnership may offer an opportunity for 
unions to extend their representative capacity.  Ackers and Payne (1998, 531, 546) 
argued that partnership “offers British unions a strategy that is not only capable of 
moving with the times and accommodating new political developments, but also 
allowing them a hand in shaping their own destiny” and “provides an opportunity 
for British unions to return from political and economic exile”.  They suggest that 
partnership offers unions a new opportunity following the neo-liberal legacy of the 
Thatcher government, and as such may be seen as a way for ailing unions to regain 
influence, membership and legitimacy.  As such they believe partnership is of 
importance not only at the workplace level, but also in terms of the wider changing 
political and societal context.  Similarly, Boxall and Haynes (1997) suggest that 
partnership unionism offers unions a potential survival strategy in neo-liberal 
environments, by combining servicing and organising approaches aspects, and 
blending their traditional role with more modern approaches.  It is certainly true that 
union elites appear to have been attracted to the potential of a new role in the 
regulation and managing of work (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004b), which is 
unsurprising given that many have found themselves out in the cold in recent years.   
 
Advocates are attracted by the idea of mutual gains bargaining over employment 
security, flexibility, development and involvement (Kochan and Osterman, 1994).  
They suggest that employers may benefit from a new cadre of representatives, 
improved relations with unions, and assistance with the facilitation of change.  In 
turn unions may benefit from more influence, access to information, job security 
and inter-union co-operation (Marchington, 1998).   Employees are also said to 
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benefit from greater job security, training, quality jobs, good communication and a 
more effective voice (Guest and Peccei, 2001; Kochan and Osterman, 1994; Knell, 
1999).  Most enthusiasm has been from  policy makers and practitioners including 
the IPA, TUC, and DTI, while supportive academics have normally been more 
cautious in their endorsement. The TUC argue that unions can contribute to 
organisational success by, for example, increased transparency making conflict less 
likely, increasing the legitimacy of decision-making, and contributing to increased 
employee commitment (TUC, 2002, 4).  They suggest that unions and workers are 
likely to benefit from greater job security, a greater involvement in decision-
making, better quality jobs, greater investment in skills and training, greater 
influence over working time, and improvements in recognition, membership levels 
and facilities (TUC, 2002, 2003).  Management are said to benefit from less time 
dealing with grievances, better decision-making, a more highly skilled workforce, 
more committed staff, improved morale and more flexible approach to work 
organisation. Similarly, the IPA cite benefits including lower labour turnover, lower 
absenteeism, better performance, higher sales and profits, greater willingness to 
innovate, and greater employee commitment (IPA, 1998).  A DTI study also 
comments how all their case study firms reported  a positive link between 
partnership and business performance.  Again, benefits were also suggested in terms 
of commitment, performance and ability to respond to change, as well as increased 
voice, openness and employability.  As highlighted earlier, the British government 
has generally been keen to promote the link between workplace consultation and 
organisational performance and competitiveness (DTI, 2002; Knell, 1999).  
Partnership, it seems, can only be good. 
 
Critics question the coherence of the partnership model, and point to the risks of 
adopting such an approach (Claydon, 1998; Danford et.al, 2005a; Kelly, 1996; 
Taylor and Ramsey, 1998).  Their primary concern is the extent to which 
partnership incorporates trade unions and may lead to compliant unions thus 
limiting the ability of unions to attract members (Kelly, 1996; Marks et.al, 1998; 
Taylor and Ramsey, 1998).  It has been argued that some employers may view 
partnership as another union „Trojan horse‟ and express a preference for free labour 
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markets and individualisation of the employment relationship (Claydon, 1998).  
Indeed, WERS04 revealed that 77% managers agreed that they would rather deal 
with employees directly rather than through trade unions (Kersely et.al, 2006).  
Managers may also be concerned that partnership may slow down decision-making, 
incur extra costs, and challenge their managerial prerogative.  Others simply doubt 
the putative benefits of such an approach.  Critics argue that partnership may simply 
represent a pragmatic management decision rather than evidence of a long-term 
commitment to working with unions, as managers decide to „involve‟ unions but 
only within strictly defined parameters, and very much upon their own terms 
(Ackers et.al, 2004; Bacon, 2001).  In other words, management will always be 
pragmatic in attempts to identify „what works‟ (Edwards, 2003). Others question 
whether partnership is just HRM in another guise (Taylor and Ramsey, 1998).   
 
The most vocal case against partnership has been expressed by Kelly who defines 
the debate in terms of militancy versus moderation (1996, 87).  He contends that 
there are four main reasons why union militancy is a better option.  Firstly, the 
growing hostility of employers to any form of unionism.  Secondly, the beneficial 
consequences of industrial action.  Thirdly, the meagre consequences of moderation.  
Finally, the continuing antagonism of interests between workers and employers.  He 
concludes that “it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve a partnership with a party 
who would prefer that you didn‟t‟ exist, the growth of employer hostility is a major 
objection to the case for moderation” (Kelly, 1996, 88).  However, Kelly fails to 
explain how trade unions could thrive without state or employer support, as well as 
in a context of negative public opinion, two of the main reasons union power 
evaporated in the 1980s.  The 1980s demonstrated the vulnerability of trade unions 
to employer hostility, and how they could not force employers to recognise them, 
and neither could they force people to join.  Unions are also vulnerable to media 
hostility, with images of rubbish rotting in the street and corpses unburied in the 
street during the Winter of Discontent still embedded in the public consciousness 
over 25 years later (Howell, 2005). 
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Critics also express fundamental concerns regarding the British business 
environment and structure of corporate governance which focuses upon short-term 
performance, meaning there is less incentive to engage in long-term partnerships 
(Ackers et.al, 2004; Deakin et.al, 2004; Heery, 2002; Suff and Williams, 2004) and 
the employer may renege on promises at any time, given the voluntarist framework 
of minimal juridification (see also Haynes and Allen, 2001).  Indeed Heery has 
stated that    “The dominant characteristics of British business…do not furnish an 
environment in which union strategy of partnership can flourish” (Heery, 2002, 26). 
Kelly (2004b) also stresses the need to understand different national contexts and in 
particular the contrasts between liberal market economies such as the UK and the 
USA, and Coordinated Market Economies such as Germany (see also Hall and 
Soskice, 2001).  Whereas the former are characterised by decentralised bargaining, 
low bargaining coverage, high levels of workforce insecurity/flexibility and limited 
training, the latter is characterised by more centralised bargaining, greater 
employment protection, and high training provision (Table 2.9).  Kelly (2004b, 313) 
concludes that the institutional arrangements characteristic of the LMEs are 
particularly inhospitable to partnership agreements in general and to labour parity 
agreements in particular.  The main characteristics of UK corporate governance are 
said to include (Bach, 2005):  
 Emphasis on shareholder value rather than stakeholders 
 Institutional share ownership encourages and investment trust encourage 
focus on short-term profits rather than long term market share or added 
value 
 Relative ease of takeover puts pressure on short-term profits to maintain 
share price 
 Dominance of financial management over other functions 
 Industrial relations voluntarism/ arms length adversarialism 
 Decentralised and declining collective bargaining 
 
Table 2.9 
Comparative institutional frameworks 
Characteristic LME CME 
Corporate governance Short-term Long-term 
Training Underinvestment Investment 
Pay bargaining Low bargaining coverage Sectoral 
Representation Single channel Dual system 
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In addition he argues that, institutional barriers notwithstanding, organisations such 
as the CBI campaigning against the 1999 Employment Relations Act and the new 
Information and Consultation Regulations may demonstrate a lack of willingness of 
British employers to engage in meaningful partnerships.  Others also doubt the 
enthusiasm of employers.  However, such arguments fall down on three counts.  
Firstly, it could be argued that current institutional arrangements are equally 
incompatible with strategies founded upon militancy.  Secondly, there is a tendency 
to create an idealised picture of CMEs and contrast the UK with this ideal.  
However, as highlighted earlier the institutional frameworks of other European 
countries have not been without criticism, especially in relation to their inflexibility 
and rigidity.  Finally, Kelly‟s argument (2004b) is also limited on the grounds that 
there is little prospect of the UK becoming a CME.   
 
Admittedly, as Guest has argued, the cliché that „people are our most important 
asset‟ is patently untrue with high trust, high commitment workplaces very much 
the exception rather than the rule (Guest, 2001).  Moreover as Kessler and Purcell 
remark, “Evidence suggests that management are driven more by a cost-
minimisation and opportunistic approach to employees, reflecting more than 
anything a traditional style” (Kessler and Purcell, 2003, 353), echoing the 
arguments of Fox two decades earlier (Fox, 1974).  Thompson (2003) has also 
suggested that in many cases managers hands are tied despite the best will they may 
have, and describes this as „disconnected capitalism‟.  More optimistically, other 
studies report more positive findings regarding the „normalisation‟ of participation 
in the UK (Ackers et.al, 2004; Marchington et.al, 2001).  Research by Brown also 
found a positive shift in managerial attitudes to unions, and evidence of a shift 
towards a more consultative and cooperative approach (Brown, 2001). 
 
For trade unions, key concerns relate to becoming „too close to management‟, being 
party to unpopular decisions, or having only limited influence over management 
decision-making, while a blurring of their traditional role may also create unease 
(Marchington, 1998; Oxenbridge and Brown 2004c; Terry, 2003).  Radicals object 
to the principle of a moderation strategy due to concerns that it may lead to an 
  The partnership phenomenon 
 
 
 
 57 
inability of union members to resist management, poorer terms and conditions, 
employee apathy creating difficulties recruiting new members, resulting in an 
imbalanced situation with negligible benefits for unions.  Gall (2003) is keen to 
stress that union must have a strong „demonstration effect‟ requiring an ability to 
counter managerial unilateralism, be it in the style of an „iron fist‟ or „velvet glove‟, 
and that partnership may jeopardise this ability.  The importance of demonstrating 
effectiveness to members is central, and is reflected in a study by Greene et.al 
(2000), where interactions between management and the union were described as 
„theatre‟ and „drama‟ in order to demonstrate union effectiveness at dealing with 
management.  In short the partnership debate is starkly polarised between the 
optimists and the pessimists, and these competing perspectives are outlined in Table 
2.10. 
Table 2.10 
Partnership: polarised perspectives 
Optimistic Pessimistic 
 Union renewal, legitimacy, renaissance, 
organisation 
 Organisational success, competitiveness, 
productivity 
 Employee involvement, quality of working life 
 Win-win 
 Greater job security  
 Better working conditions 
 Higher productivity 
 
 Union incorporation, emasculation 
 Work intensification 
 Surveillance 
 Co-option 
 Employee disillusionment 
 Zero-sum 
Ackers and Payne (1998) IPA (2005), TUC 
(1999,2002) 
Kelly (1996; 2000); Claydon (1998); Gall (2003) 
 
 
Partnership and industrial relations frames of reference 
 
To a great extent the divergence of opinion can be explained partly in terms of 
industrial relations frames of reference as these shape how  workplace dynamics are 
viewed.  Frames of reference are normally attributed to work by the „Oxford 
School‟ and in particular Fox (1966) and his paper „Industrial Sociology and 
Industrial Relations‟ written for the Donovan Commission, although of course the 
term already has a much longer history in disciplines such as social and political 
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theory.  In defining a frame of reference Fox referred to the work of Thelen and 
Whitehall: 
“[Each person] perceives and interprets events by means of a conceptual 
structure of generalisations or contexts, [which consists of] postulates about 
what is essential, assumptions as to what is valuable, attitudes about what is 
possible, and ideas about what will work effectively.  This conceptual structure 
constitutes the frame of reference of that person” (Thelen and Whitehall  
quoted by Fox (1966). 
Fox proposed that frames of reference determine how we expect people to behave, 
how we react to peoples behaviour, and the methods we choose when we change 
people behaviour.  Two frames of reference were outlined in his initial research 
paper and these were termed „unitarist‟ and „pluralist‟.  Unitarism stresses the 
common goal of an enterprise, with all participants sharing the same basic aim, 
namely that of creating an efficient enterprise.  All participants are expected to share 
the rewards accrued by sharing this aim, and the organisation is viewed very much 
as a united team with no factions or rival leaders. Unitarists believe that conflict is 
not an inherent or inevitable feature of the employment relationship, and that a 
coalescence of interests may be achieved.  Conflict is viewed as an aberration and 
the result of poor communication and poor management.  Accordingly, an 
ambivalent stance may be taken regarding voice, because good management and 
communication is key, while third party representation is viewed as unnecessary.  
Adherents to the unitarist frame of reference may include managements, employer 
bodies and governments.  It also resonates with many of the ideas of the human 
relations school (e.g. Elton Mayo), who argue that conflict is the result of poor 
social relations, requiring for example better channels of communication, but largely 
overlooking the potential for differences of interest to create conflict.  Key 
criticisms often made of the approach include the failure to explain the prevalence 
of conflict in organisations, and the failure to take account of the uneven distribution 
of power between management and workers in the decision-making process. 
 
A pluralist frame of reference, on the other hand, adopts a rather different approach, 
suggesting that an organisations contains people with a variety of different interests, 
aspirations, perceptions, priorities and aims.  Rather than team analogy of unitarism, 
the organisation is viewed as “a miniature democratic state composed of sectional 
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groups with divergent interests over which the government tries to maintain some 
dynamic equilibrium (Fox, 1966, 2).  The enterprise is characterised by a complex 
set of tensions which need to be managed in order to reconcile conflicting opinions, 
and keep conflict within some kind of accepted bounds.  A pluralist believes that the 
employment relationship is inherently contested, and as such, regulation is 
necessary through, for example, employee representation and state regulation.  
Trade unions are therefore viewed both as a legitimate pressure group and as a 
method of regulating relationships, and the dominant role of the state is rejected 
(Poole, 1981).   Conflict is not viewed as abnormal but is to be expected, and 
alternative legal measures to suppress conflicts are deemed immoral and reminiscent 
of the regimes of Hitler and Stalin.  They are also believed to be ineffective 
(Batstone, 1984),   Competing interests are accepted as inevitable and legitimate, 
and therefore the focus is on creating structures through which conflict can be 
contained and expressed.  Interests may sometimes conflict (for example where the 
employer wants to reduce labour costs), but may also be shared (for example a 
desire for the company to be successful).  Indeed, for pluralists occasional overt 
conflict could be viewed as a positive sign that the collaborative process is working 
properly, although consistent conflict could be indicative of a failure of the process, 
requiring the rule making processes to be changed.  Equally, a lack of any conflict 
would also be considered highly unusual. Pluralists believe that a stable „negotiated 
order‟ will develop from the expression of competing interests, in other the words, 
the „insitutionalisation of conflict‟, through for example a process of bargaining 
between actors (Batstone, 1984; Blyton and Turnbull, 2004).  Intellectually, many 
of the ideas link to the work of Schumpeter and Durkheim (Poole, 1981). 
 
However, pluralism is not a homogeneous  or indeed static body of analysis or 
prescription; indeed a plurality of pluralist approaches exist and these have evolved 
over time (Ackers, 2002; Batstone, 1984; Fox; 1966; Fox, 1973; Hyman, 1978; 
Poole, 1981).  Advances in interpretations of British pluralism can be traced, for 
example, to 1970s debates between two members of the „Oxford School‟: Clegg and 
Fox.  Drawing upon political science, Clegg proposed that pluralism emerged as a 
criticism of the political doctrine of sovereignty and was based on a process of 
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“concession and compromise”.  He suggested that pluralism concerned a body of 
rules to ensure freedom and prevent abuses of power as well as a moral imperative 
to compromise. However, he proposed that there was not necessarily an equality of 
power between bargaining partners, and therefore endorsed some restrictions on 
management power from example through state policy  (Poole, 1981).   
 
Fox‟s 1970s writings may reflect his analytical roots in Durkheimian and Marxist 
thought in relation to the forced division of labour and class-based inequality, thus 
contrasting with the „institutional opposition‟ perspective of Clegg.  Though Fox 
retained a commitment to the pluralist notion of divergent interests, several 
differences emerged when they both articulated their interpretations of pluralism. 
Firstly, there are differences in opinion regarding whether pluralists believe a 
compromise may be reached as a result of the bargaining process.  In his  work on 
frames of reference, Fox had suggested that for pluralists: 
“Every industrial conflict situation can, in sufficiently skilled and patient 
hands, be made to yield some compromise or synthetic solution which all the 
interests involved will find acceptable and workable” (Fox, 1974, 264) 
Clegg (1975) argues that, in contrast to what he proposes Fox believes, pluralism 
does not necessarily imply the inevitability of a compromise in all situations.  
Though committed to the belief that on most occasions conflict will result in 
compromise, he suggests that there is also the possibility that a compromise will not 
be reached, citing the dispute between the government and miners in 1974 where he 
suggests “it seems reasonable to conclude that no acceptable compromise was 
available”  (Clegg, 1975, 312).  Yet he also argues that even on occasions where a 
compromise may be unattainable  this does not mean that the process has 
necessarily been in vain, suggesting that there is intrinsic value in the freedom of 
expression. 
 
Secondly, there are differences regarding the degree to which pluralism implies a 
degree of equality between the conflicting parties.  IR radicals for example believe 
that workplace conflict reflects broader social issues of class conflict, and that 
inequalities of power are a product of the entire social, political, economic and legal 
structure, and as such IR cannot be studied in isolation from the broader social 
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structure of which IR actors are a part.  Society is viewed in terms of fundamental 
inequalities, and a deeply cynical view is taken of any potential for constructive 
bargaining processes (Batstone, 1984).  For radicals in particular, the assumption of 
the availability of compromise, and the existence of some kind of balance of power 
between parties, could actually act as a useful veneer to disguise and maintain 
existing inequalities, with agreements signed under duress.  They argue that power 
is typically tipped firmly in favour of management.  Consequently, pluralism is 
viewed as effectively managerialist because it is based upon misguided 
assumptions.  Such sociological notions appear to have influenced Fox in his later 
works, written during a period of 1970s radicalisation and the revival of Marxism,  
where he accepts such criticisms, proposing that pluralism has several weaknesses 
in accurately explaining and demystifying IR (Ackers and Wilkinson, 2003).  
Effectively developing his own brand of „radical pluralism‟, he engages with the 
“power balance illusion” critique of pluralist thought (Fox, 1973, 211), 
acknowledging that the notion of pluralism could be extremely useful for the 
bouregoise, potentially “indoctrinating the victims of an exploitative set of 
economic and social relations into accepting the system” by veiling power 
disparities (Fox, 1973, 206).  In addition, he argues that pluralism could be viewed 
as a mechanism for maintaining the status quo of unequal wealth, power and 
privilege, leaving the essential structures of control unchanged.  Nevertheless, 
unlike Marxists, Fox retained a commitment to pluralism on the grounds that firstly 
it remained a more realistic stance than unitarism, and secondly, because it acts as a 
practical way of working by promoting change and acknowledging conflict.  In 
addition, while the radical pluralist stance questions the efficacy of reform, it differs 
from more Marxian writers who argue that reform would be – and has been 
successful – in reinforcing managerial objectives (Batstone, 1984). 
  
Yet for Clegg (1975) pluralism simply does not imply a balance of power, 
suggesting in fact  it would be difficult to examine or measure such concepts 
empirically, or perhaps even to imagine what a „balance of power‟ would look like.  
For example, where there is a power disparity between  a plant manager and a shop 
steward the pluralist ethic is argued to concern the right of the steward to present 
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their case and deploy their strength, with both sides honouring their respective 
obligations. Accordingly, in his view a radical critique of pluralism on these 
grounds is not necessarily damaging because it is based upon a misinterpretation of 
the pluralist ethic (Clegg, 1975). As Batstone proposes, “it would be more accurate 
to say that [pluralists] would prefer to see the continuation of the existing structure 
of inequality than to embark upon moves to greater equality which they fear might 
end up in dictatorship and poverty (Batstone, 1984, 21).  Of course, the different 
interpretations can perhaps be attributed to the fact that frames of reference 
perspectives are simplified „ideal types‟ based upon different value judgements and 
emphasising different aspects of the employment relationship.  They are not 
definitive categories, and as such the boundaries between pluralism, radical 
pluralism, and radicalism are far from clear.  The main point, however, is that there 
are interesting differences between the pluralist definitions of Clegg and Fox.  These 
may be said to include diverse conceptions of justice and liberty (opposition versus 
social structural conditions), divergent evaluations of the working of pluralist 
institutions, different interpretations of the sources and distribution of power, and 
the related solutions to problems in British IR (Poole, 1981). 
 
Nevertheless, pluralism has proved to be flexible and resilient, with the debate 
continuing (Edwards, 2003), despite the influence of 1980s neo-liberal government, 
and the popularity of unitarist human resource management and organisational 
culture interventions.  Curiously, few pluralist IR researchers have explicitly 
explored or discussed the development of pluralism, although an exception is 
Ackers (2002).  He argues that more contemporary notions of pluralism must be 
expanded beyond the narrow 1970s focus of collective bargaining and trade unions, 
suggesting that the „problem of order‟ has shifted from a narrow focus at the 
workplace level, to the wider relationships between employment and society and a 
wider range of stakeholders, as well as values and interests (see also Provis, 1996).  
He contends that IR pluralism has tended to focus too much upon internal 
workplace relations and economics issues, at the expense of wider societal issues 
such as ethics, family, community and social cohesion.  As such Ackers offers „neo-
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pluralism‟ as a means of analysing contemporary employment relation (Ackers, 
2002).  
 
Table 2.11 
Partnership and Industrial Relations Frames of Reference 
IR frame of reference Unitarist Pluralist Critical/radical IR 
Discipline Human resource 
management 
Pluralist industrial 
relations 
Critical industrial 
relations 
Adherents CIPD, CBI Kochan, Oxenbridge and 
Brown 
Kelly, Gall, Danford 
Beliefs Harmony 
Integration 
Coalescence of interests 
Common goal 
 
Groups 
Competing interests 
Regulation 
 
Conflict 
Imbalance of power 
Control 
 
Requirements Human resource 
management 
Employee 
representation/state 
regulation 
Worker control 
Employee voice Ambivalent Important Important 
Source of conflict Misunderstandings Economic Class-based/social 
Conflict Temporary/Misunderstood/ 
Aberrant Behaviour 
Inevitable but 
manageable 
Distributive conflict 
Inevitable 
Focus Common interests Regulation Conflict 
Implications for view of 
partnership 
Ambivalent. Since 
interests of employees 
and employee can be 
aligned, through for 
example HRM policies, 
unions and regulation may 
be viewed as unnecessary 
or intrusive. 
Positive. Inherent conflict 
of interest requires 
regulation through unions 
and the role of the state 
to balance the uneven 
bargaining power/level 
the playing field 
Negative. The inherent 
conflict of interest 
between employer and 
employees is social and 
class based. Due to 
power differences 
worker control is 
needed. Seeking to 
balance is likely to be 
futile in a capitalist 
society.  
 
The preceding discussion has profound implications for likely views on partnership 
(Table 2.11).  For a unitarist ambivalence may be expected, because although they 
may not be against partnership, they may not perceive any added value beyond what 
HRM can offer.  On the other hand, for radical scholars partnership is almost 
doomed to fail because of the power imbalance in the employment relationship.  
The notion of both sides working together would be viewed as ineffectual, 
superficial and naive.   
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Pluralists, however, accept that the interests of capital and labour are sometimes 
divergent, given the various organisations that participate in determining the rules of 
employment (Clegg, 1979,1; Fox, 1974; Kochan, 1982), but suggest that the key 
concern is how the employment relationship may be regulated, and how conflicting 
interests may be reconciled.  It is argued that in a capitalist society employment 
relationships are inherently asymmetrical (Turnbull et.al, 2004), but that the main 
issue is how contradictory demands are managed to create an inevitably fragile 
social order (Korczynski, 2002). For pluralists “employment relations…is 
characterised by conflict and co-operation.  At certain times, and in certain 
workplaces, one of these assumes predominance” (Marchington and Wilkinson 
2005, 292).  There are inevitably areas of divergence, especially in relation to 
„distributive issues‟ (Walton and McKersie, 1965), where a clear conflict of interest 
exists.  Employees are likely to favour higher wages, better conditions and job 
security, whereas, conversely, employers are often under pressure to increase 
flexibility, increase output and lower (labour) costs. These views would all seem to 
broadly support the notion of partnership as a potential regulative mechanism. 
 
This is not to say that all workplace issues involve conflict.  In reality, it is argued 
that common interests do exist.  It seems realistic to propose that employees would 
prefer to work for successful organisations, and that many employees do not take 
merely an instrumental view but actually take pride in doing good work, or are 
proud to work for a well-respected organisation;  work is not merely transactional 
(c.f. Herzberg, 1967; MacGregor, 1967).  On other hand, it seems fair to suggest 
that many employers would prefer staff to be satisfied than dissatisfied, and to 
suggest that employers do not necessarily set out to deliberately mistreat their 
employees.  As Hyman (2004, 393) acknowledges “it is difficult plausibly to deny 
that the employment relationship is in part a positive-sum game.  Workers do not, in 
the main, wish their employer to go bankrupt, particularly when alternative 
employment opportunities are scarce.  Both sides might reasonably agree that a 
bigger cake would be to their mutual benefit; they still have to negotiate their 
respective slices.  In other words conflict and co-operation interact” (Hyman, 2004, 
394).  It is therefore important to bear these theoretical lenses in mind when 
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examining the empirical evidence, else there is a danger of making fatalistic 
assumptions. 
 
Recent empirical evidence 
Most of the evidence on partnership is characterised by case study research, 
although there are also some survey-based studies (Appelbaum et.al, 2000; Guest 
and Peccei, 2001; Osterman, 2000).  In terms of research focus, two main themes 
dominate the research: trade union representative capacity outcomes, and the 
delivery of mutual gains. To illustrate the quantity of research partnership has 
attracted, major studies are outlined in Table 2.12 and will now be explored in more 
depth. 
 
TABLE  2.12 
Empirical partnership studies 1998-2006 
 AUTHORS(S) COUNTRY SECTOR METHOD FOCUS UNION 
STATUS 
1 Ackers et.al 2004 UK VARIOUS CASE STUDY EMPLOYEE VOICE 
UNION/NON-
UNION 
2 
Bacon and 
Storey, 2000 
UK VARIOUS CASE STUDY 
MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGY 
UNION 
3 
Badigannavar 
and Kelly, 2005 
UK CIVIL SERVICE CASE STUDY 
UNION 
ORGANISATION 
UNION 
4 
Badigannavar 
and Kelly, 2005 
UK RETAIL CASE STUDY 
EMPLOYEE 
OUTCOMES 
NON-UNION 
5 Beale, 2004 UK INLAND REVENUE CASE STUDY 
HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
UNION 
6 
Danford et.al 
2005 
UK AEROSPACE CASE STUDY EMPLOYEE VOICE UNION 
7 
Danford et.al 
2005 
UK AEROSPACE CASE STUDY 
EMPLOYEE  
RESPONSES 
UNION 
8 Deakin et.al 2004 UK VARIOUS CASE STUDY 
CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
UNION 
9 Deitz et.al 2005 UK CLOTHING CASE STUDY 
NON-UNION 
PARTNERSHIP 
NON-UNION 
10 Dietz 2004 UK 
SPIRITS, 
ENGINEERING, NHS 
CASE STUDY 
PARTNERSHIP AND 
TRUST 
UNION 
11 Gall 2001 UK FINANCE 
UNION 
INTERVIEWS 
IR DEVELOPMENT UNION 
12 
Geary and Roche 
2003 
IRELAND AIRPORTS CASE STUDY 
TRADE UNION 
ORGANISATION 
UNION 
13 
Guest and 
Peccei 2001 
UK VARIOUS SURVEY MUTUALITY UNION 
14 
Haynes and Allen 
2001 
UK RETAIL/FINANCE CASE STUDY UNION STRATEGY UNION 
15 Heaton et.al UK NHS CASE STUDY UNION UNION 
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2000 RELATIONSHIPS 
16 Heery et.al 2004 UK MANPOWER/TGWU CASE STUDY TRADE UNIONISM UNION 
17 
Johnstone et.al 
2004 
UK UTILITIES CASE STUDY ACTOR REACTIONS UNION 
18 Kelly, 2004a UK VARIOUS 
SECONDARY 
ANALYSIS 
LABOUR OUTCOMES UNION 
19 Kelly, 2004b UK VARIOUS 
SECONDARY 
ANALYSIS 
LABOUR OUTCOMES UNION 
20 
Marchington 
et.al, 2001 
UK VARIOUS CASE STUDY EMPLOYEE VOICE 
UNION/NON-
UNION 
21 
Marchington and 
Galinos 2006 
GREECE TEXTILES 
CASE STUDY 
+ 
STAKEHOLDER 
INTERVIEWS 
INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT 
UNION 
22 Marks et.al, 1998 UK SPIRITS CASE STUDY 
WORKPLACE 
CHANGE/INNOVATION 
UNION 
23 Martin et.al, 2003 UK OFFSHORE OIL CASE STUDY 
MANAGEMENT AND 
UNION STRATEGIES 
UNION 
24 
Lucio and Stuart, 
2002 
UK MSF SURVEY 
TU REPRESENTATIVE 
ATTITUDES 
UNION 
25 
Mason et.al, 
2004 
UK NHS CASE STUDY 
MANAGEMENT AND 
UNION STRATEGIES 
UNION 
26 
McBride and 
Stirling, 2002 
UK 
MARITIME 
CONSTRUCTION 
CASE STUDY 
TU REPRESENTATIVE 
EXPERIENCES 
UNION 
27 
Oxenbridge and 
Brown, 2002 
UK VARIOUS CASE STUDY 
CHARACTERISTICS 
OF PARTNERSHIP 
UNION 
28 
Oxenbridge and 
Brown, 2004b 
UK VARIOUS CASE STUDY 
FORMAL AND 
INFORMAL 
PARTNERSHIPS 
UNION 
29 
Oxenbridge and 
Brown, 2004a 
UK VARIOUS CASE STUDY 
STABILITY OF 
PARTNERSHIP 
UNION 
30 
Richardson et.al 
2004 
UK 
AEROSPACE/LOCAL 
GVT 
CASE STUDY 
EMPLOYEE  
RESPONSES 
UNION 
31 
Richardson et.al, 
2005 
UK 
LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
CASE STUDY 
EMPLOYEE 
EXPERIENCES 
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Trade union representative capacity outcomes 
Perhaps because of the bleak prognosis of recent commentaries on the future of 
unions in the UK (Howell, 1999; Metcalf, 2004; Ross and Martin, 1999), much of 
the empirical research has focused on what implications partnership has for the 
future of trade unions (see for example, Badigannavar and Kelly, 2005; Geary and 
Roche, 2003; Haynes and Allen, 2001; Heaton et.al, 2000; Heery et.al, 2004; 
Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2002; McBride and Stirling, 2002; Roche and Geary, 
2002; Samuel, 2005; Wills, 2004; Wray, 2004).  In many respects this illustrates the 
remarkable loyalty of the British IR community to the trade union movement.  In a 
study of Tesco and Legal and General, Haynes and Allen (2001) suggest that 
partnership not only led to the strengthening of workplace union organisation, but 
was actually founded upon strong unionisation.  At Legal and General benefits were 
thought to include better training, jointly-management flexibility initiatives, a more 
open environment, and an increase in union members and activists.  The Tesco case 
also experienced increased union membership, increased activism, and more 
effective consultative procedures in terms of issue resolution and quality of input  
(see also IRS, 15.08.1999; Samuel, 2001).  A similar argument has been made by 
Ackers et.al (2004) who suggest that weak union partnerships are unlikely to be 
sustainable. 
 
Wills (2004) studied the Barclays-Unifi agreement, and found that partnership 
offered both benefits and risks for the union.  On the one hand, the union had access 
to senior decision-makers in the organisation, greater employer support for the 
union, improved workplace representation and more positive shop-floor 
management attitudes.  On the other hand, tensions include the difficulties in 
actually demonstrating their impact, and the risk of being perceived to be bought-in 
to management decision-making, thus supporting both the positive (Ackers and 
Payne, 1998), and negative positions (Kelly, 1996; Taylor and Ramsey, 1998), 
suggesting that unions have to walk the partnership tightrope carefully.  
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Samuel (2005) investigated a partnership agreement between Legal and General and 
Amicus-MSF.  He argues that partnership actually improved union organisation and 
increased influence in management decision-making, especially at the workplace 
level.  In particular, he found a new cadre of pro-active and competent union 
representatives were able to forge better relations with management.  He accepts 
that partnership was very much on management‟s terms but that, ultimately, union 
membership had increased, employee satisfaction with the union was good, and 
there was evidence of the union providing an important „checks and balances‟ role.     
 
Badigannavar and Kelly (2004) investigated the implications of partnership for trade 
unions in the UK civil service, and their conclusions were much more pessimistic.  
To test the arguments of the partnership advocates, they devised seven hypotheses 
in relation to improvements in employee influence, access to information, 
employment security, union influence, grievances, employer support and union 
membership growth.  These were then compared between partnership and non-
partnership organisations.  Hypotheses were positive on three dimensions 
(employee influence, information, and training) but negative on the other four 
dimensions.  They conclude that partnership did seem to offer improvements in 
employee influence, information, and training, but on the other hand, evidence on 
employment security and union influence was mixed, and they suggest that 
partnership appeared to be negatively related to grievances and union density.  Their 
findings were said to “lend little support to the idea that in the current UK context 
partnership arrangements…are likely to contribute to union revival” (22). 
 
A study in the NHS was also pessimistic, commenting that partnership offered 
limited discretion and was a process very remote from most employees.  Tailby et.al 
(2004) argue that there was a “democratic deficit” primarily as a result of the 
performance regimes under which managers managed.  Union decision-making was 
found to be centralised and distant from members, and the effectiveness limited by 
the contradictory pressures of divergent targets, priorities and expectations (Tailby 
et.al, 2004, 417).  In the Tyneside maritime construction industry, partnership was 
also found to have contributed little to union organisation or membership levels.  
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Rather, the partnership agreement was viewed more as a symbolic agreement – of 
interest perhaps only to external customers – but of little day-to-day relevance 
(McBride and Stirling, 2002). 
 
This can be compared with evidence from the Irish context, albeit with the 
important qualification that Ireland reflects partnership in a different institutional 
context.   Geary and Roche (2002) have developed the „theory of the displaced 
activist‟ arguing that workplace partnership can result in the centralisation of union 
activity around an elite corps of activists, thus creating intra-union conflict as 
„displaced activists‟ are unhappy with the arrangement (see also Dietz, 2004; Gall, 
2003; Heaton et.al, 2002; Marks et.al, 1999, Terry and Smith, 2003, 87).  However, 
they also found active management/union co-operation and positive effects on union 
representative capacity, thus “offer[ing] modest support the position of the 
advocates” (682).  Nevertheless, they do express some concerns regarding the 
durability of the structure, particularly in light of pockets of management 
ambivalence and opposition. They concluded that partnership can actually dispose 
employees to be more committed to organisations and trade unions, thus supporting 
some of the „positive-sum‟ claims of the optimistic partnership literature.  However, 
they argue that to transform attitudes and foster dual commitment partnership 
working must be sufficiently institutionalised.  This was particularly important vis-
à-vis employee attitudes where partnership structures need to engage with decision-
making at multiple levels  and day-to-day workplace decision-making.  Despite the 
optimistic conclusions they suggest that “such a project will seldom be easy or 
straightforward” (382).  They also highlight the dangers of raising expectations, or 
where partnership remains the preserve of an elite corps at the apex of the 
organisation disconnected from the grassroots. 
 
Partnership and trade unions: a polarised debate 
In sum, the bulk of the literature exploring the implications of partnership for trade 
unionism has been critical, and can be related to the union renewal (Ackers and 
Payne, 1998) versus union incorporation arguments (Kelly, 1996) discussed earlier.  
For some, partnership as a strategy remains doomed and a militant unionism is a 
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more appropriate option.  This is illustrated by the comments of Danford et.al 
(2004), who argue that, “Partnership does not negate Kelly‟s militant unionism, it 
demands it…high performance work systems and partnership do not resolve the 
structural antagonism between capital and labour” (Danford et.al, 2004, 186).  This 
view echoes Taylor and Ramsey (1998, 141) argue that “for unions…an 
„oppositional stance‟ to management remains justified and relevant”. For Hyman 
the focus should be on partnership between trade unionists and not been 
management and unions.  As he states, “Trade unions should indeed embrace the 
principle of partnership.  But its basis should be with other workers and trade 
unionists: nationally and internationally” (Hyman, 2004, 407).  However, it is 
argued that it is not necessarily the „resolution‟ of antagonisms between capital and 
labour which is the main issue, but rather the moderation of a dynamic employment 
relationship characterised by periods of both conflict and co-operation. 
 
Bacon and Blyton (1999) argue that co-operation can deliver for unions, but that 
this requires a position of strength whereby unions can insist on an equitable share 
of the gains (see also Ackers and Payne, 1998; Ackers et.al, 2004; Haynes and 
Allen, 2001).  In a more recent study, Bacon and Blyton (2006) examined 
workplace restructuring at two large sites, one of which has been introduced through 
a co-operative bargaining process, and another which has been introduced through a 
conflictual negotiations.  They conclude that a cooperative approach from the union 
representatives was associated with management making fewer concessions 
regarding the implementation of teamworking.  On the other hand, a more 
conflictual approach was said to bolster union ability to negotiate concessions, 
leading to higher satisfaction among employees with the outcomes. “These findings 
demonstrate the rationality of conflict, if not militancy as a strategy of worker 
representation” (Bacon and Blyton, 2006, 17). 
 
On the other hand, others conclude that alternative strategies such as militancy are 
simply untenable in the current environment, with Ackers et.al concluding that 
“Partnership with employees is going ahead with or without trade unions (Ackers 
et.al, 2004, 64), leaving unions with a choice of „partnership or perish‟. A similar 
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conclusion is reached by Oxenbridge and Brown who believe that there are limited 
alternatives to partnership.  They believe that “for unionised employment in Britain 
as a whole, the future will lie in greater cooperation.  The economic and legal 
environment in prospect leaves little option” (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004c, 157), 
and that “given the realities of contemporary power relationships it is, wholly 
misleading to pose robust, traditional negotiation as a viable hypothetical 
alternative for most contemporary cooperative relationships” (Oxenbridge and 
Brown, 2004b) 
 
Mutual gain outcomes 
A second stream of literature has also emerged, focusing on the outcomes of 
partnership, and specifically the extent to which partnership can be argued to deliver 
„mutual gains‟ to the various actors.  Many studies have now evaluated whether 
partnership delivers mutual or uneven benefits to employers, unions and employees 
(See Badigannvar and Kelly, 2005; Danford et.al 2004; 2005; Johnstone et.al, 2004; 
Kelly, 2004; Kelly, 2004b; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004b; Richardson et.al 2004; 
2005; Suff and Williams, 2004).  Much of the interest in this particular appears to 
relate to a seminal article by Guest and Peccei (2001) on the „balance of advantage‟.   
 
Guest and Peccei (2001), although overall in favour, concluded that there appeared 
to be unbalanced outcomes towards management.  However, they stress that this is 
not an argument against partnership per se, as they believe that a strong high trust 
partnership could potentially deliver superior outcomes for employers, unions and 
employees.  The key benefits identified for management included higher employee 
contribution, improved employment relations, and superior performance.  For 
employee representatives the benefits were said to include more engagement in 
organisational decision-making.  The key point the authors make, however, is the 
need to take an integrated approach, and that in practice a lack of trust between 
parties was often a barrier to building effective partnership relationships.  However, 
they argue that in principle a high-trust partnership with extensive employee 
representation and direct participation should create benefits which flow to all 
stakeholders.  They warn that a pick-and-mix approach is inherently risky and may 
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simply become a disappointing „hollow promise‟ (233) (see also Kochan and 
Osterman, 1994; Roche and Geary, 2002).  They conclude that, “The findings 
support a mutual gains model, but show that the balance of advantage is skewed 
towards management, and generally reflects low management trust in employee 
representatives” (Guest and Peccei, 2001, 207) 
 
Kelly (2004a) suggests that partnership firms perform no better than their non-union 
counterparts.  His research focused on the labour outcomes in partnership as 
opposed to non-partnership organisations, through the examination of issues 
including employment records and job losses, profits, wages, and hours of work and 
holidays, and union density.  He concludes that there was no impact on wage 
settlements, working time, holidays or union density.  In terms of employment, in 
expanding industries partnership firms created more jobs than in non-partnership 
firms, but in declining industries partnership firms shed more jobs than non-
partnership firms.  However, it remains very difficult to quantitatively „measure‟ the 
outcomes of partnership accurately. 
 
Badigannavar and Kelly (2004) have investigated the outcomes of arrangements for 
workers, unions and employers by comparing matched comparisons  of partnership 
and non-partnership organisations in the NHS and civil service.  They draw three 
main conclusions.  Firstly, that in only a few cases were employee outcome 
variables superior to their non-partnership counterparts.  Secondly,  there were 
significant differences in outcomes between the health service and the civil service, 
and in particular the finding that there was so difference in the employee outcomes 
between the two NHS trusts.  In the civil service they found superior outcomes in 
the non-partnership organisation.  Thirdly, they argue that this could be explained 
by the fact that the NHS agreement was heavily „employer dominant‟ whereas the 
union in the civil service partnership organisation had never been as well organised 
or achieved such high density as its non-partnership rival. They conclude that there 
is little evidence to support the mutual gains assertions in terms of union influence 
or better voice for workers.  Another study in the non-union retail sector by the 
same authors also concludes that the partnership is “precarious and well as 
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ineffective” (Badigannavar and Kelly,  2005). Richardson et.al present findings of 
two case studies drawn from the aerospace and public sectors:  JetCo and CityCo.  
They suggest work intensification stress and job insecurity may actually be the 
reality for employees in partnership environments, and conclude that “the 
assumption that partnership leads unambiguously to mutual gains is highly 
questionable” (Richardson et.al, 2004, 353).  This a slightly odd criticism as even 
the most ardent partnership advocates never suggested that partnership would lead 
unambiguously to mutual gains. 
 
Less pessimistically, Suff and Williams (2004) found mixed results in their case 
study of Borg Warner where management and union representatives generally 
argued that partnership had been a success.  Employees also cited benefits including 
better participation in organisational decision making.  On the other hand, 
employees did not really believe they had significant influence over decisions.  
Most employees also still felt insecure, and indeed thankful that they still had a job.  
With regard to rationale they found that, “the partnership concept is better viewed 
as a management device to secure enhanced organisational performance than an 
attempt to build genuine mutuality” (Suff and Williams, 2004, 4). 
 
From his study of negotiations under a partnership agreement Wray (2004, 209) 
concludes that “in many instances, far from a situation of „mutual gains‟, only 
marginal gains have been won for workers compared to significant gains for 
management”.  He argues that this case organisation was characterised by a labour 
process based on exploitation and control rather than a collaborative relationship 
between capital and labour.    Turnbull et.al (2004) explored partnership in the 
European civil aviation industry.  From their evaluation of partnership at Lufthansa, 
British Airways and Aer Lingus, they conclude that industrial relations context is 
important.  In the Germany, CME context it was argued that there was a degree of 
complementarity between the macro-environment of social partnership, with 
partnership strategies at the micro and meso level.  Without this support, partnership 
at BA and AL was found to be constrained by the cost cutting strategies encouraged 
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by a decentralised and deregulated system, as opposed to innovative long-term 
strategies. 
 
In sum, it seems fair to suggest that the partnership vogue has resulted in a fierce 
debate between critics and advocates.  There are also those who support partnership 
in principle but – in response to empirical evidence – express doubts regarding the 
extent to which benefits have been achieved to date, and are conscious that barriers 
have to be overcome (Bacon and Storey, 2000; Guest and Peccei, 1998; Oxenbridge 
and Brown, 2004a, 2004b).  This supports other empirical research which has 
suggested that “labour-management partnerships…are highly vulnerable to 
external shocks which can see a return to managerial strategies based on labour 
shedding (Deakin et.al, 2004, 130).  On balance then, this review supports the 
suggestion that “the   empirical evidence suggests that partnership in the UK is 
uneven, fragile, with little evidence of increased employee voice or mutual gains” 
(Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004b, 412). 
 
Typologies of partnership 
 
The chapter began by examining the conceptual confusion surrounding the notion of 
partnership.  A limitation of the current research is the implicit assumption that 
partnership agreements are homogenous, and that partnership is either „good‟ or 
„bad‟.  Some accounts, however, have pointed to a variety of potential employment 
relations implications, arguing that the outcomes are less black-and-white than the 
polarised debate implies.  There is increasing acknowledgement in the literature that 
earlier debates were fatalistic (Samuel, 2005), and that partnership may not hold any 
single consequence, but may depend upon various conditions such as the underlying 
management and union strategies, rationale for partnership, and the way in which it 
has been implemented (Heery, 2002; Heery et.al, 2004; Roche and Geary 2003; 
Samuel, 2005; Wills, 2004).  Given that partnership has been subject to various uses 
and interventions, and for different reasons, it is perhaps unsurprising that different 
outcomes appear to have emerged in the literature (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 
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2004b) after all “partnership is an imprecise term in employment relation , the 
meaning on which wanders from user to user and context to context”(Heery et.al 
2004, 274).  From the literature various distinctions can be drawn including formal 
v informal, union v non-union, private v public sector, and the route to partnership.  
This had led to typologies of partnerships emerging in the literature (Kelly, 2004a, 
2004b).   
 
Wray (2004) draws a distinction between „genuine‟ and „counterfeit‟ agreements in 
his study of a light engineering company in the north of England.   He argues that a 
genuine partnership depends upon how much voice partnership provides to 
employees, how far the relationship provides mutual gains, and how and for whose 
benefit the structures of partnership are operationalised.  However, he suggests that 
the case in his study is best regarded as counterfeit.  This was thought to be partly a 
result of the route to partnership which was characterised by the possibility of 
enforced recognition under the Employment Relations Act (1999), and a union 
signing the agreement primarily to increase membership.  However, despite his 
critical stance, Wray (2004) does suggest the possibility that a genuine partnership 
may exist.  
 
Oxenbridge and Brown (2002) identify a distinction between „containing‟ and 
„nurturing‟ arrangements, which they refer to as the „two faces of partnership‟.  
They suggest that in the service sector containing agreements were more typical, 
where employers tried to contain the union by restricting their rights, whereas in 
manufacturing nurturing was more common, characterised by negotiating rights 
over pay and conditions, high union density, and active workplace representatives.  
Later work by the same authors (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004b) examines the life 
expectancy of partnerships, and identifies „robust‟ and „shallow‟ agreements.  
Robust relationships were identified as conferring a range of benefits to both parties, 
and were found in organisations where the employer supported trade union 
recruitment, wide scope of recognition, a history of trade unionism, high union 
density and extensive union input into decision making.  The primary benefits were 
from the informal consultative processes and the higher levels of trust.   Shallow 
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arrangements provided much less benefits for the union and argued to be much less 
embedded.  In the cases managers typically restricted union recruitment activity, 
and allowed unions on limited involvement in workplace affairs.   They conclude 
that while robust cases with employer support for the union and high membership 
appeared to be sustainable, the same could not be said for shallow case characterised 
by a lack of employer support and employee apathy.  Accordingly, they propose that 
partnership is more likely to be sustainable in large scale manufacturing and the 
public sector, where a tradition of trade unionism is already deep rooted.   
 
This is similar to the arguments of Ackers et.al (2004) who argue that with the right 
skills and commitment from managers, a strong union partnership may actually be a 
fairly stable form of employment relations, in the style of Fox‟s (1974) 
„sophisticated modern‟ organisation.  Conversely, they believe that an adversarial 
us-and-them union model, or „continuous challenge model‟ to use Fox‟s terms, is 
simply no longer viable for several reasons.  They suggest that it is not just about 
changing management attitudes, but also broader societal shifts.  Not only are 
government and employers intolerant of militancy, but it is likely that the support of 
the media and public in their role as consumers is also lacking.   
 
Kelly (2004a) makes a distinction between „employer dominant agreements‟ and 
„labour parity agreements‟.  He argues that, given the fact that most agreements 
have been signed within a context of restructuring or poor industrial relations, they 
are thus more likely to have taken the form of weak employer-dominant 
partnerships, for example agreements in utilities following privatisation, banking 
following deregulation, and motor manufacturing following intense Japanese 
competition.  Labour parity agreements, he argues, are more likely where there are 
strong power resources such as with BA pilots and the Royal Mail.  In reality 
however, it is difficult to believe that such agreements are achievable in a private 
sector environment; indeed it is difficult to visualise what a true „labour parity‟ 
arrangement would look like.   
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Deakin et.al (2004, 115) suggest that partnerships can be either be „mature and 
enduring‟ or „weak and disintegrating‟.  The former are characterised by union 
promotion of a high trust culture, and management keeping their side of the bargain 
and investing in human capital.  The latter scenario, however, involves a union role 
limited to that of dealing with the consequences of redundancy, with management 
offering a minimal commitment to employment security.  They suggest that while a 
mature and enduring partnership is likely to survive an external shock, in weak 
partnerships actors are more interested in taking measures to minimise their 
exposure in the event of corporate failure, as opposed to genuinely engaging in a 
strategy aiming for mutual gains co-operation. Samuel (2001) also draws a 
distinction between „defensive‟ partnerships arising out of a crisis, and „offensive‟ 
partnerships reflecting a more evolutionary approach to improving employment 
relations.  The former are more likely to focus on issues such as redundancy 
management, whereas the latter may be looking at improving performance or skills. 
Finally, Martinez-Lucio and Stuart (2005, 809) identify what they refer to as 
nurturing, transitional and coerced partnerships. Nurturing partnerships are 
predicated on an evolution of positive industrial relations (see also Oxenbridge and 
Brown, 2002; 2004a, 2004b).  These are short-term, objective focussed, and are 
often the result of an exogenous shock, in other words what they describe as a 
„marriage of convenience‟.  They also identify coerced partnerships which they refer 
to as akin to shotgun weddings.  These are elite level management driven 
partnerships, devised by management to manage change and often exhibit union 
compliance.  Both coerced and transitional partnerships appear to be incompatible  
with high trust enduring partnerships.   
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Table 2.13 
Typologies of partnership 
Positive Negative 
Genuine 
Nurturing 
Robust 
Labour-parity 
Mature and enduring 
Offensive 
Nurturing 
Nurturing  
Counterfeit 
Containing 
Shallow 
Employer-dominant 
Weak and disintegrating 
Defensive 
Transitional  
Coerced/ Transitional 
 
 
In sum, as Roche and Geary (2004) remind us, there appear to be specific conditions 
under which a robust partnership is likely to emerge.  This reflects the arguments of 
Kochan and Osterman (1994) that partnership must be sufficiently institutionalised 
if it is to be enhancing or effective, and suggests that there is a need to understand 
the different types of partnership that are possible and to avoid asserting that 
partnership necessarily leads to a specific outcome (Haynes and Allen, 2001; 
Samuels, 2005; Wills, 2004).   This suggests a need to understand more about what 
facilitates positive and negative consequences, and in particular the contexts and 
preconditions associated with each. 
 
 
Limitations of the existing literature 
 
Having reviewed the literature in detail the final section considers some of the main 
weaknesses of the current research evidence.  Clearly, the existing literature is 
characterised by a starkly polarised debate between advocates and critics.  However, 
as Martinez-Lucio and Stuart state: 
“Accounts of partnership as a panacea for the future of employment relations 
are too simplistic, but so too are those that crudely conceptualise partnership 
as the latest management weapon for incorporating trade unions” (Martinez-
Lucio and Stuart, 2004, 421). 
Moreover, as if to exacerbate the confusion, the recent literature suggests that there 
is not only an advocates/critic debate, but also a variety of possible outcomes in 
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more recent studies by same authors.  Accordingly, several potential limitations of 
the literature shall now be discussed in more detail. 
 
The ideological  dimension 
Firstly, there is a strong ideological dimension to partnership (McBride and Stirling, 
2002).  Views on partnership are inextricably linked to industrial relations frames of 
reference (Fox, 1974), and as such partnership is much more likely to be acceptable 
to those holding a unitarist or pluralist viewpoint.  Frames of reference influence 
what researchers believe partnership means, as well as their expectations of what 
partnership is expected to achieve.  For pluralists, partnership is likely to concern a 
regulatory role, and success may be judged on the basis of the extent to which it can 
be seen to moderate the countervailing forces within the employment relationship.  
For radicals, partnership is simply naïve because of inherent power imbalances, and 
partnership is likely to be judged on the basis of the extent it redresses these 
imbalances, and within a capitalist society such high measures of success will 
inevitably lead to disappointment.  The fact that we have a “highly polarised 
political debate” (Kelly, 2004b, 305), in the UK is therefore not surprising, as it is 
difficult to separate views on partnership, from the ideological beliefs and political 
colours of researchers.  For some, the institutional framework – without sectoral or 
industrial bargaining, and combined with short-termist corporate governance – 
inevitably leaves little scope for partnership (Waddington, 2003).  In addition, even 
although they report some positive findings these are typically overlooked in the 
conclusions of the overtly critical commentators.  It also reflects the ideological 
constitution of British IR as an academic field, with a strong Marxist tradition 
centred on the study of trade unions in contrast to perhaps the USA (Budd, 2005). 
 
Sensitivity to context 
McBride and Stirling (2002, 302) suggest that analysis of partnership should 
examine the context of the agreement as well as the relationships surrounding the 
negotiations, in other words, „ideology, process and outcomes‟.  As Marchington 
et.al (1994, 890) argue in their studies of EI, it is important to contextualise actor 
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attitudes within the competitive and strategic environment in which the business 
operates. They argue that there is a need to „ground‟ studies of employee 
involvement in context, and the same is true for studies of partnership.  For example 
if only bad news is being delivered through the partnership infrastructure this could 
very possibly lead to negative attitudes to partnership itself.  Conversely, positive 
attitudes towards partnership could be symptomatic, perhaps, of a feel good factor 
within the organisation because of recent good news such as a large pay rise.  This 
leads to difficulties interpreting and comparing evaluations derived from both 
buoyant sectors and those in decline (Johnstone et.al, 2004).  Moreover, workers‟ 
prior experiences of participation and in general, management‟s approach to 
employment relations, and the recent and future performance of the organisation is 
likely to be important (Marchington et.al, 1992, 1994).  The issue of context is also 
important in relation to the issue of sector.  Studies examine partnership in different 
sectors with very different product and labour market conditions, as well as different 
traditions of industrial relations, and the possibility that partnership is likely to be 
successful in older industry sectors, with a history of unionisation, and buoyant 
sectors (Kelly, 2004a; Heery, 2002; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004b).  In addition a 
clear distinction must be made between partnership in the public sector, where 
union density is often high, combined with strong union traditions and insulation 
from market forces, compared to the private sector, where union density is often 
low, a tradition of unionism may be less entrenched, and market competition may be 
high.   
 
Methodology 
There are also several methodological issues.  Firstly, there is lack of data regarding 
worker responses to partnership.  As Ackers et.al (2004) state, “The attitudes and 
experiences of ordinary employees are central to deciding how successful a system 
of partnership or participation is”, given that managers and trade union criterion for 
„effective‟ voice are likely to be quite different from those of „ordinary workers‟ 
(Ackers et.al, 2004, 56).  Surprisingly, there has been a lack of emphasis on 
employee responses to partnership (notable exceptions include Richardson et.al, 
2004), and as Suff and Williams note, “direct evidence on the implications of 
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partnership for workers in remarkably scarce” (Suff and Williams, 2004, 33).  
Rather, interviewees are typically trade union officials and managers.  Few 
partnership studies have really engaged with debates on what workers want (see for 
example Bryson and Freeman, 2006).  In many ways this reflects the tendency of 
industrial relations research to conflate the institutional interests of trade unions 
with the interests of employees, based on an assumption that what is good for the 
union must also be good for workers, and in turn failing to allow employee attitudes 
to be a shaping factor in the success or failure of partnership.  Secondly, there is a 
lack of comparative case study research.  Kelly (2004a, 289) notes this lack of 
comparative case studies in the British literature, and suggests these may also be 
useful in the British context to complement the existing single-case based research.  
Indeed, it is likely that comparative cases could assist with the process of 
„theoretical generalisation‟ from the cases (Yin, 2003).  Admittedly, the conduct of 
comparative case studies is not helped by the fact that it is difficult to identify a 
credible prima facie instance of partnership, given that partnership is such a vague 
and poorly defined concept it is perhaps unsurprising that the evidence presents 
mixed findings.  This leads to the situation whereby Kelly (2004a) identifies Abbey 
National as a non-partnership organisation, whereas the IPA (2003, 1) describe the 
same organisation as having “a formal partnership agreement which has been in 
place for a number of years and which was updated in July 2003”.  Clearly, 
researchers need to question whether – and justify why – they believe the case 
investigated constitutes a prima facie instance of partnership, for example in relation 
to the partnership criteria.   
 
More generally, Kelly has also criticised the lack of methodological rigour in some 
of the case study research commenting how, “The level of methodological rigour in 
the empirical research is sometimes poor.  There are numerous widely cited case 
studies of partnership firms that are often uncritical and journalistic in tone, 
excessively reliant on the views of a few partisan informants, and seriously under-
theorised” (Kelly, 2004a, 270).  While an important point, clearly the need for 
methodologically rigorous research applies equally to the conduct of quantitative 
partnership studies as well.  Again, it is not only case study research that is 
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problematic.  The TUC (2001) for example claim that evidence from WERS98 
suggests that partnership organisations make fewer people redundant, have shorter 
average working hours and rarely declare compulsory redundancies.  This is a 
somewhat dubious analysis given that WERS98 does not distinguish between 
partnership and non-partnership organisations, or indeed make any reference to 
partnership whatsoever.  Moreover, much of the literature is limited to snapshot case 
studies at a particular point in time.  Clearly, this is not ideal given that partnership 
is a dynamic process evolving over time, and like any relationship takes time to 
evolve. 
 
Sensitivity to different types of partnership arrangement 
A related issue concerns sensitivity to different types of partnership agreement.  As 
the introductory section made clear, “Partnership is a loose word for many shades 
of the employment relationship” (Ackers et.al, 2004, 17), and distinctions can be 
made in terms of several variables.  Firstly, despite the variety of arrangements, 
there has been a focus on formalised agreements (with the exception of Oxenbridge 
and Brown, 2004), although some research has begun to make a distinction between 
„de jure‟ and „de facto‟ partnerships (Ackers et.al, 2004).  Oxenbridge and Brown 
(2004b) identify three broad categories of relationship in terms of formality: formal 
partnerships with explicit agreements; informal partnerships where the term is 
widely used, and cooperative relationships which may not actually be described by 
the parties as partnerships.  Secondly, there is also the issue of the different routes to 
– and rationale for – partnership.  In other words, was the desire to build a strong 
partnership to assist with the management of change, to sponsor weak unions, or to 
bypass unions (see for example Ackers et.al, 2004; also Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 
2005). 
 
Thirdly, there has been a traditional focus on partnerships between unions and 
management. However, as Ackers et.al (2004, 56) argue, “it seems sociologically 
unproductive to rule out non-union consultative forms, whether voluntary or state 
regulated…before examining the evidence”.  A similar point has been made by 
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Stuart and Martinez-Lucio who argue that “much more research is needed to draw 
out the extent, characteristics and form of…non-union partnerships” (Stuart and 
Martinez-Lucio, 2004b, 418).  The same bias is evident in wider discussions of 
voice which have also tended to be union centred. Non union workplaces are 
crudely assumed to have no HRM and no IR, and often dismissed as inferior to 
union voice without reference to empirical evidence (Haynes, 2005). Again, where 
non-union voice structures do exist they are assumed to be merely cosmetic devices 
because they may lack the necessary power and authority to be effective (Terry, 
1999).  The evidence on the efficacy of representation in non-union settings is 
mixed (Bryson, 2004; Gollan 2001,2005,2007; Rollinson and Dundon, 2004). Some 
have, however, expressed concern regarding the viability non-union partnerships.  
As Kochan (1997, 6) comments, “The biggest challenge lies in how to substitute the 
partnership model in non-union or weakly unionised firms”. 
 
It has been suggested that there are three key reasons to study non-union voice.  
Firstly, it is neglected compared with union voice.  Secondly, union voice is now a 
minority phenomenon.  Thirdly, many sectors that dominate the UK economy do 
not have a tradition of unionisation (Dundon et.al, 2005).  However, the possibility 
of a non-union partnership seems to be permissible under the broad definitions of 
partnership promulgated by New Labour, CBI, CIPD and the IPA outlined earlier.  
Despite TUC reluctance, there seems no particular reason to rule out the possibility 
of non-union partnerships (Deitz et.al, 2005; Guest and Peccei, 2001).  The 
Information and Consultation Regulations also provide an added impetus to 
investigate people management practices in non-union settings.   Encouragingly, 
some research into non-union partnerships has begun to emerge (see for example 
Dietz et.al, 2005; Upchurch et.al, 2006).  In short, as Kelly rightly states, there is a 
need for research into different forms of partnership as “Our knowledge of the 
mechanisms and outcomes of different forms of partnership arrangements is patchy 
and rudimentary” (Kelly, 2004a, 271). 
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Table 2.14 
Sensitivity to different forms of partnership arrangement 
Partnership arrangements 
De facto 
Informal 
Union 
Buoyant markets 
Crisis 
Public sector 
De jure 
Formal 
Non-union 
Struggling markets 
Natural evolution 
Private sector 
 
Focus on outcomes 
Perhaps the greatest limitation of the partnership literature is the focus on outcomes.  
This is odd given that firstly partnership outcomes are notoriously difficult to 
quantify (Roper, 2000), and the fact that partnership is about much more than just 
outcomes. As Stuart and Martinez-Lucio make clear: 
 “Partnership is not just about outcomes, or its potential for trade 
unions…partnership is a development that represents the emergence of a new 
approach to employment relations that attempts to reconfigure the form and 
content of management-union relations…it raises broader questions about the 
regulation of employment relations…partnership must be viewed [as] an 
attempt to reconfigure the form of employment relations and not just its 
outcomes” (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004, 11). 
 
In other words, partnership can be viewed more broadly as an attempt to reconfigure 
employment relations in light of the demise of old style joint regulation (Terry, 
2003).  The narrow focus on outcomes is also criticised by Dietz, who suggest that it 
not just the outcome which is important but also more subtle issues such as the way 
issues have been handled, and again criticises the notion that partnership can be 
judged upon outcomes alone, for example in relation to job losses: 
 “One need not express surprise when large scale redundancies take place 
under partnership.  This issue is how they are agreed upon and handled.  
Training to enhance staff employability also plays a part” (Dietz, 2004, 9) 
Partnership is also about subtle changes in attitudes and behaviours, which may not 
always be apparent if a narrow outcome focus is taken, and more attention should be 
paid to “internal behaviour transformations and attitudinal improvements” (Dietz, 
2004, 7; c.f. Walton and McKersie, 1965).  Such factors would inevitably be missed 
by studies such as Kelly (2004a) where selected labour outcomes are used to 
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„measure‟ the success of partnership.  A similar sentiment is expressed by Wray 
who explains how in his research, “It quickly became clear that a full assessment of 
the outcome would be impossible without a comprehensive understanding of the 
nuances shaping the process of negotiation” (Wray, 2004, 193).   
 
However, for some commentators voice is simply viewed as a means to an end.  
Radical scholars such as Hyman (2005) for example, may take the view that it is not 
voice which is valued but the effective influence voice has on outcomes.  He 
comments how “ „I hear what you say‟ is a familiar but chilling phrase: you can 
state your case but I will ignore it.  Voice is an effective means to achieve one‟s 
aims or it is a charade” (Hyman, 2005, 127).  This seems to imply that the priority 
is achieving „better outcomes‟ (however defined), and that the process through 
which these are achieved is almost irrelevant, be it state intervention, employer 
goodwill or union negotiation.  Similarly, work by Kelly (2004) has also focused 
upon „measuring‟ the labour outcomes of partnership.  Admittedly, voice which 
never influences outcomes is unlikely to be tenable, however the key point is that 
voice is important even when the final decision may be displeasing for certain 
organisational actors.  In other words, participation is of intrinsic value “whether or 
not it improves economic performance, and whether or not it alters the economic 
distribution for rewards” (Budd, 2004, 2), as unions have the dual function of 
protection and participation (Weiler, 1990).  Again, this relates back to the 
discussion earlier in the chapter regarding frames of reference, with radicals tending 
to focus on outcomes, viewing voice as a means to and end, while pluralists tend  to 
perceive intrinsic value in the very process of voice itself (Clegg, 1975).  For a 
contemporary pluralist then, non-union representative bodies may also serve a 
useful function as a process, channelling employee opinion into the decision making 
processes, irrespective of the power they yield relative to their union counterparts.  
Conversely, a radical would likely view a non-union body  as inevitably superficial 
and ineffectual due to the limited power they believe such a structure could possibly 
have. 
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The distinction between process and outcome mirrors debates in law and politics 
which have made a clear distinction between fair process (procedural justice) and 
fair outcomes (distributive justice). In law for example Thibaut and Walker (1975)  
conclude that the processes through which legal outcomes are reached are of great 
significance to citizens as well as the outcome.  In the context of industrial and 
organisational psychology, Folger and Konovsky (1989) investigated the effects of 
procedural and distributive justice on reactions to pay raise decisions.  They 
surveyed over 200 employees on their reaction to pay raise decisions, and found that 
distributive justice accounted for more unique variance in satisfaction with pay than 
did procedural justice, but procedural justice accounted for more unique variance in 
two other measures namely trust and organisational commitment.  They conclude 
that : 
“Apart from their desire for fair outcomes, people care a great deal about the 
justice of decision making procedures.  Moreover, as the issue moves from the 
level of personal satisfaction with present outcomes to higher-order issues 
regarding commitment to a system and trust in its authorities, these procedural 
concerns begin to loom larger than the distributive ones emphasised by equity 
theory” (Folger and Konovsky, 1989, 126). 
Similarly, in studies of redundancy situations, Brockner et.al (1992) found that 
managers conduct in managing the workforce reduction process, in terms of 
explaining rationale and treating employees with dignity and respect, influenced the 
commitment, morale and co-operation of remaining staff.  In addition, they found 
that there was also „good citizenship effect‟ in relation to staff who were actually 
selected for redundancy through from initial notification to termination.  In a sense, 
it is argued that employee voice generally and partnership specifically,  are also 
about „procedural justice‟, in that it is the extent to which procedures as opposed to 
just outcomes are fair (distributive justice). Procedures are not merely viewed 
instrumentally as a means to an end.  As Budd (2004, 28) states: 
“Political democracies are premised on the ideal that people should have input 
into the decisions that effect their lives – voice.  For reasons stemming from 
political theory, religious thought, human dignity, and elsewhere, extending 
voice into the workplace is a „moral imperative‟. 
 
In addition, in relation to partnership outcomes the critics fail to address the 
„typologies‟ of partnership which have emerged in the literature, suggesting that 
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partnership holds no single automatic consequence.  As illustrated in Table 2.13, 
recent studies have employed a variety of different labels to contrast „positive‟ and 
„negative‟ cases of partnership.  This suggests that there are specific conditions 
which need to be understood, resulting in positive and negative consequences.  
Curiously, despite the plethora of typologies in the literature, critics have tended to 
focus almost exclusively upon explaining their pessimistic findings, but fail to 
engage or conveniently overlook the fact that recent findings are less clear cut. 
 
It is not only the focus on outcomes which gives cause for concern, but also the way 
the outcomes of partnership have been evaluated and judged.  In particular there is a 
lack of agreement regarding what partnership is actually expected to achieve, 
especially if the measurements for success are set unrealistically high.  This has led 
a situation whereby:  “The expectations (both in terms of hopes and fears) generate 
by the term [partnership] means that it has become all too easy to set it up as a 
straw debate with aim of knocking it down” (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004b, 22).  
In such an approach, outcomes are too easily offset against unrealistic 
announcements and agreements (e.g. increasing transparency, enhancing training 
and development, creating a better quality of working life), or other equally 
ambitious aims such as the renaissance of the union movement, way beyond the 
expectations of even the partnership advocates like Ackers and Payne (1998).  They 
also tend to overlook or disregard some of the positive findings they report.  Much 
depends on how „successful‟ partnership is defined and what it is expected to 
achieve, but it seems unrealistic that long-term partnerships will lead to harmonious, 
consensual and conflict-free IR (Terry and Smith, 2003). After all, the employment 
relationship consists of a blend of shared and contrary interests which inevitably 
lead to periods of both co-operation and conflict (Bacon, 2001).   It also seems 
unrealistic to even suggest that partnership will lead to „mutual gains‟ in the purest 
sense of the term, with gains flowing equally and harmoniously to all parties. 
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Most commentators agree, therefore, that with a concept such as partnership it 
essential to examine process in addition to outcomes if a more holistic 
understanding is to be achieved, as the following array of quotes illustrate: 
 “The theoretical debates concerning partnership concerning partnership can 
only properly be assessed by empirical investigation into the actual processes 
and outcomes it delivers” (Stoney, 2002, 2)  
 “Good processes matter more than good institutions” (Guest and Peccei, 
1998, 9). 
 “Although there exists a wealth of published material governing the breadth 
and depth of participatory practices in UK workplaces, we have much less 
understanding of participation as a process” (Danford et.al, 2005, 613). 
 “The study of partnership requires an approach that is sensitive to internal 
processes of decision-making, and the rationales that underpin the elaboration 
of strategies regarding work” (Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2004, 421). 
 “Need to understand more about the substance of the relationships forged as a 
measure of robustness as opposed to the formality of the agreement” 
(Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004c, 143). 
Curiously, despite acknowledgement that process is important, and that without it 
only a partial view of partnership can be achieved, few existing studies have 
explicitly focused on understanding the process as well as the outcomes, in order to 
achieve a more holistic understanding. 
 
Implications 
There are three main implications from the literature review.  Firstly, it is important 
to examine partnership in context.  Secondly, it is clear from the literature survey 
that there is a need to understand much more about the process of partnership. 
Remarkably, despite the agreement that process is important, much of the 
partnership debate has focussed significantly more on hard-to-measure outcomes 
rather than on understanding process (Terry and Smith, 2003).  It is proposed that 
two particular aspects of process are likely to be instructive.  Firstly, there is a need 
to be more sensitive to the mechanisms of voice, and to the ways in which 
partnership mechanisms influence behaviour and outcomes, for example in terms of 
decision making processes.  As Dietz states:  
 “The litmus test for all partnerships – unionised or not – is the quality of the 
joint problem solving processes…giving significant influence to employees over 
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organisational decision-making early in the process, and in delivering regular, 
acceptable mutual gains for all parties” (Dietz et.al, 2005, 302). 
 
Secondly, sensitivity must be paid to the presence or absence of partnership 
„behaviours‟ in the employer-union relationship, such as the level of trust between 
actors and the way they interact and this is really what is distinctive about 
partnership.  Oxenbridge and Brown (2004d) suggest that a high trust relationship is 
likely to be characterised by a central and legitimised role for workplace 
representatives, trade union involvement at the earliest stage of management 
decision-making, explicit or implicit acknowledgement that each party benefits from 
the relationship, openness in dealings between the parties, and commitment to the 
relationship from managers at all levels of the organisation  (Oxenbridge and 
Brown, 2004d, 156). It is important therefore to “look beyond the superficial 
terminology to the relationships that underlie it…the intentions that lie behind 
them” (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004d, 157). 
 
Thirdly, there is a need to clarify the meaning and expectations of partnership before 
any attempt can be made to empirically judge the outcomes.  Definitions of 
partnership such as „mutuality‟,  „reciprocity‟ are simply too vague to be of much 
use.  They suggest a relationship between two parties, and the notion of an exchange 
where each party gains something, but this reveals very little about the quality of the 
employment relationship; indeed even a Dickensian sweatshop could be described 
in such terms.  „Co-operative employment relations‟ is also ambiguous, as a co-
operative relationship to one person could be perceived as co-option by another 
(Dietz, 2004).   
 
Accordingly, it is proposed that a more useful definition would offer some 
suggestions regarding the identifiable practices and processes associated with 
partnership.  In terms of practices, employee voice is central to all definitions and 
this may involve a mix of direct participation, representative participation and 
financial involvement. However, most policy and organisational definitions suggest 
it is representative participation which is the bedrock of partnership, with or without 
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trade unions, and this is also implicit in most academic research.  At the centre of 
the process of partnership are issues of decision making and actor relationships.  
Partnership decision making is typically described as a „joint problem solving 
approach‟, characterised by a genuine process of early consultation and affording 
some influence over decision making.  It does not necessarily mean joint decision 
making as management will normally reserve the right to make the final decision.  
Actor relationships are said to require trust and openness, mutual legitimacy and a 
commitment to business success, and as such the values and behaviours of 
organisational actors are crucial.  
 
 Inevitably, there is likely to be some variety within this general framework, but it is 
proposed that there are the practices and processes which underpin a prima facie 
case of partnership are likely to be mutually reinforcing.  For example, introducing 
partnership practices such as a representative body without the associated processes 
is unlikely to be viable.  Equally, partnership processes without any agreed 
structures or practices may become amorphous and unsustainable.  It is important to 
note at this stage, that while several influential definitions include outcomes as part 
of their definition of partnership, it is proposed that it is important not to conflate 
partnership processes with employment relations outcomes (such as employment 
security) which are better thought of as aspirations which need to be explored 
empirically, but do not constitute an integral component of the partnership process 
per se.  This represents a key limitation of both the radical and pluralist partnership 
literature which invariably conflate the two.  It is proposed that an organisation 
could achieve good ER outcomes without partnership.  Conversely, an organisation 
espousing a partnership approach to employment relations could experience less 
positive outcomes.  Accordingly, it is important to draw an analytical distinction 
between partnership (defined as a combination of practices and processes), and 
employment relations outcomes which ought to be considered separately.   In sum, 
there is a clear need to understand how participative mechanisms, in this case 
partnership, work in practice and what it actually means in terms of the real 
relations between the actors involved (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005; Terry, 
2003, 494), in order to transcend simplistic polarised debates.  In response to these 
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challenges, the following section outlines the research approach adopted in this 
particular study. 
 
 
Research framework: transcending polarised partnership debates 
 
In light of the preceding discussion it seems sensible to suggest that a fruitful 
approach for further research would be sensitive to the meaning, context, process 
and outcomes of partnership (Guest and Peccei, 2001; McBride and Stirling, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Conceptualising partnership: context, process and outcomes 
 
Firstly, in terms of context it is important firstly to justify how the organisation met 
the criteria of a prima facie „partnership organisation‟ else there is the risk of 
comparing pseudo-partnerships and therefore setting up the study to fail.  It is useful 
to explore how partnership is played out in different contexts, for example between 
formal and informal partnerships, and particular contemporary interest relates to 
comparisons between union and non-union partnerships.  To minimise sectoral 
variables this study make comparisons within the same sector, else there is the risk 
of contamination from the „noise‟ of exogenous variables limiting the scope for 
useful comparisons to be drawn. 
 
 
Context 
Process Outcomes 
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Table 2.15 
Context, process and empirical outcomes of partnership 
Context 
 Identifying partnership 
 Routes to partnership 
 Varieties of partnership (union/non-union, formal/informal, 
governance) 
 Sector (e.g. public v private) 
Process 
 Relationships 
 Issues, decision making and governance 
Empirical 
Outcomes 
 Purpose and expectations of partnership 
 Metrics of success 
 Trade union outcomes 
 Mutual gains outcomes (efficiency, equity and voice) 
 Actor outcomes (employer, employees, unions) 
 
Secondly, this study benefits by paying closer attention to issues of process, which 
are often overlooked in the current literature.  Key questions include the nature of 
actor relationships under partnership working, as well as the nature of decision-
making and the way issues are handled in partnership organisations.  Thirdly, 
regarding the final dimension of empirical partnership outcomes, it is argued that 
there is a need to re-evaluate the way the outcomes of partnership are judged.  It is 
argued that the analytical framework proposed by Budd (2004) is a useful device for 
the analysis of the process and outcomes of partnership. Secondly, it is also 
suggested that the Walton and McKersie (1965) framework may also be useful in 
assessing the values and principles of partnership.   These are examined in the 
following section.  
 
Analytical framework 
Kelly (2004a) criticises the existing partnership literature on the grounds that there 
is insufficient reference to theory. At the centre of most discussions around 
partnership is the notion that it concerns a shift from adversarialism towards 
constructive co-operative relationships. Again, most discussions of partnership 
acknowledge that, in terms of process it suggests some degree of influence over 
some decision making. In terms of outcomes the idea of mutual gains is central.   In 
order to examine the process and outcomes of partnership it is proposed that two 
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analytical frameworks are likely to be useful.  These are the frameworks of Walton 
and McKersie (1965) and Budd (2004). 
1. From distributive bargaining to integrative bargaining? 
The first analytical framework concerns distributive and integrative bargaining, as 
developed by Walton and McKersie (1965).  As the theory of their framework has 
already been outlined earlier in the chapter the proposed applicability to partnership 
studies is addressed only briefly here.  The partnership literature suggests that 
partnership concerns a shift in relationships from predominantly adversarial towards 
more constructive and co-operative relationships.  More specifically, speculations 
may be made regarding the characteristics of a successful partnership.  Issues would 
be addressed in terms of common interests rather than conflicting interests, in other 
words increasing the size of the pie rather than slicing it.  The focus would be on the 
interests of parties rather than the statement of positions, i.e. „interest bargaining‟ as 
opposed to „positional bargaining‟.  Building trust would also be seen as an integral 
part of the partnership endeavour where it may be deemed of minor importance 
under distributive bargaining.  There would also be an expectation that information 
would be free flowing rather than closely guarded.  Tactically, problem solving and 
brainstorming would be more important than manipulation and delay.   Partnership 
would also be expected to be more participative in terms of consultation, with the 
involvement of several actors rather than a small elite.  In terms of outcomes, 
distributive outcomes would be expected to be more zero-sum, with integrative 
outcomes according more with some sense of positive sum or mutual gain outcome.  
It is suggested the framework provides a useful litmus test of the success of 
partnership. 
 
2. Balancing efficiency, equity and voice? 
The second analytical framework adopted has been devised by Budd (2004).  He 
argues that the objectives of the employment relationship can be conceptualised as 
issues of efficiency, equity and voice.  Given that partnership has been defined as 
“an attempt to marry social and efficiency issues”, and in the UK has pluralist 
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notions of employee voice at its core (Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2002, 254), this 
notion appears to chime with the idea of partnership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Balancing efficiency, equity and voice (Budd, 2004, 4). 
 
Budd builds upon the traditional economic view of the employment relationship, in 
which capital wants to increase profits and workers want higher wages, and argues 
that equity and voice are equally important objectives.   The narrow economic 
focus, he argues, must be balanced with employees entitlement to fair treatment 
(equity) and the opportunity to have meaningful input into decisions (voice).  He 
argues that extremes of either component are undesirable, and that a balance should 
the ultimate aim.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voice 
 
Efficiency             Equity 
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Table 2.16 
Efficiency, equity and voice 
Objective Rationale 
Efficiency 
 Market-based transactions and contracts 
 Minimum labour standards (wages, hours, 
safety, family leave, advance notice, child labour 
 Income maintenance (unemployment insurance, 
worker’s compensation, pension standards 
 Industrial peace 
 Increased labour bargaining power 
 
 Workplace public goods 
 Equality of opportunity 
 Employee representation/participation 
 
 Just cause dismissal 
 
 Allocative efficiency 
 Externalities (social cost, purchasing power), 
asymmetric information 
 Asymmetric information, costly dispute 
resolution, liquidity constraints 
 Externalities (social cost) 
 Externalities (social cost, purchasing power) 
mobility costs 
 Externalities (free riders) 
 
 Coordination failure, asymmetric information 
 
 Coordination failure, costly dispute resolution 
Equity 
 Minimum labour standards (wages, hours, 
safety, family leave, advance notice, child labour) 
 Balanced distribution of income 
 Equality of opportunity 
 
 Just cause dismissal 
 
 
 Human dignity (moral and religious) 
 
 Political equality/liberty 
 Human dignity (moral and religious) political 
equality/liberty, due process rights 
 Human dignity (moral and religious) political 
equality/liberty, due process rights 
Voice 
 Industrial democracy 
 Employee decision making and autonomy 
 
 
 Free speech 
 Political employee voice 
 
 Political equality/liberty/democracy 
 Human dignity (moral and religious), 
psychological/social needs, property rights 
(stakeholder theory) 
 Liberty/human dignity (moral) 
 Political equality/liberty 
Source: (Budd, 2004,19). 
 
Budd acknowledges that these ideas are not necessarily new but have been 
discussed for a long time.  For example as John R Commons stated in 1919: 
“Representative democracy is neither the imagined anarchistic equality of 
individuals nor the socialistic dictatorship of labour, but it is the equilibrium of 
capital and labour – the class partnership of organised capital and organised 
labour in the public interest” (Commons, 1919, 43, cited in Budd, 2004).   
Again, a similar notion has been expressed by Kochan in 1980:  
“Industrial relations theories, research and policy prescriptions must be 
conscious of the relationships among the goals of workers, employer and the 
larger society and seek ways of achieving a workable and equitable balance 
among these interests” (Kochan 1980,21, cited in Budd, 2004)   
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As Edwards comments, the employment relationship is inherently contested:  
“The employment relationship is a contest terrain embracing conflict and 
consent.  From an employment relations point of view, there is an inherent 
management of uncertainty.  For employees concerns include dignity and 
justice as well as economic interests” (Edwards, 2003, 5).   
Similarly, as Hyman (1996, 67) acknowledges, “uncompromising militancy is a 
recipe for defeat and exclusion; unqualified collaboration invites grassroots 
alienation and perhaps revolt.  Any effective system of representation is a 
contradictory combination of conflict and accommodation”.   
 
In other words, the comments reinforce the notion that some kind of 
accommodation is desirable.  The idea is also reflected in the current policy 
environment.  As the government stated in 1997, in tune with their „Third Way‟ 
objectives:   
 “For those in work, the Government has two key objectives for the labour 
market: efficiency and fairness.  We want to see efficiency because we want 
people to work well enough and hard enough to generate prosperity for the 
country as a whole.  And we want to see fairness because people at work 
deserve to be treated decently – and they perform better when they are.  
Efficiency and fairness are wholly compatible.  It is perfectly possible to have 
a modern, flexible and efficient labour market which is both a vital engine for 
economic growth and business output and a means for people to find well-paid 
and satisfying jobs” (DTI, 1998, 4, emphasis added). 
 
Admittedly, in terms of rhetoric a key DTI discussion document “High performance 
workplaces: the role of employee involvement in a modern economy”, appears to be 
focusing on the business case which is surprising given that the legislation emanates 
from European Social Policy.   However, it is not really that remarkable given that 
all policies are couched rhetorically in terms of the intended audience, in this case 
the business community.  Moreover, European social partnership also has a business 
case dimension as well.  The Work Foundation also stress that information and 
consultation is not just about economic efficiency, but is equally concerned with 
issues of industrial citizenship.  A similar point has also been made by Dundon et.al 
(2004), who argue that there is interest in voice for two reasons: high performance 
and high commitment, as well as issues of industrial citizenship, rights of workers to 
have their say, diversity, equality of opportunity and procedural justice.  The links 
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between employment and wider society are also highlighted by Ackers (2002).  
Even Joseph Stiglitz – former Chief Economist at the World Bank has 
acknowledged the importance of voice for broader economic, social and political 
reasons: 
 “We care about the kind of society we live in.  We believe in 
democracy…Democratic processes must entail open dialogue and broadly 
active civil engagement, and it requires that individuals have a voice in 
decisions that effect them, including economic decisions…Economic democracy 
is an essential part of a democratic society” (Stiglitz, 2000, 20). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 The UK, US and European Social Model compared 
 
The Budd model thus allows a schematic comparison of various industrial relations 
trajectories.  As Figure 2.3 above illustrates the orthodox view is that the US model 
is characterised by free markets, voluntarism and more recently managerially driven 
HRM initiatives.  This focus would put the US firmly in the bottom left of the 
triangle, reflecting the demise of the New Deal model.  On the other hand, the 
European Social Model, with its emphasis on collective bargaining, employee 
representation, codetermination and neocorporatist social partnership would put the 
model towards the right of the triangle, given the focus on voice and equity.  It also 
illustrates how this model has been challenged in recent times and criticised on the 
account that it can be inflexible and inefficient. 
 
Voice 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 98 
Moreover, recent arguments in all countries appear to demonstrate a degree of 
theoretical convergence.  Mutual gains as promoted by Kochan and Osterman 
(1994) appear to be pushing towards the centre of the triangle, in attempts to 
increase the importance of voice and equity in US workplaces.  A similar point 
could be made in relation to the „new‟ European social model which has been 
traditionally strong on voice and equity, but has encountered criticism in relation to 
efficiency.  In the UK context, it could be argued in the 1970s IR swayed too much 
towards voice and equity and was subsequently pushed towards a focus on 
efficiency at the expense of the other two objectives.  UK style partnership, US 
mutual gains models and the „new‟ European Social Model could all be viewed as 
an attempt to redress the balance.   
 
In the British context, as Martinez-Lucio state, “it is generally accepted that in 
rhetorical terms, partnership is related to an approach to employment relations 
based on a belief – whether well founded or not - that there are employers that find 
it both ethically responsible and economically effective to co-operate with trade 
unions (and employees) on strategic matters of organisational change” (Martinez-
Lucio and Stuart, 2004).  This accords with Budd‟s proposition that  “debates over 
social partnerships can be interpreted as debates over balancing efficiency, equity 
and voice ” [and that] efficiency, equity and voice provide the dimensions for 
evaluating social partnerships” (Budd, 2004, 120).  In terms of frames of reference 
discussed earlier, the arguments of Budd fall clearly within a pluralist conception of 
the employment relationship.  It therefore appears to be a useful analytical tool in 
terms of evaluating the processes and outcomes of workplace partnership working.    
 
In practical terms two main propositions may be made.  Firstly, at the level of 
organisational decision making, it could be speculated that a successful partnership 
would be characterised by attempts to accommodate the competing demands of 
stakeholders in some way.  On occasion this may mean that the union acknowledges 
certain demands would be uneconomical, while on others it would be expected that 
the employer would demonstrate due regard for employees in terms of the fairness 
of decisions.  Secondly, in terms of outcomes of partnership overall, it could be 
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speculated that outcomes in a successful partnership would be more balanced than 
they may otherwise have been. Again, it is important to note that though partnership 
is a process in which voice involves an attempt to balance equity and efficiency, this 
does not necessarily mean that this is actually an outcome, but rather that 
partnership is a process which involves such an attempt to balance equity and 
efficiency.  This supports the argument that there is a need to draw an analytical 
distinctions between process and outcomes.  It is proposed that these represent two 
useful tests of partnership. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter began by highlighting the definitional ambiguity surrounding the 
notion of partnership, and reviewed the definitions offered by academic 
commentators, stakeholder bodies and organisations espousing partnership 
approaches.  There was evidence from this review to suggest that there is a 
convergence around a common set of prescriptions and assumptions concerning 
ideas of employee voice, trust, a commitment to the success of the enterprise, as 
well as reciprocity and mutual gains.  There was also evidence to suggest that, 
despite drawing upon a long history of British IR traditions,  partnership does 
represent something quite distinctive from previous ideas such as employee 
involvement or human resource management.  Key differences include a renewed 
pluralist commitment to employee representation, and the fact that partnership 
appears to be driven by a dual efficiency/equity logic in contrast to more 
managerially driven instrumental EI driven by business expediency.  It has been 
proposed that partnership has a long genesis in the UK and warns against 
caricaturing British IR has predominantly adversarial.  Nevertheless, in its current 
form interest in partnership can be traced to the influences of the European Social 
Model as well as the US „mutual gains‟ literature.  Both these approaches share 
concerns with combining fair treatment of employees with productive, competitive 
organisations, and the idea that the two should not be mutually exclusive.  It has 
also been argued that it is important to explore partnership in the UK in context.  
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Again, a desire to improve employment relations is certainly nothing new; rather IR 
reform and improvement was a perennial issue throughout the twentieth century.   
Indeed, often the state has been involved in encouraging such reforms and as such 
there are limits to the orthodox view that state abstention and voluntarism was the 
norm in Britain.  Nevertheless, decollectivisation did occur following the election of 
the anti-union Thatcher government in 1979, and the sudden removal of state 
support for unions is clearly one of the key factors explaining a decline in union 
membership and the dilution of union voice.  The bleak environment for unions and 
the decline of collective employment relations provide crucial context to the interest 
in partnership. 
 
New Labour endorsed partnership as a central plank of their commitment to 
„modernise‟ employment relations, underpinned by the Third Way notions of 
reconciling the interests of both the business community and workers.  After the 
failures of the 1970s, it was clear the government favoured a new approach, 
characterised partly by a shift towards more government regulation and the 
promotion of partnership, although there was little interest in a corporatist level 
system of social partnership.  Partnership was also promoted by the long established 
Involvement and Participation Association, and the TUC took an interest accepting 
that militancy was out, and co-operation was out.  For unions, partnership arguably 
presented an opportunity for them to „get their foot back in the door‟.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly employer bodies have generally adopted pragmatic stances, often 
endorsing partnership but opposing regulation which compels firms to adopt 
systems which they argue may not meet specific organisational needs.  Pragmatism 
also describes the attitudes of employers to partnership.  Often partnership was 
agreed where there was a specific industrial relations problem, and in some cases 
perhaps reflected the failure of EI style direct involvement alone.  It is also 
interesting that partnership was favoured by many service sector organisations 
which are highly vulnerable to poor industrial relations. 
 
The chapter has demonstrated how the merits and demerits of partnership has led to 
a starkly polarised debate between advocates and critics, with the debates focusing 
  The partnership phenomenon 
 
 
 
 101 
upon the likely impact on trade union renewal, and the reality of the mutual gains 
rhetoric.  Most support has come from policymakers, while academic commentators 
have either been cautiously supportive, or overtly dismissive of partnership.  
Academic disagreement can largely be explained using IR frames of reference, with 
radical IR theorists suggesting that partnership is likely to be futile and superficial, 
while pluralists are more positive, suggesting that a strong partnership may help to 
level the employer/employee playing field.  Unitarist perspectives are characteristic 
of employer bodies such as the CBI, who are concerned that partnership may be 
unnecessary and intrusive.  The empirical evidence is also mixed, although 
admittedly pessimistic studies outnumber the optimistic.  More recent studies, 
however, have begun to suggest that partnership need not necessarily have any 
predetermined consequences and that a variety of outcomes are possible.      
 
Several limitations of the literature were identified.  These included the ideological 
dimension of partnership and the influence political colours are likely to have on 
researchers opinions and interpretation of findings.  There is also a lack of 
sensitivity to context, with research often glossing over crucial contextual issues, 
which are essential if an informed assessment of partnership is to be made.  
Methodologically, studies provide little assessment of worker attitudes but tend to 
conflate these with the views of union officials.  There is also a lack of comparative 
case study research which would allow a greater degree of analytical generalisation.  
There are also issues regarding the rigour of both qualitative and quantitative 
studies, as well as a lack of sensitivity to different forms of partnership arrangement.  
The most important limitation is the crude focus on „outcomes‟, despite the problem 
that such outcomes are notoriously difficult to quantify, and in addition, partnership 
is about much more than just outcomes.  The impact on the regulation of 
employment relations simply cannot be deduced from „measures‟ such as pay or 
holidays, as this may miss subtle but important nuances such as behavioural and 
attitudinal transformation which make partnership a distinctive social phenomenon.  
Indeed, it is simply too easy to set partnership up as a straw man with the aim of 
tearing it down.    
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Accordingly, this thesis aims to address the limitations identified in several ways.  
Firstly, it is believed that any study of partnership must be grounded in context.  
Secondly, there is a need to clarify the meaning of partnership.  Thirdly, it is 
important to understand much more about the process of partnership, for example 
actor relationships or the way decisions are made, in addition to the outcomes.  Of 
course outcomes cannot be ignored but there is also a need to reconsider how they 
are assessed.  It is suggested that the two analytical frameworks proposed by Walton 
and McKersie (1965) and Budd (2004) provide excellent analytical devices for this 
purpose, and may be used to facilitate an assessment of partnership relationships, 
the way decisions are made, and the outcomes of decisions.  In light of the 
limitations of existing research, the methodological approach adopted in this study 
is outlined in detail in Chapter Three.   
 
 
 
   3 
CHAPTER 
Methodology 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research methodology 
 
 
 
 105 
Chapter 3:  Research Methodology 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter offered a review of the literature on partnership, and 
highlighted some of the limitations of the current research literature.  It was argued 
that there was a need for a more sophisticated understanding of the context and 
process of partnership in order to transcend the over-simplistic arguments „for‟ and 
„against‟.  Moreover it was suggested that there is a need to re-evaluate the way we 
measure outcomes and define success, and to avoid the use of crude labour 
outcomes alone. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research methods 
adopted in this study, and to explain their suitability. The chapter is divided into 
four main sections.  The first section provides a review of different general 
methodological approaches.  The second section considers methodological 
traditions in industrial relations research.  The third section provides an outline of 
the research design adopted in this particular study, while the final section provides 
details of the research and data collection process.   
 
 
Research theories and perspectives 
 
In selecting methods for any research inquiry, there appears to be a philosophical 
spectrum of thought in terms of the very logic of research, and therefore the 
appropriate approach the investigator ought to take.  For Guba and Lincoln (1998) 
research issues of method are secondary to issues of research paradigm:  
'Paradigm issues are crucial; no inquirer ought to go about the business of 
inquiry without being clear about just what paradigm informs and guides his or 
her approach (Guba and Lincoln, 1998, 218). 
In other words, there is a need to understand different approaches to research, and 
the way we look at and make sense of the world.  Thus, philosophical issues of 
epistemology and ontology are important.  Epistemology concerns the nature, form, 
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acquisition and communication of knowledge.  Ontology, on the other hand 
concerns the very nature of the social phenomena being investigated.   Accordingly, 
there are strong debates in the  literature regarding different approaches to research 
including the differences between positivism and interpretivism/phenomenology.  
The former supports the use of natural science methods in the social sciences, 
whereas the latter is concerned with how things appear to people and how they 
experience the world (see Table 3.1).  For example, Burrell and Morgan make a 
distinction between nomothetic methodologies on the one hand, and ideographic 
methodologies on the other.  Nomothetic methodologies concern a systematic 
approach following protocol and are typical in the natural sciences, and often 
involve the testing of general theories that predict and explain behaviour (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979).  Emphasis is on deduction and the testing of hypotheses as well 
as causal explanations and laws.  Ideographic methods, on the other hand, focus on 
subjective accounts and „getting inside‟ situations, and generating theory grounded 
in empirical observations by gaining access to actors subjectivity and culture (Gill 
and Johnson, 1999).  This is clearly related to debates regarding the use of 
quantitative and qualitative methods (Bryman, 1988). 
Table 3.1 
Typical distinctions between methodological approaches 
Theory Deductive Inductive 
Theory (cause and effect) Deductive Inductive 
Epistemology (valid knowledge) Positivism Interpretivism 
Ontology (essence of phenomena) Objectivism Constructionism 
 
To illustrate simply, competing methodological approaches can be placed on a 
continuum between the „classical approach‟ and „ethnography‟ (see Table 3.2).  The 
former approach typically concerns approaches such as laboratory experiments 
characterised by a deductive approach to theory, hypothesis testing, and highly 
structured methods such as those employed in the natural sciences.  Conversely, 
ethnography is rooted firmly within the inductive tradition, and emphasis is on 
„getting inside‟ situations and understanding subjects meaning and interpretational 
systems.  Writers holding an interpretivist methodology have been critical of the use 
of the scientific model in the study of the social world, and argue that studying 
people and institutions is fundamentally different from studies in the natural 
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sciences.  This reflects Weber‟s notion of a „Verstehen‟ approach which stresses the 
need for ―interpretive understanding of social action in order to arrive at a causal 
explanation of its course and effects‖ (1947, 88).    Ethnography would therefore 
have minimum structure  and use mainly qualitative data.    Lying somewhere in 
between the two extremes would be approaches such as quasi- experiments and 
action research.  The contrasting research traditions are illustrated in Table 3.2 
below. 
Table 3.2 
Contrasting research traditions 
Source: Adapted from Gill and Johnson, 2002, 44 
 
Of course, while it is useful to explore and appreciate the different traditions (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1998), it is equally important not to overstate the differences between 
them.  An appreciation of the differences in terms of theory, and epistemological 
and ontological worldview is nonetheless useful, in appreciating the belief system of 
different researchers, and the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches.  It 
also means researchers can engage more critically with other published work.  
Accordingly, it could be argued that, in terms of research perspective, this research 
was informed by an intepretivist epistemological approach, and a blend of both 
inductive and deductive approaches to theory, with the literature providing basic 
questions, but also allowing new questions to emerge from the data   Nevertheless, 
real world research is seldom so straightforward.   
 
Nomothetic methods emphasize Ideographic methods emphasize 
1. Deductive 
2. Explanation via analysis of causal 
relationships and explanation by covering 
laws (etic) 
3. Generation and use if quantitative data 
4. Use of various control, physical or 
statistical, so as to allow the testing if 
hypotheses 
5. Highly structured research methodology to 
ensure the replicability of 1,2,3.4 
 
1. Induction 
2. Explanation of subjective meaning systems and 
explanation by understanding (emic) 
 
3. Generation and use of qualitative data 
4. Commitment to research in everyday settings to allow 
access to and to minimise reactivity among the 
subjects of research 
5. Minimum structure to ensure 2,3,4 (as result of 1) 
 
 
 
         Laboratory experiments, quasi-experiments, surveys, action research, ethnography, grounded theory. 
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As Gill and Johnson comment: 
 ―The rational model of the traditional methods textbook, which presents the 
research process as an idealised, neat set of logically directed steps, does not 
of course provide a description of the way in which research is actually 
conducted‖ (Gill and Johnson, 2002, 193).   
Similarly, Marshall and Rossman (1995, 15) admit that ―real research is often 
confusing, messy, intensely frustrating and fundamentally non-linear‖.  In reality 
often research questions do not lend themselves to either of the „pure‟ approaches.  
The main focus is utilising techniques most appropriate to these issues at hand.  
Ackroyd illustrates the view that often it is a case of horses for courses stating that: 
 ―Methods are means of accomplishing things, and should be thought about as 
being like tools.  It all depends what kind of tasks there are to do and what is 
being sought to accomplish what tool should be used.  To borrow an analogy 
from Lawson (1994, 258), a big stick may be useful for cleaning a dusty old 
mat but it is not useful for cleaning a dirty window‖ (Ackroyd, 2004) 
 
Although an awareness of different methodological traditions is clearly important,  
as an old proverb states, ―For he who has but one tool, the hammer, the whole 
world looks like a nail‖ (quoted in Gill and Johnson, 2002, 10).  Thus, many 
commentators have endorsed an approach of „methodological pluralism‟ (Gill and 
Johnson, 2002, 11), viewing the researcher as „bricoleur‟ (Denzin and Lincoln, 
1998, 3).  This suggests a more pragmatic, emergent approach, and range of 
different methods are employed and pieced together to solve the research puzzle.    
Thus ―the choice of research practices depends upon the questions that are asked, 
and the questions depend on their context‖ (Nelson et.al, 1992, 2), as well as the 
opportunities and type of evidence that turn up.  As Gill and Johnson conclude, 
―there is no one best method but many methods contingent on the issue being 
studied regardless of epistemological biases‖ (Gill and Johnson, 2002, 11), and 
qualitative methodology is inherently multi-method in focus (Denzin, 1989, Brewer 
and Hunter, 1989, Patton, 1990). 
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Methodological traditions in industrial relations research 
 
Today a positivist approach remains dominant in management research and would 
be placed at towards the left of the continuum in Table 3.3 (Alvesson and Deetz, 
2000; Alvesson and Wilmott, 1996), although the use of qualitative methods have 
begun to increase (Gummesson, 1999; Yin, 2003).   Qualitative research has been 
criticised as „soft science‟ or even „journalism‟, on the grounds that it is unscientific, 
only exploratory or full of bias (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, 7).    To some extent the 
industrial relations research tradition is at odds with this.  British IR research has 
been ―inductive, qualitative, concerned with applied/policy oriented problems and 
relatively a-theoretical (or at most concerned with middle range theory‖ (Whitfield 
and Strauss, 2000), or what Marginson refers to as the ―empirically founded 
inductive tradition of the field‖ (Marginson, 1998, 384).  This is illustrated by 
examples of workplace ethnographic studies including Lupton (1963), Beynon 
(1984 ), Pollert (1981) and Delbridge (1998), which would be placed towards the 
right side of the continuum in Table 3.2, in stark contrast to the favoured approaches 
in the natural sciences. 
 
IR research traditions vary internationally however.  US IR research has been 
identified as the most quantitative oriented (88%), whereas the UK was fairly 
evenly balanced (51%), and in Germany only 1/3 of articles were quantitative 
(Frege, 2005).  This is seen to reflect a long standing bias in US social science 
towards quantitative research, whereas sociology has been much stronger within 
European IR.  However, in the UK context two traditions are apparent with the 
LSE-based British Journal of Industrial Relations more quantitative, and the 
Industrial Relations Journal (IRJ) publishing more qualitative sociological work (see 
also Heery, 2005).  However it has been argued that there is an increasing influence 
from the field of labour economics and associated questions and preferred 
methodologies, which often focus upon identifying measurable outcomes (see for 
example BJIR, September 2005).    Indeed, the UK ESRC has identified a 
„quantitative deficit‟ among UK social scientists for over a decade, and is currently 
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undertaking work examining the need for „quantitative-skill capacity building‟ 
among the social science research community (ESRC, 2006).   
 
However, Whitfield and Strauss (2000, 147) identify a shift towards deduction and 
quantification in the mainstream journals, pushing IR research in a new direction.  
Reasons for this are said to include: computer technology; availability of large data 
sets such as WERS; shift of research focus from institutions to individuals, and a 
―growing opinion among some researchers that the main IR journals favoured 
quantitative pieces‖.  It has been suggested that in the 1980s ―qualitative case study 
research was eclipsed by the quantitative survey method (Ackers and Wilkinson, 
2003, 451), and the tradition of sociology in IR gave way to economics.  Some have 
argued that there are severe limitations of a macro-survey approach to industrial 
relations research, describing it as ―often second order desktop research‖, and that 
often such studies merely confirm what was already thought to have been the case, 
and provide few causal explanations of why changes occurred.  Quantitative 
methods have also been criticised on the grounds that the British IR tradition has 
been for researchers to „get their hands dirty‟ out in the field, whereas quantitative 
research often employs agency interviewers to conduct the fieldwork on their behalf 
(McCarthy, 1993, 318) 
 
Again this leads back to the debate over whether quantitative methods are „better‟ 
than qualitative techniques as illustrated in Table 3.3 (Bryman, 1998).  Pragmatists 
suggest a symbiotic relationship: surveys can inform case study design, while case 
study design can inform surveys i.e. a two way process shaping case study research 
or informing its findings (Marginson, 1998). Again, even critics of quantitative 
research like McCarthy (1993) acknowledge that the two traditions may be 
complementary; he is more concerned that quantitative techniques should not 
become the dominant mode of IR research. 
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Table 3.3 
Quantitative versus qualitative research 
 Strengths Weakness 
Qualitative research - Close - Time consuming 
Quantitative research - Generalisability 
- Transparency 
- Quick 
- Limited understanding of 
processes 
- Distant 
 
The potentially complementary nature of qualitative and quantitative techniques is 
illustrated by Brown and Wright (1994) who remark that: 
 ―Large-scale surveys are in much of social science best iterated with in-depth 
fieldwork.  Unless their questions receive constant refreshment  from case 
studies, they cease to engage with the phenomena they seek to observe 
measure.  Unless case study findings are placed in a statistical perspective, 
their significance may be ignored‖ (Brown and Wright, 1994, 162).  
Thus, the aim in this study was to employ the methods most appropriate to the 
particular issues being investigated (Bryman, 1998), and this is explored in more 
detail in the following section. 
 
 
Research approach and design: the case study method 
 
This study is concerned to establish a deeper understanding of partnership working, 
and to transcend the advocates/critics deadlock.  It is argued that there is a need to 
try to transcend the existing polarised debate, and in particular to understand the 
way partnership plays out in different contexts, the nature of relationships and the 
way issues are handled, as well as the way actors experience partnership and 
perceive the outcomes.  It is argued that outcomes cannot be fully understood 
without paying due attention to issues of context and process.  Moreover, the study 
aims to understand what actors understand by partnership given that it is such an ill-
defined term (Guest and Peccei, 2001).  Given the concern with the way 
organisational actors perceive and interpret situations, a qualitative approach was 
thought to be essential, in order to  understand issues of meaning and process.  This 
reflects wider industrial relations critiques of neo-classical economics on the 
grounds that such traditions overlook the importance of contexts and the role of 
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institutions.  With a topic like partnership, contextual variables such as different 
firms, sectoral norms and institutions are highly likely to be germane to the topic of 
study in explaining the diversity of IR practice.  After all:, 
―Qualitative research is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, 
naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, 
or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. 
Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of 
empirical materials—case study, personal experience, introspective, life story, 
interview, observational, historical, interactional and visual texts—that 
describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals‘ lives.‖ 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2003,3). 
 
Mintzberg (1977) argues that an inductive approach is useful when there is a need to 
understand soft variables suggesting that,  
―Research will bear the most fruit when it is inductive; since the need is to 
build new theories; when it is creative; since the need is for considerable 
conceptual leaps forward; and when it is focused in the field; where the 
richness of complexity is found. …A significant share of the research efforts 
should be devoted to intensive probes into single organisations.  Small sample 
research will bring order to the array of soft variables in question‖ 
(Mintzberg, 1977, 94, emphasis added). 
 
The use of quantitative indicators to „measure‟ partnership is inherently 
problematic, and using raw labour outcomes as indicators may reveal little about the 
quality of employment relations.  Moreover, such indicators reveal little about why 
such outcomes are the case.  Accordingly, a case study methodology was thought to 
be particularly appropriate because of the rich data it can yield, according with the 
long established history in the field of industrial relations: 
―The archetypal [industrial relations research] during [the] ‗golden age‘ 
involved the undertaking of a case study, and IR researchers typically got into 
the field and met practitioners‖ (Whitfield and Strauss, 2000, 141). 
 
Theoretically, the approach taken reflects several aspects of critical realism (CR).  
Critical realism as a philosophy of science prioritises issues of ontology over 
epistemology, and suggests that the way the world is should guide how knowledge 
about it can be obtained.  Critical realism may been seen as a middle way between 
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positivism, with its focus on observable events, and postmodernism which typically 
demonstrates a social constructionist ontology.  Critical realists reject the positivists 
focus on measurement and quantification, but also the postmodernist downplaying 
of the role of non-linguistic, non-discursive or non-semiotic phenomena.  There are 
also parallels between critical realism and institutionalism, such as the focus on the 
role of institutions, the belief in the importance of human agency and of cultural and 
cognitive frameworks, as well as issues of power and conflict.  Where the two 
theories differ perhaps is that critical realists are interested in „social structures‟ 
whereas institutionalists are interested in „institutions‟, although the difference is 
possibly only semantic, give that an institution may be defined as a specific kind of 
social structure (Hesketh and Fleetwood, 2006).  In many ways this reflects 
industrial relations traditional focus upon structures such as organisations, trade 
unions, and related habits, procedures and rules (Ackers, 2002). 
 
Definitions of case studies 
Case studies have been defined as inquiries where context is deemed to be 
important: 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident‖ (Yin, 2003, 13). 
“The researcher explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a process,  
or one or more individuals.  The case(s) are bounded by time, and activity, 
researchers collect detailed information using a variety of data collection 
procedures over a sustained period of time‖  (Creswell, 2003, 15).   
According to Stake (1995, 47) qualitative case studies have four main 
characteristics.  Firstly, they are holistic as the case is seen to be a bounded system. 
Secondly, an empirical field oriented approach is adopted.  Thirdly, they are 
interpretive, since   ―researchers rely more on intuition, with many criteria not 
specified…and that it is attuned to the fact that research is a researcher-subject 
interaction‖.  Fourthly, they are empathetic and responsive to emergent themes, and 
seek to understand the actors frame of reference.  This is especially important in 
relation to new and exploratory topics where it is difficult to predict in advance what 
would be the most appropriate questions to ask.  Again, these features reinforce its 
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suitability for this particular research project where the emphasis was on 
understanding what actors understand by partnership in different contexts. 
 
Multiple case studies 
Stake (2000) delineates three types of case studies: intrinsic, instrumental, and 
collective, although he acknowledges that the three are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  Intrinsic case studies focus on a case that is unusual and is of particular 
interest to the researcher (Creswell, 1998; Stake, 2000). The intent is not to build 
theory, but because the case itself is thought to be of interest (Stake, 2000). An 
instrumental case study is pursued in order to provide insight about a particular 
issue that may be generalisable (Creswell, 2003). The primary purpose of an 
instrumental case study is to help advance understanding and refine theory.  The 
case itself is of secondary interest, it is a broader external interest which forms the 
main interest (Stake, 2000). The comparative case study encompasses more than 
one case "in order to investigate a phenomenon, population, or general condition" 
(Stake, 2000, p. 437). Since the purpose is to help advance understanding, a 
collective case study is a grouping of instrumental case studies, and they may be 
similar or dissimilar (Stake, 2000). Using a collective case study approach can allow 
for the possibility of stronger interpretation and "perhaps better theorizing" (Stake, 
2000, p. 437).  Regardless of whether the purpose is replication or contrast, multiple 
case studies are "considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore 
regarded as more robust" (Yin, 2003, p. 46). 
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Rationale for case studies 
As Yin states, the case study is useful when you want to uncover contextual 
conditions: 
 “The major rationale for using this method [i.e., a case study] is when your 
investigation must cover both a particular phenomenon and the context within 
which the phenomenon is occurring,” (Yin, 2003). He argues that ―you would 
use the case study method because you deliberately want to uncover contextual 
conditions – believing they may be highly pertinent to your phenomenon of 
study‖ (Yin, 1994, 13).   
The case study design is also employed to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
situation and meaning for those involved.  The interest is in process rather than 
outcomes, in context rather than a specific variable, in discovery rather than 
confirmation.  As Merriam (1998) points out, "Case study is a particularly suitable 
design if you are interested in process" (p.33). Similarly, as Burns comments, 
―Case study is used to gain in-depth understanding replete with meaning for the 
subject, focusing on process rather than outcome, on discovery rather than 
confirmation (Burns, 2000, 460).  A case study is also useful when the aim is to 
understand „how‟ and „why‟.  As Yin states:  
―In general case studies are the preferred strategy when ―how‖ or ―why‖ 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events 
and the focus is on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena‖ (Yin, 
2003, 1).   
He adds:  
―How and why questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of 
case studies, histories and experiments as the preferred research strategies.  
This is because such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced 
over time rather than mere frequencies or incidences‖ (Yin, 2003, 6). 
 
This resonates with the central aim of this research: to understand more about how 
and why partnership plays out in practice, as perceived by different organisational 
actors.  It is believed that the soft intangible variables in question would be very 
difficult to capture with quantitative methods.  As Hartley (1994, 332) comments, 
―The key feature of the case study approach is not method or data but the 
emphasis on understanding processes as they occur in their context.  Research 
questions about ‗how‘ and ‗why‘ rather than ‗what‘ or ‗how much‘ are best 
suited to the case study strategy.  The emphasis is not on divorcing context 
from the topic under investigation but rather to see this as a strength and to 
Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 116 
explore in the interactions of phenomena and context.  Much case study 
research, because of the opportunity for open-ended inquiry is able to draw on 
inductive methods of research which aim to build theory and generate 
hypotheses rather than primarily to test them‖.   
Thus, the central research questions of this study would not be easily discernible 
from a survey.  For instance, given the conceptual confusion surrounding the notion 
of partnership (Guest and Peccei, 2001), it would be difficult to check that 
respondents are interpreting questions in standard ways.  A case study approach 
therefore provides the opportunity for the „story‟ to be clarified (Stake, 1995). 
 
Criticisms of case studies 
Common criticisms of case studies include bias, inability to generalise, lack of 
rigour, and low reliability.  In relation to bias, it is argued that with case studies 
there is a high degree of subjectivity in selecting evidence or devising explanations 
of evidence.  In particular, it is argued that it is easy for the investigator to be 
influenced by personal views.  However, bias enters the conduct of experiments or 
questionnaire design as well.  (Burns, 2000).  Eisenhardt (1989) argues that, on the 
contrary, the opposite is true as when researchers are faced with conflicting realities 
actually „unfreezes‟ thinking thus meaning the potential to actually build theory 
with less researcher bias than axiomatic deduction.  Moreover, the use of multiple 
sources of evidence and data also reduce concerns regarding investigator 
subjectivity (Yin, 2003), and this reinforces the importance of triangulation (Denzin, 
1970). 
 
Case studies are also criticised in relation to their inability to generalise, a criticism 
commonly made by those holding a more positivist orientation (Gummerson, 1991; 
Yin, 2003), and is therefore inherently linked with philosophical perspectives on 
research outlined in the first section of this chapter.   The key objective of case 
study research is building and testing theory – theoretical generalisation (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2003), seeing through the eyes of respondents and to dig beneath the 
surface.  For Stake (1995) case studies are studies of the particular, not the general.  
Again, this may at first seem like a reasonable criticism of case study research. After 
all, how can generalisations possibly be made from three discrete cases of 
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partnership?  But to a large extent it misses the very point of case study research.  It 
is not proposed that the findings of the three cases will be replicated in other 
organisations.  Yet this does not mean that the discoveries and understandings raised 
from the experiences of the three organisations are not useful or relevant to other 
organisations. As Yin remarks:  
―Two case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes. In doing a case study, your 
goal will be to expand and generate theories (analytic generalisation) and not 
to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalisation)‖ (Yin, 2003, 10). 
 
Case studies are not a „sample of one‟ and are not intended to be representative.  
This is in stark contrast to the purpose of survey research, involving the generation 
of new theory from empirical findings (i.e. elements of an inductive approach).  
Even a single case study could potentially falsify over-ambitious quantitative 
generalisations.  To borrow from Popper‟s white swan analogy, a single partnership 
case study may falsify or qualify the over zealous predictions of the partnership 
enthusiasts.  Equally, a single case study could reveal that the gloomy predictions of 
Kelly (1996) were not only pessimistic but also deterministic.  By comparing the 
case study evidence, literature thus increases the internal validity and 
generalisability, and in turn the level of theory building possible from the cases 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Large scale surveys can perhaps be used to compare the findings 
with general trends. As Scott concludes, ―Case studies are not about indicating how 
common a particular phenomenon is, but rather about helping one to understand 
situations‖ (Scott, 1994, 30). 
 
Case studies have also been subject to criticism on the basis that they often lack 
rigour (Yin, 2003).  A comment in a recent Editorial of the British Journal of 
Industrial Relations illustrates this kind of criticism in relation to qualitative 
research such as case studies: 
 ―Some of the qualitative submissions we receive are poorly designed, with a 
rather unsystematic analysis of evidence.  It may be that researchers in this 
tradition need to pay more regard to questions of technique in the manner of 
their quantitative peers‖ (Heery, 2005, 6).   
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However, the same argument could be made vis-à-vis poorly designed and poorly 
executed positivist research. Potential problems associated with a lack of rigour are 
certainly not unique to case study research. Perhaps the difficulties in the quality 
control of case study research is that the techniques involved cannot be easily taken 
„off the shelf‟, and good approaches cannot simply be trained and monitored in a 
classroom.  Moreover, while a researcher‟s quantitative data set could be examined 
relatively quickly by an enthusiastic reviewer, it is likely to be much more difficult 
to review hundreds of original transcripts to judge rigour and check interpretation.  
For the researcher, this demands that the research design and methods are as 
transparent as possible, in order to demonstrate that academic rigour was 
maintained. 
 
Of course, quantitative approaches, such as surveys in industrial relations, also have 
their uses.  The recent Workplace Employment Relations Series is a good 
illustration (Kersley et.al, 2005).  WERS04 involved interviews with 3000 
managers, 1000 worker representatives and 20,000 employees, although earlier 
projects focused upon senior HR managers and union representatives.  However, 
there are limitations to such research.  For example, the latest WERS reveals that 
joint consultative committees were present in 14% of workplaces with 10 or more 
employees in 2004 (Kersely et.al, 2004).  Though useful in providing an overview 
as to how common such institutions are, this reveals little about how they work and 
operate in practice.  As Marchington and Wilkinson comment,  
―Survey questions about the extensiveness (or absence and presence) tell us 
nothing about the degree to which schemes are embedded within a workplace 
or an organisation…analysis based on survey data which is abstracted from 
organisational context can gloss over the real meaning and interpretation of 
these processes‖ (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005, 407).   
This is especially important given the fact that partnership is a contested and 
nebulous concept, and concerns human relationships which means different things 
to different people.  For example, Chapter 6 reveals how the formal JCNC at BuSoc 
– ostensibly the main representative body – was found to be much less important in 
reality with most decision-making occurring during informal corridor conversations 
and meals between senior figures.  WERS may reveal, in response to a yes or no 
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question whether a committee formally exists, and perhaps also how often it meets, 
but reveals little about how a committee actually operates.  This is where case 
studies are useful, as they allow investigators to probe beneath the surface of 
management policy and official structures.  
 
There are two main limitations of such quantitative approaches.  Results from large 
scale surveys of the workplace may provide limited understanding as to why a 
finding may be the case.  For example, the 2004 WERS series reveals that mutual 
trust between managers and non-union representatives is twice as high (64%) than 
managers and union representatives (31%).  It also suggests that „no trust‟ is higher 
where there are union representatives (23%) as opposed to non-union 
representatives (7%).  These are very interesting findings about what is happening, 
but tell us very little about why this may be the case, though several reasons may be 
speculated.    Are managers really twice as likely to have mutual trust with non-
union representatives?  Or is it because of different expectations?  Is there a higher 
level of political consciousness in unionised workplaces?  Can it be explained in 
terms of unionateness (Blackburn, 1967).  Is it because union representatives are 
more like to experience suspicion from anti-union managements leading to mutual 
suspicion as opposed to mutual trust?  Are non-union representatives less 
challenging because of their less secure position?  Is it because appointments to 
non-union forums are more like to have been „filtered‟ by the management team to 
prevent anybody considered too „militant‟ from becoming a representative?  Is it 
because non-union representatives are somehow different to their union 
counterparts?  Similarly, Bryson et.al (2006, 453) conclude from their quantitative 
studies that there was a strong positive relationship between worker perceptions of 
managerial responsiveness and managerial perceptions of productivity, but little 
relationship between voice practices and productivity, and the relationship between 
responsiveness and productivity only applied in non-union workplaces. They admit 
that this is “rather a puzzle” requiring qualitative research to investigate causality 
and understand more about these relationships.  This reinforces the point that 
quantitative and qualitative approaches can be symbiotic and complementary as 
opposed to mutually exclusive. 
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Yin  (2003) uses the analogy of detective work to explain case study research, 
suggesting that it requires sifting through various sources of evidence in order to 
make sense and understand what has happened and how it has happened.  In 
practice, case studies typically combine interviews, questionnaires, archival 
searches and observation (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The use of several kinds of methods 
or data is often referred to as triangulation (Denzin, 1978).  He identifies four main 
types of triangulation as outlined in Table 3.4 below. 
 
Table 3.4 
Triangulation 
 Dimension Applicability to this study 
1 Data triangulation Different people, different times, different places 
2 Investigator triangulation N/A 
3 Theory triangulation Different approaches from a range of disciplines 
4 Methodological triangulation Documents, minutes, unstructured interviews, 
semi-structured interviews, observations 
 
An ideal study may employ multiple triangulations across all four dimensions, in 
other words, multiple methods, data sources, researchers and perspectives.  A 
reasonable example of this from the area of employee participation would be the 
1990s UMIST studies into employee involvement (Marchington et.al, 1992).  In 
reality, however, this is not always possible.  The limited financial and time 
constraints must be taken into account.  The use of multiple researchers is unlikely 
to be possible in doctoral studies.  Organisational access constraints also mean the 
researcher must be pragmatic.  For example, in this particular study participant 
observation is a highly attractive method, but such high level access is difficult to 
negotiate in many organisations.  For the purposes of this study, triangulation was 
primarily in the form of data triangulation, that is interviewing a wide range of 
different stakeholders in order to achieve multiple perspectives.  Yin (2003, 34) 
suggests that multiple sources of evidence are important ―in the development of 
converging lines of enquiry‖.  Secondly, there is methodological triangulation by 
combining interview data, with secondary source material including documentation, 
statistics, presentations, reports and evidence from the quality media.  Though 
theoretical triangulation may not be the most obvious form of triangulation, it is also 
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relevant to this study.  After all, the field of human resource management and 
industrial relations is influenced strongly by various disciplines including 
economics, sociology, politics, management science and psychology.  This is 
perhaps best illustrated by the diversity of literatures referred to in Chapter 2.    
 
 
The research process and data collection 
 
The research project began in April 2003.  A large number of financial service 
organisations were contacted to ask whether they would be willing to participate in 
a short exploratory research interview to discuss employment relations within their 
organisation.  Letters were personally addressed to a senior HR figure within the 
organisation (see Appendix A).   Six organisations responded to the letter and 4 
personnel figures at the respective organisations agreed to an interview.   There was 
a need to identify whether the organisations could be categorised as being 
„partnership organisations‟, given the ambiguity of the concept.    In order to 
qualify, companies had to demonstrate a formal representative body, and prima 
facie evidence of a partnership style of working.  Two organisations were affiliated 
to the Involvement and Participation Association, and were therefore au fait with the 
language and theory of partnership.  At the third organisation, partnership was not 
used as a term but the organisations met the criteria in terms of a having a formal 
representative structure in the form of a staff union, and a history of collaborative 
management-union relations, and implicit commitments to many of the notions 
associated with partnership.  The Employee Relations contact was familiar with the 
partnership term, but suggested that the union were keen to avoid such terminology.  
However, this confirms the notion in the literature that informal partnerships may 
occur without the use of the actual language (Ackers et.al, 2004; Oxenbridge and 
Brown, 2004a).  The fourth organisation suggested it would be unable to co-operate 
further due to the complexities of a takeover by a major European bank, which was 
agreed in the weeks following the initial meetings.   
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Interviews were also arranged with key stakeholders at various peak bodies which 
also had an interest in partnership.  It was decided that, given partnership is such a 
slippery concept, an appropriate way to begin would be to clarify the usage of 
partnership among different stakeholder organisations, to obtain a general „feel‟ for 
the meaning of the concept.  Invitations for a one hour research interview were sent 
to named contacts at the Department of Trade and Industry, TUC, Acas, CIPD, 
CIPD and IoD and CBI (see Appendix A).   Interviews were subsequently arranged 
with figures at the DTI, CIPD, Acas and TUC.  The Institute of Directors were 
unwilling to arrange a formal interview, but offered some press releases and other 
position documents.  After three unsuccessful attempts to arrange an interview with 
the CBI, a response was received from the Head of Employee Relations confirming 
he would be unavailable for an interview to discuss partnership.  These are 
summarised in Table 3.5 below. 
 
Table 3.5 
Exploratory stakeholder interviews 
Stakeholder Interviewee Position Date 
Acas Terry Lippiatt National Conciliator 13.01.2004 
CIPD Mike Emmott Head of Employee Relations 21.01.2004 
IPA Robert Stevens Information Manager 13.01.2004; 01.06.2006 
TUC Richard Excell Senior Policy Adviser 16.01.2004 
CBI Neil Bentley Unavailable “Not in a position to comply with 
your request” (Personal 
correspondence, 09.02.04 
DTI Sunil Shahaney  17.05.2004 
IoD Richard Wilson Unavailable Unavailable 
 
The key organisational gatekeepers were the Employee Relations Manager at 
NatBank headquarters in London, Employee Relations Consultant at BuSoc and HR 
Business Partner at WebBank.  Three different interview schedules were then 
developed (see Appendix B).  Formal interviews were then conducted at BuSoc in 
November 2004 and February 2005, at NatBank in March 2005, and WebBank in 
April 2005. 
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Justification of the case selection 
The selection of cases is central to case study research.  As Eisenhardt states, 
―The selection of cases is an important aspect of building theory from case 
studies.  As in hypothesis testing research, the concept of population is crucial, 
because the population defines a set of entities for which the research sample is 
to be drawn‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989, 536).   
The initial design was to undertake 4 case studies, but this was reduced to 3 when 
the fourth organisation dropped out due to a business takeover.  This was not 
considered to be a particular problem given that more importance was placed upon 
the quality of the cases, as opposed to the quantity of organisations involved, and 
the extent to which they met necessary criteria to add value to the study.  Later in 
the research, another organisation expressed an interest in participating, but a 
decision was made to leave this organisation given that I had already arranged 
access at NatBank, BuSoc and WebBank, and I thought it might be best to leave the 
fourth bank as a „reserve‟, just in case access was terminated at one of the other 
cases.  The fact that the project was a solo endeavour also reinforced the view that 3 
cases were sufficient for the purposes of this particular research study.    After all, 
there is always a breadth versus depth trade off in case study research.  As Patton 
states,  
“The validity, meaningfulness and insights generated from qualitative inquiry 
have more to do with the information-richness of the cases selected and the 
observational/analytical capabilities of the researcher than with sample size 
(Patton, 1990, 185). 
 
In addition to the number of cases, a degree of „judgement sampling‟ was employed, 
in that the three organisations selected were very different, even although they were 
all drawn from the financial service sector.  This was a deliberate aim, in order to try 
and capture a diverse range of organisations operating in the same sector.  This 
illustrates a key difference between quantitative and qualitative research.  Whereas 
quantitative research aims for a random and statistically representative sample, the 
logic of qualitative research is to select information-rich cases for study in depth 
(Patton, 2002).  As alluded to in the previous section, case selection is inextricably 
linked to access agreements, and this is a common problem among researchers of 
private settings (Marshall and Rossman, 1999).  For Van Maanen and Kolb (1985, 
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11) ―gaining access to most organisations is not a matter to be taken lightly but one 
that involves some combination of strategic planning, hard work and dumb luck‖.  
Organisational gatekeepers were interested in issues such as why the organisation 
was chosen for study, what activities will occur in the company during the study, 
effort and disruption involved, reporting of results, and gains of the gatekeeper from 
the study (Bogdan and Biklen, 1992).  This study appeared to benefit from the 
Information and Consultation Directive which was topical at the time, and this had 
appeared to have raised interest in the topic under study.  Clearly, the research 
setting still has to be appropriate to satisfy the demands of the research!  
 
A key objective was that organisations should demonstrate dissimilarity and 
similarity across a range of variables, following the logic of maximum 
variation/heterogeneity sampling (Patton, 2002). As Hartley states:  ―The choice of 
case studies is particularly crucial in multiple-case design to ensure illuminating 
contrasts and similarities across the contexts and processes‖ (Hartley, 1994, 326).  
The advantage of this approach is that the data then offers both detailed descriptions 
of the case and their uniqueness, as well as shared patterns that cut across the cases 
irrespective of contextual heterogeneity (Patton, 2002).  These criteria included: 
sector, ownership, type of arrangement, union recognition, site history and size and 
internationalisation.  The key characteristics are outlined in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6 
Key characteristics of the case study organisations 
Organisation NatBank BuSoc WebBank 
Partnership Formal De facto De facto 
Union Amicus (Unifi) Staff union 
No union 
recognised 
Structure 
Partnership 
framework 
JCNC  People Forum 
Status PLC Mutual PLC 
International 
operations 
Yes No 
No, but owned by 
international finance 
group 
Ownership British British British 
Site Brownfield Brownfield Greenfield 
IPA Affiliation  Yes No Yes 
Employee 
Relations 
Agreement 
Partnership 
agreement 
Recognition and 
Procedures 
Agreement 
Commitment 
Document 
Unit of analysis 
North East Admin 
Centre 
(1000 employees) 
Midlands Admin 
Centre 
(2000 employees) 
Midlands Admin 
Centre 
(2000 employees) 
 
It was believed this could allow potentially interesting insights into partnership in 
different contexts.  This was influenced by the review of the recent partnership 
literature which suggested that partnership may have no single consequence but may 
play out differently in different contexts. 
 
Main similarities 
The first similarity concerned partnership.  All organisations espoused a 
commitment to the partnership ethos of collaborative management-representative 
relations, and were able to demonstrate a „partnership infrastructure‟ as evidence of 
this.  It was essential to confirm that the firms really qualified as displaying some 
evidence of a prima facie „partnership‟.  The aim was not to find „models‟ or 
„exemplars‟ of partnership „best practice‟, but rather to find companies illustrative 
of current partnership developments in the UK, that were at varying stages of 
developing and refining their IR approaches.  The second similarity was ownership.  
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All organisations were British owned, although this is a reflection of  British retail 
banking where international operators are still rare.  Thirdly, the unit of analysis was 
the same, as the project focused on call centres within large administration centres, 
as opposed to the wider branch network.  Size is also a common factor as each 
centre was large, employing over 1000 people.  The largest departments in these 
centres were related to customer sales and service and, again, these departments 
formed the principal focus of the study.  A fourth common factor was sector. It was 
considered important to the design to study organisations in the same sector, as 
sectoral differences such as product or labour markets could make comparisons very 
difficult (Kelly, 2004). 
 
Main differences 
However, there were several important differences as well.  Firstly, there were 
differences in site history.  NatBank and BuSoc both have a history of over 150 
years.  At each of the sites under study, the organisations had been major employers 
for over 30 years.  WebBank, however, was established only 7 years ago as an 
independent subsidiary of a major international financial services group.  The 
administration centre under study is only 5 years old.  It is often assumed that HRM 
practices are more easily imparted in greenfield sites without baggage and history, 
and it was thought to be interesting to compare organisations which had very 
different histories (Hallier and Leopold, 1999). Secondly, union recognition was 
another important variable.  NatBank and BuSoc have both recognised trade unions 
for many years.  However, the BuSoc union is a former staff association, who have 
a history of co-operative employment relations and rivalry with industry trade 
unions such as the union recognised at NatBank (Gall, 1997, 2001).  WebBank does 
not recognise trade unions.  The earlier literature focused on agreements but 
literature acknowledging the possibility of non-union partnership agreements has 
begun to emerge (Badigannavar and Kelly, 2005; Dietz et.al, 2005; Upchurch et.al, 
2006).   
 
Thirdly, the different contexts allow comparisons to be made between formal 
partnership agreements and informal partnership agreements (Ackers et.al, 2004; 
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Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004a, 2004b).   NatBank has a formal partnership 
agreement signed by senior bank executives and senior union officials.  BuSoc has a 
traditional recognition and procedural agreement, although senior management and 
union officials agreed that in practice the agreement is almost irrelevant, and both 
parties agreed that the actual relationship is much more co-operative and 
collaborative.  At WebBank, they have a Commitment Document although this is 
not signed by the partners.  The earlier partnership literature focused upon cases 
where formal partnership agreements had been signed, but there is now an 
appreciation of the possibility of informal agreements.  Fourthly, corporate 
governance provided another variable.  NatBank and WebBank are both public 
limited companies (PLCs) registered on the London Stock Exchange.  BuSoc 
remains a mutual building society owned by members.  It is often argued that one of 
the weaknesses of partnership in an Anglo-Saxon context is the pressure to deliver 
shareholder value (Heery, 2002; Deakin et.al, 2004), and therefore BuSoc presents 
an interesting point of comparison to the two PLCs. 
 
Finally, another difference is the size and internationalisation of the organisations.  
NatBank is a large international banking group.  BuSoc has focused very much on 
the domestic UK market and has no international operations.  WebBank is owned 
by an international group but it‟s operations are on the domestic UK market only.  
This provides an interesting comparison for various reasons.  They include the fact 
that organisations like NatBank already had experience within European Works 
Councils before partnership, whereas BuSoc did not.  Moreover, there is the 
likelihood that as an international bank, NatBank may have very different strategic 
priorities – and in turn employment relations practices – to smaller domestic 
organisations like BuSoc and WebBank.  These are summarised below in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.7 
Summary of main similarities and differences 
Similarities Differences 
- Partnership infrastructure/ethos - Union recognition 
- Sector - Nature of agreement 
- Ownership - Company status 
- Unit of analysis - History 
 - Size and internationalisation 
 
 
Research instruments 
The following section discusses the main research instruments employed in the 
research.  It begins by outlining the use of interviews and then proceeds to explore 
other supplementary methods including documentation analysis and non-participant 
observation, as well as the process of data analysis. 
 
Interviews 
The bulk of the data was collected by conducting one-to-one semi-structured 
interviews, as they allow rich and detailed description to be obtained. This is in 
common with much social science research which regards the interview to be the 
most popular ―digging tool‖ (Benny and Hughes, 1956, 137).  Kvale (1983, 174) 
describes the qualitative research interview as ―an interview, whose purpose is to 
gather descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpretation 
of the meaning of the described phenomena‖.  Saunders et.al (2000, 247), suggest 
that ―where it is necessary for you to understand the reasons for the decisions 
which your participants have taken, or to understand the reasons for their attitudes 
and opinions, it will be necessary for you to conduct an interview‖.    The key 
advantages of the interview include flexibility, and the ability to uncover how 
participants perceive situations and events.  Generally people were quite willing to 
participate in an interview, and employee representatives and union officials were 
particularly enthusiastic.  Many appeared to enjoy speaking with an outsider about 
their role, experiences and views. 
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Denzin (1970) identifies three main types of interview on the basis of the degree of 
structure or standardisation: 
1. Scheduled standardised 
2. Non-scheduled standardised 
3. Non-standardised 
The most structured is the scheduled standardised in which the wording and order of 
all questions is the same for every respondent.  At the other end of the spectrum is 
the non-standardised interview which is more conversational, without any real 
attempt to expose respondents to the same stimuli (questions), or to keep the format 
of the interview consistent.  The non-scheduled standard/semi-structured or „focused 
interview‟, involves a list of information which is required from each respondent, 
but the phrasing or order of questioning may vary from respondent to respondent. 
This study employed non-standardised and non-scheduled standardised interviews, 
given that the study involved interviewing very different groups of organisational 
actors from grassroots employees to senior managers, and that the purpose of the 
study was to capture the views and perspectives of different organisational actors at 
different levels within the organisation.    As Denzin (1970, 125) notes, in such 
circumstances it is useful to rephrase the questions in words familiar to those being 
interviewed: 
―The non-standardised schedule indicates an awareness that individuals  have 
unique ways of defining their world.  To meaningfully understand that world, 
researchers must approach it from the subject‘s perspective‖. 
 
The interview also has the advantage of allowing the interviewee to raise important 
issues not contained within the interview schedule.  Accordingly, more structured 
interviews were not adopted specifically because the aim was to obtain rich 
contextual data and to allow new patterns and themes to emerge.  Equally, an open-
ended ethnographic approach was not adopted as the aim was to obtain multiple 
perspectives and multiple levels, and therefore semi-structured interviews were 
deemed most appropriate, as they allowed sufficient commonality to allow a 
comparison of similar issues to be made internally between different organisational 
actors, and externally across cases.  A danger with research into experiences of 
partnership is that the researcher may expect to find three basic attitudes (positive, 
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negative, agnostic), and such attitudes may be clouded by recent events.  For 
example, research may find positive attitudes to partnership after a recent pay rise, 
or negative attitudes to partnership where job losses have recently been announced.  
In other words, respondents supposed attitudes to partnership may just reflect the 
extent to which there is a „feel good factor‟ within the organisation at the time.  
 
Inspired by „critical incident technique‟ (CIT) (Flanagan, 1954) a particular aim of 
interviews was to ―capture the thought processes, the frame of reference and the 
feelings about an incident…which have meanings for the respondent‖ (Chell, 1999, 
56), in an attempt to mitigate the risks of obtaining data which reflects vague 
underlying feelings regarding recent organisational events, as opposed to attitudes to 
partnership per se.  CIT interviews, on the other hand, involve the discussion of 
significant occurrences (events, incidents, processes) identified by the respondent, 
the way they were managed and the perceived outcomes and effects.  Another 
advantage is that interviewees find such interviews enjoyable as it affords the 
opportunity to take „time out‟ to reflect on recent events (Chell, 1999).  In practice, 
this method required interviewees to identify some of the main issues which have 
been prominent in the last five years (or since they joined the organisation if less 
than five years).  Typically, these would reflect a range of both positive and 
negative sentiments regarding the way issues were handled.  For example, a 
respondent sometimes provided an account of some incidents which they thought 
were handled badly, and other examples where they believed the event had been 
managed more successfully.  This method allowed a multi-dimensional picture of 
events to be obtained regarding organisational incidents, such as the management of 
offshoring at NatBank, or the impact of the closure of WebBank‟s French 
operations on employment relations in the UK.   
 
Admittedly, the techniques has some weaknesses: respondent accounts are 
retrospective, partial and may contain bias, and there is also the potential criticism 
that CIT only allows researchers to access issues upon the agenda of the actors 
involved. As Lukes (1974) has argued however, there are various dimensions of 
power, and in particular power cannot just be viewed in terms of decision making 
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culminating in concrete observable outcomes. Though outcomes may be relatively 
easy to measure in terms of the extent to which outcomes are perceived to favour 
one actor over another, Lukes argues that power may be exercised more subtly in 
terms of agenda setting.  In other words, management could exert power by keeping 
certain issues off the agenda completely.  Of course the „latent power argument‟ 
could be applied across the board to many studies of employee participation, 
however it is clearly important and therefore warrants a detailed explanation. In 
order to mitigate such concerns, the thesis explores the nature of the decision 
making processes  and „critical incidents‟ in great detail, and adopts a systematic 
approach in order to explore incidents and compare across the cases.  
 
 Accordingly, the study dissects decision making processes in each case by mapping 
against the dimensions put forward in earlier research on employee involvement 
(EI) by Marchington et.al (1992). They propose four dimensions regarding the 
degree, scope, form and level of decision making, and it is believed these 
dimensions remain relevant today.  Degree refers to the amount of influence over 
decision making. Form refers to the distinction between direct and indirect 
participation.  Level refers to whether issues under discussion are high level or low 
level.  Scope of decision making concerns the range of issues under discussion, and 
as such is clearly linked to concerns regarding issues of agenda setting.  The thesis 
also adds three additional dimensions derived from the partnership literature: issue 
level, representative level and timeliness.  Issue level refers to whether the issues are 
high level, such as company-wide pay negotiations, or low level, such as local 
working conditions or policies concerning a specific department. Representative 
level relates to the extent to which representation occurs at a high level, such as full-
time officials, or at a local level, through lay employee representatives.  Finally, 
timeliness concerns the point at which decisions are discussed ranging from the 
early proposal stage through to the implementation stage where decisions may be 
presented as a fait accompli.  
 
 In terms of issues of scope and agenda setting, however, it is particularly important 
to note that the same broad range of issues were addressed across the three 
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comparative cases.  These were examined under the three broad headings: pay and 
conditions; discipline and grievance; and organisational change.  These subject 
categories emerged from WERS data regarding the scope of decision making in the 
UK, and the type of issues typically discussed at meetings between employee 
representatives and management (Kersely et.al, 2006, 165).  Respondents were also 
explicitly asked if there were any issues which were not on the agenda, or which had 
not been on the agenda, and this typically elicited very candid responses.  For 
example, management and representatives were clear at WebBank that the 
negotiation of terms and conditions was off the agenda, in contrast to the 
arrangements at BuSoc and NatBank.  Though representatives at WebBank had 
been involved in reward discussions regarding the structure of the pay package, they 
were not currently involved in negotiating pay through collective bargaining as in 
the other cases, although this was not viewed as a problem by employee 
representatives.  At BuSoc, day-to-day departmental issues around performance 
targets were identified as generally being off the formal union agenda, whereas at 
NatBank and WebBank such day-to-day work issues constituted a significant 
proportion of the agenda.  At BuSoc union officials did not perceive non-
involvement in departmental decisions to be a particular worry, as they believed this 
was addressed through direct communications channels.  However, there was 
evidence to suggest that union representatives did express concerns in terms of 
being responsive to member needs, suggesting that direct channels were viewed by 
employees as being of limited effectiveness.  On the other hand, an area of 
involvement which was common across all three cases was significant involvement 
in discipline and grievance processes confirming WERS data which suggesting such 
issues now constitute a large proportion of the workload of representative bodies 
(Kersley, et.al, 2006)..  Respondents also discussed past incidents which were said 
to have been off the agenda and had emerged without consultation, for example the 
first phase of offshoring at NatBank, or the end of the final salary pension scheme at 
BuSoc. 
 
The research was also informed by an awareness of the critical literatures on 
partnership as well as labour process critiques of call centre working (for example 
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Kelly, 2004; Taylor and Bain, 1999) and these are discussed in detail in the 
following chapter.   The empirical data confirms that many of the topical issues 
raised in these literatures have indeed been captured through CIT, including 
controversies regarding redundancies, offshoring, performance/sales targets, as well 
as general pay and working conditions.  Moreover, attempts were made to capture 
views on these issues across cases, even where they may have not been raised as a 
specific „critical incident‟.  This was possible because of the heterogeneity of the 
case organisations selected.  The thesis also triangulates responses regarding the 
scope of decision making and agenda setting with other sources, for example by 
comparing accounts between different actors groups (management, union officials, 
employee representatives, employees), as well as with other data sources obtained 
such as internal and external documentation.  Finally, notwithstanding the potential 
criticisms of CIT, it is crucial to reiterate the main strength of CIT technique, in 
terms of eschewing glib, bland (and quite possibly meaningless) rhetorical 
responses from interviewees regarding whether partnership was „good‟ or not, in 
favour of context-rich responses, drawing upon detailed organisational examples to 
illustrate the „lived realities‟ of the partnership process. In addition, attitudes to 
recent „organisational dramas‟ cannot be obtained from survey questions, and the 
CIT technique allows respondents opinions to be placed in context, i.e. how they 
view the world.  The interviews also allowed insights into organisational history, 
and views of the organisation from long-serving employees compared to new 
recruits, and from the perspectives of older workers as well as young employees.  
The approach also enables comparisons to be made between the handling of a 
particular issue in one organisation compared with another, thus extending 
theoretical understanding (Chell, 1999).  
 
Accordingly, an interview schedule was designed outlining the topics to be covered 
but this was not followed rigidly even although all questions were covered during 
the course of most interviews.  Additional questions were also included where this 
was thought to be of value.  The interview covered a range of themes including 
(further details are available in the Appendix B): 
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 the rationale for partnership 
 understanding/meaning of partnership 
 partnership infrastructure 
 recent issues and decision-making processes under partnership 
 trilateral management-representative-employee relationships 
 climate of employee relations/change over time 
 outcomes of partnership of different actors 
 challenges, barriers and tensions 
 
All interviewees received an introductory letter outlining the aims of the project 
prior to the actual interviews (see Appendix A).  The objectives and format of the 
interviews were outlined at the start, as well as the opportunity to terminate the 
meeting at any time at the respondents request.  All were tape-recorded with the 
interviewees consent.  Though there are concerns that people may be less candid if 
they are being recorded, the approach offered several advantages.  Firstly, it meant 
the researcher could focus carefully on what people said during the interview 
process.  It also meant the interviews could be reviewed several times following the 
actual event, and attention could be paid to nuances such as humour or sarcasm.     
They were then transcribed verbatim personally by the researcher.  The major 
disadvantage of transcription is that it is very time consuming, though the negative 
effects of this were mitigated somewhat by combining periods of transcription with 
periods of analysis, and therefore not leaving piles of text to be analysed at the end 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003).  All respondents were also assured of anonymity.  
Interviews averaged 1 hour in length, with employee interviews normally taking 
around 45 minutes, while interviews with senior management figures typically 
lasted around 90 minutes.  Interviews with key stakeholders (e.g. organisational 
gatekeepers, senior officials) were often followed by a lunch, therefore providing 
the opportunity to check understanding, or ask additional questions outwith the 
formal context of the interview room.  Again, many of these informal conversations 
proved to be highly valuable.  Following the recommendations of King (1998) 
interviews began with open, „easy‟ questions such as a brief biography of their 
career, and their time with the organisation.  More „difficult‟ questions were 
introduced later in the interview when the interviewee was more relaxed.  Designing 
the schedules was iterative and amendments were made following initial interviews 
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when it became evident that some questions were inappropriate or required 
rephrasing.  For example, it became clear with the employee interviews that more 
time had to be spent „warming-up‟ the interviews, where management were keen to 
„dive-in‟ to the topic of discussion.  Nevertheless, it was useful to preface the core 
interview with such discussion as it allowed me to familiarise myself with their 
background and job role, and such context was valuable when interpreting the more 
specific questions which arose later in the interview.  In addition, while 
management and union respondents were happy to talk in terms of „partnership‟, 
such language was not necessarily familiar to all grassroots employees, although 
they were comfortable discussing more generally „the relationship between the bank 
and the trade union‟.       
 
Multiple and leading questions were consciously avoided.  Rather, clarification was 
sought in a less leading way e.g. can you explain a little more?  For example, a 
question such as ―You think the trade union is influential, do you‖ may provide a 
clue as to the expectations and/or views of the researcher.  Responses were 
occasionally repeated back to respondents in order to clarify and check 
understanding.  Other probing techniques included simply repeating the initial 
question, the use of silence or explanatory probes (such as asking what did you 
mean by…‟ (Easterby-Smith et.al, 1991).  A deliberate attempt was made by the 
researcher to appear impartial throughout.  An indication of the success perhaps, is 
that the majority of respondents remarked that they had actually enjoyed the 
interview experience, and many offered contact details should I require further 
clarification on any of the points raised. 
 
Some interviews were conducted by telephone.  Telephone interviews have 
advantages in terms of time and cost, as well as disadvantages in terms of the 
possibility of interviewee reluctance to participate, lack of non-verbal cues, 
difficulty controlling the pace, and reduced ability to ask complex questions 
(Saunders et.al, 2000).  For these reasons, telephone interviews were only conducted 
with interviewees whom I had already met on a face-to-face basis.  Their purpose 
was to clarify and supplement previous discussions, where a degree of trust and 
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integrity had already been established.  Telephone interviews were also recorded – 
with the permission of the respondent – and transcribed in full.     
 
Table 3.8 
Summary of interviewees 
Company Management  (Union)Representatives/Officials 
Employee Focus 
Groups 
NatBank 
(6) 
 
1 Director of Sales and Service 
1 Employee Relations Manager 
1 Admin Centre Site Manager 
1 Call Centre Manager 
2 Team Leader Group interviews 
 
(6) 
 
3 Union Full Time Officials 
3 Union representatives 
(4) 
 
4 focus groups from a 
range of functions 
BuSoc 
(10) 
 
1 Head of Personnel 
1 Personnel Consultant 
1 Employee Relations Manager 
1 Call Centre Manager 
1 Senior Lending Manager 
3 Lending Team Leaders 
2 Call Centre Team Leaders 
 
(7) 
 
1 Union General Secretary 
1 Union President 
1 Individual Case Officer 
1 Area Executive Officer 
3 Constituency Representatives 
(3) 
 
3 focus groups from a 
range of functions 
WebBank 
(5) 
 
1 HR Director 
1 Team Leader 
(5) 
 
1 Employee Forum Chair 
2 Full-time employee 
representatives 
3 Part-time forum representatives 
(6) 
 
6 employee focus 
groups from a range 
of functions 
 
 
Interviews of „ordinary‟ employees were conducted on a group basis.  According to 
Walker (1985, 5) ―The task of the group interviewer…is not to conduct interviews 
simultaneously, but to facilitate a comprehensive exchange of views in which all 
participants are able to speak their minds and respond to the ideas of others‖.  In 
particular, it has been suggested that group interviews have advantages when the 
emphasis is on experience, beliefs and attitudes, as well as on group interaction 
(Morgan, 1997).  It has also been argued that group interviews are especially useful 
in the call centre environment where employees routinely experience a high degree 
of monitoring and may view an interview as another monitoring exercise, and as 
such group interviews may be less intimidating, and generate a more open and 
richer dialogue (Richardson et.al, 2000).  These discussions were loosely moderated 
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by the researcher, but were deliberately flexible, in order to identify what employees 
themselves viewed as interesting.  Participants were selected randomly from similar 
departments, and of a similar level in the organisational hierarchy, although the 
interviewees were typically unknown to each other.  In all case organisations 
employee interviews were conducted in a neutral venue, normally a private meeting 
room.  Again, the researcher outlined the purpose of the research, anonymity and 
recording issues, and encouraged respondents to relax and initiate the discussion 
(Easterby-Smith et.al, 1991).      
 
Admittedly, a challenge of the group interview is the need to ensure that the 
discussion is not dominated by loquacious individuals, and that all participants had 
the chance to express their view, for example, by encouraging other quiet people to 
contribute (e.g. What do you think about this John?) or more generally (e.g. What 
do other people think about Jill‟s view?), (Torrington, 1991).  Another challenge is 
ensuring the topic of conversation does not lose focus.  A practical challenge of 
such a technique, is the tiring nature of the process, especially where interviews had 
been arranged back-to-back (Saunders et.al, 2000).  However, this situation seldom 
occurred, as a break was normally scheduled which allowed time to reflect upon the 
previous meeting, and to note down any emerging themes.  Another limitation is the 
potential for social pressures to limit the responses gained, and the possibility that 
some participants may be reluctant to express their views publicly (Easterby-Smith 
et.al, 1991, 106).  However, it was found that in many interviews some participants 
stayed behind after the main interview to discuss issues privately, or even spoke to 
me informally in the canteen to add something they did not want to say in the group 
situation. Therefore, despite these challenges, the advantages outweighed the 
disadvantages.  Due to the group nature of the discussion it allowed a variety of 
viewpoints to emerge, and for the group to counter and respond to the different 
views expressed.  It also enabled a greater number of employee views to be obtained 
within the time the organisation afforded to the researcher, as they  were 
understandably keen to minimise the disruption caused.   The researcher also has 
work experience in a call environment and was therefore able to empathise with 
some of the issues raised by respondents and provided an understanding of call 
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centre jargon.  This proved useful in terms of increasing the interviewers credibility 
in the interviewee‟s eyes, as well as providing a richer understanding of the context 
of the case study (Stake, 1995).   
 
Common criticisms of interviews include issues of reliability and bias.  Reliability 
concerns the lack of standardisation and the extent to which another interviewer 
would have obtained the same information (Easterby-Smith et.al, 1991).  This is 
strongly related to issues of potential bias, and the need for the interviewer to avoid 
projecting their own opinion, yet this is often quite difficult as demonstrating 
empathy with another person is a human way of building trust.  Although it is 
difficult to completely eliminate such issues from the interview process, an 
awareness of them helps to ensure that the risks are mitigated as much as possible.   
 
Table 3.9 
Primary research instruments 
Instruments Remarks 
Exploratory gatekeeper interview Sought background information about employment relations 
generally (see Appendix B) 
Document review Policies, rules, company documentation, presentations etc to 
give added depth to the data 
Rudimentary observation Observation during site visits of work environment, work process, 
interaction, site tours etc 
Formal observation Union meetings, BuSoc 
Management interviews (see Appendix B) 
Union official interviews (see Appendix B) 
Employee Focus Groups (see Appendix B) 
Representative interviews (see Appendix B) 
Observation of practitioner events IPA Partnership Seminar 24.11.04 
IPA Regional Partnership Workshop 14.04.05 
Unions 21 Partnership Seminar 
CIPD Annual Conference 2004 
 
 
Documentary evidence 
Documentary evidence is important both in its own right as well as for the purpose 
of triangulation (MacDonald and Tipton, 1993), and formed an important 
component of the data collection process throughout the study.  Even before initial 
Research methodology 
 
 
 
 139 
exploratory meetings with organisational gatekeepers, information was obtained on 
the company from business information databases (e.g. Datamonitor), media reports 
in the national and trade press (e.g. Financial Times/The Guardian), as well as 
information available freely on corporate websites (e.g. Annual Reports).  This was 
to ensure I could be reasonably familiar with recent issues in advance of the 
meetings with these busy people, and exploit fully the short interview times allotted 
with them.  Moreover, appearing knowledgeable and credible was important, given 
that I hoped to secure further access in the future. 
 
Again, during the main case study phases, the information included a variety of 
documents including annual reports, media reports, company magazines, corporate 
homepages, business information sources.  Often internal publications were 
obtained while waiting in the lobby for appointments.  Other internal documents 
were made available by interview respondents.   These included PowerPoint 
presentations, memos, reports etc.  At WebBank for example, employee 
representatives were happy to provide electronic copies of a variety of internal 
documents.  At BuSoc, the union provided me with a membership log-in, allowing 
me to access a wealth of information on the union intranet.  This included an archive 
containing minutes of meetings, newsletters, magazines as well as formal 
documentation such as the Personnel Handbook and union conference motions.  As 
a large union, the union at NatBank had a vast amount of information freely 
available on the internet.  Clearly, this provided useful additional evidence for the 
purposes of triangulation, and offered a wealth of both factual and attitudinal 
material.  Management also provided various sources of useful information, 
including the results of employee attitude surveys and reports on their plans in 
relation to the Information and Consultation Directive, which helped to augment 
and contextualise the information gathered through the interviews with senior 
managers, line managers, employees and union/employee representatives.  Overall, 
management were very co-operative regarding sharing documentation.  Hard copies 
were all stored for the duration of the project in administration box files for each 
organisation. 
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Other supplementary methods 
Additional information was gleaned from other methods.  At all case study sites a 
formal site tour was arranged, affording the opportunity to achieve a basic 
understanding of the work environment and the nature of the work undertaken.  
There was limited opportunity for some observation to be undertaken by sitting in 
on a Employee Representative Meeting at WebBank, and a union Area Council 
Meeting at BuSoc.  This was very useful to supplement the formal interviews, in 
terms of enhancing the context which is central to holistic understanding,  and also 
affords insights which respondents may not articulate in an interview because the 
routines are so taken for granted respondents are unaware of their importance 
(Patton, 2002).  For example, by attending the Area Council Meeting at BuSoc it 
quickly became clear that the discussions focused upon low level issues, whereas it 
is possible that representatives may not have expressed this in interviews, either 
because they do not perceive it in this way, or because they have a vested interested 
in presenting themselves as being actively involved.  Ideally, this method may have 
been used more widely, although unfortunately this approach is very difficult to 
arrange.  Nevertheless, this was supplemented by informal observations while 
carrying out the formal fieldwork interviews.  Indeed, even while having lunch in 
the canteen interviewees would join me to find out more about the purpose of the 
research, or to share reflections they had not thought off during the interview, or to 
express an opinion „off the record‟. 
 
Data analysis 
Detailed and systematic data analysis was undertaken.  As Eisenhardt states, 
―Analysing data is the heart of building theory from case studies, but it is the most 
difficult and least codified part of the process‖ (Eisenhardt, 1989, 532).  Fieldwork 
notes were written up immediately after the interview.  These were later fully 
transcribed and read and re-read (Yin, 2003).  In reality analysis begins during the 
actual site visits.  Fieldwork notes were made during visits and written up after 
discussions.  All interviews were fully transcribed personally by the researcher.  The 
transcripts were manually coded thematically in accordance with the research 
questions and interview guide.  For example, a section on „relationships‟ would be 
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highlighted as „R‟, or sentence on „barriers‟ coded „B‟ and so forth.  This provided a 
framework for the initial formal review of the data collected.  It was also thought to 
be essential to facilitate detailed analysis later. More detailed analysis resulted in the 
creation of more categories.  For example, the „relationships‟ category was divided 
into four, and the „issues‟ category was divided to reflect the particular issues 
frequently being raised by respondents in the particular context e.g. „pay‟ or 
„offshoring‟.  The transcripts were read several times to achieve a high level of 
familiarity and the interviews were also listened to several times to enhance and 
check understanding not always achievable from the text alone, for example in 
relation to use of humour or sarcasm.  However to minimise later mis-interpretation, 
during transcription such statements were marked with a markup language tag, such 
as (!) to indicated sarcasm and *laughs* to indicate humour.  Capitalisation was also 
used to indicate emphasis, for example, ―I just thought to myself that CANNOT 
happen‖.    
 
It has been suggested that case analysis should always precede cross-case analysis 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; Patton, 1990), and this was the approach taken in this 
study.  The concern was that by starting with cross-case analysis there is a danger 
that a contextual sense of the case as a „whole‟ risks being lost.  Within each case, 
transcripts were divided into five categories: senior manager; line manager; union 
officials; employee representatives; and employees.  Each was examined with the 
key themes in mind.  In other words, the analysis began with the individual, and was 
then raised vertically to the group level, and then compared horizontally to provide 
an insight into the organisation level.  Each empirical case was then written up in a 
similar format, following the guiding themes, in order to facilitate subsequent cross-
case analysis.  For the within-case analysis, each case is first treated as a 
comprehensive case in and of itself.  Then “Data are gathered so the researcher can 
learn as much about the contextual variables as possible that might have a bearing 
on the case…Once the analysis of each case is completed, cross-case analysis 
begins.  A qualitative, inductive, multi-case study seeks to build abstractions across 
cases‖ (Merriam, 1998 pp. 194-195). 
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Comparisons were then made between the three case organisations across the 
themes, as well as across categories of respondents.  The results of this process form 
the content of Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  Given the quantity of interviews, and the fact the 
research was a solo endeavour, it was decided not to engage in full coding of the 
data, as it was believed this could mean the researcher could potentially „lose sight‟ 
of the big picture.  It was also decided on this occasion not to use qualitative data 
analysis software.  Clearly such software may have advantages such as the 
automation of some clerical tasks, and auditability; as well as potential 
disadvantages such as potentially losing sight of the „whole‟, time needed to learn 
the software, as well as the software itself becoming a distraction activity. (St John 
and Johnson, 2000).  Ultimately it was decided that a combination of pen and paper, 
and word processor based analysis would suffice given the quantity of data which 
was to be analysed.  Indeed preliminary analysis began during the transcribing 
process.  Accordingly, „analysis‟ did not form a discrete phase of the research, with 
analysis and collection occurring concurrently (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Rather, analysis 
continued throughout the „writing-up‟ phase, echoing Hartley‟s sentiment that, 
―There are likely to be surprises and sense-making throughout the case study, right 
up to the last page of writing‖ (Hartley, 1994, 332).  An „audit trail‟ was also 
maintained by archiving email exchanges with research supervisors, as well as 
progress reports and minutes of meetings.  This proved extremely useful when 
trying to check how and when ideas had emerged or changed. 
 
Moreover, although there was no formal investigator triangulation (Denzin, 1970), 
discussions of my empirical data with my research supervisors, colleagues in the 
department, and delegates at conferences allowed me to refine my interpretation of 
the data over time.  Indeed, interaction with other researchers allowed me to 
question my own interpretation, as well as the opportunity to gain valuable practical 
tips and useful references.  The key advantage of the analysis process outlined is 
that it allowed the researcher to become deeply immersed in the interview data. 
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Problems encountered with the case studies 
The main obstacles concerned the slow process of securing access to organisations.  
This was typically a very long process, requiring a series of meetings and 
conversations with various actors, followed by a period waiting for authorisation by 
senior management.  However, persistence ensured that access was finally agreed to 
three interesting and suitable case organisations.  Once access was officially 
secured, there were still problems in securing access to relevant interviewees.  For 
example, despite senior management endorsement of the study, some line managers 
were unwilling to release employees for focus group discussions.  This was a 
particular issue at BuSoc where the call centre manager refused to co-operate, citing 
a lack of time to release employees, despite endorsement of the research by the 
Director of Corporate Personnel.  I proposed that there was no immediate need for 
the employee interviews, and that it could be arranged at a quieter time in the next 
month or two.  However, the manager suggested that there would never be a 
convenient time, despite assistance from the Employee Relations Manager to try and 
persuade him otherwise.  Thus, an alternative strategy had to be pursued, by 
extending my research to another similar department where it would be possible to 
interview employees.  Though this was not ideal, it was deemed the best alternative 
strategy given the circumstances.    I was keen to interview in the call centre 
environment for comparability reasons, and this was the environment I had focused 
on at WebBank and NatBank.  Liaising with my contact led to access being secure 
in the Lending Department at BuSoc.  Though not a call centre as such, it was the 
most similar working environment available, and a pragmatic decision was made to 
focus on this department instead.  After all, as Buchanan et.al (1998) argue, 
researchers sometimes have to adopt an opportunistic approach towards fieldwork in 
organisations, balancing what is desirable against what is possible, especially vis-à-
vis doctoral research. 
 
Finally some ethical issues should be raised.  All organisations were not named to 
each other, and a decision was taken to anonymise the company names in the 
research.  All interviewees were asked permission to record the interviews, and no 
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one declined this request.  All respondents were advised that all responses were 
anonymous and no single person would be identified in the reporting of the data. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The previous chapter argued that the partnership literature had become polarised, 
and that there was a need for a more sophisticated understanding of partnership, 
which explores the context, meaning and process of partnership in addition to the 
crude use of labour outcomes which may reveal little about the quality of 
employment relations.  Accordingly, the case study approach was deemed useful in 
order to establish a deeper understanding of partnership working in order to 
transcend the advocates/critics deadlock.  Given the concern with understanding 
how partnership plays out in different contexts, the nature of relationships, the way 
issues are handled, as well as actors experiences and outcomes a qualitative 
approach was thought to be essential.  In addition, exploring contextual variables 
was also important, in order to counter simplistic accounts of partnership which 
suggest it is either „all good‟, and fatalistic accounts which paint partnership as 
inevitably „bad.  A key issue was therefore to explore partnership in different 
organisational contexts, and as such a case study approach was deemed most 
appropriate. 
 
It is argued that the use of quantitative indicators to „measure‟ partnership are 
inherently problematic, and explain little about „why‟ outcomes may be the case.  
Rather, the research was influenced more by notions of critical realism and 
institutional theory, in that issues such as context, human agency, the role of social 
structures, and issues of causality were argued to be of importance (Ackers, 2002).  
This accords with case study research which is useful when exploring „how‟ and 
„why‟ questions, and when the emphasis is on understanding processes as they 
occur in context.  This is useful when exploring a concept such as partnership which 
is clouded by conceptual confusion.  Indeed, survey questions may reveal the 
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extensiveness of espoused practices but reveal little about how embedded the 
practices are, or how they are interpreted and operationalised in practice.   
 
In practice the research employed a range of research instruments, though the bulk 
of the data was collected through interviews.  These were inspired by the notion of 
critical incident technique which allowed focused discussions on recent 
organisational incidents and events.  This allowed excellent data to be obtained 
regarding actor interpretations of the process of partnership.  Interview data was 
supplemented with documentary evidence as well as formal and informal 
observation.  It is argued that this approach allowed a rich „feel‟ for the meaning, 
context and process of partnership to be obtained, in addition to the outcomes which 
are the focus of most other studies.  Of course all research has limitations.  It may 
have been useful to conduct more observational research, however, this was difficult 
to arrange because of confidentiality issues.  It may also have been useful to conduct 
an employee questionnaire in order to provide an insight into broad attitudes to 
partnership.  However, this was deemed to be beyond the scope of this particular 
project, as the primary aim was to address the gap in the literature regarding the 
detailed process and meaning of partnership in different contexts, whereas the 
outcomes have been explored at length already in existing studies.  
 
Overall, I am confident that the approach adopted compares favourably with other 
studies of partnership. The results and findings obtained by employing the 
aforementioned methods are outlined in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  Before presenting the 
findings, however, Chapter 5 provides some additional context by presenting an 
overview of some of the key issues in relation to service work, developments in 
British financial services, and call centre working, as an understanding of the 
sectoral context of the organisations is crucial if an informed and holistic 
understanding of employment relations is to be achieved. 
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Chapter 4: Employment relations in financial services 
 
Introduction 
 
There has been a significant rise in British private service sector employment, yet 
much partnership research, and indeed much industrial relations research, remains 
focused upon traditional manufacturing and public sector contexts.  This is 
surprising given that the UK economy is now dominated by industries such as 
retailing and financial services.  This chapter begins by providing some background 
to the rise in service sector employment in the UK, and considers the implications of 
this by providing an overview of the academic debates regarding service work. Here 
too it is argued that an appreciation of context is crucial, in order to fully understand 
organisational developments.  Accordingly, a ‘firm-in-sector’ approach is advocated 
(Smith et.al, 1991).  The following section therefore reviews recent developments in 
the British financial service sector which, it is argued, offers an excellent sector to 
explore partnership.  For example, distribution channels have changed, with branch 
networks declining in favour of large administration and call centres.  Arguably the 
scale of such sites partly explains why there is a much greater emphasis on 
representative participation compared to most other private sector organisations.  
Call centres in particular, with their distinctive labour process, emphasis on 
efficiency, and diverse workforce, provide an interesting context for employee 
representation.  More generally, the sector constitutes a very successful yet 
competitive component of the British economy, employing 6% workers, and is 
therefore a good indicator of the future of work in the UK.  Indeed, London is 
arguably the financial services capital of the world (The Guardian, 10.02.07).  The 
chapter begins by outlining general developments in the sector, before examining 
the industrial relations and human resource management issues.  Given that this 
particular study focuses primarily on the experiences of customer facing staff and in 
particular call agents within banks, the final section provides a brief overview of 
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general issues surrounding call centre work, and the academic debates call centre 
working has attracted. 
 
 
Towards a service economy? 
 
In the post war era, economists, management theorists and sociologists began to 
predict a shift away from industrial economies.  GK Galbraith, Daniel Bell and 
Peter Drucker predicted a ‘post-industrial society’ in which the majority of people 
will work in the service/information economy rather than traditional manufacturing.  
This was variously referred to as a shift towards a ‘post-industrial society’, 
‘information society’, ’new economy’ and ‘knowledge economy’ (Bell, 1973, 
Drucker, 1969; Toffler, 1971; Touraine, 1969).  For Bell (1973), it reflected stages 
of economic development from a pre-industrial (agricultural) economy, to an 
industrial (manufacturing) economy, and in turn to a post-industrial (service) 
economy. 
 
Certainly, there has been a significant trend in advanced economies from agriculture 
and manufacturing to services.  Service jobs now account for the great majority of 
employment in the UK.  In June 2005 there were 30.6 million  workforce jobs in the 
UK, of which 24.3 million of the workforce were in the service sector.  Service 
industries contribute over 70% GDP, account for 8 out of 10 jobs and employment 
has increased by 2 million since 1997 alone (Bach, 2005). A similar trend is evident 
in many other OECD countries with service sector employment exceeding 70% in 
Australia,  USA, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium (OECD, 
2000). 
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Distribution of all UK workplaces by industry
70%
12%
18%
Private sector services
Private sector manufacturing
Public sector
 
Figure 4.1 Distribution of UK workplace by industry. 
Source: Kersley et.al., 2005, 5 
 
Figures from WERS04 confirm the importance of service sector employment.  
Indeed, 70% of workplaces covered were operating in private sector services; an 
increase of 4% since 1998 (Figure 4.1), with only 12% workplaces operating in 
private sector manufacturing, and 18% in the public sector. 
  
Figure 4.2 Employment in UK Manufacturing and Services 1978-2005. 
Source: Labour force survey, Office of National Statistics 2006 
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As figure 4.2 reveals, the rise of service sector employment and the decline of 
manufacturing has been occurring for a long time, and service sector employment 
has exceeded manufacturing employment for at least thirty years.  Between 1978 
and 2005 employment in UK manufacturing has more than halved, while on the 
other hand, employment in services has increased by almost 50%.  This is perhaps 
more clearly expressed in terms of manufacturing-service employment ratio:  in 
1978 for every employee in manufacturing there were 2.31 in services; by 2005 
there were 7.3. 
 
Service work and the employment relationship  
However, it is not only the structural changes in the economy and the associated 
numerical importance which make service sector employment an important area of 
academic investigation.  Of particular interest is the fact that many service jobs 
involve contact with the customer thus adding a third party to the traditional 
management-worker dyadic (Korczynski, 2002).  For example, jobs which require a 
high degree of personal contact with customers often mean that employees are 
expected to manage their emotions in a way which is believed to reflect good 
service, and has been described as ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild, 1979).  As a 
result of the triangular relationship, and the fact that the employee may effectively 
become part of the service, management faces new challenges in trying to exert 
control over employee behaviour at work (Deery, 2005).   
 
It is commonly argued that customer service work is distinctive from manufacturing 
on five counts: intangibility, perishability, variability, simultaneous production and 
consumption, and inseperability (Herzenberg et.al, 1998; Korcznyski, 2002). (Table 
4.1).   
Table 4.1 
The Distinctiveness of Services 
Characteristics Remarks 
Intangibility Cannot be touched e.g. restaurant service 
Perishability Cannot be stored/stockpiled 
Variability Variable customer interactions and perceptions 
Simultaneous production and consumption Worker produces and customer consumes 
Inseperability Customer takes part in service process 
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Admittedly, not all service work would meet all of the above criteria.  However, it is 
suggested that customer service work in particular is likely to feature most of the 
above attributes, especially in relation to the potential for variability in the service 
encounter, as unlike manufactured products, services cannot be inspected before 
they are consumed (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994). The literature on service work is 
polarised between the prescriptive ‘new service management’ literature on the one 
hand, and critical research which paints a much more pessimistic picture 
(Korczynski, 2002). 
 
1. New service management 
In the 1970s Levitt (1972) argued for a ‘production-line’ line approach to services, 
suggesting that service industries could learn from manufacturing principles, such as 
the simplification of tasks, division of labour, tighter control and reduced discretion. 
By contrast, ‘new service management’ literature proposes an optimistic scenario. 
Schlesinger and Heskitt (1991) propose a cycle of good service, where satisfied 
customers will tolerate higher margins, pay employees more, increase employee 
morale and satisfaction, and in turn customer satisfaction. This has been described 
as the customer satisfaction-worker satisfaction mirror (Schneider and Bowen 1993; 
Heskett et.al, 1997).  This is contrasted with ‘old world’ production-line approaches, 
which are said to be inappropriate in services, on the grounds that narrow jobs lead 
to worker dissatisfaction, poor service quality and in turn low customer satisfaction 
(Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3 The Service Profit Chain 
Source: Heskett et.al (1997, 128) 
 
However, there are several limitations of the NSM literature.  Firstly, the concept is 
unitarist and underplays potential conflicts of interests, as the literature suggests a 
harmonious coalescence of interests around the customer.  The ‘empirical’ evidence 
of a worker satisfaction-customer satisfaction mirror is limited, and the take-up of 
these approaches is also limited.   
2. Critical school 
Conversely, critical research into service work suggests that the reality is likely to 
be low wages, poor training, high turnover, limit career paths and limited discretion.  
A good contrast with the NSM literature is argued by Ritzer and his 
McDonalidisation thesis.  He proposes that there are four main components of 
McDondaldisation: efficiency, calculability, predictability and control.  He critiques 
the production-line approach endorsed by Levitt (1972), arguing that it  leads to 
workers becoming ‘human robots’ (Ritzer, 1998, 64).  In stark contrast to the 
picture painted by the NSM writers, he argues that the reality is likely to be high 
control and deskilling.   In short, labour is a cost to be minimised.  Moreover, he 
High quality 
training 
Well-designed 
support systems, 
information, 
facilities 
Greater latitude to meet 
customer needs 
Clear limits on, and 
expectations of, employees 
Appropriate rewards and 
frequent recognition 
Satisfied 
employees 
Employee referrals 
of potential job 
candidates 
Careful employee and 
customer selection 
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suggests employee resistance to such jobs may be limited as they may have little to 
compare it to.  The competing perspectives are outlined in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 
Typologies of service sector employment relations 
New service management school Critical school 
HRM 
Empowerment 
Win:win:win 
 
McDonaldisation 
Alienating 
Cost-minimisation 
 
Schneider and Bowen (1993), Schlesinger and 
Heskett (1991), Heskett et.al (1997) 
Ritzer (1996, 1998), Hochschild (1983) 
 
Korczynski (2002) has challenged these views, and highlights the contradictory 
logics which often drive service work, namely management quests for 
rationalisation and customer orientation simultaneously.  This seems to suggest that 
a variety of different outcomes are possible.  In an effort to go beyond this 
‘either/or’ debate, Herzenberg et.al (1998) propose than in reality there are four 
different ways of organising service work.  At one end of the spectrum is tightly 
constrained work, where the focus is on economies of scale, tight supervision and 
limited training or career progression opportunities.  Typical examples include call 
centre work or fast food restaurants.  At the other end of the spectrum is high skill 
autonomous work, characterised by high education, high levels of training and low 
supervision, and examples include lawyers and academics.  In between are 
unrationalised labour intensive jobs and semi-autonomous jobs.  Examples of the 
former include cleaners, and clerical workers would be a good example of the latter.  
In sum, the rise of service work is an important phenomenon yet curiously service 
work attracts a disproportionately low amount of academic attention in IR.  Where 
attention has been given, debates have divided into two extreme camps: the 
optimistic new service management school and the critical school, however, as 
Korczynski (2002) suggests the reality is much more complex than this implies.  For 
this very reason, research into service work is even more necessary.  Before 
considering in detail the nature of the work central to this study, call centre working, 
the following section explains why a study of partnership in the financial service 
sector is particularly useful. 
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Firm-in-sector theory 
 
The research approach is to take a ‘firm-in-sector’ perspective (Smith et.al, 1990), 
in order to place organisational developments within the wider context in which 
they operate.  This approach draws upon aspects of both neo-institutional and 
contingency theory to demonstrate how, at the organisation level, management 
choice is constrained by a combination of internal capabilities and procedures, as 
well as the external environment.  Smith et.al (1990) suggest a complex interaction 
between the strategic development of firms, and particular sectoral dynamics and 
external networks.  Di Maggio and Powell (1983) argue that convergence between 
organisations need not necessarily be the result of a process of competitive 
elimination, but convergence may be due to attempts to confirm legitimacy rather 
than improve efficiency.  They argue that ‘institutional isomorphism’, where 
organisations seek to achieve rationality in a context of uncertainty, may occur in 
three ways.  Firstly, ‘coercive isomorphism’.  This concerns pressures from 
organisations and institutions as well as wider cultural expectations.  Secondly, 
‘mimetic processes’, where uncertainty encourages imitation, and as such models 
may be transferred due to employee migration, or the influence of consulting firms.  
Thirdly, ‘normative pressures’.  This concerns the pressures brought about by 
professions.  This could be the result of similar levels of educational attainment 
resulting in similar approaches being taken, and this could be reinforced by the 
experienced norms of the sector.  It could also relate to inter-organisational 
networks as the result of employees migrating between organisations, or sharing 
experiences and benchmarking ‘best practice’ with other organisations.   In the 
finance sector such forces can be identified.  The sector is heavily regulated by 
government legislation, the independent Financial Service Authority (FSA), the 
European Union, voluntary Banking Codes and the British Bankers Association.  
Managerial networks and benchmarking exercises are also common.  Traditionally, 
the finance sector has also been characterised by a strong professional identity, 
underpinned by a focus on internal labour markets and promotion, and the concept 
of creating ‘well-rounded bankers’. 
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The international importance of the City of London is also a good example of 
institutional dynamics in action, demonstrating an example of an ‘economic cluster’ 
where businesses are seen to gain by being in close proximity to one another.  
Although, technology may mean that banks can ostensibly be located anywhere, and 
there are significant cost savings in locating out of London, almost all banks have 
offices here.  Indeed, when Virgin began Virgin Direct, the intention was to save 
costs by locating in Norwich, although ultimately they also opened a head office in 
London despite initial plans not to.   The advantages in terms of professional 
networking and access to professional services was deemed to exceed the 
disadvantages of not having a presence in the capital.  In other words, you have to 
have a presence in London to be a respected member of the ‘club’ (The Economist, 
19.10.2006).  
 
Of course the notion of conformity and isomorphism does not mean individual 
organisational initiatives do not occur.  The organisational change literature makes a 
distinction between planned change and emergent change (Burnes, 2004).  The 
difference is illustrated by the planned freeze-unfreeze-refreeze model proposed by 
Lewin (1947), and arguments that change is inherently political and emergent 
(Dawson, 1994; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993), or even transformational (Kanter et.al, 
1992). In short, the ‘firm-in-sector’ approach suggests the possibility of a middle 
ground between “sector determinism and unconstrained volition” (Child and Smith, 
1987, 371), a pure institutional isomorphism view, and a resource based view which 
tends to underplay the importance of institutional factors.  Rather, the firm-in-sector 
view suggests a much more complex dynamic exists, as a result of interactions 
between firms and their rivals, as well as with external actors and networks.  It is 
therefore argued that sector exerts a strong influence upon market structure, 
technology and work organisation, and that sectoral institutions are also important 
in shaping human resource management and industrial relations policies.  This 
chapter therefore provides a picture of the external environment in which the firms 
operate, while an overview of the internal environment of each organisation is 
provided in the respective case study chapters.   
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The UK financial service sector 
 
The financial service sector is undoubtedly an important component of the UK 
economy, and a leading edge UK industry.  In a list of the ‘World’s Most Respected 
Companies’ by the Financial Times, the UK top ten has four financial service 
organisations, three of which are banks (RBS, HSBC and Barclays) (Financial 
Times, 2005).  US business magazine Forbes list of the UK’s 40 largest companies 
is dominated at the top by banks: HSBC, the Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, 
HBOS and Lloyds TSB occupy five of the top seven spots. Broadening the 
definition slightly to include other financial service organisations suggests that 
fifteen of the 40 largest UK companies (a metric of sales profits, assets and market 
value) today are financial firms, as illustrated in Table 4.3 (Forbes, 2005). 
 
Table 4.3 
Forbes List of UK’s Largest Companies 
Companies Metric 
Banking 
HSBC 
Royal Bank of Scotland 
Barclays 
HBOS 
Lloyds TSB 
Standard Chartered 
Alliance and Leicester 
Northern Rock 
 
1 
4 
5 
6 
7 
22 
30 
35 
Other financial services 
Axa 
Friends Provident 
Legal and General 
Prudential 
Royal and Sun Alliance 
 
 
9 
36 
19 
18 
32 
Source: Forbes 2005, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2005/181/Industry_1.html 
 
 
Judged in terms of market value, financial firms including HSBC, Royal Bank of 
Scotland and HBOS are all top 10 UK organisations.  Again, if the category is 
broadened to include life insurance companies, Aviva, Prudential, Old Mutual and 
Legal are General are all in the top 50 in terms of market value (Financial Times, 
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2005).  In terms of employment, financial services now accounts for 4% of UK 
workplaces, employing 6% employees (Kersely et.al, 2006). 
Figure 4.4 Employment in financial services. 
Source: Office of National Statistics, 14.03.06 
 
Figure 4.4 reveals the increase in employment from under 300, 000 in 1978 to over 
600,000 in 2005, and in 2001 financial and business services accounted for 20% 
jobs in the UK compared with around 10% jobs in 1981.  This makes it the sector 
with the highest growth in these two decades, as part of the post-war growth in 
services and decline in manufacturing (ONS, 2002).  UK banks are also major 
employers, as illustrated in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4 
Employment in the UK’s largest banks 
Banks Employees 
Barclays 113,000 
HSBC 284,000 
NatWest 33,000 
RBS Group 137,000, 102,000 
HBOS 72,000 
Abbey National 20,000 
Total 659,000 
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In addition to their importance in terms of employment and contribution to the 
economy, banking organisations are generally highly profitable businesses. Recent 
profit reports are  reported in Figure 4.5 below, offering a stark contrast to declining 
manufacturing industries. 
Figure 4.5 UK bank profits 2005 
Source: Company Reports  
 
 
History and industry development: towards a new banking model? 
Change in the banking sector has been the result of various environmental 
influences including globalisation, de-regulation, competition, new technology and 
the economic climate (Wilkinson and Holden, 2001).  Deregulation resulted in an 
increase in competition, and in return banks began to focus on marketing, 
profitability and service quality.  Secondly, technological advances meant the 
development of new delivery channels, less reliance on the branch network and 
changes in the cost structure of the banking relationship (Gardener et.al, 1999).  
Before considering the human resource management implications, the following 
section considers three main changes in detail: the market, delivery systems and 
marketing orientation.  The key characteristics are summarised in table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 
Evolution of banking 
 Traditional banking New banking 
1. Market characteristics - Oligopoly 
- Stable growth 
- Unsophisticated market 
- High barriers to entry 
- Personal sector relatively neglected 
- Highly competitive 
- Turbulent 
- Sophisticated market 
- Barriers to entry come down 
- Erosion of traditional demarcation 
- Personal sector courted assiduously 
2. Delivery systems - Extensive branch network 
- Branch network oriented 
- Reorganisation and reduction of 
branches 
- Utilisation of IT 
- 24-hour banking 
- Direct banking 
3. Marketing orientation - Mass market 
- Pricing based on cost 
- Diversity of activity 
- Product oriented 
- Collection of deposits 
- Cheque and cash handling 
- Loans 
- Full suite of basic services at all main 
branches 
- Market segmentation 
- Market position 
- Pricing based on perceived benefit 
- Focus on markets 
- Customer oriented 
- Proliferation of products but selectively 
targeted at segmented markets 
Source: Adapted from Gardener et.al (1999, 90) and Storey (1995) 
 
Market developments 
Traditional retail banking in the UK was characterised by an oligopolistic market 
whereby banks operated a cartel and price competition was limited.  High cost 
branch networks acted as an effective barrier to entry, and as such there was steady 
growth and the major players were lightly profitable. The market was traditionally 
demarcated but this ended with organisations offering a range of products and 
services. Legislation has since been changed to encourage greater competition in the 
sector and to provide better customer service.  Until the 1980s, building societies 
operated in a market by themselves, enjoyed tax privileges, with interest rates 
published by the Building Societies Association.  Their main business was 
providing loans for house purchase, and there was little price competition. 
Competition was mainly through the branch network and advertising.  In the 1980s, 
banks entered the home loan market and eroded the building society monopoly.  
The 1986 Building Societies Act also allowed building societies to develop their 
diversification strategies into unsecured lending, property investment, estate agency, 
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insurance brokering and personal pensions.  Deregulation exposed the clearing 
banks to competition, in what had previously been a clearly demarcated market. The 
personal market was also relatively neglected.  Banks, other financial institutions 
and even non-banking organisations began to compete for the same market.  In 
particular, new entrants were cherry picking the most lucrative segments of the 
market and therefore operating on a much lower cost-income ratio.    Increased 
competition led banks to focus on increasing profitability and retaining existing 
customers. 
 
Essentially, there was a convergence with organisations now attempting to cross-sell 
entire ranges of financial service offerings rather than just focus on a select few.  
Consumers are also now more sophisticated and able to compare products through 
the media e.g. newspapers and internet comparison sites such as 
http://www.moneysupermarket.com/ and consumer advice sites such as 
http://www.moneysavingexpert.com.  Banks, which traditionally benefited from a 
combination of loyalty and inertia, now have to deal with more savvy consumers.  
This is illustrated by recent controversies regarding potentially unlawful bank 
charges, and confusing interest rates on credit agreements.   Banks have also merged 
in order to reap scale economies: HSBC and Midland (1992), Halifax and Bank of 
Scotland (2001), Lloyds Bank and TSB (1995), Royal Bank of Scotland and 
NatWest (2001).  In short, retail banks have become increasingly cost-conscious, as 
new competitors have entered the market without an expensive branch network have 
selected only the most lucrative segments of the market.  This has put pressure on 
the clearing banks to reduce costs.   Key challenges have included pressures on 
profitability, competition and technology.  
 
Restructuring delivery systems 
Traditionally the branch network was important in order to facilitate physical 
financial transactions, and acted as a barrier to entry.  Recently, technological 
developments have seen a shift towards less reliance on physical branch transactions 
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in favour of electronic transactions, and increased use of telephone banking and 
online banking services.  Table 4.6 illustrates the rise in internet/telephone banking. 
 
Table 4.6  
Evolution of Telephone and Internet Banking in the UK 
Name Parent  Established 
First Direct HSBC (since 1992) 1989 
Capital One UK Capital One Corp 1995 
Egg Prudential 1996 
Smile Co-operative Bank 1999 
Intelligent Finance HBOS 2000 
Cahoot Abbey 2000 
 
Thus, branch networks are no longer a barrier to entry as a result of developments in 
technology.  New competition from e-banks, such as First Direct, has led traditional 
banks to question the cost effectiveness of their expensive branch infrastructure, 
however closing branches is bad for publicity. This has led traditional banks to 
reconsider how to best utilise the floor space (Gardener et.al, 1999).  This has 
included the closure of many branches as illustrated in Table 4.7.   
 
Table 4.7 
Branch rationalisation in the UK 
Group Branches % Change 
 1989 
 
1995 
 
2003 
 
1989-
1995 
1995-
2003 
1989-
2003 
Top 10 Building Societies*  1699 1478 1403 -13 -5.1 -17.42 
Top 6 Bank Groups** 12659 10406 8077 -17.8 -22.4 -36.2 
Top 10 converted building societies*** 3473 3348 2702 -3.6 -19.3 -22.2 
Source: Leyshon et.al 2004 
 Nationwide, Britannia, Yorkshire, Portman, Skipton, Leeds & Holbeck, Derbyshire, Coventry, West Bromwich and 
Chelsea 
 Barclays, HBOS, HSBC, Lloyds-TSB, RBS-NatWest 
 Abbey National (1989), Alliance and Leicester (1997), Birmingham Midshires (1999), Bradford and Bingley 
(2000), Bristol and West (1997), Cheltenham and Gloucester (1995), Halifax (1997), National Provincial (1996), 
Northern Rock (1997), and Woolwich Equitable (1997). 
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Research by Leyshon et.al (2004) suggests that there has been a continuous decline 
in bank branches since the late 1980s, with banks closing 36% of their branches, 
converted building societies 22% and mutual building societies 17% during the 
period 1989-2003.  Between 1995-2003 banks closed 22% of branches, converted 
building societies 19% and building societies 5%.  They argue that investor pressure 
to cut costs may explain the different rates of closure, combined with intense 
competitive pressure and the availability of new distribution channels.  Changing 
consumer behaviour is another possible factor.  However, their research did suggest 
corporate governance played a key role, with PLCs under intense pressure to reduce 
costs and boost profits.  Restructuring has occurred with a system of lead branches, 
shifting back office functions to large regional processing centres.  Lead branches 
avoid the costs involved with replication of expensive management skills, while 
processing centres encourage economies of scale (Gardener et.al, 1999). Branches 
have been redesigned and have become loss leading sales outlets, redecorated to 
offer a more open, friendly retail environment (Storey, 1995), in contrast to the 
traditional austere, high security environment. 
 
Development of a sophisticated marketing orientation 
Traditionally banks aimed to have presence in most financial markets and adopted a 
mass marketing approach.  Emphasis has begun to shift to focusing upon more 
favourable markets where the bank can earn the highest rates of return, and the 
emergence of specialisation in particular markets where it is believed a competitive 
advantage can be achieved over competitors.  Whereas previously the aim was to 
have representation across most product lines, banks have streamlined their product 
lines, and started to focus upon particular market segments.  The growth of niche 
marketing is strongly related to developments in information technology which 
allow detailed insights into their customer profile and behaviour. 
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Implications for human resource management and employment 
relations 
 
This section considers the implications of the business strategy and environmental 
changes for human resource management. For Cressey and Scott (1992, 95)  a 
combination of these factors has led to a “paradigm shift in employment relations”.  
Six main factors shall now be outlined in turn: culture change; pay; staffing; work 
organisation; skills and careers, and industrial relations, and are also summarised in 
Table 4.8. 
 
Culture change 
Firstly, it is important to outline the general shift in banking culture.  In the post-war 
era the expansion of employment, had enabled the development of stable 
paternalistic industrial relations, with a tradition of lifelong careers and for men in 
particular steady promotion through the ranks.  Cressey and Scott (1992) describe 
the dominant culture as one of deference, loyalty and risk aversion.  Employment 
relations were characterised by low levels of conflict, high job security and 
oligopolistic competition, and an IR culture of cosy staff associations. Since the 
recession of the early 1990s, controlling costs has become an important strategic 
priority. (Morris et.al, 2001). This required a change in culture from the traditional 
conservative approach, towards a more dynamic culture of performance (Cressey 
and Scott, 1992), and an emphasis on customer service (Terry, 2003).  Traditional 
banking was less cost-conscious or profit orientated, with an emphasis was on 
technical skills and lending competence.  However, there has been a shift towards a 
market-orientated culture, stressing sales ability as well as technical skill (Gardener 
et.al, 1999) 
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Table 4.8 
Summary of HR/IR Change in British banking 1989- 
Dimension Traditional Banking -1989 New Banking 1989- 
1. Culture 
Culture change from conservative, risk averse, 
stable, paternalistic, cautious, hierarchical, 
command oriented 
Dynamic, creative risk takers 
Marketing and sales orientation, 
commercial, flexible, 
performance-oriented, 
Commitment-oriented, HRM, 
TQM, EI 
Cost efficiency 
2. Pay 
Stable, incremental pay system 
Uniform pay and conditions 
Cost of living increases 
Multi-employer bargaining outside the workplace 
Wages out of competition 
Introduction of PRP 
Individual performance 
management 
Inter-bank wage competition 
Localised pay 
Pay freezes/limited rises 
1987 end national CB 
3. Staffing 
Secure, lifetime employment for career bankers 
Two-tier recruitment for clerical workers and 
trainee managers 
Steady recruitment and growth 
Paternalistic welfare policies 
Less secure, segment labour 
markets 
Rationalisation 
Jobs lost to technology 
Segmented recruitment policies 
Agency and part-time staff 
Offshoring 
4. Work organisation High street branches 
Repetitive back office work 
Taylorised processing factories 
‘Satelliting’/regional hubs 
Flexibility 
High street ‘Finance Shops’ 
5. Skills, training, career 
Emphasis on lending skills and administration 
Job evaluation and multiplicity of job grades 
Steady promotion 
Internal labour markets 
‘All round bankers’ 
Increasingly specialised and 
fragmented 
Fewer job grades 
Diminution promotion 
opportunities 
Reduce managerial 
responsibilities 
Recruitment of specialists 
Multiple tier entry 
6. Industrial relations and 
governance 
Non-unionised until 1960s 
Significant growth 
Main role played by staff associations 
Rivalry between staff associations and BIFU 
Few disputes/industrial action 
Steady union density 
Moderate employer support for collectivism 
Stable/co-operative traditions 
Containment of trade unions 
Maintenance of staff associations 
Consultation rather than 
negotiation 
‘Take-it-or –leave it’/hard-nosed 
Direct employee involvement 
First industrial action 
Uncertainty about grassroots 
discontent 
Union unity/mergers 
Source: Adapted from Cressey and Scott, 1992 and Storey, 1995, 27). 
 
 
Pay 
In terms of pay, multi-employer bargaining collapsed in the sector in the late 1980s, 
followed by a shift to company level bargaining and subsequently towards 
bargaining at the business unit level.  Traditionally, pay was set by an incremental 
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ladder with rises annually between ages 16 and 31, and normally a cost of living 
increase.  Since the late 1980s this has diminished when NatWest introduced 
performance related pay contingent upon profits, meeting targets and acceleration 
up the pay scales (Storey, 1995), resulting in a  decline in collective bargaining.   
There has been a shift towards a culture of targets, bonuses and performance-related 
pay, and as such pay remains controversial in the sector.  At HSBC in 2005 for 
example, a 24-hour walkout was staged over a pay dispute: the first in eight years.  
Amicus claimed that – despite record profits of £9.6bn, 55% of workers received no 
pay rise or a pay rise below the rate of inflation. HSBC, however, argued that 60% 
staff received a pay rise (BBC News, 27.05.05) Amicus also balloted workers at 
Lloyds TSB in February 2005, over a pay offer it claimed would mean 10% 
employees facing a pay freeze for the third consecutive year.  The problem involved 
high long-serving high-performing staff located at the top of their salary scale, who 
had become frustrated not receiving any pay rises (EIRO, 2005).  
 
Staffing 
Traditionally, a job in a bank was considered to be a ‘job-for-life’, recruiting school 
leavers long-term until retirement.  In the 1970s, banks introduced a three tier 
recruitment system: O-level holders; A-level holders and graduates.  Emphasis is 
now on recruiting to specific functions rather than rounded ‘general bankers’ 
(Storey, 1995)  As highlighted earlier, the sector has also been characterised by job 
cuts.  In 2005, large scale job cuts were announced at Abbey, Lloyds, TSB, 
Clydesdale and Yorkshire Bank, with Amicus balloting members for strike action at 
HSBC and Lloyds TSB.  At Abbey job cuts were related to the merger with Spanish 
Banco Santander, at Clydesdale and Yorkshire Banks this was related to branch 
closures, with plans to close 100 of their 449 branches.   
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Work organisation 
Attempts have been made to shift the focus of branch staff to generation of sales as 
well as a customer service, and tellers have increasingly been taking on roles as 
‘personal bankers’ or ‘financial consultants’(Storey et.al, 1999).  Regional 
processing centres have been introduced for back office activities with Taylorised 
factory-like modes of working. However, financial service call centres have often 
been viewed  often as high volume and low-value added, and therefore most prone 
to off shoring (see Table 4.9).  Labour typically accounts for over 70% of a call 
centres costs, and as such lower costs in terms of labour, IT and rent have 
contributed to an interest in off-shoring to low cost economies, where it is estimated 
that costs can be reduced by 30-40%.   
Table 4.9 
Offshoring activity of UK financial service organisations. 
Company To  Activities  
Lloyds TSB India (2003) Call centre operations 
HSBC India, Malaysia, China, Phillipines (2000) Back office processes 
Abbey India (2002) Back office processes, call centre 
Liverpool Victoria Global IT  
Norwich Union/Aviva India (2002) Call centre operations 
Zurich India Call centre operations 
Royal and Sun Alliance India/Global Software development 
Allianz Cornhill India Business processes, IT 
Scottish Widows India Back office processes 
Scottish Provident India Data processing  
BUPA India Invoice processing  
Axa India Back office processes 
Barclays India (2003) Back office processes, IT 
JP Morgan Chase India Investment analysts  
Capital One India (2002) Call centre operations 
Prudential  India (2004) Back office processes 
Goldman Sachs India (2003) IT, back office processes 
Source: Leyshon et.al, 2004 
 
However, some of the major banks most notably RBS, HBoS, NatWest, Northern 
Rock and Nationwide have remained publicly negative regarding off shoring.  The 
Chief Operating Officer of Northern Rock has suggested that  “For us, the cost 
savings of moving to India would be relatively modest compared with the risk of not 
being able to control these operations” (Press release).  Similarly The COO at 
Alliance and Leicester has stated that "I believe passionately that when a customer 
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contacts us they should be dealing with one of our own staff, trained and managed 
by us and with a dedicated focus on our customers' needs and our products and 
services…others might be happy to use call centres in overseas locations, but we 
don't intend to," (Company press release). An HBoS statement also claimed that 
“The call centre operator is the voice of the company. It’s a big enough challenge 
to ensure that all of our people in the UK are aware of changes in everyday issues, 
without having to worry about an operation that is 3,000 miles away” (Company 
press release). 
 
Although calls to make payments or query account balances are important to the 
customer, to the banks they have been perceived as a cost.  Accordingly, there has 
been an emphasis on the use of efficiency-enhancing technology.  Strategically, 
there has been an attempt to make call centres less of a cost centre, by trying to ‘add 
value’ to calls.  For example, a routine balance enquiry could result in the 
opportunity to find out more about a customer situation and to proactively offer 
additional products and services.  Negative attitudes in the UK to outbound cold 
calling mean that inbound operators are increasingly required to try and ‘add-value’ 
by cross-selling/up-selling during calls from the customer.  Most call centre workers 
are based on the telephone, with other means of customer contact (e.g. email, web, 
fax and letter) accounting for less than 9% of a typical call centres work.  Staff 
attrition is often an issue, attributed to relatively low pay and high work intensity.  
 
Skills, Training and Career Development 
Changes in banking have also contributed to changes in skill requirements and 
career paths.  There is no longer a uniform standard ‘rounded’ banking career, due 
to a preference in recruiting for specific functions and at different levels, such as 
graduate fast track, or data processing/call agents.  There has also been a growth in 
the employment agency staff, females and part-time workers.  In terms of skill 
demands there has been a shift away from administrative and clerical competence 
towards more proactive sales roles, and this has resulted in resistance from long-
service staff (Storey et.al, 1999).   
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Worker representation and enterprise governance 
The recognition of trade and staff unions in financial services can be traced back to 
the 1960s, and membership has been relatively robust (Gall, 1993). This has been 
attributed to factors including moderate employer support, increasing employment 
concentration in large centres (obviously excluding the branch network) and 
considerable employment growth from the post war period until the end of the 
1980s.  Employee representation in the finance sector has been characterised by one 
main union and numerous staff associations.  The main industrial union was the 
Banking Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU), known as the National Union of 
Bank Employees (NUBE) prior to 1979, with origins prior to this in the Bank 
Officers Guild (BOG).  UNIFI was formed by a merger of three unions in 1999: 
Banking Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU), National Westminster Staff 
Association (NWSA) which organised NatWest staff, and UNiFI from Barclays (the 
former Barclays Group Staff Union).  The Lloyds TSB union remains independent 
and is not affiliated to the TUC, and UNIFI merged with Amicus in 2005.  There are 
also many building society staff associations.  There has been a historical rivalry 
between the historically moderate, cautious, approach of building society staff 
associations as opposed to banks, although even BIFU was considered to be a fairly 
moderate union (Gall, 2001).   
 
As the table below illustrates, most of the largest financial service UK organisations 
recognise trade unions and/or staff associations.  Indeed, in 2004 72% of financial 
services workplaces recognised trade unions, and aggregate union density was 32% 
(Kersley et.al, 2005, 119).  Comparable figures in manufacturing were 23% and 
31% respectively.  In addition, 56% of financial services workplaces have a union 
density greater than 50%, compared to only 11% in manufacturing.  However, it 
must be noted that the categorisation of financial services combines insurance and 
banking, but as the study notes, density is typically much higher in banking than in 
insurance.  Nevertheless, besides privatised public utilities, financial services is 
interesting as it is the only private sector industry where union recognition is the 
norm.  (Kersley et.al, 2005, 120).  In 2004 85% of financial services workplaces had 
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arrangements for employee representation, in turn making representation available 
to 80% employees in the sector.   
 
Table 4.10 
Representation and consultation in financial services 
Indicator Financial 
services 
Manufacturing All workplaces 
Membership density 32% 31% 34% 
Recognition 72% 23% 30% 
JCC 62% 25% 38% 
Any arrangement for 
representation (% 
workplaces*) 
85% 37% 49% 
Any arrangement for 
representation* 
(% employees) 
80% 71% 71% 
Incidence of collective 
bargaining (% workplaces) 
63% 20% 27% 
Incidence of collective 
bargaining (% employees) 
49% 39% 40% 
Source: Kersely et.al, 2006, 111-133. 
 
* Indicates presence one of one of the following: recognised union, joint consultative committee, lay-union representative or 
stand alone non-union representative.   
 
This compares favourably with the private sector average of 47% and 61% 
respectively (Kersley et.al, 2005, 133).  Non-union banks are certainly in the 
minority, and include organisations such as internet banks Capital One and Egg, and 
the building society, Bristol and West.  Nevertheless, most non-union financial 
service organisations also have formal representative structures, such as the Partners 
Council at Bristol and West, and the ‘LINK’ representative council at Standard Life. 
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 Organisation Union 
recognised 
Nos 
covered 
Partnership Date signed Sources 
1 Abbey National ANGU 28,500 Yes  Informal IPA (2004), IRS (2003) 
2 Alliance and Leicester ALGUS, CWU 6,300    
3 AMP UK Amicus 6,000    
4 Aviva CGNU 34,000    
5 Axa Insurance Amicus 5,000 Yes   1998 (Unifi, 2002) (TUC, 2001) 
6 Axa Sun Life Amicus 2,300    
7 Bank of Scotland Amicus 20,000 See Halifax   
8 Barclays Bank Amicus 50,000 Yes 1998, 2000, 2005 Unifi, 2002), Wills (2002) 
9 Bradford and Bingley BS UBBS 4,000    
10 Britannia BS BSU 3,000    
11 Churchill Insurance Amicus 5,000 see RBS   
12 Clydesdale Bank Amicus 5,000    
13 Co-operative Bank Amicus 4,100 Yes  1997 Bacon and Storey (2000) (Unifi, 2002)  
14 Co-operative Insurance Society Amicus 4,900    
15 Cornhill Insurance Amicus 3,500    
16 Halifax  Accord 25,000 Yes   (HBOS, 2005) 
17 HSBC Amicus 39,000  1997  
18 Legal and General Amicus 7,800 Yes  1997 (Gall, 2001; Haynes and Allen, 2001, Kelly, 2004a) 
19 Lloyds TSB Amicus, LTU 72,000 Yes  1997 (Gall, 2001)  
20 Nationwide BS NGSU 15,000 Yes   (Informal) 
21 Natwest Amicus 47,500 Yes  1996 (Gall, 2001; Knell, 1999; Kelly, 2004a) 
22 Northern Rock Amicus  3,500    
23 Royal and Sun Alliance Amicus 22,800 Yes  2002 (Unifi, 2002) 
24 RBS Amicus 70,000    
25 Scottish Provident Amicus 1,000    
26 Woolwich WISA 6,500 see Barclays   
27 Yorkshire Bank Amicus 5,000    
28 Yorkshire BS Amicus 1,900    
29 Zurich UFS 4,000    
Union recognition in UK financial service organisations 
Table 4.11  Adapted from Gall (2001),IDS 892 (2003), IRS (2003), Unifi (2002) and company reports.  Partnership organisations in bold 
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Historically, employment relations in the sector have been generally calm; however 
during the 1990s the sector was “far from strike free and docile” (Gall, 2001). 
Union density peaked at 54% in 1994, in stark contrast to the general industrial 
relations trends of the time.  This was in response to major business changes 
including attempts to extend branch opening hours and the introduction of 
performance related pay, and the resulting “restructuring and erosion of the 
psychological contract in the finance sector” (Gall, 2001, 361). 
 
Table 4.12 
Rise of disputes and calls for industrial action  in UK banking 
Organisation Date Reason 
Barclays 1995 Pay 
Clydesdale 1995 Pay 
Lloyds TSB 1996 Pay 
Midland 24 December 1997 Working hours 
Royal Bank of Scotland 24 December 1997 Working hours 
Yorkshire Bank 24 December 1997 PRP 
Clydesdale Bank 24 December 1997 PRP 
Barclays November 1997 Pay freeze/PRP 
Source: Media reports 
 
Towards partnership in the finance sector? 
Following a hostile period of industrial relations in the sector, several organisations 
signed partnership agreements with the trade unions, in an apparent 
acknowledgement of the untenable nature of a poor employment relations climate.  
In particular service organisations are especially vulnerable to the bad media 
publicity strikes attract. Poor IR in a context of industrial action and job cuts 
appeared to be the impetus at Barclays, Co-operative Bank, NatWest and Lloyds 
TSB.  In some other cases, including Legal and General and Scottish Widows, the 
rationale appeared to be slightly different, in that they were attempting to cement 
existing relationships (Gall, 2001).  It is noteworthy that despite the popularity of 
partnership deals in the sector the main omissions appear to be HSBC, RBS Group 
and National Australia Group.      
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Figure  4. 6 Countervailing forces in the banking sector? efficiency, equity and voice (Budd, 2004). 
 
Cressey and Scott (1992) suggest that employment levels, career structure and 
industrial relations were the ‘three pillars’ of stability in the banking sector.  
Recently, they argue, this has been undermined, and the paternalism-loyalty quid 
pro quo no longer exists between the employer and the employee.  As this chapter 
has illustrated, the changing environment has resulted in a major drive to improve 
operating efficiencies.  As Gardener et.al (1999) reflect: 
 “The UK banking system is probably the most strongly market-oriented, 
shareholder value influenced in Europe…The single most important issue 
facing clearing banks in the future will be pressures on profitability and the 
need to improve shareholder value” (Gardener et.al, 1999, 94). 
 Returning to the framework outlined in Chapter 2, these developments may be 
conceptualised as issues of efficiency, equity and voice.  Traditional banking 
appeared to represent a fairly stable context of moderate efficiency, in a context of 
high barriers to entry and modest competition in an oligopolistic market.  
Employment practices were stable and paternalistic, with a tradition of lifetime 
employment, steady promotion and welfare oriented personnel policies.  In other 
words, they also exhibited a high degree of equity.  There was also a dual system of 
voice with multi-employer bargaining outside the workplace, and workplace 
representation through a system of trade unions and staff associations.  The shift to 
new banking, however, may be conceptualised as a sudden lurch in the 1990s to an 
Voice 
 
Efficiency             Equity 
Post war stability 
1990s 
instability/ 
radical change 
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efficiency focus.  The recent announcement by First Direct to levy a charge on their 
current accounts is further evidence of attempts to improve efficiency, and to 
counter the challenges of consumer bad debt and increasing regulation (Financial 
Times, 16.11.06).  Paternalistic employment policies have been modified, in 
attempts to foster a dynamic commercial culture. In the 1990s, voice was already 
under threat with attempts at managerial unilateralism and resulting union and 
employee dissatisfaction, culminating in industrial action during the middle of the 
decade (see Table 4.13).   
 
Table 4.13 
Efficiency, equity and voice in UK banking 
 Traditional banking - 1989 New banking – 1990+ 
Efficiency Moderate (stable markets) High (competitive markets) 
Equity Moderate (paternalistic) Moderate/Low 
Voice Moderate (collective bargaining and 
employee representation) 
Moderate/Low (decentralisation 
and individualisation) 
 
After an uncharacteristic period of disputes in the sector, banking became a popular 
sector for partnership agreements, suggesting that there may be a specific sectoral 
dynamic to partnership.  It is proposed that a key test of partnership is the extent to 
which partnership offers an effective modus operandi in terms of accommodating 
and institutionalising these competing objectives.  In short, to what extent, if any, 
does partnership offer the potential to redress the imbalanced focus on efficiency 
which characterised 1990s banking?  It is proposed that if it does, then partnership 
could demonstrate a modicum of success.  Having outlined key commercial and 
HRM changes in the sector, the final section offers a brief overview of call centre 
working. 
 
 
Call centre work 
 
The chapter began by providing an overview of debates regarding the rise of the 
service economy and the related debates regarding employment in service 
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industries.  However, the thesis focuses specifically upon the experiences of 
workers in large administration centres which have effectively become call centres 
in recent years.  There are several reasons why the focus on call centres is 
interesting, not least because 3% of the working population actually work in a centre 
(The Scotsman, 18.06.2006).  Firstly, call centre workers account for a large part of 
the financial services workforce outside the branch network.  Secondly, call centres 
exhibit many interesting features such as the young workforce and high proportion 
of female employees, thus offering an interesting contrast with manufacturing or 
public sector research.  Call centres also use many employment practices such as 
flexible working, atypical labour and performance related pay which are arguably 
indicative of the future of work.  They are also the divisions which  organisations 
find the most problematic in terms of employment relations, and especially 
recruitment and retention.  There are several reasons to suggest that call centres may 
be unfavourable for trade unions.  For example the workforce is white collar, 2/3 
female and 1/3 part time (IRS, 2000), all categories with lower traditional union 
membership than male, manual full-time workers (Waddington and Whitson, 1997).  
The young age of individualistic ‘Generation X’ call centre workers might also be 
though to be a hurdle.  Lastly, the individualistic and controlled labour process may 
be seen to be another barrier (Knights and McCabe, 1998).  On the other hand there 
is also a sizeable community of call centre workers who have come from other 
occupations and may well have experience of trade unionism, making over-
generalising dangerous.  It has also been argued that “a strong base for trade 
unionism already exists in many finance sector call centres” (Bain and Taylor, 
2002). It is useful, therefore, to define exactly what is meant by a call centre. 
 
A call centre has been defined the UK government as: 
 “a contact centre will be said to exist where ten or more people work 
exclusively or for the majority of their time in a structured telephony 
environment (which may also involve electronic means of customer 
management), including either inbound and outbound operations. The 
operation will usually use an ACD (automatic call distributor) and this is an 
characteristic of a contact centre” (DTI, 2004). 
At the end of 2003, 790,000 people in the UK were employed in call centres, 
typically in roles such as customer service, telesales, and management and support 
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roles.  It was estimated that there were 5320 call centre operations and 500,000 
workers employed as call centre agents.  The British call centre industry has grown 
by 250% since 1995, and is the largest in Europe, and the second largest in the 
world.  By 2007, call centres are predicted to employ over 650,000 call agents and 
over 1 million employees overall (Datamonitor, 2004). 
 
Call centres in financial services 
Financial services is by far the dominant operator of call centres, operating twice as 
many as the next largest industry sector, and indeed financial organisations were 
one of the pioneers of the concept in the early 1990s.  In particular, First Direct 
(Midland, now HSBC) and Direct Line (RBS) are generally accepted to be among 
the first movers, beginning operations in 1988 and 1989 respectively (Bain and 
Taylor, 2002).  Indeed, 15% of UK call centres are in financial services, accounting 
for over 800 centres in the UK, and 25% of call centre workers are employed in 
financial services.  In the East Midlands, where two of the case studies were 
conducted, call centre employment accounts for just under 30,000 jobs.  The finance 
industry also receives by far the most ‘call minutes’ at around 12,500 million 
minutes per year – over twice as many as the next vertical market, accounting for 
30% of inbound traffic (Datamonitor, 2004). 
 
The typical contact centre worker is female and in her 20s, with females accounting 
for around 70% call agents.  At management level, gender is split more equally.  
Average tenure in a call centre is 3 years for a call agent and 4 years for a manage 
and the average age is 28.  Typical workers are school leavers, students, graduates 
and women returning to work after having children.  The mean average salary is 
£12, 945 overall and £12,500 is the finance sector, with team leaders typically 
earning £19,000 and managers 27,250 (Datamonitor, 2004).   
 
Academic debates 
Call centres have attracted huge academic interest.  Managerial writers suggest that 
call centres are characterised by skilled, empowered employees providing high 
quality customer service (Durr, 1996; Hook, 1998).  This positive image portrays 
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call centre employees as empowered, semi-professional workers working closely 
with the customer and supported by advanced IT.  To this end, working conditions 
are considered to be pleasant, offering interesting work, generous employment 
relations, teamwork, and good physical working conditions.  This is reminiscent of 
the new service management literature alluded to earlier and the ideas around the 
productivity benefits of empowered workers (Schneider and Bowen, 1993; 
Schlesinger and Heskitt, 1991).   
 
Most of the published academic research, written in a critical labour process 
tradition, has focused upon work organisation and management control and has 
taken an overtly critical view.  Studies have examined industrial relations 
developments in call centres (Taylor and Bain, 2002, Rose, 2002), human resource 
management (Kinnie et.al, 2000) and union representation (Bain et.al, 2004).  The 
call centre literature has also investigated labour process (Bain and Taylor, 2000), 
gender (Belt, 2002), work organisation (Frenkel et.al, 1999) and human resource 
management practices (Hutchinson et.al, 2000).  Critics have described call centres 
as ‘electronic sweatshops’ (Garson, 1988), ‘panoptical wired cage’ (Menzes, 1996), 
‘twentieth century panopticons’ (Fernie and Metcalfe, 1998), ‘assembly lines in the 
head’ (Taylor and Bain, 1999), and ‘female ghettos’ (Belt, 2002).   Concerns have 
been raised in relation to the low status, poor pay, limited career prospects, high 
level of routine and limited discretion. The two perspectives are summarised in 
Table 4.14. 
 
Table 4.14 
Typologies of call centre work 
Optimistic Critical 
Empowerment 
Modern workplaces 
High quality customer services 
Assembly line in the head 
Bright satanic offices 
Taylorisation 
Durr (1996), Hook (1998) Garson (1998), Fernie and Metcalf 
(1998), Taylor and Bain (1999). 
 
However, Taylor et.al (2002) argue that a diversity of call centre working can best 
be understood by reference to a range of quantitative and qualitative characteristics.  
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Thus, there may be a continuum between those where workflow is volume driven 
with limited discretion, to those with higher levels of discretion and a focus on high 
quality customer service.   
 
More positively, Frenkel et.al (1999) conclude that that neither the deeply 
pessimistic, nor the optimistic views are a fair representation of call centre work 
organisation, arguing that complex hybrid forms of work organisation exist.  They 
argue that elements of both coexist, as management grapple with two competing 
objectives: standardisation of processes and customisation of products.  Frenkel et.al 
(1999b, 91 ) conclude relatively optimistically that call centre workers do not “fit 
the stereotype image of the technologically incarcerated, regimented front-line 
employee” and “the image of the service organisation as regimented is overdrawn 
and therefore invalid”.  Their studies found evidence of environments where call 
centre jobs were interesting and challenging, and front line workers did appear to be 
valued.   For example, 75% of employee respondents reported overall satisfaction 
with their job (Korczynski, 2002).  Deery and Kinnie (2002) suggest that there are 
limits to the ‘engineering model’ for three main reasons.  Firstly, in some 
circumstance employees may need to exercise discretion or subjective interpretation 
in the interests of providing good service.  Secondly, customers value the way 
service is provided, but this is limited in a tightly scripted and highly controlled 
interaction.  Thirdly, given the fact the customer is part of the process, it is difficult 
to predict their demands and requests, therefore requiring scope for a degree of 
flexibility.    
 
This apparent paradox between maximising efficiency on the one hand, and 
customer-orientation on the other, has been addressed in work by Korzcynski 
(2002), and his theory of the ‘customer-oriented bureaucracy’.  Clearly, then, there 
are evident tensions, and this leads to choices in employment relations strategies.  In 
other words, do organisations adopt an ‘efficiency model’ with individualised pay, 
insecure jobs and strict routine and discipline, or do they adopt an HR system based 
upon high training, supportive supervision and team-working.   
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Figure  4. 7 Countervailing forces in call centre work. 
Source: Adapted from Budd, 2004, 4. 
 
In other words, organisations make strategic decisions in relation to their business 
objectives, market segment and labour market (Kinnie et.al, 2000), and it is 
proposed that the employment relations implications may be discussed in terms of 
the efficiency-equity-voice framework. A company which aims to maximise call 
volume and minimise costs is likely to pursue an approach with limited discretion, 
standardisation, surveillance and monitoring.  In other words a high efficiency, low 
voice, low equity option.  Conversely, an organisation aiming to provide high 
quality service may provide greater autonomy, wider skill utilisation, and 
technology focused on providing agents with information they need.  The aim of 
this approach would be to accommodate interests of voice and equity as well as 
efficiency.  These choices are similar to what Bowen and Lawler (1992) term the 
‘production line’ approach and the ‘empowerment’ approach.  Curiously, as 
manufacturing has shifted away from Taylorism and scientific management, this 
appears to be the dominant paradigm embraced by the service sector (Batt, 2002), 
and call centres in particular (Taylor and Bain, 1999).  Recent evidence would seem 
to suggest however, that in reality, the constrained approach is actually inefficient 
(Deery and Kinnie, 2002), and could perhaps explain why several organisations 
which have offshored, have begun to return to the UK as service quality diminished.  
Voice 
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Equally, not all offshoring has been high volume/low quality, for example the 
employment of highly skilled Indian graduates by IT organisations in IT support 
roles. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that despite the rise of service sector employment, and the 
importance of the private sector to the economy, much industrial relations research 
remains firmly rooted in traditional manufacturing and public sector contexts.  It has 
also demonstrated how the employment relationship in service work differs from 
these contexts as the customer often becomes a third party added to the traditional 
management-worker dyadic.  In a similar way to the partnership debate, opinions on 
service work are divided between the optimistic new service management school 
and the critical school.  More pragmatically, some have suggested that significant 
variations exist under the broad banner of service work, ranging for example from 
fast food restaurant workers to architects.  There is a clear need for more studies 
conducted in service contexts, which are arguably more indicative of the future of 
work rather than declining manufacturing industries.  Internationally respected UK 
companies are now more likely to be Royal Bank and Scotland, Tesco and Virgin, 
rather than ICI or British Steel (Corus). 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 argued that an understanding of context is essential to partnership 
research.  Therefore, before outlining the internal context in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the 
external environment has been explored.  Following ‘firm-in-sector’ theory, it is 
suggested that there is a need to place organisational developments within the wider 
context in which they operate.  Again, a clear advantage of studying organisations 
drawn from a single sector is the degree of homogeneity it affords which could not 
be achieved, for example, by comparing a supermarket with the NHS.  Indeed, it is 
proposed that there are many similarities between financial service organisations, 
which may represent a degree institutional isomorphism.   
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Undoubtedly, the financial service sector is a major and successful component of 
the UK economy.  It is also one which has experienced massive change from stable 
oligopolistic ‘traditional banking’, to turbulent and intensively competitive ‘new 
banking’.    This has driven an urgent need to change organisational culture, pay 
structures, staffing, work organisation, careers and industrial relations, and resulted 
in a significant rise in disputes and calls for industrial action.  The rise of 
adversarialism may partly explain why partnership has been embraced in this sector, 
as unions and management had to address the end of post-war stability, and  deal 
with the issue of falling profits and industrial relations unrest.  This context provides 
an excellent leading edge test of partnership i.e. to what extent can partnership 
working regulate the competing equity and efficiency forces, in an industry where 
such forces had generally been balanced in the post war era?  In particular, the study 
explored the experience of call centre workers.  Again, this forms an important 
contemporary component of UK working, and financial services is the biggest 
employer of such workers.  Moreover, call centres may be considered to be more 
representative of ‘modern’ employment relations, and have many interesting 
characteristics including the profile of employees and HRM/IR practices adopted, in 
a sense suggesting that if partnership is the future, this provides a good context.  It 
exemplifies the drive for both efficiency in terms of answering calls and processing 
requests, and equity in light of problems of high staff turnover and the negative 
opinions on call centre working.  Call centres also present an interesting 
environment for employee voice, and many have been targets for trade union 
recognition.  Accordingly, the context provides an excellent contrast to existing 
partnership studies in aerospace, shipbuilding and public services (Danford et.al, 
2005; McBride and Stirling, 2002; Richardson et.al, 2004).   
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Chapter 5:  Case Study 1 – NatBank 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the first case study undertaken at the NatBank credit card 
administration centre in the North East of England.  It begins by providing an 
outline to the case organisation and the site under study.  This is followed by a 
discussion of the background to employment relations within the organisation, and 
at the centre.   The partnership structures and understanding of the concept within 
the organisation is then examined.  The chapter then examines the process of 
partnership by focusing on the nature of the various relationships forged between 
managers, union officials and representatives and employees.  This is followed by a 
review of some of the key issues within the organisation in recent years, and in 
particular the way decisions have been made.  The final sections evaluate the 
outcomes of the NatBank partnership, before concluding with some of the key 
barriers and challenges to partnership at NatBank. 
 
 
Company profile 
 
NatBank is part of a major UK-based financial service group, established in London 
300 years ago, and currently one of the largest in the world.   The bank converted 
into a public limited company in the early 1980s, and the Group has a turnover of 
£11 billion.  The Bank is currently developing a growing international presence, and 
has around 118,000 employees across 60 countries.  The bank is engaged primarily 
in banking, investment banking and investment management.  Operations are 
divided into five main divisions: UK Banking, Credit Card, non-UK retail and 
commercial banking, Capital and Global Investors.  In the 1960s, the bank created a 
separate credit card division, and the credit card business is one of the leading credit 
card organisations in Europe, with significant international operations in Africa and 
North America.  Indeed, the NatBank credit card business alone would qualify as a 
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FTSE-100 company if it were to be listed separately on the stock exchange.  The 
credit card business holds significant autonomy from the rest of the Bank.  
Geographically, operations were initially based in the Midlands, but in the 1970s 
centres were opened up in other locations where there was high unemployment 
including Liverpool and the North East.  They have over 12 million credit UK cards 
holders and over 5 million internationally.  The credit card business is also a 
significant player in the corporate credit card market with over 550,000 corporate 
cardholders, as well as in the transaction processing market where they have 
relationships with one third of British retailers.  The business was also one of the 
founder members of the international VISA network in the 1970s.  The credit card 
business employs over 5,000 people at four locations across the UK.  Strategically, 
the business has not traditionally competed on price; rather it has dedicated 
significant resource to advertising, promotion and branding.  Industry reports 
suggest the organisation has benefited from strong brand awareness, a good 
distribution network and information technology capabilities.  This has enabled the 
business to maintain a one third share of the UK credit card market despite intense 
competition in the marketplace, from building societies, American credit card 
entrants, retailer point-of-sale credit offerings, and the popularity of storecards and 
debit cards such as Switch/Maestro.   
 
The vision  of the credit card division is to “be the most admired card business in 
the world, by delivering value through a deep understanding of our customers”.  
Underpinning this vision are espoused commitments to what the company describes 
as “the 4C‟s”, namely Customers, Colleagues, Company and Community.  These 
are summarised in Table 5.1.   
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Table 5.1 
The Credit Card Vision: the 4C’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The case site: North East Credit Card centre 
 
The credit card business has four main administration centres throughout the UK.  
The bulk of the research was conducted at a large credit card Administration Centre 
in the North East of England.  The local area is synonymous with the industrial 
revolution, and as an important port for coal, iron and steel due to its abundant 
natural resources.  It is also famous as the birthplace of the railway industry and a 
centre for bridge building, constructing major bridges throughout the world.   In the 
post-war era, the area experienced economic decline and over the last 30 years 
employment loss in traditional industries exacerbated already high unemployment.   
The area has a mix of both affluence and social disadvantage. The area suffered 
during the recession of 1970s which reached a peak in the mid 1980s and was 
attributed in particular to closures in the steel industry.  The region has since 
embarked upon a significant regeneration strategy to re-invent itself as a centre for 
inward investment and for service industries in particular.  Largely this strategy has 
been founded upon expansion by employers with a presence already in the area, and 
attracting new investors to the area. The riverbank was once dominated by 
engineering and shipbuilding from the 1850s until eventual closure in the 1980s, 
and this reflects the importance of manufacturing to the local area, which is still 
above the national average.  Jobs in financial services are slightly below the English 
The 4C’s Commitments 
Customers 
We will be the first for value, understanding and confidence in the 
eyes of our customers. 
Colleagues 
We will challenge, support and respect each other, valuing individual 
contribution. We will act with honesty and integrity. 
Company 
We will deliver on our promises to our shareholders, lead and grow 
the card industry and make outstanding contributions to the group. 
Community 
We will make a positive difference in the diverse communities that 
we are part of. 
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average at 3%, although unemployment and the number of people permanently sick 
or disabled is also above the national average (Table 5.2).  The riverbank area is 
now a modern £350million business park, part of a major redevelopment project, 
built upon former industrial wasteland since the closure of an engineering works 
and the loss of 2500 jobs.    The business park has attracted investment from several 
financial service organisations as well a local university, management consultants, 
legal services, architectural and engineering consultancy, as well as modern 
apartment developments.  Most of the work on the park is clerical and 
administrative: call centre work accounts for 1/3 employment, administration 1/3 
and professional services 1/3.  The park now employs around 5000 people and 
according to local authority publications contributes an estimated £50 million per 
year to the local economy.   
 
Table 5.2 
Industry of employment (aged 16-74 in employment) 
Industries in NatBank area Local 
authority 
North East England 
Agriculture; hunting; forestry 0.55 1.13 1.45 
Fishing 0.01 0.04 0.02 
Mining and quarrying 0.6 0.56 0.25 
Manufacturing 17.92 16.99 14.83 
Electricity gas and water 1.21 1.01 0.71 
Construction 7.66 7.32 6.76 
Wholesale and retail 17.61 16.19 16.85 
Hotels and catering 4.51 5.1 4.73 
Transport, storage and communication 6.35 6.76 7.09 
Financial intermediation 3.06 3.04 4.8 
Real estate, renting and business activities 9.87 9.16 13.21 
Public administration 6.51 7.43 5.66 
Education 8.2 8.02 7.74 
Health and social work 11.87 12.74 10.7 
Economically inactive: unemployed 4.98 4.53 3.35 
Economically inactive: permanently sick or disabled 7.13 8.97 5.3 
Source: Statistics.gov.uk, ONS (2006), Data derived from Census 2001. 
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Employment relations at NatBank 
 
NatBank is a large organisation employing 126,000 employees worldwide, 113,000 
of which are full-time equivalent (FTE).  Over one half are based in the UK, one 
third in Africa and the Middle East, 3% in the Americas, 1% in Asia and 7% in 
continental Europe.  In common with many financial service organisations the 
majority of employees in the organisation are women, and global staff turnover and 
resignation rates are around 18% and 11% respectively (Table 5.3).   
 
Table 5.3 
NatBank global employment statistics 
Global employment 
statistics 
2005 
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) 113,300 
Total employee headcount 126,000 
Percentage of female 
employees 
61.90% 
Percentage working part time 15.40% 
Turnover rate 17.80% 
Resignation rate 10.90% 
Source: Internal documentation 
 
In the UK NatBank employs over 60,000 employees, and the average length of 
service is around 10 years.  Part-time working accounts for around one quarter of 
the UK workforce, and around 30% staff have parental responsibilities.  The 
sickness and absence rate is 4%, and staff turnover is slightly above the global 
average at 20%.  The UK resignation rate is comparable with the average 
resignation rate within NatBank globally, which is around 12% (Table 5.4). 
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Table 5.4 
NatBank UK employment statistics 
NatBank employees (2005) 
Total employees 62,682 
Average length of service (years) 10.7 
Percentage with parental responsibilities 29.60% 
Percentage working part time 25.50% 
Sickness absence rate 4.20% 
Turnover rate 20.40% 
Resignation rate 11.60% 
Source: Internal documentation 
 
The age profile of the organisation is also interesting with the vast majority (57%) 
of employees aged between 30 and 49.  In addition, around one third of employees 
are under 30, of which almost one fifth are under 25.  The smallest category is the 
over 50s who account for 11% of the workforce (Table 5.5). 
 
Table 5.5 
Employee age profile 
Age profile (%) 
Employees aged under 25 17.90% 
Employees aged 25-29 14.10% 
Employees aged 30-49 57.10% 
Employees aged 50+ 11.00% 
Source: Internal documentation 
 
Though this provides a useful backcloth to the organisation as a whole, it is 
important to contextualise the credit card business in more detail. It is noteworthy 
that the administration centre has only recently become a call centre, following the 
relocation of many clerical/administrative functions to offshore partners in India 
several years ago. A similar strategy has been taken by other local employers 
including Eagle Star and the AA.  Before the shift in emphasis, the North East 
centre delivered a wide range of back-office banking functions including record 
research (maintaining customer files e.g. statements), fraud, charge-backs (dealing 
with purchase disputes), customer complaints, and the central mailroom for the 
  NatBank 
 
 
 
 191 
credit card business.  Indeed, up until the 1990s around 90% staff employed at in the 
credit card business were in administrative roles such as data processing/input or 
cardholder servicing, in a clerical or keyboard capacity .  The majority of staff at the 
site have always been female, and this remains the case today, and working hours 
were typically Monday to Friday 9-5.  Although the central HR function has always 
been involved in pay negotiations, many employment relations issues have always 
been dealt with locally within the credit card business.    A long period of growth 
and profitability coupled with natural employee turnover meant that the credit card 
business was almost always recruiting, and issues of redundancy were unknown 
until the 1990s.  Promotion through the bank‟s internal labour market was the norm, 
and training focused on the development of routine technical and computing skills.  
Graduate recruitment was controlled centrally, although the credit card division was 
traditionally viewed as one of the least glamorous parts of the business for new 
graduate entrants, given its primarily administrative image. 
 
Today the NatBank site under study employs around 1000 people. Most are 
employed as „Customer Account Managers‟ (known as CAM‟s), resolving inbound 
telephone queries from customers and promoting credit card products and services. 
Though the employment profile of a typical NatBank call centre worker is 18-24 
years old, because of the history of the site, a substantial number of staff are females 
who have been employed for 10-20 years and are now in their 30‟s and 40‟s.  Many 
joined straight from school, when getting a job in banking administration was 
viewed as a respectable start to a career.  Issues of staff turnover are also 
substantially higher than in other parts of the business, although comparable with 
other call centres in the organisation. 
 
Most roles now involve wearing a headset and receiving sales and service calls from  
customers. Callers are connected to the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system to 
determine the nature of their query and route them to a suitable adviser. These are 
automatically routed through the Automated Call Distribution System (ADS), which 
is also used to generate various statistics regarding the efficiency of the call centre.  
With computer technology integration (CTI) the agent is automatically offered a 
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profile („screen pop‟) of the customer on their screen to enable them to process 
requests efficiently.  The profiling system may also prompt the adviser to promote a 
particular product during the call if the customer matches marketing criteria.  For 
example a „call-to-activate‟ – where a new customer calls to activate their new 
credit card – is seen to be one of the calls with the highest potential for generating 
additional cross-selling.  Short and medium-term call volumes are also forecast to 
ensure an appropriate number of staff are „online‟ at one time to meet incoming call 
volumes.  The employee profile now ranges from school leavers and graduates who 
have recently joined, to long serving former clerical staff with over 20 years 
experience.  Many of the new recruits worked for a recruitment agency which was 
perceived to be a „probationary‟ area which would lead to „permanency‟ if you were 
successful.  Many of the graduate employees explained how they viewed the post as 
a stop gap before pursuing further study, or as a source of income immediately 
following graduation.  Most employees suggested that NatBank was a good 
company „to have on the CV‟.  The environment was generally formal and 
traditional, and the dress code consisted of shirt and trousers without a tie.  They are 
piloting a scheme of plasma screens in the call centre in a move to try and minimise 
unauthorised absenteeism.  The idea was that the screens could be used to view 
major football matches and other events which typically created high absenteeism.  
However, when there was no special event the screens were tuned into rolling news 
coverage.   
 
Following the transition from administration centre to call centre, employees 
suggested that the organisation had become a lot more pressurised with emphasis on 
“stats”, performance measures and key performance indicators (KPIs), and 
generating sales and meeting targets.  There was awareness, however, that while 
NatBank used to have a strong market leading position, there was now intense 
competition in the credit card industry since deregulation.  Whereas before their 
credit card offering was reputable and innovative, now supermarkets, airlines, 
universities and even football clubs offer cards.  There were also employee concerns 
regarding the repetitive and highly structured working environment of a call centre.  
However the Credit Card Customer Service Director, who was responsible for the 
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current sales strategy, demonstrated a unitarist perspective, suggesting that 
employee issues were related to a lack of understanding of business needs, or mis-
communication requiring better leadership.   
 
Table 5.6 
Results from the 2003/4 NatBank Employee Attitude Survey 
Survey metric CC 2004 CC 2003 NB 2004 NB 2003 
Leadership of the Group 45 47 51 44 
Employee engagement 55 54 59 51 
Employer of choice 56 55 59 50 
Business unit/area leadership 54 57 61 55 
Team leadership 69 71 71 70 
Corporate performance and 
responsibility 
65 67 70 66 
Reputation for excellence 49 50 54 50 
Competitive edge 46 44 45 40 
Two-way communication 52 50 58 48 
Supportive culture 63 64 66 62 
Efficiency working practices 34 33 33 31 
IT and technology 32 40 38 35 
Equipping people to do the job 69 70 72 70 
Team and work environment 67 68 73 71 
Managing pressure 59 60 58 53 
Performance development 58 61 60 59 
Job empowerment and fulfilment 67 68 72 68 
People development 59 61 63 58 
Reward 66 65 61 59 
Recruitment 47 46 47 43 
Complaints management procedure 52 54 53 51 
Job security 61 63 67 65 
Customer orientation index 51 53 59 56 
Employee engagement index 57 57 62 54 
Source: Internal documentation 
 
Table 5.6 presents the results of a recent attitude survey conducted, by an external 
consultancy, within the credit card business and the bank overall.  When the 
indicators are combined to give an overall ‘employee engagement index’ the results 
for the credit card business is 57% compared to a group average of 62%.  It reveals 
that employee concerns centred around issues such as group leadership, efficient 
working practices and technology. The most favourable results were received on 
indicators of team leadership, team and work environment, and job empowerment 
and fulfilment.  It is also interesting that the survey results are fairly consistent over 
the two years available, and are therefore a useful general indicator of the quality of 
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employment relations.  Management interpretation of these results was that they 
were generally satisfactory but ‘flat’, and falling marginally below the group 
average on most indicators. 
 
 
Partnership structures at NatBank 
 
The partnership agreement at NatBank was a borne out of a very poor climate of 
industrial relations in the late 1990s, culminating in industrial action over pay in 
1997.  This centred around the proposed introduction of performance related pay 
which the union claimed would effectively mean a pay freeze for 7 out of 10 
employees.  The Bank argued that the new system would reward high performing 
staff unlike existing across-the-board pay increases based on seniority.  This also 
meant that pay increases would not necessarily be consolidated into basic salary, 
which in turn would lead to lower pension entitlements.  The union balloted for a 
series of actions including two and three-day strikes, an overtime ban, and work-to-
rule. The union also organised a „take-your-full-lunch-day”, encouraging employees 
to use their full lunch hour, which they suggested many cut short to clear backlogs 
of work.  A similar proposal also resulted in industrial action at other organisations 
including British Airways at the same time. Union representatives admitted that 
there was a need to end the hostile „everybody out mentality‟ that prevailed within 
the Bank whenever an issue arose.  The Chief Executive has suggested that the 
reason why such issues were counter to the culture of European banking is 
historical, and that, “many of them were nationalised, and many people got into the 
habit of thinking of them as social services…but the fact of the matter is we have to 
make profits…and if certain shops aren‟t making money, these shops will 
close”(Internal document).  This reflects the other side of the argument, the fact that 
there was a crisis of City confidence in the leadership of the bank in the late 1990s, 
with business press reports suggesting the company was being outperformed by 
other banks.  In the early 1980s NatBank was Britain‟s biggest bank but had 
experienced hard competition during the 1990s, and in 1998 the Chief Executive 
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resigned.  A new Chief Executive was appointed with the remit of “turning the bank 
around”.   
 
The Employee Relations manager for the credit card division is based at corporate 
headquarters, and is responsible for employment relations issues across the four 
sites.  He explained how, when he joined the organisation as a graduate trainee in 
the 1990s, the industrial relations climate was poor: 
“When I first joined the organisation the relationship was absolutely shocking.  Within the 
three months of me joining the organisation there was industrial action.  Not because of 
anything I‟d done!  There was industrial action in the branch network.  As I began to find out 
that was the culmination of a lot of things going badly in terms of the overall relationship.  
During the 1990s the relationship between the union and the company had been quite fractious, 
every odd year there would industrial action and every even year they‟d be long days and 
evenings at ACAS trying to solve problems” (Employee Relations Manager). 
Similarly, the union National Secretary, who had been heavily involved during the 
1990s disputes, suggested the union was kept at arms length: 
“In 1995 the bank tolerated the union and both the unions were kept very much at arms‟ length, 
weren‟t allowed into the banks head office,  had no relationship with  the business-end of the 
bank, had no relationship with the senior HR or other managers in the  Bank…the only 
relationship they had was with the Employee Relations  Director.  And in autumn 1997 we had 
the most horrendous strike in NatBank, we were out for three days, it doesn‟t sound much but 
in finance industry terms that‟s pretty big.  I didn‟t speak to the Bank for about 6 months”. 
 
Management and union respondents agreed that the 1990s situation was untenable.  
A formal partnership agreement was signed at a national level between NatBank and 
the recognised union in 2000 and, following a formal review and ballot, has recently 
been renewed for another five-year period in 2005. The partnership agreement was 
based upon an adaptation of six principles of partnership espoused by the TUC 
(TUC, 1999).   The full terms of the agreement are included in the Appendix, 
although the six main principles are summarised below. 
 
The principles of partnership: 
1. to secure and promote the long terms success of NatBank 
2. to promote the interests of employees, customers and shareholders 
3. to ensure that NatBank meets customer expectations by having people with 
the right skills in the right place at the right cost 
4. to facilitate the management of change 
5. to ensure employees are managed fairly and professionally 
6. to promote equality of treatment and opportunity for all, valuing diversity 
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There are currently three accredited union representatives on site, while for a period 
before there were none.  The role of a union rep is “to represent union members and 
to work with line managers/team leaders in resolving staff issues arising at a local 
level”.  Typical duties include providing advice to members, delivering joint 
union/management communications, recruitment, liaising between management and 
members on issues and representing members during discipline and grievance 
procedures.  All are long-standing employees of the Bank and have been in the role 
as representatives for around two years.   They decided to get involved following 
several related incidents within the organisation concerning a poorly received pay 
deal which resulted in a pay freeze for many long serving staff, and attempts to 
harmonise contracts, after the announcement of plans to offshore certain 
administrative functions to India.   Essentially, the decision to outsource various 
administrative departments meant that the North East centre was to become 
primarily a call centre.  This resulted in many previously non-customer facing staff 
being transferred to new telephone-based customer service and sales roles.  
Converting to a call centre meant a review of pay for the new roles, as well as the 
need to change from a 9-5 office to gradually becoming a 24-hour operation.  The 
union representatives explained their motivation for standing as a representative.  
The key driver was the suggestion that flexible call centre-oriented contracts were to 
be introduced.  As one representative explained: 
I thought I‟m going to need to get more involved here, it cannot come in!  It cannot come in to 
the centre. Because what they were looking for was to get everyone off the original NatBank 
contracts which were fantastic contracts, and get them all on these flexi contracts which are 
pish!  Very little pay, and also staggered start and finish times, you don't know when you are in 
from one week to the next really. They've streamlined a lot of it since then, but that's why I got 
involved.  I thought its not happening.  I‟m not letting it happen.  And I haven't let it happen!  
(Union representative). 
Another representative offered a similar explanation: 
“We didn't have a rep here and there was loads going on.  I just thought bugger it, I'm going to 
go for it and see if I can make a difference.  And I went for the interview and I got the role” 
(Union representative). 
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Table 5.7 
Partnership mechanisms at North East centre 
Mechanism Remark 
1. Local union representatives 3 accredited union representatives; 1 union learning representative 
2. National union consultation Monthly (ER Manager, FTOs) 
3. Union/rep facilities 2 days month plus ad hoc, private telephone, mobile telephone, 
noticeboard, internal/external mail access, PC, photocopying, filing 
cabinet, expenses, training, revised performance targets 
 
Representatives receive two days per month for union duties although there is scope 
for scheduling of extra time if union duties require it, and the representatives 
suggested that this is normally granted by their line-managers.  The representatives 
also have weekly meetings together to discuss issues, fortnightly meetings with the 
call centre managers and monthly meetings with the Head of Site.  They also hold 
quarterly meetings for members, although it was reported that generally these are 
poorly attended, with most members preferring to make informal contact on an ad 
hoc basis during the working day should they have an issue.  The representatives 
also have frequent contact with the central union receiving various weekly mailings 
through the post, and can also email and telephone for important enquiries.  They 
also appeared to be fairly active, suggesting that they deal with at least one union 
issue each day.  They described the role of the NatBank full-time union official as 
one of „mentor‟ offering advice and support when they feel they need to escalate 
and issue, although many decisions are devolved locally.  The credit card division 
FTO suggested that it was an explicit aim to build a solid cadre of local 
representatives because this was desirable for practical reasons, but also because the 
partnership working required competent and knowledgeable local representatives. 
The union represents both NatBank employees and also provide basic support for 
agency staff working for the preferred recruitment agency, for a reduced rate of 
subscription.  The full-time official suggested that the role of representatives is 
twofold. Firstly, to deal with day-to-day discipline and grievance issues with 
members.  Secondly, to provide local expertise at negotiating meetings, but they are 
not allowed to agree changes to contracts or terms and conditions.  He suggested 
this was logical because he and the Employee Relations manager cannot fully 
understand the dynamics of call centre working, and do not have a first-hand 
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understanding of the issues.  On the other hand, representatives were not allow to 
agree any changes to terms and conditions as the FTO suggested these ought to be 
reviewed and agreed centrally.   
 
Though partnership was described as primarily in terms of mechanisms of 
representative participation between the employer and the trade union, the business 
also utilised an array of direct employee involvement mechanisms.  These included  
newspapers and magazines, „buzz‟ team briefing sessions, memo „desk-drops‟ and 
the company intranet.  Though much of the emphasis was on downward 
communication there were also some upward mechanisms, for example the Head of 
Site also holds occasional informal feedback sessions with employees over coffee. 
She believed this offered her a quick snapshot into the concerns of „ordinary‟ 
employees.   At a business level there were also employee attitude surveys and 
suggestion schemes.  There was no evidence to suggest that these practices 
competed with representative participation; rather they appeared to operate in 
parallel. 
 
 
Definition of partnership with NatBank 
 
According to the Employee Relations manager partnership concerned a modern, 
sensible approach to the management of industrial relations centred around a joint 
commitment to business success: 
“I think [partnership] is about sensible modern industrial relations. From a trade union 
perspective what they are interested in is long-term business success because without the 
business being successful, well trade unions rely on businesses being successful in order for 
themselves to be successful.  There is a mutual self-interest here.  We want to make lots of 
money for our shareholders, and the union would like us to make lots of money so we can 
continue to employ lots of staff who can in turn contribute to the unions funds.  That means that 
the central core of partnership is about long-term business success, but that the perspectives the 
employer and trade union are coming at it are completely different” (Employee relations 
manager). 
Management suggested that in practice this meant more dialogue and interaction 
with the trade union, and considering decisions from an employee as well as 
business/financial point of view.  Without a partnership approach, the Director of 
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Credit Card Customer Service suggested that the union wants what is best for the 
union, and the business simply wants what is best for the business:  
“When you don‟t have partnership, the trade union want to get a result which is good for the 
trade union.  And the company wants to get a result which is good for the company…[with 
partnership] when you take an issue to the table, everybody wants to get it solved” (Director of 
Customer Service). 
Local managers also suggested that partnership concerned a more proactive problem 
solving approach, and understanding the rationale behind decisions and business 
pressures.  As the Site Manager explained: 
“Working together to get the best outcome…it‟s thinking about what we‟re doing in advance 
and that we need to talk to the reps…I think we do that now…it‟s not an afterthought anymore” 
(Site Manager). 
For the call centre manager, clarifying the rationale for decisions was central to the 
approach: 
“The idea of partnership for me is that we work on things together…they [the representatives] 
have the absolute and full logic behind decisions” (Call centre manager). 
The Site Manager offered a fairly unitarist definition: 
“I think the value of employers today and the values of the union are more closely 
aligned.  Unions want sustainable jobs and the employer wants to be profitable.  And 
profitable businesses are more likely to deliver sustainable jobs.  I think there has been 
a meeting of minds in a way” (Site Manager). 
 
For the union national secretary, „partnership‟ also concerns problem-solving and 
closer interaction between the union and the management team, but warned that 
perhaps the term partnership itself is a misnomer:  
“Respect and transparency.  Also, a move from „institutionalised‟ conflict to problem solving.  
The whole ethos around partnership is problem-solving.  But partnership is not the right word.  
It can never be a partnership.  NatBank are running a business which makes 4  billion per year 
profit!  What it does mean is that we are now in the tent rather than out the tent.    In terms of 
interfacing with the main leaders of the bank, in terms of business decisions and the impact on 
staff.  Dealing with staff in a totally different way.  Dealing with staff as a real resource that the 
Bank want to train and keep” (Union National Secretary). 
In other words, he believed it was possible to get involved in a debate as to whether 
partnership offered an „equal‟ relationship, overlooking the benefits such a 
framework offers, including access to key business decision makers, better 
information, and a greater respect for each parties point of view.  In a similar vein, 
another FTO who had only recent joined the union‟s NatBank team, suggested that 
partnership as a term is not as revolutionary as it sounds, but that it essentially 
provides a framework by clarifying each others rights and responsibilities and 
setting out the „rules of the game‟.   Full-time officials also suggested that one of the 
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key components of partnership concerned both management and the union 
understanding each sides point of view.  The National Secretary suggested that 
senior management now had a clearer idea of the operation of trade unions, and 
equally full-time officials now had a greater appreciation of business issues.  He 
contrasted partnership – which he described as “a joint-working group approach” – 
with an “institutional conflict approach”, where he said the union would make a 
claim, and the bank would then respond to that claim without any real dialogue or 
regard for the other parties point of view.  In other words, in terms of approach, 
partnership was quite distinctive from traditional zero-sum arms-length 
adversarialism. 
 
Yet it is important to recognise that the FTO with responsibility for the credit card 
division, with a background in engineering unionism,  was openly opposed to 
partnership, suggesting that partnership is founded upon an unrealistic unitary view, 
and that it is no better and indeed no different to a traditional recognition and 
procedures agreement.    He suggested that “if partnership delivered any real 
power, management wouldn‟t touch it with a barge poll”.  For this FTO, partnership 
is a managerial strategy to enhance the ability of management to exercise control 
over the union, and this was a viewpoint for which he was well known.  He 
concluded that partnership would only be „real‟ if the union had 50% seats on the 
Board. He suggested that though he can “live with it”, he did not believe the Bank 
believed in the underpinning philosophy. On the other hand, another National 
Officer took the view that in reality British companies have been in some kind of 
partnership for decades, and that a traditional recognition and procedure agreement 
is some kind of partnership.  For him, the characterisation of British IR as 
historically hostile and adversarial was only a small part of the picture.  As he 
explained: 
“I think a lot of old R and P agreements talk about working in partnership together…it gives 
the employer certain rights and responsibilities.  It allows us to do certain things and it allows 
the employer to do certain things…I suppose the key thing is it puts in place the structure, it‟s a 
means to an end really.  A means to try and get good industrial relations” (Full-time officer). 
 
For the representatives partnership was described as a less conflictual approach, and 
suggested that they now had to consider decisions from a staff and business point of 
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view, whereas previously they may have only looked at the staff point of view.  
They also suggested that partnership concerned early consultation regarding issues 
as opposed to discussion at the implementation stage which they believe 
characterised non-partnership relationships.  Representatives offered the following 
definitions: 
“A 50:50 way of sorting things out…meeting in the middle without strikes and ballots.  
There‟s nothing daft.  Sat round a table sorting things out before it gets any further”(Union 
representative). 
“Partnership is working together to try and solve issues.  Not in conflict.  It‟s both working for 
the best possible interests for the members, well its not just the members that benefit but the 
staff.  That‟s my understanding.  That‟s my idea of partnership” (Union representative). 
“As a rep it‟s a fine balance.  You are there for the staff, but you are also there for the business.  
Basically in that in-between bit.  Obviously we are more there for the staff than the business, 
but the business does pull on us as well” (Union representative). 
In short, even within the company and the union there were a diverse range of views 
regarding the precise meaning and desirability of partnership.  It is also noteworthy 
that there are different opinions regarding the desirability of partnership between 
union officials and not just managerial respondents. 
 
Influence and managerial prerogative 
It was made clear by the management team, however, that the union representatives 
do not need to agree or “rubberstamp” decisions.  Rather, the focus is on early 
consultation regarding developments and the opportunity for representatives to 
provide feedback and input while decisions are still at “the design stage”, in other 
words as soon as proposals are put forward.  When local representatives have strong 
feelings on an issue and no agreement can be reach locally there is the option of 
escalating it to national consultation for further detailed discussion.  Formal 
consultation meetings take place monthly at the different sites, and involve the 
credit card business Employee Relations manager, full-time union official and other 
relevant management and representative guest members.  The Employee Relations 
manager made clear that under partnership the business retains the right to make the 
final decisions: 
“The union is not always going to agree with us.  We are not always going to agree with them.  
Big Deal.  In a large organisations its about being adult and grown up about that, its ok to have 
rows.  It‟s ok to have diversity of opinion.  It just means one side has to convince the other that 
their arguments are stronger.  But ultimately the business will make the decision.  Because its 
the business that has to answer to shareholders.  It wouldn't necessarily stop us from doing 
something. Sometimes it might stop us from doing something, but ultimately we would proffer 
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the view that we are dealing with the shareholders not the trade union” (Employee Relations 
manager). 
Indeed it was suggested by the call centre manager that if employees perceive that 
the trade union actually agrees all decisions this can lead to misunderstandings 
between representatives and union members: 
I think the reps get themselves into a bit of a corner sometimes, because I think they like people  
to think that they agree everything and that nothing can happen until they've said yes, so when 
something does happen they don't agree staff are up in arms with them.  So I think its in 
everyone's interests to be very clear, the union reps do not need to sign everything off, but they 
will understand why we've done what we've done, and I think that they learn that more and 
more as we go forward, and the more experienced union reps absolutely know that.  Your life is 
a nightmare if the staff think that they agree everything.  Because they get attacked.  So it's far 
better, that everybody understands that relationship. (Call centre manager). 
 
Union representatives, however, suggested that sometimes the way decisions were 
communicated through joint statements contributed to the employee perception that 
unpopular decisions have been „authorised‟ by the union.  This is illustrated by the 
following quotes: 
“We are tied when it says NB have agreed in conjunction with Unifi”.  
“It‟s the wording, but there's nothing we can do about it”. 
“Sometimes staff might think the union agree to anything but they don't know what the starting 
point was, and they cant be told.  They can only be told what he outcome is.  Its part of the 
restriction the Bank place on it.  Quite a lot of things.  If its bad news it says NatBank and the 
union have agreed this, that makes them look in a better light.  And we can‟t say what the 
starting agreement was, and that what we ended up with was a hell of a lot better! (Union 
representative).” 
 
However, as the Employee Relations manager put it, ultimately the bank is a 
business and is run to make a profit and must deliver for shareholders.  He argued 
that, as the market changed the business must also change and that may inevitably 
lead to changes to jobs.  As he concluded, “Ultimately we are responsible to 
shareholders.  And even if fundamentally the trade union is opposed and we wanted 
to do something, we'd go and do it”.  On balance, he suggested that union were now 
more sensitive to “commercial realities” of operating a bank in a globally 
competitive sector. 
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 Relationships  
 
Given that the definitions suggest that partnership concerns joint-working and trying 
to understand each parties point of view, it is useful to explore the realities of the 
relationships between the key actors.  These are now discussed in turn. 
 
Senior management-union relationships 
Senior managers and union officials unanimously agreed that at a senior level 
management-union relationships were healthy.  The Employee Relations Manager 
suggested the key issue was creating a dialogue which attempted to balance 
employee interests with commercial realities and shareholder expectations.  
However, he commented that the nature of the relationships forged under 
partnership were “oceans apart” compared to pre-partnership which he described as 
a time of “arms-length legislative compliance, rather than real enthusiasm”.  
Again, there did seem to be a belief that there had indeed been a significant change 
in behaviours and attitudes.  He suggested making the relationship work required 
great perseverance and required much more trust and faith, and that since the 
outcomes for management and the union are hard to quantify, partnership is very 
much an article of faith.  He contrasted the UK partnership approach with traditional 
approaches to employment relations in Sweden, acknowledging that changing 
British management attitudes to trade unions would be far from straightforward.  He 
proposed that at a senior level the relationship can work well, with union officials 
acknowledging business rationale, and senior management acknowledging the value 
of union dialogue, as an insight into employee opinion and likely reactions.  The 
Customer Service Director agreed that at a senior level within the bank and within 
Credit Card there is a constructive dialogue centred around ensuring the bank is 
successful.     
 
The credit card business full-time official was, again, less enthusiastic regarding 
partnership.  He admitted that some of the relationships, especially the one he had 
with the Employee Relations Manager were “very good but [had] nothing to do 
with partnership”.  He reiterated his opposition to the partnership philosophy, and 
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argued that there was nothing special about partnership, and that it is merely a fad 
and buzzword.  He explained:  
“My relationship with ER Director is quite good.  I get on well with him.  In fact I get on well 
with all the ER people.  But basically they have their job to do and I have mine, we will do 
deals.  We will play our particular roles.  Bt I‟ve had similar relationships with other people.  
Partnership is just a name” (Credit Card FTO). 
However, the National Officer disagreed with this viewpoint, arguing that you have 
to evaluate the relationship in relative terms, and on this basis he proposed the 
relationship was actually better than most others in the industry.  Likewise the 
Employee Relations Manager concluded that the NatBank relationship was very 
good in comparison to many others in the UK but not perhaps in comparison to a 
social democratic country like Sweden.  In other words, how you measure success 
appeared to be important.  As the Customer Service Director concluded: 
“If you look at the senior representation within the trade union they are broad minded forward 
looking individuals.  Who are thinking about the broader agenda.  But I don‟t think that‟s 
always the case for local reps” (Customer Service Director). 
This clearly suggests that there are different levels of partnership and highlights the 
importance of the role of local representatives. 
 
Representative-manager relationships 
Senior managers and union officials agreed that typically relationships were less 
strong at a middle management level.  The credit card division full time official 
suggested this was because middle managers are not rewarded on the basis of 
„partnership behaviours‟ but rather on the basis of delivering quantitative business 
targets, and often this would mean issues concerning involvement and consultation 
would “fall by the wayside”, in order to achieve the business demands placed upon 
them.  The NatBank National Officer also agreed that the main problem area was 
what he described as the “marzipan layer of management”.   The Employee 
Relations Manager echoed this view, but suggested that a diversity of opinion was 
to be expected: 
“Further down the organisational food chain you‟ve got a mixed bag really of people who are 
very pro the trade union, and the role they can play as the representatives of staff, to people 
who are agnostic about the role the union can play, to people who are damn right hostile.  Well 
that‟s no different to society.  It would be a very odd organisation if we didn‟t reflect that”.  
(Employee Relations Manager).   
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However, the representatives all agreed that local relationships had improved 
immensely within the North East centre since the partnership agreement.  In 
particular, it was believed that the fact that the union representatives and most of the 
management team were long-serving employees had helped to promote a strong 
relationship.  For example, the current Site Manager is a former union 
representative, and actually recruited one of representatives to the union many years 
ago!  The site management team are also mostly members of the union.  As the 
representatives commented: “We have a good relationship with local 
management….there‟s not much we need to take to [formal] consultation” (Union 
representative). Another representative expressed a similar view, “We can go and 
talk to anybody.  We don‟t always get what we want, but we know we are heard.  
They suggested the relationship was now much more open and they can approach 
the management team informally as opposed to the more traditional style “when it 
was all about managers‟ and managers assistants‟.  As one representative 
commented “I‟ll go for a ciggie with the managers, it‟s really no problem!”.  
 
Similarly, local management were also positive.  As the site manager remarked “the 
relationship is quite open and honest”.  She argued that the representatives were 
“well-balanced” and were good at bringing views “from the floor”, and not afraid 
to challenge or be the voice of the people: 
“I would say we have a good relationship…it‟s not without it‟s problems…we don‟t always 
agree but it‟s not about agreeing, and it‟s not about rubber stamping, it‟s about talking to each 
other, and trying to get the best possible outcome for everybody concerned” (Site manager). 
“We‟ve got a good relationship, quite friendly really…but I‟ve worked with these people for a 
long time” (Call centre manager). 
Indeed, the three representatives appeared to have complimentary personalities.  
One of the representatives was fairly quiet and enjoyed researching issues.  Another 
was interested in how the credit card centre compared nationally, and enjoyed 
getting involved in national level union activities.  The third representative was a 
very charismatic and confident character, and often took on the role of spokesperson 
at management meetings after being briefed on the details by the other two.  Both 
management and local union representatives openly admitted that there has been 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 206 
conflict and some very heated debates, but suggested that this was a normal part of a 
healthy partnership agreement, and was therefore to be expected:  
“The relationship should be strong enough to withstand heated debates.  Some people would 
probably be offended by it.  But because you know the people as individuals you can do that” 
(Call Centre Manager). 
The importance of getting to know people and build relationships was described as 
hard work, but was said to pay off. It was argued that there was a need to build 
relationships, and to understand the highly political nature of the partnership process 
and negotiations, and that each side is just playing their role.  On the other hand, the 
Call Centre Manager also suggested that sometimes she suspected that the issues 
raised were the views of a vocal minority but not always the views of the centre as a 
whole, and that “they are not always very specific about the things they bring to the 
table”.  She said there was a need to stop representatives bringing personal issues to 
the table. 
 
Team managers were also positive about the union role, although it is worth noting 
that direct knowledge of the role of the local representatives was patchy.  
Nevertheless, all knew who the local representatives were and had heard indirectly 
information about their role, and the work they carry out with the centre 
management.  At an immediate level though, they mainly viewed them as the 
advocates of employees on day-to-day individual issues such as discipline and 
grievance procedures: 
“I think the union are there to ensure things are run fairly and effectively, not to catch 
management out.  From my own experience of that situation, that‟s how I find it” (Team 
manager). 
“It‟s another voice really, you need it for clarification on a lot things.  I suppose it‟s a 
secondary mechanism there if you want to resolve issues” (Team manager). 
 
Employees and union representatives 
It also appeared that the union representatives had a good relationship with 
employees, and most employees appeared to know who the representatives were.  
Employee understanding of the exact nature of the union representatives 
involvement and relationship with management was patchy, but most employees 
perceived the management-union relationship to be reasonably good, and were 
aware that such a relationship existed.  Overall, most employee respondents 
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admitted they did not really know much about representative involvement in 
collective issues but rather took the view that “no news is good news” and “I 
wouldn‟t pay £10 month if I didn‟t think they were doing something”.  Most 
employees agreed that the union representatives were well known and that there was 
a degree of trust in them doing a good job.  The following quotes were typical: 
 “Everybody knows the union reps, they are all characters, you definitely know them!”  
“They have their pictures up in the canteen”  
“We don‟t get to see what they do for us.  We don‟t know all the ins and outs.  But you‟d rather 
pay your funds because you think, if I didn‟t what would happen?!”  
“I guess there must be trust in there somewhere otherwise you‟d withdraw”  
“I‟ve never had a personal issue but I know people who have gone to them, and they must do a 
lot behind the scenes.  They are very active and do seem to play a part.  And I think they are 
really approachable.  I wouldn‟t hesitate if I had a problem”  
“I think they are a lot more approachable now.  A few years ago you wouldn‟t have had a clue 
who they were” 
 (Employee Focus Groups). 
 
A union representative also believed that they had managed to establish some 
credibility with members over the last few years, suggesting they had received 
various compliments in relation to their achievements: 
“The lassies and lads  know we will fight like hell to do the best for the people.  Even though 
they don‟t know what‟s going on they do trust us.  I think it has to be somebody old in the 
tooth.  It doesn‟t bother us standing up in front of 30 kids and saying you WILL join the union.  
Newbie‟s might not have that confidence” (Union representative). 
This is an interesting finding, given than many employees had previously 
withdrawn from the union in the late 1990s because they believed they were being 
“sold down the river” by the trade union, and appears to suggest an increase in 
confidence and trust.  Representatives stressed that one of their main tasks when 
they became accredited representatives, was to try and recruit many of the 
disaffected former members who had previously cancelled their subscriptions.   
 
 
Issues and decision making 
 
Given the context of poor organisational performance and poor industrial relations 
in the late 1990s, the North East centre has experienced significant organisational 
change over the five years preceding the fieldwork. A key objective was to explore 
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the way some of the key issues had been handled, and how various decisions have 
been made.  These are discussed in this section.  The section begins with a 
discussion of traditional union issues such as pay and working conditions and then 
explores some other issues specific to the company. 
 
1. Pay and working conditions 
As discussed earlier, pay had been one of the main sources of industrial relations 
conflict, culminating in the 1997 industrial action, when the bank introduced PRP as 
a replacement for traditional seniority based pay. For management, the negotiation 
of pay and conditions has improved under partnership, and a 3 year pay deals now 
agreed with the union three times.  NatBank follows a market-rate based pay 
system, although this had to be changed as previously many staff already above 
market rate were receiving no pay rise, resulting in low morale.  On the other hand, 
the highest pay rises were received by high performers below market rate. Now, all 
good performers on rates above market levels should receive pay increases.  In 
practice this meant in 2004 60,000 staff received rises averaging 3.35%.  Pay is now 
determined by a combination of position in market, pay grade and individual 
performance.  
 
For the Employee Relations manager the nature of pay negotiations had improved 
significantly under partnership, suggesting it is one of the main benefits of 
partnership working: 
“We have had 3 3 year pay deals (sic).  The thing people are most interested in when they come 
to work is how much money they are going to be paid and how they are going to be paid.  By 
working with the trade union we have been able to have at least 3 pay deals that have been 
agreed on and voted on by members of the union.  And to my mind that‟s a strong endorsement 
that staff buy-in to how we are going to pay them, their reward.  From an employer perspective 
it gives us a level of clarity in terms of being able to plan for the future, so we are not 
constantly in pay negotiation mode. I‟ve taken quite an open book approach in terms of what 
we an cant afford, and them having the opportunity to influence that at the start of our thinking 
on pay, means that they have the opportunity to gain things they not have had the opportunity 
to get if we‟d come along and said well, it‟s 2%, right across the board.  They have been able to 
gain more influence by/through partnership than they might have otherwise done.  And 
likewise we‟ve been able to get a lot more planning done that we might have, if we hadn‟t had 
partnership.” (Employee Relations manager) 
Full time officials agreed that they “get very involved in the whole pay and 
reward”.   The National Secretary boasted that the most recent NatBank pay deal 
was the envy of his union colleagues.  As he explained: 
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“We discuss all terms and conditions.  Pay.  All terms and conditions.  Equality and diversity.  
Pay, holidays.  You name it.  We don‟t negotiate bonuses but we have an influence and a 
debate.  Well factually we don‟t negotiate bonuses (Union National Secretary)”. 
This was contrasted with pay negotiations pre-partnership: 
“The bank would tell us about changes an hour before.  It was all done and dusted…  This is 
what we are offering and we ain‟t moving.  You can do what you like. Now we sit down and 
negotiate.  Now we have a pay formula. PRP. Inflation plus a formula” (Union National 
Secretary). 
Indeed, 9:1 members voted to accept a recent pay ballot, and this was cited by both 
the National Secretary and Employee Relations Manager as a positive endorsement 
of the successful negotiations under partnership.  
 
One of the representatives had been involved at the national level pay talks the 
previous year, and suggested that it was a really good experience to see how it all 
works in reality. The representatives were overall positive regarding the pay rises 
under partnership, whereas pay had been a major issue of controversy before.  As 
highlighted earlier, many employees who had stopped receiving pay rises because 
they were deemed to already have reached market rate had been leaving the union in 
the belief it was letting them down. As a representative explained, “before 
partnership we had strikes over pay.  Because the talks weren‟t as good”  Members 
were beginning to leave the union because of poorly received pay deals.  As one 
employee commented, “They [the union] decided then to settle with a pay package 
which meant that people like me got nothing.  I walked away”.  As the 
representatives confirmed: 
“They‟ve been here donkeys years like us and they came out because they didn‟t get a pay rise 
for a few years because of the Union.  The Union did sell us down the river and there is no 
hiding it, they did.  About 5 years ago.  Because I came out.  (Before partnership).  I cancelled 
as well.  I thought I will get an extra £120 year because I‟ll cancel my subs.  And I did it” 
(Union representative). 
“To be honest I‟d actually left the Union because of the previous pay talks, because I didn‟t get 
a pay rise” (Union representative). 
“The pay rise…What happens, you get a benchmark, so they look at the marketplace for the 
average salary for the type of job we do.  That it for every grade.  You are in the middle.  If you 
earn over that, you don‟t get anything, if you are close you get a small rise, if you weren‟t on it, 
you get a little bit, you know, if you are under you get a massive increase.  I‟m a top performer 
and all my figures are fine, but last year I got nothing at all.  So you think, well I may as well 
sit on my arse and do nothing.  Because I got nothing for it.  Where‟s the benefit for me?” 
(Union representative) 
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The representatives explained how this had made them absolutely determined to try 
and get a pay rise for all employees, and despite intense negotiations, this appears to 
have been successful: 
The pay talks...because I‟m long serving and didn‟t get a pay rise last time, I went and sat on 
the board to make sure I get one this time (laughs).  So people said well done, you got us a pay 
rise.  This year we all got a pay rise.  And it‟s only through the union” (Union representative).  
We went away and everybody who was in the top bracket or the high bracket, or moderate gets 
a pay rise regardless of what salary they earn.  The pot was divided.  That took about four days 
of arguing with them all.  Loads of arguing.  They weren‟t going to give in .  The top people 
were at that meeting (Union representative). 
 
Overall then, representatives clearly believed that under partnership pay 
negotiations have improved.  However, they also suggested that it was still very 
difficult to „sell‟ the success of the pay negotiations when union members do not 
know the detail of the actual negotiations, but only the final outcome.  For example 
the final deal may be much greater than the bank was initially prepared to offer, but 
employees would be unaware of this, and may pass judgment based upon the level 
of the increase alone.  This was quite different to traditional bargaining processes 
where collective bargaining worked as a useful rhetorical device in terms of 
demonstrating value to members. 
 
This is clearly significant, as for most members, the key role of the union was the 
negotiation of pay.  Indeed, when asked about the role of the union, even those with 
a minimal interest in union activity remarked, “I know that any pay deal goes 
through the union, and has to be sanctioned by the union, apart from that not 
much”.  Fortunately for the union, there was a feeling that pay negotiations had 
improved under partnership, therefore satisfying both those at the lower and higher 
end of their bands, as the following quotes illustrate:   
“I actually got a rise last year because I work at the top of the B3 salary anyway, I got a rise and 
it was my first rise in 4 years.  And I think that was something, that had been pushed through 
the union that we‟d get a minimum rise, and I thought last year, oh that‟s a one off.  About 
£25/month, at least I got a rise.  Even if its...well it‟ll pay the water rates.  You just feel at least 
you are getting a rise.  I hadn‟t had one for about 4 years.  I think that‟s the union pushing that 
through.   
“They changed all the pay structure didn‟t they.  A few years ago.  To makes sure people like 
you on the top of their salary get a rise, but the people at the bottom get a bigger increase, its 
more of an incentive isn‟t it.  Because you get to situations where someone who is a new 
starter, at the same level, can be earning 1000s below someone who has been here a long time.  
They made it so if you do well, and achieve targets you‟ll jump a lot quicker.  Which pleased 
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me because I‟m at the lower end of the scale, people at the top end, it didn‟t please them, but 
from a personal point of view its a lot better” (Employee Focus Group) 
This demonstrates the challenge the union faced in terms of managing the internal 
divisions between employees, when negotiations resulted in both „winners‟ and 
„losers‟.  Other respondents acknowledged that with intense market competition, the 
union is in a difficult position and that on “things like pay and redundancies that 
their hands are tied”. 
 
To conclude the pay negotiations – previously one of the main employment 
relations flashpoints throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s – were said by 
management, full-time officials and the union representatives as better under the 
partnership process.  Between the union and the management there seemed to be a 
mutual acceptance that, on the one hand, employee pay was already competitive and 
the company could not afford massive rises, and on the other hand that no pay rise 
for several years is unfair and demoralising.  Employees were generally pleased 
also, because they were receiving pay rises whereas prior to partnership many 
employees were not, leading to disillusionment with the union. 
 
2. Discipline and grievance 
The management of discipline and grievance was another key area of union 
involvement at NatBank.  The Employee Relations Manager suggested that under 
partnership, they now have established jointly agreed procedures for managing 
discipline and grievance.  It was proposed that this has created clarity for the 
organisation in terms of their expectations of employee conduct, but also provides 
clarity for the union in terms of raising claims against the organisation when they 
have reason to believe the process has been unfair.   
 
The union representatives suggested that among young employees in particular 
disciplinaries were common regarding issues such as sickness, absence, time-
keeping and underperformance.  It was proposed that for many of these employees 
the union was viewed as a source of help should they end up in a discipline and 
grievance situation, and that they had managed to build up a good reputation as a 
source of help in such cases.  Indeed, after successfully defending an employee in a 
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disciplinary hearing the representatives would commonly provide the member with 
a bundle of membership forms and ask them to find new members to demonstrate 
their appreciation of the union service!  The representatives believed that their 
success at dealing with disciplinary hearings was a good form of word-of-mouth 
marketing, especially among the younger employees who may not otherwise have 
been interested in joining.  It was argued that overall due process was being 
followed more often under partnership, and representatives believed that cases of 
arbitrary treatment had been declining, as line managers increasingly paid attention 
to formally agreed procedures.  As a representative explained: 
“I think it‟s better, I think they think about the process more before they put people through 
disciplinaries.  We don‟t seem to be getting so many stupid ones now.  We won every one for 
six months because they didn‟t follow process, because they were silly.  If you weren‟t a union 
member you could have got the sack through that.  Now it‟s starting to hurt when you‟re losing 
them, but you realise that‟s the process and people do things wrong” (Union representative).   
 
Nevertheless, assisting those in trouble especially among the younger members of 
staff had proved to be a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, it had increased 
membership amongst a cohort of employees they have had difficulty  persuading to 
join the union.  On other hand, some managers believed this was a cynical and 
untenable approach.  For example the Director of Customer Service was less 
convinced, arguing that unions should not be focusing their efforts on defending 
people with a poor attendance case but that, “they should be protecting the people 
who come in every day and carry the people who are consistently sick”.  As he 
explained: 
“The union will always come down on the side of the people who they feel are going to be 
subject to some form of management policy or procedure.  And they‟ll want to protect their 
interests rather than the interests of the corporation as a whole” (Director of Customer Service). 
As the above comment illustrates, this has actually been double-edged as the union 
winning disciplinary cases had previously been a useful tool in demonstrating their 
effectiveness and aiding recruitment. However, it is clear that managers are unlikely 
to appreciate them re-inventing themselves as the advocates of underperformers.  
Equally, it is possible that some employees would also resent this situation if they 
shared the view that the union effectively „carried‟ the weakest members of staff. 
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For line managers, direct interaction with representatives occurred primarily during 
the discipline process, and many viewed them positively as a useful party acting as a 
“checking mechanism to make sure people are dealt with fairly and 
consistently”and that due process was followed.  Interestingly, line managers who 
had not been involved in such hearings appeared to have more limited direct 
interaction with the representatives or knowledge of the union.  As one young team 
manager explained: 
“I pretty much see them as people who come to disciplinaries to see you dot your I‟s and cross 
your t‟s…I don‟t think we as team managers are made fully aware of the background.  It would 
be something we would have to proactively find out as opposed to having to know about it as 
part of your role” (Team manager). 
Other team managers would proactively seek out the representatives before a 
hearing to try and establish different sides to the story.  Indeed, on the day of 
interview one of the representatives had found a mini-muffin on her desk from a line 
manager keen to get some advice on dealing with a problematic employee.  Overall 
the general view was that processes had improved since partnership.  As one 
representative commented, “they‟d probably get rid of a lot of staff who wouldn‟t 
lose their job if they had a rep and it was done properly through clear set 
procedures”.  In addition, it was suggested that very few formal grievances are now 
raised by employees at the centre.  This was also seen to be an achievement as at 
other credit card centres they are much more frequent.  
 
3. Managing change 
The third main issue concerns the management of change and in particular the 
implications of transforming a back office administration centre into a call centre.  
This required a change in culture, as management attempted to transform the centre 
from a cost centre into a profit centre, whereby it actually generates revenue streams 
as opposed to draining resources.  Four related issues illustrate the management of 
change: outsourcing to India; regarding and flexible contracts; targets, and the 
sales/service split.  These are now examined in turn. 
 
i) Outsourcing to India 
The main issue to affect the centre in recent years was agreed to be the off-shoring 
of several back office administrative functions to India. This had contributed to 
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various other employment relations issues.  The site manager suggested that off-
shoring had undoubtedly resulted in fears regarding job security. This involved the 
relocation of what she described as labour intensive “basic skill” jobs to India in 
areas such as correspondence and „charge-backs‟ i.e. when the buyer requests that 
their card company claims back a payment from a merchant.   The centre is also the  
Operational Support Unit for Indian operations, meaning there is direct daily contact 
between the centre and the offshore unit.  The Head of Site suggested that this 
meant “India was on everyone‟s radar”. In practice this meant that employees who 
would previously have been dealing with customers through written correspondence 
or engaged in other non-customer facing clerical roles were offered roles as 
telephone based customer agents.  This was described by managers as a big cultural 
change.  “It‟s quite a change in culture to put a headset on and answer the phone 
call after call…a lot of the old school took very hard to that change”.  It was 
suggested that the union lost many members at the centre because of the off-shoring 
issue, described by one representative as “an almighty cock up”.   According to one 
representative “people thought the union were pretty crap”.  This was argued by the 
representatives (who were not representatives at the time), to have been completely 
“out-of-blue”, with minimal information provided to employees from management 
or the union.  Indeed, some contended that a few months prior to the official 
announcment NatBank had actually forcefully attempted to quash any rumours that 
off-shoring was imminent.   
 
Employees suggested that the news of off-shoring was published on the internet 
before NatBank had even made a formal announcement, and that “it was just a 
major hoo-haa, we were all very worried”.   Since the fallout of the off-shoring the 
union and the Bank have signed a „globalisation agreement‟, outlining various 
commitments regarding off-shoring practices.  The union lead negotiator has 
described the agreement as “representing what  can be achieved through an 
atmosphere of partnership between unions and employers”.  At the centre of the 
agreement is a framework to avoid compulsory redundancies in the event of 
offshoring.  The agreement was signed following two months of negotiations 
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between senior management and union negotiators.  They key provisions of the 
agreement are: 
 
 Voluntary redundancy register across geographic regions 
 Enhanced use of voluntary job matching 
 Redeployment into alternative employment where a role is undertaken by a 
contractor or agency staff trial periods and no loss of redundancy option 
 £2000 gross training support for external career retraining 
 In-placement and outplacement support by consultants 
 3 months advanced notice plus 3 months displacement 
 TUPE transfers and globalisation such as redundancy terms and pension 
provision 
 International Labour Standards – freedom of association in international 
operations 
 Rolling management information on job transfer possibilities 
 
There is also the possibility of an industrial action ballot if compulsory 
redundancies arise.  The union national secretary suggested that this meant the 
employer now has “hoops and barriers they need to jump across” to mitigate the 
worst excesses.  The National Officer suggested that this is as much as the union 
probably can do by tying the bank into early consultation, extra provision around 
training and redeployment for staff who are affected.  As he concluded “it doesn‟t‟ 
stop the off-shoring happening but it does protect the existing staff”.  Without such 
an agreement he speculated that the union would not be consulted as early as they 
have been, and that the bank may only make minimal, cursory efforts at 
redeployment.  As an official union policy announcement states: 
“This agreement represents what can be achieved positively under our partnership agreement 
when the employers interests and the employees interests are potentially at opposite ends of the 
pole….the union has recognised the bank‟s need to reshape the business in line with market 
changes; the bank has recognised the union‟s need to protect the employability and job security 
of its members (Union Press Release, 2004). 
To date nobody has lost their job as a result of the off-shoring programme; indeed 
according to the representatives they have many older members very interested in 
pursuing the attractive voluntary redundancy package should further job cuts arise.  
This was confirmed during employee interviewees.  The national secretary argued 
that the Bank initially proposed 1000 job cuts and the union managed to reduce that 
to 225, and ensure a good severance scheme for the displaced, and that this 
represents a good measure of success. 
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Management suggest that the main difference under the new framework is that there 
is an agreed process for managing business change even if the union inevitably 
opposes such decisions.  The Employee Relations Manager suggested that having an 
agreed process means that now such change is upfront with early union 
involvement, as well as union appreciation of competitive pressures and business 
rationale.  In a similar vein the Director of Customer Service suggested a need to 
confront tough realities and that in the current climate there is no such thing as a 
„job for life‟, and the priority should be treating people correctly if they are made 
redundant.  He suggested that no organisation can currently offer a job-for-life and 
that this is true for senior executives as well as call agents.  The national officials 
agreed that the union role is to mitigate the effects of such decisions through 
redeployment, training and earlier consultation.  They believe with a non-
partnership situation the bank may make less effort in managing redundancies or 
offer a less generous severance scheme.  However, the full time official for the 
credit card business was decidedly sceptical regarding the agreement questioning 
“Will it [The Globalisation Agreement] stand up when the real outsourcing 
begins?”.  In other words, while it may work while the off shoring is small scale, he 
doubted the effectiveness in dealing with large scale job losses.  The representatives 
suggested, however, that a reality of the current climate is that the union cannot stop 
off shoring.   Instead, they suggest a need to focus on ensuring employees affected 
get the very best possible deal either in terms of redundancy package or finding 
alternative employment and that they are treated fairly and with respect.  As one 
union representative concluded, “What they‟ve said to us is [that] jobs are going to 
India.  It‟s reality.  But because we‟ve got this[agreement] hopefully job losses 
won‟t be that big”. 
 
ii) Re-grading and flexible contracts 
As the centre became a call centre as result of off-shoring, most employees were to 
take customer-facing telephony roles as “Customer Account Managers”.   
Moreover, management believed that as technology had developed, decisions were 
now more systems based and the job roles were to be re-evaluated to explore this.  
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The re-evaluation of job roles meant that call centre agents could potentially have 
ended up on a lower grade (known as grade B2 rather than the current B3).   
 
The job evaluation concluded that the CAM role was more suited to grade B2.  The 
management and union explored the various options and a decision was made to 
leave existing employees unaffected to avoid conflict.   The call centre manager 
suggested that without the partnership process it may have been a fait accompli, 
with minimal consultation, seeking union input at a late stage if at all.  As the 
Employee Relations Manager explained, without the extensive dialogue through the 
partnership process, a „logical‟ business decision may “have been imposed from on 
high without much consideration”.  Clearly, there was a business need to change.  
Under partnership protocol, the final decision followed a long period of consultation 
and discussion about the potentially disastrous impact on morale.  The final decision 
was therefore to leave existing staff on their B3 grade, but to recruit new hires on 
the new B2 grade which the management team believed better represented the 
market rate and reflected the demands of the job.   This was described by the union 
representatives as an example of a “good win”, as it reflected a good compromise 
and a degree of success.  They argued that the final decision did not benefit the 
business as much as they would perhaps have liked and neither did it satisfy the 
union fully, but ultimately they suggested it was the best outcome for both sides 
given the constraints.  As the call centre manager concluded “it wasn‟t a great 
shock, it was the most palatable option. They got their win really”. 
 
Table 5.8 
Pay structure at NatBank 
Grade Market Rate Example Roles 
B1  £13,000 Cashier 
B2 Standard £15,000 Admin assistant, customer service assistant 
B2 High £15,000 Customer sales adviser 
B3 Standard £18,000 Office manager’s assistant, project assistant 
B3 High £19,000 Customer adviser 
B3 Premium £21,000 Branch manager 
B4   £20000 Analyst 
B5   £28,000 Branch manager 
B6   £40,000 Corporate manager 
Source: Internal documentation 
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She added that by talking about the job evaluation from the start representatives 
understood exactly what was happening, and the rationale behind carrying out 
another job evaluation.  As she explained: 
“I talked to them [the representatives] from day one so they knew everything I was doing and it 
wasn‟t a great shock to them, and I think it was the best approach to take.  And they‟re not 
stupid.  They knew it was absolutely the right thing to do” (Call centre manager). 
She contrasted this with the general approach before partnership: 
“Previously we would have done that 100% behind closed doors.  It would have just been 
delivered.  A fait accompli just dropped on them.  I have been involved in things before where 
it was absolutely cloak-and-dagger behind closed doors”. (Call centre manager). 
For the union representatives, the compromise was the best approach for both sides:  
“Although it‟s not ideal, it‟s not benefiting the business as much as they would like to have 
from a money perspective.  It made everybody happy.  They knew the score” (Union 
representative). 
This demonstrates a clear difference in terms of process between pre-partnership 
and post-partnership decision-making in terms of the level of engagement, and the 
fact that representatives were involved from an early stage. 
 
A second issue concerns the introduction of new contracts.   The issue concerned 
the introduction of a new flexible contract to replace the traditional 9-5 contract 
existing staff had.  From a business perspective, it was believed to be important to 
be able to deal with customer enquiries in the evening rather than just during office 
hours, as is the case with many customer service operations.  For many long-serving 
employees the new contract was seen to represent a significant diminution in their 
terms and conditions.  For example, the new contracts pay a lower premium for 
weekend working and variable shift patterns.  Of course, the business environment 
has changed considerably since the 9-5 contracts were first issued and was 
completely counter to the cultural traditions of the credit card centre.  Again it was 
eventually decided to keep existing staff on these contracts to avoid the potentially 
negative impact on morale.  New bank employees, are of course, recruited on the 
basis of the new flexible contract.  A team manager speculated that the decision not 
to change the grade was probably a business compromise: 
“I would say the existing CAMs remaining at B3, I would have said that was a business 
compromise.  I don‟t know for sure, but I‟d have said that if there was no union, we‟d probably 
have all our CAMS now as B2 or B2 High.  I certainly think the business compromises with the 
union” (Team manager). 
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Management suggested, however, that without discussions with the union providing 
an insight into how potentially damaging this could prove in terms of employee 
morale and attrition the decision may simply have been imposed.  As the Employee 
Relations Manager explained: 
If we hadn't had that ongoing dialogue with the Union, there is no doubt we would have 
imposed something from on high, would have pissed a load of people off, would have moved 
our attrition rates up, and would have cost us longer, cost us more in the long term.  Because 
people would have left, and we would have had to recruit people, and trained them, and 
invested in them, and so on.  We had people stay on those contracts, keep them happy and 
working.  And not made radical changes when we didn't need to (Employee Relations 
Manager). 
Representatives also suggested that the new flexible contract was to offer no 
weekend or bank holiday shift premia and this was opposed by the union.  They 
managed to negotiate a 25% premium: 
“So we opposed that totally, and got them 25%.  And that was a big win.  Because management 
came in and said there was no way they were going to budge.  So we got 25%.  Even thought it 
was still crap it‟s better than nothing.  Nothing like what we get, but times have changed, and 
they need to change.  That was a good one” (Union Representative). 
Clearly, then the approach appeared to have enabled management to take a more 
holistic view of the situation, and to look at the impact of decisions on a longer 
timeframe.    
 
iii) Targets 
Another topical issue concerned targets.  The representatives argued that the targets 
were too stretching and a controversial issue was the proposed reduction of „not 
ready‟ time between calls from 20 seconds to 15 seconds.   As a representative 
stated “these are people we are dealing with, they are not battery chickens”.  It was 
argued that this was leading to low morale as a result of constant flow of calls, and 
little time for social interaction.  At the time of the research the issue appeared to 
have reached stalemate and was due to be escalated to a formal business 
consultation meeting with the senior management and full-time union officials.  The 
site manager suggested that throughout the change programme there had been 
regular meetings with the local representatives and full-time union officials.  The 
call centre manager argued that the way targets were to be set had been agreed in 
consultation with the union, but that the actual quantitative targets remain at the 
discretion of management depending upon business change and employee 
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performance.  She contended that the targets were achievable for most employees – 
and that many advisers were already achieving them - and that the representatives 
would need to build a more convincing case to oppose the issue.   
 
The Employee Relations Manager suggested that most of the issues regarding 
targets could be attributed to a lack of communication, as to why the targets were 
being raised and why the management team believed they were achievable.  He 
proposed that “Businesses make big errors where they just impose things on people 
- and then they wonder why people get pissed off”.  This view was echoed by the 
Customer Service Director who argued that the targets were achievable, and most 
people were meeting them, and the business was not catering for a minority of low 
underperforming employees.  Again, this raises the concern of unions which are 
perceived to be defending the lowest performing members of the organisation.  His 
view was that employees need to stretched if the company is to achieve its goals: 
“The Bank needs to raise targets to become a top 5 world bank.  It‟s not achievable via 
mediocrity.  People don‟t come to work to bugger about and have a chat and go home.  Sorry 
we don‟t have jobs like that” (Customer Service Director). 
The credit card division FTO was less impressed arguing that “they don‟t give a 
damn provided they produce profits…they are taking the piss”.  At the time of the 
research this issue was still unresolved. 
 
iv) Sales and Service Split 
In light of intense competition in the credit card market, NatBank has been keen to 
make the organisation much more sales-oriented, encouraging employees to cross-
sell a range of products and services on even the most routine calls and queries.  The 
IT systems are designed to advise employees if a caller is a good prospect for 
additional services, and prompts them with product offerings such as insurance.  
The call centre manager explained that there was a need to change the call centre 
culture to become more of an income centre generating new leads, as opposed to a 
service centre merely reactively servicing customers problems.  However, the 
response to this change towards a more intense sales culture was not positive, with 
many customer advisers uncomfortable working with the new pressure to sell on 
even the most routine calls.    Many staff actually left the organisation as a result.  
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Again, this was a culture shock for many of the long-serving employees, who were 
therefore extremely resistant to change.  Eventually, it was decided after long 
consultation with the union that all customer advisers would not be forced to sell, 
but that those adopting a sales and service role would be receive greater rewards.  
As one manager commented: 
“For a long time, because we hadn't thought of it quite frankly, we resisted the unions call for 
splitting the sales and service. And then - low and behold - there's nothing so zealous as a 
recent convert, we suddenly „came up‟ with the idea.  Oh, wouldn't it be good to split sales and 
service.  And the union said we told you so.  Its another good example of where we have 
worked together” (Employee Relations Manager). 
He argued again that the consultation process meant there was a greater 
understanding of the day-to-day dynamics of call centre work, and the views of 
grassroots employees rather than just a pure technical model.  The Director of 
Customer Service was less sympathetic, and less supportive of the final decision 
arguing that “employees should want to sell, sales is the best job protection scheme 
there is.  They should be bloody glad we as a business are trying sell”.   
 
For the union representatives this was another example of successful consultation 
exercise.  They argued that there is a need to be a certain type of person to be good 
at sales and many long-serving employees had no experience in sales, and the found 
sales roles too stressful.  The Employee Relations Manager echoed this view. 
“It‟s a bit of a double win really.  The people who like to sell get the best people to sell to…and 
the people who don‟t want to sell don‟t.  So it worked out really well because everybody got 
their first choice” (Call centre manager). 
 
Yet this had created a new problem.  Employees generally agreed that the final 
decision was good, but there was evidence to suggest that customer service advisers 
now feel that they are “second-class citizens”, and that “sales get everything”, and 
“all that matters is sales”.  There was also the feeling amongst employees that 
when the new job roles were announced there was limited information about the 
exact requirements of the job roles.  For the Director of Customer Service this was 
“tough”; he argued that service advisers will need to accept that sales advisors will 
get greater rewards because they are doing a harder job and contributing more to the 
business.  He suggested that if the decision had been up to him people who did not 
want to sell could have left to find alternative employment with organisations where 
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selling is not important, and appeared to consider the final decision to be 
suboptimal. 
 
Line managers were pragmatic, proposing that they key issue is ensuring employees 
understand the business rationale for the sales culture, and the need to maintain 
market share and the need to remain competitive and continually improve.  Again, 
for the trade union it raises the problem of protecting – or being perceived to be 
protecting – the lowest performing employees in the organisation.  Nevertheless, it 
highlights how partnership facilitated discussions around the business rationale, and 
identified potential flaws and pitfalls based upon the particular culture and historical 
context of the credit card centre. 
 
 
Outcomes 
 
To summarise, there was clear evidence of several benefits compared to the pre-
partnership days at the North East administration centre.  These include the 
influence and regulation of decision making, improved employment relations 
locally, and increased union legitimacy. 
 
1. Influence and regulation of decision-making 
One of the key benefits concerns the influence and regulation of decision making.  
Management suggested that when the representatives challenge proposals it can be 
constructive, as it means pre-emptive changes may be made, avoiding unnecessary 
„kickback‟ from the workforce, leading to the greater legitimacy and acceptance of 
decisions.  As one manager explained: 
“I might have an idea, and I might think it‟s appropriate but the union may say „hmm, this has 
been an issue elsewhere‟, and I can then use their intelligence and they can also use mine. So 
you get both sides of the story early on, and can actually come up with something better…I 
guess it‟s common sense really” (Site Manager). 
 
This was echoed by a union representative who explained how “They can come to 
us and get our feedback on anything they‟ve got.  And we can say no that won‟t 
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work.  Or brilliant get that it in”.  The call centre manager argued that the union do 
have an influence and that on certain issues they would now carefully weigh up the 
potential cost and benefits of a particular business decision, and consider whether it 
is actually “worth the hassle” from an employment relations perspective, and have 
sometimes decided “don‟t start things that you can‟t finish”.   As she reflected: 
“The union are a great mechanism… there to make you stop and think.  Are we being fair?  Is it 
reasonable? Is it even legal?  Is it right for the people?  So we‟ve been through the thought 
process and by the time we make the decision we are absolutely convinced it‟s the right thing to 
do” (Call centre manager). 
 
Similarly, the Employee Relations manager suggested the partnership framework 
resulted in more thorough decisions which had been considered in great detail, and 
evaluated from a colleague (employee) as well as a pure business perspective, and in 
particular encourage a longer term perspective than may have otherwise been the 
case.  Similarly, the site manager proposed that decisions were now better received 
because many issues had been „ironed out‟ before they went wrong.  She described 
the approach as one of mutual understanding as opposed to agreeing, in attempts to 
try and balance dual priorities of business success and sustainable jobs.  The 
accommodation of countervailing pressures is illustrated well by the way issues 
such as re-grading and flexible contracts have been handled. 
 
However, as the National Secretary reflected “I‟m not sure whether we are involved 
in decision-making as such, but there is high level consultation, and we do have 
influence on changing decisions”.  Encouraging news for the union is that their 
influence was also perceived by employees as the following quotes illustrate: 
 “The Bank don‟t seem to go as far as the could sometimes.  They seem to show some respect 
for their employees” 
“Every employees‟ dream is to have some say in what the company does, and we believe we do 
get asked our opinion.  It‟ll always be what is best for the business, and we‟ll find out what the 
balance will be.  It might not suit everyone, but at least we have been asked”  
“It could have chosen to scrap everything and start again.  Those contracts don‟t exist anymore.  
You need to sign new ones.  But it doesn‟t choose to do that.  It chooses to leave those people 
on those contracts, and let things change slowly through time.  They won‟t issue those contracts 
now.  The demands of the business and customer have changed.  But they don‟t choose to do 
that”  
(Employee Focus Groups) 
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 Not everyone was convinced however.  The credit card division full time official 
remained philosophically opposed to the idea that the union should be trying to 
balance business and employee interests.  As he remarked: 
“Our role is to represent our members and to improve our members lives while they are at 
work.  And that‟s it full stop…our role is not to improve profits.  I am not there to help 
shareholders.  I am there to help my members.  And if that means less profits, tough.  I‟m 
responsible to my members only, not shareholders!” ( FTO). 
 
However,  the more moderate view expressed by the Employee Relations Manager 
was more typical of most managerial respondents: 
“Imposing changes often causes disgruntlement, it can slow things down particularly, it can 
mean morale goes through the floor, because something has been imposed rather than 
introduced with people.  Having the union in at early doors having them work with us keeps the 
ER climate quiet and it means we can facilitate change quicker than we could without 
partnership” (Employee Relations Manager). 
The Site Manager argued that the union adds value if both parties engage upfront, 
allowing management to benefit from the intelligence of representatives and union 
officials and their feedback.  She argued that by engaging in discussion early there 
is additional brainpower, sharing of different experiences and perceptions, and more 
ownership and buy-in to the final decision: 
“We go to the union and say that we are looking at doing X, they might say well fine, but have 
you thought about this, because if you go forward with X this might be an issue.  We can come 
up with a better compromise.  By working together I hope that 9 times out of 10 I hope that it‟ll 
actually be better received because we‟ve considered all options, and we haven‟t just consider it 
from the business point of view, we‟ve very much considered it from the colleague aspect as 
well” (Site Manager). 
Similar sentiments were expressed by the call centre manager, who admitted that the 
partnership process can often be hard work, but that better outcomes do result: 
“If you didn‟t have the Union to jump in and say hang on sometimes, you would just jump in 
and make dictatorial decisions with no idea of the impact.  Create so much disruption and it‟s 
too late to do anything about it because you‟ve already done it!” (Call centre manager). 
“I really value the relationship.  It can be a pain sometimes don‟t get me wrong.  But they put 
the other side and that‟s what they are there for.  It‟s a useful process to go through” (Call 
centre manager). 
The local union representatives were also positive, suggesting that they had an 
important role in trying to ensure decisions are as fair as possible: 
“I think its very effective.  It‟d worry me if we lost it.  I think we need somebody to keep it 
going and to keep management thinking “we cant do that” because of them.  I think our roles 
are a bit like the police.  To make sure they treat people fairly.  We are here for that”.  (Union 
representative). 
“If we weren‟t here they‟d have walked all over us by now” (Union representative). 
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2. Improved employment relations locally 
In this particular case, therefore, partnership appeared to be operating at multiple 
levels. Management and union representatives agreed that another benefit of 
partnership was more local decision making.  Representatives explained how,” We 
iron a lot out locally that management have a quieter life because of partnership.  It 
was suggested that the formal escalation process is used infrequently by the North 
East centre.  Moreover, there was evidence to suggest that the union representatives 
were well informed and aware of business issues.  The full time official for the 
credit card division suggested that creating a capable and well-trained cadre of local 
union representative was a priority for him.  The only restriction is that local 
representatives are not allowed to agree any formal changes to terms and conditions 
without the involvement of the credit card business full-time official.    
It was also suggested that before partnership employees were less likely to speak out 
because they did not want to be perceived to be being negative or being a “trouble-
causer”.  There is now less hierarchy following a restructuring of the management 
team, and the use of first name terms was thought to be symbolic of a more 
approachable management team.   This was contrasted with the traditional staid 
banking culture.  There was also evidence of significant respect for the charismatic 
Head of Site as she was a long serving employee who began her career in clerical 
work at the centre, but had steadily risen through the ranks into management.  It was 
suggested that employees now know who the management team are, whereas 
previously this was not the case.  Managers share the open plan office space as 
opposed to traditional private offices.  Line managers agreed that generally NatBank 
is “just a better place to work than it was before”, and the change in management 
style was also acknowledged by employees: 
“When I first started the management was the man at the end of the corridor.  You saw him 
once every 3 months because you had an appraisal, and you put your best clothes on.  But he 
didn‟t have a clue who you were.  Now you see the managers walking around the building and 
they give you the impression that they are more approachable” (Employee Focus Group). 
 
3. Union legitimacy 
The third main outcome is increased union legitimacy.  It was suggested that before 
partnership the representatives had very little facilities or resources, and that much 
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of the work was expected to be undertaken at home.  This had led to difficulties 
finding volunteers to fill the representative vacancies, meaning for periods of time 
the centre was completely without union representation.   Prior to partnership the 
role of a representative was described by a full-time union official as a passive 
“letterbox rather than an activist”.  As one representative remarked “Nobody 
wanted to be a rep before partnership….it was a hassle and a lot of work”.  Since 
partnership, credible and active representative roles have been created, and at the 
time of the research all union committee positions were filled, and there was 
evidence of improved workplace organisation..  The representatives are now 
allowed to hold a recruitment day in the staff canteen every three months.  They 
have a stand with an abundance of leaflets, photos, promotional materials and 
information on how to contact them for advice.  They are also given 15 minutes 
during induction sessions to promote the union to new recruits, as well as the ability 
to post information on the staff intranet.  Representatives were also happy with 
other arrangements such as access to private meeting rooms, internet use, and ad 
hoc time off for union business above the allocated slots.  The union representatives 
also recently won a union award as a result of the success of their recruitment 
campaigns.   
 
One of the representatives was so enthusiastic about her new role that she had 
successfully applied for a Seconded Representative role.  This involves a two year 
secondment to work full-time for the union at a regional level, representing 
members, dealing with enquiries and casework and supporting the union 
representatives.  The centre also has one union learning representative responsible 
for helping members find learning and development opportunities both inside and 
outside the workplace. The National Officer cited the competent union 
representatives as evidence of success. 
 
Another theme which frequently arose was the provision of information at an early 
stage as opposed to after a decision had already been made as the following quotes 
illustrate: 
“ We engage early on…they [the reps] have an input at the design stage” (Call centre manager) 
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“We know a lot about issues…displacements, job losses, knocking down walls…we know a lot 
longer, months before it happens (Union representative) 
“They virtually run everything past us and ask for our feedback” (Union representative). 
Indeed, one representative suggested that by the time the Site Manager formally 
announced a decision to her she had often heard months before from other sources.  
When asked if there were times when union representatives would not be involved 
the call centre manager remarked: “Even if its things they won‟t have influence over 
we still tell them in advance and get their feedback.  Nothing is absolutely set in 
stone and rigid”.  The representatives also agreed that on balance they know well in 
advance of upcoming issues, typically “a long time before things happen”. 
 
 
Challenges 
Despite the advantages of partnership some challenges remained. The main 
challenges included: understanding of the meaning of partnership, embedding a 
partnership culture, communication, representative efficacy and resistance to 
adversity.  These are now discussed in turn. 
 
1. Shared understanding of the meaning of partnership 
This concerns actor understandings of the meaning of partnership, and in particular 
what it means in terms of working relationships and decision-making.  There was a 
feeling that sometimes the partnership becomes “woolly”, and that this could result 
in confusion and unnecessary tensions. 
“It gets a bit muddy really…they [the reps] think its they‟re role to agree…it‟s not their role to 
agree…it‟s they‟re role for me to show them how we arrived at it [decisions], and so they know 
the rationale, but they don‟t have to agree with everything” (Contact centre manager) 
 
It was made clear by senior management and union figures that partnership did not 
mean joint decision making, or that the union had to „sign-off‟ all proposals.  
Rather, the key components of partnership were consultation at the design change, 
an explanation of rationale, and an opportunity for the union to comment, question 
and propose alternatives.  Another central component was that both sides agreed to 
consider both the business and employee point of view when making business 
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decisions, but ultimately the final decision lay with management.  It was suggested 
that some representatives within the business remained dissatisfied with this 
approach, preferring traditional bargaining over consultation which they believed to 
be „second best‟.  This was certainly the view of the credit card division full time 
official who criticised partnership on the grounds that it did not deliver any real 
power, and was also said to be the general feeling at the Liverpool centre which has 
a history of highly antagonistic employment relations. For the FTO of the credit 
card business, however, partnership means “that the union is in danger of becoming 
an adjunct of the Employee Relations Department…we don‟t challenge enough”. 
Despite these criticisms, the comments from management and union representatives 
at the North East centre were generally sanguine, although representatives believed 
that partnership did benefit the Bank more commenting how, “It‟s good, it does 
work, but I still think it works for the Bank more”.  However, they took a pragmatic 
point of view that, in relative terms, things were now significantly better than they 
had been prior to partnership.  In other words, the adversarial strategies of the 1990s 
appeared to have been ineffectual during a period of business crisis.  The call centre 
manager echoed this positive assessment suggesting that “I would hate to go back to 
a position where we locked horns with the unions all the time…I‟d far rather work 
with them and I hope they‟d say the same” (Call centre manager). 
 
2. Embedding a partnership culture 
Embedding a partnership culture throughout the entire organisation was another 
challenge, especially at the middle management level.  In this particular case 
relationships appeared to be strongest at a senior level between the senior 
management and union officials, as well as locally between the local management 
team and representatives.  However, the main manifestation of tension was at the 
line manager level.  The credit card division FTO suggested that often local issues 
escalate because “management start to play hard and fast with the rules” and take 
short cuts, despite the formal procedures and processes in place.  He argued that line 
managers are under pressure to deliver profits and when things are tough “the first 
thing to go out of the window is proper negotiation or consultation”.  
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The union National Officer agreed that managers either forget or are sometimes not 
aware of agreed process, and implement local decisions without due consideration 
of the consultation procedures.  It was also suggested that some more old-fashioned 
managers still resent having to consult with union representatives about decisions.  
He proposed that many older managers who grew up in the bank when the union 
was kept very much at arms length may find it difficult to change their traditional 
mindset.  Line managers also appeared to occupy a space outwith the partnership 
system, which focused on relationships between more senior managers and 
representatives.  Patchy relationships with middle managers were also highlighted 
by union representatives: 
“Some team managers are fine.  Take on board what you say and sort things out.  Other team 
managers couldn‟t give a shit, want to make a name for themselves, want to go up the ladder 
and are pure bastards” (Union Representative). 
 
In addition to getting the buy-in of middle managers, another challenge was 
engaging employees.  There was a feeling that many employees have little 
knowledge or interest in the union.  Of course a diversity of views is not surprising.  
As the Employee Relations manager suggested, in any organisation three camps 
typically exist: the pro-union, the anti-union and the neutral/agnostics.  As a team 
manager stated, non-members often think they will not need it until it is too late: 
“I still think there is some apathy amongst people towards the union.  What can they do for me?  
They won‟t do anything?  It‟s like a life preserver on a boat.  You don‟t‟ need them until the 
boat starts to sink.  And then they think, oh, where is my life preserver?!” (Team manager).   
Yet employee attitudes towards trade unions generally were positive, and the quote 
below was fairly typical: 
“I think what they do is ensure there is a degree of fairness.  If a company makes a change in 
policy whether it be to type of contract, hours you work, health and safety – just ensuring 
fairness.  They will certainly fight your corner in that respect and do it well” (Employee Focus 
Group). 
 
Although as mentioned earlier some employees did have trust in the union to work 
effectively behind the scenes, other employees were unconvinced, and 
demonstrating their effectiveness presented another challenge to the union: 
“I personally don‟t think they are a lot of help to us”  
“I think the unions are in a difficult position.  Not just here but at other companies as well.  
This is what it‟s going to be, end of story.  No more discussions and that‟s it.  In lot‟s of 
companies the unions have their hands tied.  They have nowhere to go”  
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“The only thing I hear from the union is vote for this and vote for that in the mail”.  
(Employee Focus Groups) 
 
3. Communication 
Another component of partnership was the idea that there should be „no surprises‟.  
It was agreed that one of the main barriers to the partnership process was the 
communication with staff which one union representative described as “simply 
atrocious”, an issue that also recurs in the annual staff attitude surveys.  52% of 
employees in the credit card business were satisfied with communication in 2004 
staff survey, although this was up form 50% in 2003.  Nevertheless, this was still 
lower than the NatBank Group average of 58% in 2004  (Internal document).  
Documentation reveals, however, that issues of improving communication have 
been an explicit strategy throughout the NatBank Group in recent years.  This was 
especially true in the call centre environment where the work environment was 
described as an impediment to good communication.  It was felt that since the call 
centre workers are on the telephone for most of their day, they simply do not have 
time to read or digest the frequent information bulletins provided.  Attempts had 
been made to address the issue through „buzz‟ team brief sessions between customer 
advisers and team managers, but these were often irregular or cancelled due to 
fluctuations in call volumes.  Yet the representatives also joked that often they still 
find things out „from the floor‟ or „in the smoking shelter‟. 
 
Managers acknowledged that communication was a major problem, and that 
although downward cascades of information were plentiful there were significant 
issues getting feedback from the floor.  Much of the communication relied upon the 
use of paper „desk-drops‟ and notices on the electronic bulletin boards.  This was 
attributed to the 24-hour environment, diverse shift patterns and the fact that 
customer service agents are on calls for most of the day making face-to-face 
interaction very difficult.  As the call centre manager summed up “it makes two-way 
communication a bloody nightmare”, and arguably therefore even more important.   
Employees also raised the issue suggesting that to a great extent the work 
environment inhibited communication, and that time set for communication sessions 
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was often cancelled.  Many expressed frustration regarding the fact that even when 
communications were available they had no time to read memos and emails, or to 
browse the intranet.  This suggests that good communication is both more difficult 
yet even more necessary in the call centre environment. 
 
4. Representative efficacy 
There was also the worry by the union representatives that they were sometimes 
perceived to be „in the Bank‟s pocket‟, as staff were sometimes unaware of union 
achievements, and representatives were bound by strict embargoes on information.  
This was compounded by the fact that Bank and the union release joint statements 
stating that “The Bank and the Union have agreed…” leaving members unaware of 
the starting point, how successful or heated negotiations were, or whether a 
compromise was reached.  The representatives stressed that there was a need for a 
great deal of trust from members that they were actively involved on their behalf 
and not management poodles.  There was a feeling that the representatives were 
sometimes unable to advertise their success and that this was particularly true of 
significant collective successes.  One representative suggested how she would 
ideally like to create a document listing their achievements but suggested that it 
would not be possible as it would be seen to be against „the spirit of partnership‟.  
As she explained, “You don‟t want to advertise everything because you don‟t want 
to step on their toes really”.  There was a perception that advertising successes 
under traditional bargaining would be a lot easier.   However, they suggested that 
small individual successes (e.g. discipline and grievance cases) were often spread 
through word-of-mouth.  The representatives accepted that generally employees 
have a limited knowledge especially vis-à-vis collective issues.   For example, it 
was suggested that employees may think a 3% pay rise is bad, but the starting point 
could have been no pay rise at all, yet employees feel they have been “sold down 
the river”.  As one representative remarked, “Members need to trust us to fight for 
them even if they don‟t know exactly what‟s going on”. 
 
Nevertheless, the site manager proposed that the representatives are very credible 
suggesting that, “the reps here are very credible…I think they‟re good at promoting 
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what they do and I think their people know when they‟ve intervened, and when 
we‟ve had discussions and maybe changed something”.  The call centre manager, 
however, acknowledged that sometimes it may be difficult for the representatives, 
because if members perceived that the role of the representative is to agree 
everything, they will inevitably be “attacked” if the final decision is unpopular.  The 
Site Manager admitted that some employees may view partnership as a „cop-out‟.  
The Employee Relations Manager proposed that unions “need to re-assess their 
very member proposition”, suggesting that whereas militancy afforded unions a 
high degree of visibility to members, partnership relationships are significantly 
more low key making it more difficult to explicitly demonstrate influence to 
members.  While some members took the view that no news was good news, on the 
other hand, no news meant no credit for the union.  This was echoed by a National 
Officer, who suggested that unions need to go through a „watershed‟ to address the 
new realities of work, in the style of the reincarnation of the Labour Party.  In other 
words, just as the Labour party had to reinvent themselves to win business 
confidence, the unions may need to follow a similar strategy if they are to achieve 
employer support. 
 
5. Resistance to adversity 
Another concern was the sustainability of partnership over time.  The credit card 
division National officer proposed a key challenge could be if economic times are 
much harder and the Bank has to make very tough decisions arguing that “A major 
announcement e.g. closure of a centre or takeover could tear it to pieces very 
quickly”.  He argued that though mitigation of the worst effects had occurred during 
initial small scale off-shoring, how sustainable is this way of working if the bank 
decides to offshore on a much larger scale.  Other management and union 
respondents also queried how sustainable the partnership is if „champions‟ left the 
organisation or if there was a shift in government policy.  Despite the challenges 
outlined above,  the sanguine view of the Employee Relations Manager was typical 
of most management and union respondents: 
“Don‟t get me wrong, there are still massive challenges.  But what partnership gives us is a 
framework to address those challenges.  And if for no other reason than that, that‟s a good 
enough reason for it to continue” (Employee Relations Manager).  
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Finally, employee views were also positive, with the majority expressing support for 
more co-operative employment relations, and few expressing a desire for a more 
traditional adversarial relationship between the company and the union. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has presented the findings of the first case study conducted at NatBank.  
Contextually, it is proposed that the partnership is interesting for several reasons.  
Firstly, NatBank have a long history of working with trade unions.  Though 
employment relations were thought to have been historically stable, intense market 
pressure and attempts to reconfigure the business resulted in a long period of 
industrial relations conflict in the 1990s.  In addition, the business also experienced 
a diminution in City and shareholder confidence, who expressed doubts about the 
leadership of the organisation.  In the late 1990s the business changed Chief 
Executive three times, and national industrial action also threatened to damage the 
reputation of the bank even further.  The new Chief Executive therefore had the dual 
role of restoring investor confidence, and improving the poor employment relations.  
Inspired by the partnership model being promoted by the government as well as 
organisation such as the TUC, IPA and Acas, a formal partnership agreement was 
signed in 2000.  The founding principles included joint commitments to the success 
of the bank, employees, customers and shareholders.  Employees were to be treated 
fairly but equally, the union committed to the principles of business flexibility and 
the need for organisational change.  The approach was summed up as one of joint 
problem solving.   
 
In contrast to the frosty times of the 1990s relationships between senior 
management and union officials, as well as between local management and local 
representative appeared to be very good.  The main challenge was changing the 
attitudes of line managers who were loathe to work with the union, as well as 
restoring employee interest and support for the union.  Indeed, in the late 1990s 
many employees cancelled their memberships.  Local representatives, who were 
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previously described as „letterboxes‟ rather than activists were now involved in 
issues including pay and conditions, discipline and grievance and organisational 
change.  Before partnership, representative roles at the North East centre were often 
vacant; now they have a highly enthusiastic team.  They acknowledged that their 
role concerned persuading, challenging and questioning rather than simply 
opposing.  For them, the key issue was devising a strong case to convince 
management on the basis of both employee impact and business rationale.  The 
examples of re-grading, flexible contracts and the sales/service split all illustrate that 
they did appear to have an impact. A counter argument may be however be posed: 
does partnership lead to suboptimal decisions from a business perspective?  The 
evidence from this case suggests that the „optimal‟ short-term business decision may 
actually be suboptimal in the medium term.  Imposing the pressure on all employees 
to sell created inefficiencies in that staff turnover increased significantly.    Or put 
differently what was ostensibly the most efficient decision was often not efficient, 
because of other interfering variables. Though less quantifiable, the „optimal‟ 
business decision to downgrade staff and change their contracts may have had such 
a detrimental impact on the quality of employment relations, potentially 
outweighing the proposed financial savings.   
 
Through the process of partnership, benefits included the regulation of decision 
making, increased union legitimacy and better employment relations.  Management 
benefited from the union input regarding negative consequences of decisions, and 
the union benefited from the opportunity to comment and question.  The union has 
also benefited in terms of legitimacy and revived weak trade union organisation.  
Most management and union figures agreed that the hostile relationship which 
characterised the 1990s was ineffectual from both a union and management point of 
view.  Lastly, from an employee point of view there also appear to have been 
improvements.  Employee comments were generally positive, an important finding 
given the significant changes which have occurred within the bank in recent years.   
Naturally, challenges remain. There is still some disagreement about what 
partnership actually means.  The partnership culture is not embedded across all 
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levels and especially in relation to line managers and work teams.  Representatives 
have a tough job demonstrating their effectiveness to members as a result of a more 
low key approach.  Communication is also problematic and is exacerbated by the 
nature of the jobs.  Finally, it is difficult to assess how the partnership framework 
will cope with future business challenges, or the impact key champions leaving the 
organisation could have.  Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that within 
the context of the NatBank North East centre, a partnership approach appears to be 
fairly well rooted, and has demonstrated a reasonable degree of success, and 
delivered a variety of benefits to actors.   
  
  6 
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Chapter 6:  Case Study 2 – BuSoc 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the second case study undertaken at the BuSoc administration 
centre in the Midlands of England.  The chapter begins with an introduction to the 
case organisation and to the site under study.  A brief background to the evolution 
of employment relations and the partnership structures at BuSoc is then provided. 
This is followed by a discussion of the meaning of partnership in this context.  The 
chapter then explores the process of partnership in detail by firstly examining the 
nature of the relationships forged between they key actors.   Secondly, recent and 
issues and decisions within the organisation, including pay and conditions and 
discipline and grievance processes, are examined.  The chapter concludes with an 
evaluation of the BuSoc partnership, and discusses some of the main benefits and 
gains, as well as the challenges to partnership at BuSoc. 
 
 
Company profile 
 
BuSoc is a major British building society providing mortgages, loans, savings 
accounts and insurance products.  The current organisation is the result of a series of 
mergers between many regional and national building societies, and historically, the 
roots of the society can be traced to the 1850s.  Building societies developed in 
response to the population migrations of the Industrial Revolution when workers 
began to form societies, in order to save for land and materials to build houses of 
their own.  Each member would make a regular contribution until all members‟ 
houses had been built, after which the temporary society would be closed.  In the 
late 19
th
 century the number of these societies expanded rapidly, and many became 
permanent loans and savings institutions, paying interest to savers and charging 
interest to borrowers.  The most significant merger was in the late 1980s when the 
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society merged with a major competitor.   The business press suggests that the 
society experienced a lack of focus and high complaints following the merger, and 
struggled to bring the two organisations together.   BuSoc‟s problems were 
exacerbated by arrears problems as a result of early 1990s recession, a downturn in 
the housing market and a significant rise in bad debt.  Economically, a combination 
of low output, high unemployment and high inflation posed a significant challenge 
to the society,  and public relations at this time were very poor.  Since these crisis 
years, BuSoc appears to have had some success in reinvigorating the business.  In 
2006, BuSoc‟s assets reached a record £120bn with pre-tax profits exceeding £500 
million. This gives BuSoc a position within the largest UK financial service 
organisations, and within the top three in terms of mortgage lending.  They currently 
have over 10 million customers (members).  Though the society entered into the 
provision of personal banking services, following the deregulation of the market in 
the 1980s the primary business remains residential mortgage lending to individuals.  
The organisation has received various awards as an „Employer of Choice‟,  „Top 
100 Company to Work For‟ and „Investor in People Champion‟, and has developed 
a reputation as a good employer.  It also retains a commitment to its mutual status 
and has used the fact that it continues to be owned by members to give it a 
distinctive marketing edge compared to the „profit-driven‟ high street banks and 
converted building societies.  The society claims that mutuality allows both a more 
customer and employee-focused approach, due to the absence of stock market 
pressure.  Indeed, BuSoc is proud of its position as „consumer champion‟, and can 
often be found campaigning against unfair charges or confusing marketing.  
Mutuality has become a major part of the ethos especially since many other former 
building societies have converted to plc status, as the corporate presentation 
summarised in Table 6.1 demonstrates.  
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Table 6.1 
Building societies versus banks 
BuSoc  (and other building societies) Most high street banks 
 Mutual status: owned by members.   Public limited company (plc) 
status: owned by shareholders. 
 Run in the interests of people who have 
bought the Society's products, that is, 
members and customers. 
 Plcs must listen to their shareholders 
(as well as to their customers). 
 Profits are returned to members in the 
form of better rates and lower fees and 
charges. Does not pay dividends to 
shareholders. 
 Some profits are returned to 
shareholders in the form of dividends. 
 Owned internally, by members. Not listed 
on the stock market. 
 Owned externally, by shareholders. 
Listed on the stock market. 
 One member, one vote. Members are 
encouraged to have a say in the running 
of the business, including voting at the 
AGM. Did you vote this year? 
 Larger shareholders tend to have 
more influence. Shareholders have 
voting rights, depending on how the 
company is incorporated. 
Source: BuSoc corporate presentation 
 
At a corporate presentation the Employee Relations Director described the BuSoc 
approach as demonstrating “a sense of corporate responsibility and sense of 
decency in a crowded marketplace”. The official BuSoc vision outlined below, 
promotes a commitment to customers, employees, partners and the communities in 
which they operate. 
 financial success by continuing to give our members great value 
 encouraging and supporting our employees to fulfil their potential 
 working to have a positive impact on the communities we serve, and on 
wider society 
 improving our environmental performance and reducing our negative 
environmental impacts 
 working closely with our partners to operate effectively and deliver value to 
our members 
 
The case site: Midlands Administration Centre 
The organisation has 16,000 employees in the UK across 700 branches and two 
large administration centres.   As a result of a merger in the late 1980s, BuSoc has 
two main administration centres because the two companies decided to retain their 
respective headquarter buildings.  One of the merged organisations had its roots in 
the co-operative movements of London, but relocated its head office to new offices 
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on the M4 corridor in the 1970s.  The other merged organisation is associated with a 
large East Midlands town.  The bulk of the research was conducted at the secondary 
administration centre in this town, with a population of around 200,000. 
Traditional employers in the area include brewing and engineering, although current 
growth industries include financial/customer services, communication, transport and 
logistics, and creative industries.  The area is also known as a „high tech cluster‟ 
because of its proximity to an important belt of technology industries.  Despite the 
collapse of the traditional footwear industry, as part of a wider decline of 
manufacturing employment, proximity to London and the West Midlands have 
helped the local economy remain reasonably buoyant.  Unemployment is slightly 
below the national average at just over 3%.  Main industries of employment include 
manufacturing (17%), wholesale and retail (19%), and transport storage, and 
communications (8%).  Employment in financial intermediation is also important at 
almost 7%, over twice the average for the East Midlands region, and also above the 
average for England as a whole.    The data is summarised in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 
Industry of employment (aged 16-74 in employment) 
Industries in BuSoc area Local 
authority 
East 
Midlands 
England 
Agriculture; hunting; forestry 0.5 1.88 1.45 
Fishing 0 0.01 0.02 
Mining and quarrying 0.06 0.042 0.25 
Manufacturing 16.76 19.91 14.83 
Electricity gas and water 0.4 0.83 0.71 
Construction 6.65 6.86 6.76 
Wholesale and retail 19.49 18.21 16.85 
Hotels and catering 4.2 4.51 4.73 
Transport, storage and communication 7.7 6.25 7.09 
Financial intermediation 6.68 3.07 4.8 
Real estate, renting and business activities 11.93 10.41 13.21 
Public administration 4.1 4.95 5.66 
Education 6.72 7.8 7.74 
Health and social work 10.67 10.6 10.7 
Economically inactive: unemployed 3.09 3.27 3.35 
Economically inactive:  long term sick or disabled 4.44 5.29 5.3 
Source: ONS (2006), Data derived from Census 2001 
 
 
Employment relations at BuSoc 
 
In addition to the context of the local area, and the buoyant local economy, it is also 
important to consider the employment relations profile of the company.  BuSoc 
employs 16,000 employees in the UK, with a split between 1/3 part-time and 2/3 
full-time.  The average age of an employee is 36, and voluntary employee turnover 
is 8% per annum, below the industry benchmark of 11% (Table 6.3).  In terms of 
gender, the majority of employees are female,  with 71% female and 29% male, and 
this is especially true in the branch network.   Women are underrepresented at a 
senior level with only 20% senior managers female, but at middle management level 
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52% of managers are female. These ratios also compare favourably with the 
industry benchmark of 25%, although the BuSoc aim is still to achieve an eventual 
ratio of 50% female managers.  
 
Table 6.3 
UK employment statistics 
Employment Metric 
Number of employees 16, 000 
% Full Time 68% 
% Part Time 32% 
Average employee age 36 years old 
Sickness absence 3.14 
Overall turnover rate 9% 
Voluntary employee turnover 8% 
Voluntary short service turnover 20% 
Source: internal documents 
 
In terms of the age profile of employees, many are young, with over a third under 
30.  The majority of employees at just over half are aged between 30 and 50.  13% 
of the workforce are over 50 (Table 6.4). 
 
Table 6.4 
Age profile of the BuSoc workforce 
Age profile (%) 
Employees 60+ 1% 
Employees 50-59 12% 
Employees aged 40-49 23% 
Employees aged 30-39 30% 
Employees aged 20-29 30% 
Employees aged < 20 4% 
Source: Internal documents 
 
Though this provides some background on the organisation as a whole, it is 
important to provide some detailed background to the site under study.  The 
administration centre site employees just over 2000 people across a wide range of 
roles including customer sales and service, information technology, finance and law.  
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Again, like NatBank, the offices are located on a major business park on the 
outskirts of the town.  As the former headquarters of one of the merged building 
societies the building represents a very traditional office environment.  The primary 
functions at the administration centre are mortgage administration and customer 
services.  However, the centre has recently been refurbished and includes an on-site 
gym, beauty salon, hairdresser, shop, restaurant, internet cafe and Starbucks coffee 
kiosk.  Providing a range of services on site was thought to be important as the 
office is over three miles from the town centre.  The dress code is smart with most 
employees wearing a shirt and tie, although the company operate a „dress down 
Friday‟ policy where employees are allowed to wear more relaxed clothing.   
 
To maintain consistency with the other case studies, the focus was on customer 
service and sales departments including lending control and the contact centre, and 
such typical roles as „lending advisor‟ and „customer advisor‟.  Lending advisors 
deal with customer arrears issues where customers have fallen behind with 
payments on their mortgages, personal loans or credit cards. This often involves 
calling customers who have payment difficulties, and arranging payment plans.  It 
can also involve arranging the sale of repossessed houses and liaising with other 
parties such as surveyors.  Customer service advisors are involved with inbound 
customer account management issues in a department called „BuSoc Direct‟.  
Typical roles include Collections Adviser and Sales Advisers.  A collections adviser 
has the remit of trying to get customers who are in debt back into credit.  Pay is 
around £12, 500 basic salary with an annual corporate bonus, and a target related 
monthly bonus of up to around £300 month. The Sales Adviser role attracts a pay of 
around £14,500 composed of a basic salary of £12,500, annual corporate bonus and 
performance related bonus of up to £250 per month.  The roles are based on flexible 
shift patterns including evenings and weekends.  Customer service roles are similar, 
although they attract a lower performance related bonus package, because they do 
not have as much pressure to sell.  Due to invariably high call volumes, the call 
centre environment normally provides significant opportunity for overtime working.   
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Overall BuSoc‟s five call centres answer 25,000 telephone calls each day and 
employ 1,200 people, around 300 of which are based at the Midlands operation 
centre.  The call centre was introduced five years ago in response to increased 
workloads, and it was believed that it would be more efficient to streamline 
operations by separating customer contact and non-customer contact roles.  The 
most obvious difference between the Lending and Call Centre environment is that in 
the former employees have greater autonomy in managing their workload, whereas 
in the call centre environment the automated system distributes a constant flow of 
calls.  Lending agents also have more time „offline‟ completing paperwork, whereas 
in the call centre environment almost all time is spent answering calls.  Before the 
opening of the call centre, many of the long serving staff had been working in 
administrative roles, including filing and reprographics, and as such there was a 
feeling that call centre roles were a lot more pressurised than traditional 
administrative work.  In the call centre environment, agent activity is monitored and 
compared to targets.  For example, advisers are targeted to deal with 8 calls per 
hour, and to be „online‟, i.e. on the phone, 68% of the day.  Other targets include the 
number of times the adviser says the customers name, and the amount of sales leads 
generated.  The call centre is typically very busy and advisers normally deal with a 
steady flow of calls for the duration of their shift.   
 
Culturally, the business has also experienced change towards becoming a more 
sales-oriented organisation.  Before, branches would have a mortgage quota to lend 
each month, and if the branch had already allocated this quota they would have to 
decline customer requests.  Now the business has become more sales focused, trying 
to embed the view “that actually we are there to serve the customers rather than 
doing them a favour by granting them a mortgage (Employee Relations Manager).  
Nevertheless, there was a feeling among the union representatives that Head Office 
administration jobs are still generally more comfortable, and as a result a more 
content workforce compared to the branches.  As one representative remarked: “I 
feel sorry for the people in the branches who work really hard.  I think they tend to 
have more issues than people in the Admin Centres.  I think we‟ve got it good here 
basically”.  The Area Officer suggested that the Administration Centre is one of the 
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lowest in terms of union membership, and speculated that this may be due to the 
fact they have less „issues‟ compared to the Head Office and branch network.    
 
Team managers suggested that employment relations were generally positive 
especially with flexible working and good benefits. They also agreed that the 
current Chief Executive is perceived to be keen on people and the ethical image, and 
that the company had been good at explaining the rationale behind business 
decisions.  They also agreed that there were less „issues‟ in the administration centre 
environment generally, and many more issues in the branch environment.  This was 
not to say there were no pressing issues in the administration centres; the fact the 
call centre environment is so busy and targets keep increasing were examples of 
issues in the call centre.  However, on a day-to-day basis the Administration Centre 
was generally seen to offer a more  relaxed working environment than the branches. 
 
Employees also agreed that on balance administration centre life was calmer than in 
the branches, and there was evidence to suggest that this perceived secure and calm 
environment may have contributed to the lack of interest in the union.  Some 
employees suspected they would join and be more interested in union issues if they 
perceived the situation to be more vulnerable or “up in the air”.  In their current 
role, however, many appeared to feel fairly comfortable.  As one employee in the 
lending department stated “they are always going to need somebody to collect 
debt”.  Likewise, in the call centre job security was also though to be very good as 
the demand for agents exceeded supply, and overtime was plentiful.  The results of 
BuSoc employee attitude surveys, conducted by an external agency, are a useful 
indicator of employment relations within the building society overall (Table 6.5).  
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Table 6.5 
BuSoc Attitude Survey results (2004-2006) 
Survey metric 2004 2005 2006 
Organisational change 72 67 59 
Job satisfaction 83 75 75 
Leadership and group image 82 82 80 
Job security 67 67 64 
Employee involvement 67 63 62 
Pay and benefits 57 69 68 
Working conditions 81 77 77 
Supervision 76 75 75 
Working relationships 87 75 76 
Employee-customer commitment index 97 89 89 
Communication 81 79 80 
Training and development 72 78 79 
Performance appraisal and recognition 78 73 74 
Career development 75 67 68 
Employee satisfaction 79 77 77 
Overall response rate 89 91 86 
Source: Internal documentation 
 
Communication, leadership and group image, and training and development all 
scored particularly high in 2006.  The lowest scores include organisational change, 
employee involvement and job security, however all scores are well above 50%.  
When the indicators are combined to provide an overall „employee satisfaction‟ 
index, the results appear to be positive with results around 77%.  Management 
interpretations of the annual employee opinion survey were that results are normally 
very favourable when benchmarked with other financial service organisations.  
Unfortunately, only aggregate figures were available, and as such these statistics 
offer little insight into the quality of employment relations at different sites or 
between different operational divisions of the business.  For example, the fact job 
security received one of the lower ratings contrasts with the comments from the 
Administration Centre employees.  It may be speculated that this reflects responses 
from the branch network.  
  BuSoc 
 
 
 
 249 
Partnership structures at BuSoc 
 
Representative participation at BuSoc centres around the recognised staff union. 
The union has been recognised by the Certification Office as independent from the 
employer since the late 1980s (it was formerly a staff association), and has been 
representing BuSoc employees for over 30 years. Until the late 1980s the 
association did not have full-time officials; rather a Chairman was appointed on a 
seconded basis. He was supported by external consultants who would provide 
specialist advice.  However, in 1990 the staff associations of the two merging 
organisations also merged to form one new association.  The union was run by a 
General Manager, and this was said to be symbolic of the kind of association it was: 
a business union rather than a campaigning union.  The staff association represents 
all staff below general and senior management.  Membership of the staff union is 
currently around 75% and it is affiliated to the TUC but has no formal political 
affiliation.  In 2006, union membership at the administration centre was 54%.  This 
compares to membership of 64% at the South West operations centre and an 
average of 75% in the branch network.  The union has 14 staff members.  Officially, 
management supports the role of the union.  According to the staff handbook: 
“BuSoc recognises the importance of staff representation and, although 
membership of the Union is not a condition of employment, encourages employees 
to support the activities of the Union by becoming members”. The union also makes 
a presentation to new employees during induction sessions. 
 
Currently, the main formal mechanism for information, consultation and negotiation 
is the Joint Consultation and Negotiation Committee (JCNC), chaired by the 
Divisional Director of Personnel.  The Union President, General Secretary, 
Assistant General Secretary, and some representatives from the NEC also attend 
these meetings.  The General Secretary is the Chief Executive of the Union, and 
Chief Negotiator.  The President - who is seconded from BuSoc for two years - acts 
as Chair of the NEC and National Conference, and is the Chief „Lay‟ Officer.  Most 
of the society members are from personnel functions, although one senior manager 
from branch network also sits on the JCNC.  Formally the JCNC convenes for the 
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Annual Pay Review with the majority of other issues advanced through informal 
talks and „corridor conversations‟.   There is a list of negotiable items in the 
recognition agreement, and the business has resisted abandoning this list despite 
union pressure.  Formally at least, negotiation still remains limited to the issues 
summarised below: 
 
 Pay ranges 
 The amount of money available for distribution in general salary reviews 
 Number of hours in the basic working week 
 Annual holiday allowance 
 Overtime pay rates Shift payments 
 Saturday morning payments 
 Compensation for employees using their own car on BuSoc business 
 Payments for working on Public Holidays 
 On-call and call-out agreements 
 Additional responsibility payments 
 Unsociable hours payments 
 London allowance 
 Lunch time payments 
 Maternity leave and benefits, adoption leave and paternity leave 
 Employment break 
 Subsistence allowances 
 
This does not mean that items not on the list fail to be discussed, but that the union 
would be unable to take the society to formal arbitration.  If they fail to agree at 
JCNC another meeting has to be scheduled within 14 days and this would be 
attended by a senior executive.  If there is still a failure to agree the union can raise 
the issue with Acas for pendulum arbitration.  Pendulum arbitration would involve 
the arbitrator choosing between the position of the trade union or the employer, 
without any option of „splitting the difference‟ and suggesting a third solution or 
compromise, as this is meant to encourage each party to make sensible demands.  
However, the union acknowledges that this is a high risk, worst case scenario 
strategy, as each side risks losing everything through the arbitrator‟s decision.  
Nevertheless, this is an extremely powerful tool for the union meaning there is no 
need to strike.  It is important to note that at the time of the fieldwork (2005) the 
infrastructure fell short of the demands of the Information and Consultation 
Regulations because the focus of the current structures is very much on personnel as 
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opposed to general business issues, and a new employee involvement structure was 
intended to be in place later in the year. 
 
Table 6.6 
Formal partnership mechanisms 
Mechanisms Remarks 
BuSoc Staff Union 160 reps, funded Union President on two-
year secondment 
Union reps/facilities 75% membership of the union 
 
Constituency Representatives are allocated 4 days per year plus additional time at 
the discretion of their line manager throughout the year.  Area Executive Members 
receive 6 days per year, Health and Safety reps are also granted 6 days per year, and 
those with both roles receive both allocations.  NEC members receive 12 days per 
year.   In terms of ability to get time off for union duties the evidence was mixed.  
As the Area Officer explained “It all comes down to the line manager/business 
needs.  If the teams workload is so high the union role has to take a bit of a 
backseat.  It‟s balancing the business needs”.  Much appeared to hinge upon the 
attitudes of individual line managers.  For example, there has been poor attendance 
at Area Council meetings even though the meetings are planned months in advance.  
As the Area Officer argued, if representatives do not attend meetings, they cannot 
properly represent their members.  However, despite these difficulties, there 
appeared to be an acceptance that union work is very much secondary to their full-
time job. As the Area Officer explained, “We are not employed by the Union.  We 
are employed by the Society.  At the end of the day they are paying us to do a job.  
The union work is voluntary”.   The Union President highlighted that the role of the 
local representatives is to collect views, provide feedback, and relay information 
“but they are not there as negotiators” and that they are  “not like traditional shop 
stewards who negotiate terms and conditions”. 
 
Although most actors believed partnership primarily concerned representative 
participation, like most UK organisations the business also employs various direct 
employee involvement mechanisms.  These include, for example, team briefing 
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sessions, company videos, intranet, suggestion schemes and attitude surveys.  In the 
call centre monthly focus groups had also been recently introduced to provide a 
forum for call agents to air some of the day-to-day concerns regarding working 
practices or other issues of concern. 
 
 
Definition of partnership at BuSoc 
 
Although there is no formal partnership agreement between management and the 
union, it was argued by senior management and union actors that the relationship 
between the business and the union could be described as a partnership relationship.  
This was thought to be a result of contextual factors such as the history of mutuality 
and the resultant management style.  Indeed, the management style was typically 
described as „benevolent‟ and „paternalistic‟ by both union and management 
respondents.  Management were keen to stress their commitment to being 
recognised as a responsible/ethical organisation and as an employer, and argued that 
it was complimentary to the partnership ethos.  As one manager stated: 
“Everything we do is for our membership and that‟s changed the way we think and operate.  
We‟re perhaps not as ruthless as a bank might be in terms of our personnel policies.  We‟re 
much more paternalistic” (Employee Relations Manager).   
 
The partnership term is also used on the company website: “We encourage everyone 
to get involved…and have their say – which is why we constantly work in 
partnership with the BuSoc Staff Union, an independent affiliated union, to look at 
how we can make life even better here.” (BuSoc Recruitment Literature, emphasis 
added)  The Personnel Director suggested that BuSoc has always had good 
personnel policies: 
“BuSoc has always had good employment policies.  I felt that when I came in.  I was very 
impressed with the caring attitude.  Whereas – I worked in the City before and you would be 
out of the door much more quickly.  I think over the last 15 years we have made a concerted 
effort to say we want to be a leading edge employer, and we have deliberately gone out to see 
what is best practice and where we can go beyond best practice” (Director of Personnel).   
She argued that historically Building societies were “caring organisations” and the 
fact that 75% of the workforce is female has contributed to the focus on employees 
and employment policy.    She also suggested that internal research had confirmed a 
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sound business rationale for investing in employees.  Similarly, the Employee 
Relations Manager suggested that there was a feeling that good employee relations 
were complimentary to good customer service and in turn business success.  He 
quoted an old BuSoc mantra by way of illustration: 
“We used to say we knew BuSoc was successful when customers said it would be their first 
choice, where business experts would recommend BuSoc as their first choice, and employees 
would say BuSoc is where I want to work” (Employee Relations Manager). 
For the Director of Personnel it was suggested that this may partly be related to 
mutuality meaning the organisation does not have the pressure to impress 
shareholders: 
“A traditional city organisation would be looking at maximising shareholder value., we don‟t 
have shareholders so our focus is how do we maximise values for members.  But I think 
culturally the difference is greater, and I‟m convinced it‟s related to our mutual structure.  It 
sounds clichéd but there is something different” (Personnel Director). 
A Personnel Consultant also stated that mutuality does make the organisation 
distinctive compared to competitors: 
“I think we have it right because we are a mutual organisation, and our competitors are PLCs.  
They have shareholders to satisfy, and maybe they have to be a little more astute with some of 
their policies.  Whereas we deal with fairness which sits comfortably with me, and the way they 
treat employees, it‟s a very big positive mutuality.  At then end of the day it‟s about working 
for the members: people with mortgages, savings and investments.  And to make sure at the 
same time the workforce are equally rewarded and treated as well” (Personnel Consultant). 
He argued that at other banks and demutualised Building societies they “have to 
answer to their shareholders a lot more severely” and that in City organisations if 
performance slips “they get kicked out to grass”.  Team managers also proposed 
that in general mutual organisations are less ruthless.  As a team manager 
commented believed it led to a more ethical approach: 
Going back when companies were converting, I suppose it seemed old fashioned, that we were 
a mutual…a bit of a blast from the past.  But when you actually look at it, and you think about 
other companies that are out to make a profit at the expense of their customers.  They treat them 
as a means to make profit.  A lot of the things they do don‟t seem very ethical” (Team 
manager). 
 
The General Secretary also held the view that “At the end of the day…BuSoc is a 
relatively benevolent employer”.  Of course, a more rigorous approach is needed to 
establish whether the relationship at BuSoc can be considered to have the typical 
characteristics associated with partnership organisations, as there is no automatic 
link between paternalism and partnership.  For this reason, it is useful to review the 
commonly cited TUC principles of partnership: 
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 A commitment to the success of the organisation 
 A focus on the quality of working life 
 A recognition of and respect for the legitimate roles of the employer and the 
trade union 
 A commitment to employment security 
 Openness and transparency 
 Adding value to all concerned 
 
Firstly, it is argued that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the union and 
management shared a commitment to the success of the organisation.  Most of the 
union officials are employees or ex-employees of the society, many have held 
middle management posts, and all stressed the importance of BuSoc delivering to 
members as well employees.  Documentation also states how “BuSoc and the union 
have a common objective in ensuring the efficiency of BuSoc and its employees”.  
This resonates with the TUC principle of a shared understanding of and 
commitment to business success.  The second commitment concerns quality of 
working life.  Again, there is evidence to suggest that BuSoc have demonstrated a 
commitment to working life by implementing many pioneering HR initiatives and 
exceeding statutory requirements on most aspects of employment law.  With regard 
to the legitimacy of the union, the fact the union funds the seconded President post, 
and that union Individual Case Officers have offices in the two administration 
centres suggests a level of support for the union.  The employee manual for new 
employees also states that “BuSoc acknowledges the benefits of BuSoc employees 
being members of the union”.  The fourth TUC principle concerns employment 
security and a flexibility/employment security agreement is at the core of many 
partnerships.  On this issue the union and the company have a Security of 
Employment and Redundancy Agreement (SERA), which outlines the consultation 
process to be followed, and “BuSoc‟s need to be flexible with employees needs for 
stability in employment, affording maximum protection for employees and their 
earning potential”.  SERA exceeds statutory requirements in that BuSoc agrees to 
consult with the union regarding redundancies regardless of union membership, 
number of redundancies or length of service.  Another principle concerns openness 
and transparency.  In accordance with this, the Recognition and Procedure 
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Agreement expresses a management commitment to “hold regular meetings with 
the union, maintain effective communication and exchange information on business 
issues”.  Moreover, “both parties believe that effective consultation and negotiation 
are instrumental”.  The final TUC principle is adding value to all concerned.  
“BuSoc and the Union have a common objective in ensuring the efficiency and 
prosperity of BuSoc and its employees” and that “good employee relations…will in 
turn promote the well-being of BuSoc and it‟s employees”.  The evidence is 
summed up in Table 6.7 below. 
Table 6.7 
Evidence of partnership at BuSoc 
TUC Definition Evidence at BuSoc Partnership 
Success of organisation Common objective efficiency + employees Y 
Quality of working life Benevolent employer, £13 million training budget, IIP Champion, 
IIP since 1993 
Y 
Legitimacy Acknowledge union duty to protect members 
Acknowledge benefits of employees being members of union 
Acknowledge valuable contribution of union 
Y 
Employment security Security and Redundancy Agreement (SERA) Y 
Transparency Effective consultation and negotiation instrumental Y 
Adding value Good employee relations good for company and employees Y 
 
In short, the evidence suggests that the arrangement does appear to have many of 
ingredients of a prima facie partnership.  Interestingly, despite the positive 
comments regarding partnership relationships, officials were reluctant to engage 
with the formal language of partnership, pointing out that they had discussed the 
notion of establishing a formal partnership agreement, but had subsequently rejected 
the idea.  As the President explained: 
“A number of years ago we did look into putting in place a partnership agreement…I think it‟s 
fair to say that around the National Executive table there was quite a concern that the Union, 
was possibly too bought into - and certainly perceived to be - too bought into society strategy 
and decision-making” (Union President) 
In other words, the union was keen to maintain a degree of distance from the 
company, and perhaps also reluctant to give up the power the pendulum arbitration 
clause affords.  Yet he proposed the approach was more like partnership than 
traditional arms length collective bargaining:  He stated how “we will and probably 
do have a very partnership style approach to the way we operate…I doubt we‟d be 
in a hurry to call it a partnership though…the word just wouldn‟t sit well with 
it…but it‟d be that in all but name perhaps”.  The reluctance by the union to 
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formally engage with language of partnership appeared to be related to the concern 
that they needed to demonstrate their independence from the employer, and this 
appeared to relate to their history as a staff association.   The General Secretary also 
highlighted the need to be seen to be independent of the Society. 
“Those who are aware of what is going on, are aware that we are very very independent.  But I 
guess if you asked somebody working in a branch in Oban or something, they‟d probably think 
we are just another department of BuSoc.  It‟s really strange.  But I‟d like to think that‟s more 
the nature of people who work for BuSoc than actually what‟s going on.  Or at least I‟d like to 
think it is” (Union General Secretary). 
He suggested that this perception was not a major problem given that membership 
of the union was healthy, and that he did not imagine employees of a paternalistic 
employer would want to be members of a more „militant‟ trade union.  He attributed 
the moderate attitudes to the employee profile of the organisation, and in particular 
to the high proportion of female and part-time staff, and suggested that financial 
service organisations are fundamentally different to traditional manufacturing 
environments.  These views accorded with an article from the union newsletter from 
the mid-1990s, when the union were debating whether to change their name from 
BuSoc Group Staff Association to BuSoc Group Staff Union.  The article suggests 
that two points of view prevailed.  On the one hand some employees believed an 
association was not a „real‟ union, and reported to – or was part of – the Society.  
On the other hand, some employees were perceived to be  put off by the 
connotations of the late 1970s and early 1980s which were perceived to be 
inappropriate in the finance sector.  Following a conference motion the association 
did change its name to a union to reinforce its independence from the employer.  
This suggests that a balance has to be struck between being perceived as militant on 
the one hand, and co-opted on the other.   
 
These concerns notwithstanding, there was a feeling that the actual name is not 
important.  The Union President cited examples of partnership agreements in the 
finance sector which he believes have meant very little in practice, and were not 
different from traditional recognition and procedure agreements.   In short, the 
partnership „badge‟ was not thought to be so important.  He argued that 
“partnership agreements just replace an „R and P‟ agreement in essence, a 
partnership will only work if both parties are committed to it…partnership is about 
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genuinely working together for the business and the employees. Yet despite the 
union reluctance to use the formal language it was agreed that the 
operation/relationship is generally reflective of a de facto partnership.  As the Union 
President stated: 
“Our role is to look after the people who work for BuSoc.  I have always maintained that we 
can look after people who work for BuSoc a lot better if we have a relationship which is 
constructive…because if you don‟t, it‟s dead easy for the employer to just keep saying no” 
(Union President). 
He argued that even in the context of a good employer, issues still occur and the 
union role is to challenge and ensure employees are treated responsibly.  Equally, 
union involvement in issues can make them easier to manager and lead to better 
outcomes for the business as well.  A similar sentiment was expressed by an 
Individual Case Officer who explained that things are quite different now compared 
to the 1980s.  She explained that, “we are not by nature what I would describe as a 
militant union.  And we do try to do things by negotiation and conciliation, rather 
than perhaps the way perhaps some people still see the body of the trade union in 
the Scargill era”.  When asked specifically how she would describe the 
union/management relationship she explained how, “We haven‟t got as far as 
signing a partnership agreement.  But yes we do work very closely with them”. 
 
For the Employee Relations Manager, one of the key differences between 
partnership and non-partnership working was the stage at which the union is 
engaged with decision-making.  He suggested that with a traditional decision-
making process in an organisation, consultation would often begin after a great deal 
of time had elapsed, and much of the management chain had already been consulted 
before union involvement began.  He proposed that the partnership ideal is to 
consult early enough to allow ideas to be considered and refined, providing more of 
an opportunity to fine tune and discuss the plan.  He presented the following 
diagram by way of illustration: 
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Figure 6.1 Partnership working 
Source: Employee Relations Manager‟s diagram. 
 
He explained how a traditional approach would mean the union would be consulted 
after a great deal of time had elapsed (y axis), and following extensive private 
discussions among the management team.  His view of a partnership approach, 
however, was where the union would be involved early (y axis) and only after some 
early management discussions had occurred.  The current agreement with the union 
is that consultation will normally occur at the “provisional business case stage” 
outlining both the idea and the rationale, before the idea becomes a formal proposal.  
This would then be presented to the union for initial discussion.  On some occasions 
consultation may actually precede any proposal document.  He argued that a co-
operative approach makes much more sense, at least in theory: 
“More constructive because you are going forward with a joint plan, you know what the union 
reaction is going to be, you know the communication the union is likely to give out to 
employees, and you can go forward almost with one voice, and everybody is very supportive 
and they feel that they‟ve influenced and got something out of the process, and the business has 
also.  And you can deliver much more quickly, and there‟s not so much conflict.  That‟s the 
ideal model.” (Employee Relations Manager). 
 
He suggested that the main benefit was that the business had insight into likely 
reactions, union commitment enhances the legitimacy of the decision, and that 
ultimately both parties gain some value through the process.  The Director of 
Personnel also suggested that there is a need for a modern constructive relationship: 
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“I think BuSoc and the Union work together well.  I think it‟s a constructive relationship, it‟s 
challenging which is right, but I think things are resolved in a constructive/co-operative fashion 
which is something that I would personally prefer.  It‟s a modern relationship and it works 
well” (Director of Personnel). 
A co-operative approach was also favoured by the union representatives: 
“I think the union is important.  You need somebody looking after you in case you are 
mistreated. As long as they are not too leftie but sensible and logical. Sometimes unions can be 
a bit extreme, you know any little thing and it‟s down tools and walk out.  I don‟t agree with 
that kind of thing.  You just want somebody there to fight your corner if need be and make sure 
your best interests are looked after” (Union representative). 
A team manager echoed the need for a moderate approach: 
“I think there is a need for unions.  I think everything is in moderation, I‟m not one of these 
people who think militancy is the best way to go about things.  I think you have to be more 
consultative”. 
 
Union officials stressed the need for  a degree of „give-and-take‟ if the relationships 
are to be successful.  For example for the Individual Case Officer building up 
informal relationships with management was preferable to working to the letter of 
the law, as it allowed greater latitude in decision-making.  The Union President also 
suggested that there is a need to go beyond what the law requires.  As he remarked 
“I want a balance between we‟ll work with you, so you‟ll work with us, it‟s very 
much a two-way thing”.  He suggested that the current Chief Executive, who has 
previous experience in banking and property, has been the more people focused 
compared to his predecessor: 
“The society had a change of Chief Executive, to somebody who in many ways and is certainly 
viewed by the employees as more people focused than his predecessor so perhaps it was 
inevitable that they‟d be more „peopley‟ stuff, than with someone who was very business 
oriented in the past.  Or perhaps that‟s a total coincidence.  They are not stupid people, they 
have been aware for sometime that the EU had agreed the ICD so at some point they had to do 
it, so why not bite the bullet, do it early it make it look really good on them” (Union President) 
For the Director of Personnel, partnership suggests a commonality of interests, but 
at the same time expects the union to challenge and question: 
“The union and I don‟t come from a „they want to do this and I want to do that‟, we have lots of 
ideas in common.  Things that are good for BuSoc.  I dislike playing games.  I value people 
saying this is what I think.  I expect when we go forward there may be times when what I am 
trying to achieve differs from what they are, I would expect it to be challenging. (Director of 
Corporate Personnel).   
 
It was also clear that, as a small union with only fourteen staff and 12,000 members, 
the union operation centred around a few key figures at the elite level, in particular 
the long-serving General Secretary, a former branch manager who has held the top 
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union position for 15 years.  There was a feeling that such a reliance on a few key 
figures was a precarious strategy for the union.  The Employee Relations Manager 
explained that having a close relationship between a few key players can be very 
beneficial, but on the other hand creates significant problems in relation to 
succession.  As he explained: 
“The General Secretary is very well known around the business, he takes the whole shooting 
match on his shoulders really, and he is the union.  He is known to be the union.  He has a huge 
network and gets to know lots of things…and that makes the union very effective, he‟s got his 
finger on the pulse, but frankly if he was run over by a bus tomorrow the union would struggle” 
(Employee Relations Manager). 
This was also implied by the Union President who remarked how “It would be 
really easy to say that the key relationship exists between me, the people in 
personnel and the Chief Executive, and there is an element where that‟s true”.  For 
example, the Chief Executive and Deputy Chief Executive go out for dinner three or 
four times a year with the General Secretary, and often deals are struck during lunch 
meetings and „corridor conversations‟ rather than at formal union JCNC meetings.  
It was proposed that the reliance on key personalities meant that if certain managers 
did not really like the Union General Secretary, they may be reluctant to consult 
him.  Some senior figures suggested the need for a union merger should the General 
Secretary leave because of the wealth of experience that would be lost. 
 
The Employee Relations Manager was not sure how effective the relationship would 
be between BuSoc and an external organisation like Amicus. Culturally most staff 
union officials are former BuSoc employees, and he believed this was a significant 
advantage for management, but one which many managers perhaps did not 
appreciate. As the Employee Relations Manager commented, “I think it‟s important 
we support the Union because there are advantages for BuSoc of having this single 
employer relationship”.  He argued that there was also a need to convince some 
non-HR personnel that the union is a useful business partner and “probably more 
agreeable than Amicus”.  He suggested that in particular the viewpoint of the Union 
President is often fairly moderate, based in terms of “when I was a manager”.  On 
the other hand the fact that seconded officials have to return to a job was said to 
“limit the contribution they can make”, and this is not necessarily such a good thing 
from the union point of view.  A company union is therefore double-edged. 
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Influence and managerial prerogative 
According to the Director of Personnel the role of the staff union is to challenge and 
promote fairness: 
“I think it‟s the role of the union to constantly challenge the business/management on it‟s 
practices, policies, equality, provisions for disabled employees, part-time workers.  I think it‟s 
their role to see you are being fair to everybody.  And even if you have the policies are they 
being implemented properly?” (Director of Personnel). 
For union officials, the role of the union is also to promote fairness and to ensure 
decisions take account of both a business and employee perspective.  As the 
President remarked: 
“Our role is to make sure that the employee perspective is brought into it as opposed to just the 
management view of an employee perspective.  Or just a management perspective.  At the end 
of the day we are here to look after our members.  Hopefully enhance their terms and 
conditions, makes sure they get good pay and good conditions, but actually we are here to make 
sure that they are treated fairly, and if that slips in any way we can make it right” (Union 
President). 
A senior collections manager expressed a very similar point of view, suggesting that 
the role of the union was to ensure fairness and consistency in decision-making. 
“We basically want to achieve the same things: fairness. And everybody has got the right to 
have their say and to be treated fairly consistently.  I see them there to protect the rights of 
employee and ensure fair and consistent treatment.  ” (Senior collections manager). 
 
In terms of influence, the President described an important distinction between 
negotiation on certain items - but predominantly pay and terms and conditions - and 
discussion and consultation on most other issues.  The General Secretary suggested 
the unions aim is to ensure that as much as possible BuSoc remains a good place to 
work, although he acknowledged union influence may not always be obvious to 
employees as much is behind the scenes. 
“Because we have a partnership/collaborative approach, a lot of things BuSoc were going to do 
get stopped before anybody even knows they were thinking about it.  So, from that point of 
view, employees perception of BuSoc is that it‟s actually a pretty nice place to work.  You 
think if we didn‟t do our job for a month, they would still think that?  But that‟s just the way of 
the world isn‟t it?” (Union General Secretary). 
 
However, management admitted that – at least formally – the union has traditionally 
had limited access to high-level business information beyond private discussions 
between senior management and the General Secretary.  As the Employee Relations 
Manager explained, “The union really haven‟t had access to other high level 
business information, sharing of information around strategy, they do pick it up in 
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other ways but there has been no real formal mechanism”.  This suggests a 
limitation in terms of the process of partnership.  The President reinforced the view 
that there is influence, but at a high level which may not be apparent to most people.  
He suggested that there has been “more than there has been…more at a senior level 
than the next level down…at the committees the General Secretary sits on there is 
involvement, and they are making strategic decisions”.  In short, partnership 
appeared to be much more about relationships in this particular case, with much less 
use of clearly defined, formal institutional structures compared to NatBank. 
 
The General Secretary argued, however, that the list of „negotiable items‟ is archaic 
because it includes uncontroversial issues such as mileage allowances, but excludes 
important pay and conditions issues such as bonuses.   He queried why the union 
has the right to take BuSoc to Acas over issues such as mileage allowances, but not 
for healthcare or bonus payments.  It may be speculated that because of the 
powerful pendulum arbitration clause, the employer is keen to keep potentially 
controversial issues off of the negotiable items list.   The General Secretary believed 
the management were reluctant to give up this list because they did not want the 
union to have negotiating power over bonus payments.  However, he thought 
perhaps that the Society‟s reluctance to give up the negotiable items list was proof 
that they viewed the union to be a genuine challenging force.  He explained how,  
“in some ways, I take it as a backhanded compliment, because they accept that we 
will take them on.  You can take a positive out of this, implicitly they recognise we 
will do what we need to do for our members”.  However he strongly believed such a 
document remains incongruous with the spirit of a partnership/relationship style 
approach.  It is therefore intriguing to note that the union was both unhappy with a 
traditional recognition and procedural agreement which they believed was “old 
fashioned and based on assumptions of conflict”, but were also weary of a 
partnership agreement which they believed may appear to be “too cosy”.   
 
The Director of Personnel, did not share the concern that the existing formal 
agreement was inappropriate or outmoded.  She explained how, 
“I‟ve looked and thought that seems fair enough, you know what areas you are able to comment 
on and influence over and so do we.  I though it was a good idea.  It sets things out quite 
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clearly.  Both know what is expected.  I don‟t know whether their view is the same- I assume it 
would be” (Director of Personnel). 
Irrespective of the terms of the actual agreement, the Employee Relations Manager 
suggested that the union was an influential force, and that it did act as a useful 
regulator on business decision-making: 
“I‟ve always seen the union as a bit of a regulator on us.  Making sure we do the right thing.  It 
doesn‟t mean that they should stop the business making the right decisions for the business, 
because both parties have got the same vested interests: making BuSoc a viable business 
proposition, for the prosperity of customers and employees” (Employee Relations Manager). 
He added that sometimes union input can be valuable in preventing the business 
making short-sighted decisions which actually overlooked major problems with 
business proposals. 
“I think there have been examples where the business wants to do something and the union 
have come back and said well have you thought about this, have you thought about that.  And 
whilst it might have sounded like a good idea for a particular business department, in the 
context of fairness, employment law, regulation and the business as a whole you sit back and 
think yeah, actually brainstorming is very well but that wasn‟t a good idea” (Employee 
Relations Manager). 
He gave the example of the proposal to pay double overtime in a department that 
was severely understaffed.  For the department managers this appeared to make 
business sense but was actually deemed unfair for part-time workers, other 
departments, unrealistic targets, and was rejected.  The Personnel Consultant agreed 
the union do have influence, again, through the strong senior relationships: 
“As a collective group, I think yes, they do have influence.  They have quite a lot of influence 
and that‟s down to the relationship the General Secretary has with D2, the Directors and 
Executive Directors.  And also with the membership numbers behind them it gives them quite a 
bit of weight there, to make sure their voice is heard” (Personnel Consultant). 
Even the call centre manager who was openly suspicious about the effectiveness of 
the union from his perspective as an employee, suggested that the union may play a 
useful role in terms of checks and balances on the business, suggesting that “as 
checks and balances the union are involved, to the extent that they will have a voice, 
and I know the relationship with the senior execs in the organisation is very strong, 
so actually they have a very useful function to play”. 
 
Union interviewees also believed the union did have influence.  The union 
Individual Case Officer suggested that union input is generally valued, and that 
management understand that the union do highlight important issues: 
“I think quite a lot of influence.  They do listen to us and they do value our opinion.  I think the 
Society take the view that if the union is coming to them, its not because they are wanting to be 
Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 264 
difficult.  It‟s because their members have genuine issues.  …I think a lot of the issues are cost 
driven…I think they take the attitude that if the union is saying it‟s a problem, then at least we 
need to listen.  I don‟t think it‟s oh, no, they don‟t have enough to do so they banging this drum 
again” (ICO). 
Local union representatives were less clear on the extent of influence because so 
much occurred at a high level but they speculated that the union is influential.  As 
one representative noted, they do not actually know what happens at negotiations. 
“I would hope there is influence.  I think there is.  But again I‟ve got no evidence of that.  Our 
messages come through saying it‟s a joint statement from Tim and whoever, but I don‟t know 
about the negotiations or how they have gone, you just take on board what they‟ve said.  But it 
appears to me there must be some pretty good working relationships to get what we get.” 
(Union representative). 
A similar view was taken by another representative who believed that the dialogue 
promoted the interests of the union, employees and the company, 
“I think it should be fairly amicable but at the same time it‟s got to be positive enough for both 
of them to put their case forward and talk positively and openly about issues.  And come to an 
agreement that will suit everybody: the staff, the company and the union.  I feel that‟s what 
they do but it‟s only my opinion.  I‟ve never sat in one of their meetings so I don‟t know for 
sure” (Union representative). 
However, one representative suggested that there was not really a need to know the 
exact details of the negotiating process: 
“I don‟t think it‟s important to know all that‟s going on in there.  OK, you need to know the 
basics that negotiating is going on, what the issue is, the outcome.  I don‟t think you need to 
know the nitty gritty, that‟s what they are there for” (Union representative). 
 
One criticism raised by the representatives was that the union is more concerned 
with company-wide issues and policies, and local representatives do not always feel 
they receive sufficient assistance to deal with local concerns e.g. stress and morale 
in the call centre.  As a representative remarked “I think on the major decisions the 
union have quite a good influence”.  It was suggested that this had upset some 
members who believed it was a union issue, but were advised to take up issues 
directly with managers but “people don‟t want to put their neck on the line 
directly”.  Again, it was suggested by team managers that sometimes it seemed that 
the union were involved in society-wide changes regarding collective policy and 
procedure, but that departmental issues are often introduced with minimal 
consultation and “they‟ll probably implement it and then sort out the fallout, rather 
than have the Union involved there and then”.  It appeared that departmental issues 
are generally channelled through a monthly meeting between managers and non-
union representatives from each team, but there was a feeling that this was not 
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effective as often employees did not want to be seen to be the person complaining.  
In other words, although there was a channel of direct employee involvement 
mechanisms for many day-to-day issues, sometimes the result was that employees 
felt their issue was perhaps too small or specific to be a „union issue‟, but lacked the 
confidence to raise it through direct mechanisms.   In relation to the topical issue of 
call centre targets, one representative was unsympathetic and argued that in reality 
the targets were not really as bad as people implied and that it is “everybody 
moaning when really they should just get on with it”.  In other words, on the one 
hand some union activists took the view that there were very few issues in the 
administration centre environment, while on the other hand, other union 
representatives were dismissing issues that members raised with them as 
unimportant, or not of concern to the union. 
 
 
Relationships 
 
Given that definitions of partnership are based upon the premise of the legitimacy of 
different points of view, problem solving and added value for all, it is useful to 
understand the realities of the relationships between key actors.  These are now 
discussed in turn. 
 
Senior management-union relationships 
The first issue concerns the relationship between the trade union and senior 
management.  The President explained that there was “generally a very good 
relationship.  Where we are at the moment, the dialogue is constructive, I‟d hesitate 
to call it friendly.  It‟s carried out in a reasonably conducive environment to get a 
good result”.  However, he expressed a slight concerned that the relationship had 
not really been tested recently: 
“You do worry that there have been no really, really significant disagreements between us [the 
union and management] for a couple of years.  So how much of that is genuine and how much 
would evaporate if we said actually, no, you can‟t do that on something that they though was 
significant.  Or if we just dug our heels in about something and they thought we were being 
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obdurate…How much is it dependent that things are running pretty smoothly between us and 
how much is actually a genuine commitment on everybody‟s part to make things work even 
when we do disagree?” (Union President). 
In other words, it is difficult to test the strength of a relationship when things are 
going well.  Nevertheless he suggested that senior management are more likely to 
look more favourably on dealing with the staff union, as opposed to “some oik from 
Amicus”.  The central relationship, however, involved the General Secretary and 
senior management.  The General Secretary is heavily involved in a myriad of 
meetings and committees, and has a busy schedule. Indeed, the Union President 
joked that it is probably easier to arrange a meeting with one of the Directors than 
the General Secretary, reflected by the fact that his diary is always booked months 
in advance. 
 
Senior HR managers also described a good working relationship with the union, 
again suggesting that the union adds value.  As the Employee Relations Manager 
explained: 
“The union have helped no end…We would say we have a good relationship with them, we try 
to involve them in new employee type issues, at an early stage in terms of policy and procedure 
design.  The business, and certainly personnel, values the relationship with the union” 
(Employee Relations Manager). 
Managers particularly valued the fact that most union officials are former 
employees, suggesting that this enables them to take a more balanced view on 
issues. A similar view was expressed by a Personnel Consultant: 
“I think it‟s a good relationship.  It used to be the staff association.  And that to me suggests a 
very close link between the union and BuSoc.  A lot of union officials are former employees 
and have a good understanding of what BuSoc is trying to do.  And therefore, when they 
become reps and we enter into discussions, they have a good idea of where we are coming from 
and it can be quite harmonious.  But at the same time they are ready to challenge if they think 
something is not right.  Which is good.  It makes us think are we doing the right thing?” 
(Personnel Consultant). 
To an extent this was confirmed when speaking to the seconded Union President.  
He would often answer questions firstly, from a union perspective and then “take 
his union cap off”, and reflect on the question from a managers point of view, citing 
his experience as an IT Manager.   
 
However, the extent to which good relationships extended beyond the personnel 
department was less clear.  As the call centre manager remarked, “presumably they 
[the union] are having a positive effect from their perspective but who knows.  I 
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don‟t get involved in negotiations”.  A senior collections manager in the mortgage 
division also admitted she did not have a great deal of knowledge of the union but 
speculated that the relationship was probably healthy: 
 
“I would say it‟s very healthy.  It‟s not them and us, we work closely together.  In terms of 
policies and people we are very likewise thinking I feel.  Whatever dealings I‟ve had with the 
union, it‟s always been amicable, professional I feel.  We are looking to achieve the same thing 
for the business and individuals really.  We want the same.  We work well as far as I‟m 
concerned” (Senior collections manager). 
In other words, there did appear to be some common ground between the aims of 
management and the aims of the union, in terms of an overarching objective of 
achieving good business decisions which are also fair.  As she elaborated: 
“I see them as a strong force but not them-and-us.  I do really think it‟s more of a partnership.  
We are looking to achieve the same thing: ensure people‟s views get heard and they are 
represented fairly.  And that‟s what we all want to achieve” (Senior collections manager). 
A Personnel Consultant also echoed that periods of disagreement are a normal part 
of healthy relationship: 
“I imagine there is some healthy debate there sometimes, when there is disagreement.  What is 
the right thing to do?  I‟d say it‟s healthy.  There have been some firm strong challenges, but 
people move on from that” (Personnel Consultant). 
The Personnel Director also suggested that the union can add value to the process 
because they have a good level of business knowledge, and can bring a different 
perspective to decision making.  As she explained: 
“I‟m always very impressed with the level of knowledge the union people have, around what 
goes on in BuSoc…it makes it more transparent because you can‟t pull the wool over each 
others eyes.  You both understand what you are dealing with” (Director of Personnel). 
 
There were also examples where individual managers had approached the union for 
advice, for example how to deal with a specific employee who is underperforming, 
or on the procedures for dealing with an employee who is on long-term sick leave.  
However, in terms of union dialogue most appeared to occur at a senior level 
between senior HR figures and union officials.  As the senior collections manager 
explained, “I think the most involvement is above my level really.  We don‟t have a 
lot of contact with the union ourselves really…in terms of liaising/looking at 
policies with them, I don‟t really have any involvement with that”. It was suggested 
that major organisational changes normally involve senior union figures and senior 
managers especially from personnel. 
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Union representatives also described a good relationship, suggesting that it was 
“generally civilised and not militant” which they believed could actually prove 
counterproductive as the following comments illustrate: 
“We work in liaison…not confrontational…we are not that kind of Union”  
“I think we work a lot closer…a dovetailing of interests…we know the business has to be 
successful as well”  
“It‟s pretty civilised.  I don‟t get involved there, obviously but I feel it‟s civilised, yes a good 
relationship.” 
“You don‟t see what goes on, behind the scenes when they have meetings about pay and all 
that.  I‟d like to think it‟s a nice positive relationship, and a productive one, but obviously you 
have got BuSoc on the one  side wanting to do this, and the union saying no we want to do this, 
so I‟d like to see what‟s really like in the heat of the battle” . 
(Union representatives) 
Union representatives were dismissive of adversarial relationships, and most used 
terms such as „civilised‟ but „challenging‟ to describe the relationship.  It is worth 
noting that representatives tended to define partnership in terms of a choice between 
a militant versus a co-operative approach. 
 
Representative-manager relationships 
It was suggested by both management and union respondents that despite a fairly 
robust senior management/union relationship, the failing point is „old-school‟ 
middle management, who still view union involvement as unnecessary or 
inconvenient.  According to the Individual Case Officer the situation has improved 
but still requires more work.  As she explained: 
“In general terms I think it‟s a lot better….but I think with changes in hierarchy, there has been 
a lot more understanding of what the union is trying to do.  I feel there are still certain people in 
here, that have a quite hostile attitude to unions.  We are here to cause trouble”. (Individual 
Case Officer). 
As the Employee Relations Manager explained, middle management may 
sometimes perceive agreed policies to be awkward or barriers, and they may seem 
like an impediment to „good‟ business decision making.  As such, “the union may 
therefore be perceived to be a bit of a thorn in their side”.  He suggested that this 
was actually short-sighted, however, and that managers should be pleased to be 
working with a generally co-operative internal union, rather than a national union.  
Moreover, there was evidence to support the notion that some middle managers 
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were not convinced by the relevance of the union.  As the call centre manager 
remarked: 
“I don‟t think we have an adversarial relationship with the union, it‟s just part of life and I 
accept it as such…I don‟t know how relevant people see it to be.  I‟m not the person to ask 
because I‟m not a member anymore.  I got fed up with what they were doing for me, which was 
actually nothing…I don‟t see much relevance to it” (Call centre manager). 
 
Indeed, there was evidence to suggest that some managers were hostile to the union 
because several years ago they had left because in a personal capacity they had 
deemed it ineffective at negotiating pay.  There was certainly evidence to suggest 
the call centre manager in particular had a particular grudge against the union, as 
well as further evidence that this may not have been an isolated case.  The 
disinterest of middle managers was also a topic of discussion at a recent union Area 
Council Meeting.  The Call Centre Manager expressed a feeling that legislation 
means that the discipline and grievance process is now “very long winded, it seems 
like there all sorts of barriers put in the way of line managers to actually manage 
the business effectively.  There is obviously a good reason but it‟s not always 
apparent”.  He argued that the government and Europe in particular is “ more keen 
on employee rights” and that in general the business is very risk averse, and would 
avoid an employment tribunal at all costs, even when they have a solid case with 
regard to a poor performing employee.  One of his main objections was that 
discipline and grievance procedures make it very difficult to end the contracts of 
underperforming staff, mirroring some of the tensions highlighted in the NatBank 
case: 
“If you want to get rid of someone who is not good, even if they have just joined you need to 
get into a process with many steps, eventually a hearing between you, the people and the 
union...It can be very frustrating, someone is constantly sick on a Monday, and results are not 
good.  They don‟t give a damn about working here but you can‟t do much about it…it‟s just a 
very long winded process…you just want to say goodbye to this person (Call centre manager). 
 
Given the mixed managerial attitudes to the union, it is unsurprising that the 
relationships between union representatives was also mixed.  As one representative 
working in the call centre explained: 
“I can say what I feel, I can ask them if they have a spare 5 minutes.  I don‟t think there is a 
problem.  I know I can say to either of them I need some time, can we discuss something.  And 
they‟ll say yes.  I don‟t find it a problem” (Union representative). 
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Another call centre representative was less sure, suggesting that she “would like to 
think we have a good relationship but I don‟t know”.  There was evidence of 
representatives experiencing difficulties with managers who were not supportive of 
the union, particularly in the call centre.  As a representative explained: 
“I think the manager/rep relationship is good except for the really negative senior manager and 
he‟s just really hard.  He‟s not interested in the union at all so I won‟t go and see him; if I need 
something I‟ll go and see the other one.  What their personal feelings are and how they handle 
it affects how they deal with you” (Union representative). 
She also explained that following the centre refurbishment the manager had 
declined her request to put the union notice board back up, ostensibly for aesthetic 
reasons: 
“They don‟t like you putting up anything about the union around the call centre now.  Posters 
and leaflets.  So we have to sneak them up when no-one is looking.  Our department has been 
refurbished.  It‟s all purple and „new and wonderful‟.  They don‟t want a crappy notice board 
on their new purple walls apparently” (Union representative) 
 
Employee and union representatives 
The relationship between employees and representatives appeared to be very 
limited.  Most of the employees interviewed were uncertain of who there 
representative was.  Conversely, attendance at an Area Council meeting confirmed 
that many representatives were also unsure of who there constituents were.  At the 
Area Council meeting, representatives presented their „constituency reports‟, which 
outlined that in fact most had not been active in the six months prior to the meeting.  
In general, the role of a constituency representative at the Administration Centre 
appeared to be extremely limited.  Nevertheless, employees perceived the union-
management relationship to be generally co-operative, although most admitted they 
could not say for certain, due to a lack of knowledge: 
“I think it‟s amicable.  I‟m not sure but I‟d say so.  You get more done on a friendly basis”.  
“I think they work closely, I think the relationship is quite amicable between the union and the 
society.  They are not a militant union”(Employee Focus Groups). 
Again, the nature of union communications may also partly explain the employees 
lack of knowledge.  Union newsletters and magazines appeared to only offer very 
limited factual information such as the number of discipline and grievance cases, 
employment trends, prize draw winners and adverts to fill the many representative 
vacancies available.  
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Issues and decision making  
 
In comparison to the other case organisations the pace of change at BuSoc in the 
five years preceding the research appeared to have been more incremental and less 
radical.  A key objective of the research was to explore the way some key issues 
have been handled in each organisation in order to enrich understanding of the 
reality of the partnership process.  These are discussed in following section.  The 
section begins with a discussion of traditional union issues such as pay and working 
conditions, and discipline and grievance, and then reviews some other issues 
specific to the company. 
 
 1. Pay and  working conditions 
Unsurprisingly, the negotiation of pay and conditions was considered to be one of 
the main union issues by management, union officials and employees alike.    In 
2005 staff received increases worth 3.93% of the paybill, and a corporate bonus of 
12.8%.  This was described as an “excellent overall settlement” by the General 
Secretary.  
Table 6.8 
Pay structure at BuSoc 
Job/Salary Minimum Target (market) Maximum Level 
Receptionist 9, 464 11, 867 14, 241 1 
Claims advisor 13, 491 16, 863 20, 236 1 
Senior advisor 16, 489 19, 398 24, 248 2 
Claims manager 23, 276 29, 095 34, 914 2 
Source: Internal documentation 
 
However, the Union General Secretary expressed great concern that BuSoc have 
been “holding down” basic pay and placing increased emphasis on the use of bonus 
pay.  As he explained, “ultimately people will recognise that actually their pay in 
the market place is dropping behind, because they are getting bonus pay rather than 
pay which goes on their salary, and pay going into their pension.  It really pisses me 
off!”. The issue centres around the fact that basic pay is formally negotiated with the 
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union, but the bonus is not on the list of formal negotiable items.  The union 
remains resolutely opposed to the increased use in bonus pay, viewing it as 
sacrificing basic pay, and resulting in a stealth diminution in terms and conditions, 
and increased vulnerability for employees.  Although the bonus scheme is not a 
formally negotiable item, union officials suggested this has not prevented the union 
from raising issues and concerns regarding the operation of the various bonus 
schemes.  
 
A senior collections manager argued that bonus dependent pay was creating a 
recruitment problem in her department.   She speculated that when people are 
searching for a job they make bottom line salary comparisons and therefore consider 
BuSoc to offer low pay because they do not factor in the benefits and bonus scheme.  
There is evidence to suggest that this has changed in recent months as current job 
adverts for collections advisers promise an overall „package of 14k to 17k‟, whereas 
older recruitment literature advertise ‟12.5k basic salary + bonuses‟.  
 
For many employees, the role of the union is predominantly negotiating pay rises. 
As some employees remarked: 
“I am part of the union, but I do always tend to think the union – probably wrongly – is there 
for more important issues like your pay rise, if you‟ve got something you are really objecting 
to.  My last port of call.  If something was really bad they are there”  
“We just got a rise the other week, and they‟ve been fighting to get our standard pay up and 
stuff.  They do a lot on our behalf behind the scenes.  I‟m aware of what they do” (Employee 
Focus Groups). 
 
Team managers suggested that generally employee opinion on BuSoc as a place to 
work is sharply divided on the basis of those who are – and those who are not 
achieving their bonuses, and there was evidence to support this notion.  Again, this 
reflects the notion of „winners‟ and „losers‟ discussed in the NatBank case,  Among 
employees, bonuses remained a controversial topic.  Employees cited examples of 
departments where employees often achieve 300%, and others where employees 
seldom meet their targets. Employees also acknowledged that overall they have a 
good package of terms and conditions, but that their basic pay appears to be low 
compared to other local employers. 
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The union have also been involved in improving the holiday purchase scheme.  The 
ability to buy extra holidays appeared to be applied inconsistently by middle 
managers, some of whom would normally accept requests, while others would 
invariably decline requests.  The Union President commented how the union had 
been involved in making the process clearer and fairer, and ensuring that it is 
applied in a more consistent manner, whereas before it could be “at the whim of a 
manager”. Previously the wording was that you had to „agree‟ with your line 
manager but this was changed to you need to „discuss‟ holiday purchase options 
with your line manager.  
 
2. Discipline and grievance 
Discipline and grievance situations were another key area where the union had close 
involvement with the Society.  In the first six months of 2006 for example, the 
union dealt with over 100 such cases.  Union members subject to disciplinary 
proceedings would normally have the assistance of a lay disciplinary officer, or a 
union employed Individual Case Officer.  Individual Case Officers are employed to 
“protect and promote the interests of the union members”.  Duties include 
representing members at hearings, providing advice to members, consulting with 
local managers and promoting the union within BuSoc.  According to the ICO, 
typical disputes include holidays, time off to care for sick children, appeals against 
appraisal ratings, and disagreements over performance ratings.  When discussing the 
reputation BuSoc appears to hold as a good employer, she remarked how, “It‟s not 
as good as it‟s PR, otherwise I wouldn‟t be so busy”.  She explained that typically 
ICO‟s deal with cases where the policy is X but for some reason a minority of 
employees need X + Y because of specific circumstances which do not fit with 
policy.  She stressed the need for the union to have a collaborative approach with 
management to achieve this.  Conversely, she suggested that the management may 
ask for „help‟ to arrange a mutual termination, because if they push for it they could 
be accused of constructive dismissal.  In other words, there appeared to be some 
„give and take‟.  She described her role as one of mediator following a breakdown in 
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dialogue, but the main interaction is with union members who have an individual 
issue.  Individual case officers would normally not be involved with collective 
union issues. 
 
She suggested that case loads keep increasing, with currently around 300 
disciplinaries per year which she described as “an amazing statistic”.  In 2004 50 
employees were dismissed from the Society, typically because of unauthorised 
transactions on their own accounts, or after the expiry of Prolonged Sickness 
Benefit.  An article in the union newsletter confirmed union concerns over the levels 
of such cases, and urged employees to follow due processes to avoid cases arising. 
 
For team managers interaction with the union mostly concerned disciplinary cases 
concerning a member of their team, most often in relation to performance related 
issues. They viewed the union roles primarily as one to oversee see that such cases 
are handled fairly and employees are treated consistently.  
 
3. Managing change 
The third main issue concerns the management of change within the organisation.  
The research highlighted seven main issues which were topical: outsourcing; 
pensions; performance management; work-life balance; relocation assistance; home 
working and healthcare provision.  These are now examined in turn. 
i) Off-shoring and redundancy 
Contrary to the current trend towards off-shoring of customer service roles in the 
financial service sector as illustrated by the NatBank case, BuSoc has committed to 
keeping call centres in the UK and has recently opened a new contact centre in the 
North of England.  In total, around 1000 employees work in BuSoc contact centres, 
and these numbers have actually increased in recent years. The Chief Executive 
argued in a company statement that offshoring is an inappropriate strategy for the 
organisation: 
BuSoc is a mutual with strong links to the communities in which we operate, and we have no 
plans to desert these local communities in favour of overseas call centres…call centres abroad 
may suit some of our competitors, but they are not the right option for BuSoc and we are aware 
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of some commentators' concerns that some countries may not have the same level of data 
protection for consumers that exists in the UK." 
 
The union suggest that these public announcements have helped to alleviate 
concerns regarding job security at the administration centres.  However, there was 
no evidence from the union that the decision was the direct result of a management-
union agreement.  There was the suggestion by the Call Centre Manager that 
historically BuSoc have never really had big redundancy programmes like other 
financial service organisations.  As he explained, “we don‟t have big redundancy 
programmes any more.  There are some but they go out of their way to try and offer 
something else to someone who has been displaced”.  As Personnel Consultant 
echoed this view suggesting that, “you have to do something really quite bad to find 
yourself not working for us anymore”, making it difficult to distinguish between 
employer goodwill and union influence.  Team managers also suggested that 
generally there was a feeling of job security among employees because consumer 
borrowing is high, and the company has on several occasions committed to 
maintaining and even expanding UK operations.  They suggested that where 
redundancies do occur there is a need to think in advance about the impact on 
people, and argued that the Union had been fully involved in previous redundancies.   
As the Personnel Consultant commented: 
Things like that are never nice within a department, but for the business things change.  There 
was never any feeling of God, how can they treat people like that?  They made sure the people 
it affected had lots of support, lots of involvement with the union, knew the reason it was done 
and lots of support to find new jobs as well”. 
The sense of job security was confirmed by the employee focus group statements.  
As employees explained: 
“BuSoc is a safe company to work for.  I don‟t think there is any chance of this centre moving 
to India – the fact that the business wouldn‟t run as effectively, you can‟t move years of 
experience onto new heads” (Employee Focus Group) 
“There is a lot of job security.  They said as soon as people started moving out there that they‟d 
never do it” (Employee Focus Group). 
 
There is also a formal commitment in the form of the BuSoc SERA agreement, 
resonating with the employment security arrangements often agreed as part of 
formal partnership agreements.  The key provisions are that: 
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 All statutory requirements are met 
 The business rationale for change is sound and can be justified. 
 That individual consultation is conducted properly and that employees views 
are taken into account 
 All alternatives to redundancies are properly considered to redundancies 
minimum. 
 The business calls for volunteers for redundancy or if this is not possible, 
that the selection process for: 
o Determining redundancies is fair and carried out properly. 
o Decisions are communicated sensitively and effectively. 
 The severance terms available to employees provide reasonable 
compensation for loss of earnings. 
 Support is made available both at the time that the possible redundancies are 
announced and when the decision is confirmed. This includes: 
o Sufficient time-off is given to enable an individual to look for jobs or 
attend interviews 
o Outplacement support is available if required 
o Counselling services made available if required 
 Above all, the unions approach is to ensure that people are treated fairly 
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ii) Pensions 
A second topical issue concerned pensions.  BuSoc decided to end the Final Salary 
Pension Scheme for new joiners from December 2002, and introduced a Career 
Average Revalued Earning (CARE) Scheme. This was cited by all union officials as 
the last major conflict between the union and the management, and as such was 
identified as the „critical incident‟ in recent years.  Reportedly, the union was not 
consulted on this decision, and promptly circulated a scathing communication 
entitled “A Bleak Day”.  The Employee Relations Manager acknowledged that “the 
union were effectively informed that‟s what we were going to do”, and suggested 
they would have preferred to have explored alternatives such as increasing 
employee contributions.  He argued that while the union were upset because of a 
lack of consultation, management were also upset because “it seemed to paint us as 
being villains when actually the overall package available to employees is still very 
good.  And we‟ve not withdrawn it for existing employees; we are still maintaining 
it”.  He suggested that this was a significant low point in employment relations, but 
that it has improved since the appointment of a more „people-focused‟ Chief 
Executive.   
 
The General Secretary, who also explained how the union were simply „informed‟ 
of the decision, suggested that the previous Chief Executive was perceived to be 
very business-focused, demonstrating less concern for employee welfare.  He also 
reinforced the view that the relationship at the time was very poor: 
“It got very nasty….I think the current Chief Executive wouldn‟t‟ do it.  I genuinely think there 
would be an attempt to find an accommodation.  Rather than, well we will just do it anyway.  
Which is what happened in October 2001.  I genuinely think that wouldn‟t happen today” 
(General Secretary ). 
He argued that although the union view was that the changes were both unnecessary 
and unfair, the union had no grounds to challenge the decision on legal grounds: 
“So our ability to go out and attack them publicly was severely diminished…so while we had a 
real go at them, they didn‟t like it, our ability to get BuSoc members on [our] side was non-
existent ”.  The bank argued that it was to bring certainty to their future costs (Union General 
Secretary). 
 
The union remained unhappy that the decision created „tiers‟ of employment 
conditions which depended upon when you joined the organisation, and this still 
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“pisses off” the General Secretary.  He still believes there was insufficient business 
justification for the change arguing how: “BuSoc will tell you they did what they 
had to do for their balance sheet.  We didn‟t think they had to do any of those 
things”.  However, he suggested that things have since improved, especially with 
the appointment of the new Chief Executive with whom the General Secretary 
suggested he had established a very positive relationship.  As he explained: 
“They didn‟t want to talk to us about pensions.  Now it‟s a genuine dialogue about securing this 
scheme moving forward.  I‟d like to think we‟ve secured the future of the fund.  I mean you 
can‟t say categorically but hopefully.  That‟s an illustration of where it was from bad to good” 
(Union General Secretary).   
The President suggested the Society are still fully aware of the union goal of having 
all employees back on the Final Salary Pension scheme.  The Personnel Director 
was evidently aware of this, and said she “expected them to keep mentioning it” and 
that “sometimes you do things that aren‟t going to be popular”.  Examination of 
recent documentation suggests that changes to the pension scheme are a matter of 
ongoing debate between senior HR and the union 4 years after the change was 
made.  Examined in terms of outcome alone, this could perhaps be viewed as 
evidence of partnership failing.  However, given that similar measures have been 
taken in many other organisations despite union protestations, it would be over 
simplistic to conclude that this was a result of union weakness or co-option.  Rather, 
the main issue is that the process of partnership, in terms of consultation and actor 
attitudes and behaviours appears to have failed, as the company introduced a 
significant and controversial change apparently without consulting the union. 
 
iii) Performance management system 
Conversely, the design of a new performance management system was reported to 
be a successful demonstration of a more open partnership approach to decision-
making.  The Employee Relations Manager suggested that the “union were onboard 
at the beginning”, and were said to have had a lot of input in relation to the 
performance related pay scheme, involving many discussions over a long period of 
time.  This was supported by evidence obtained from the union.  The union wanted 
the new system to be clearer and more motivational.  Previous ratings, for example, 
were „good‟, „excellent‟ and „exceptional‟, and this was changed to „making a 
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difference‟, „outstanding‟ and „inspirational‟.  The career discussion was also made 
an optional part of the process in direct response to feedback from members of the 
union.  The forms were also simplified and a new „Employee Proposition‟ was 
introduced outlining more clearly what employees can expect, and what the society 
expects from the employee.  As the union President commented “a large part of 
what‟s there now bears direct relation to what we were saying”. 
 
Similarly as the Employee Relations Manager commented “The union were 
onboard with that right from the very beginning, and a lot of their objectives ended 
up in the final product…it‟s been a very good example of working well”.  Team 
managers also acknowledged that the union were heavily involved with the new 
performance management system explaining how “we had a new appraisal system 
introduced.  The union were very much involved in making sure that things were 
fair, everybody was treated fairly and the new system was the right way to go”.  
However, the President did suggest that being heavily involved in decision-making 
can be a risky strategy, suggesting that, “it‟s a bit of a dangerous strategy because if 
it all goes belly up or is perceived as unfair, and we were party to it, that is a stick 
with which members and non-members will hit us.  And if it works we‟ll get no 
thanks for it (!)”. 
 
To illustrate the operation of the new scheme, in  2005 staff who were „making a 
difference‟ received a 3.5% increase, „outstanding‟ 5.25% increase and 
„inspirational‟ an 8% increase. Clearly, the outcome of these awards is of great 
importance to employees given the increasing emphasis upon bonuses as a 
component of pay.  However union concerns remained around the performance 
management, and the related organisational culture programme of assessing 
employee behaviours, known as „Pride‟: 
 
 Put members first  
 Rise to the challenge  
 Inspire confidence  
 Deliver best value  
 Exceed expectations 
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Union interviewees suggested that the framework had almost become a bullying 
used by some line managers.  As the General Secretary explained, the programme 
was “originally designed to be motivational, teambuilding and so on and has now 
become almost a stick that managers are beating people with”.  The ongoing 
importance of this issue was supported by union literature.  For example where 
employees would not work late on an unpaid basis to meet a surge in business 
demand, they may be marked down as having a negative „Pride‟ attitude.  Again, 
this was an ongoing issue at the time of the research. 
 
iv) Work-life balance issues 
In terms of work-life balance issues such as the provision of maternity leave, 
paternity leave, flexible working, sick pay etc BuSoc exceeds the minimum legal 
requirements.  These superior terms are highlighted in union recruitment materials 
as examples of union achievements for their membership, and the union suggested 
they have been actively involved in these negotiations.  Management suggested that 
given the employee profile of female and part-time workers culturally this has 
always been very important.  Employees regularly cited this as one of the main 
benefits of working for BuSoc as opposed to other local employers.  Flexible 
working opportunities are available to all employees. For maternity and adoption 
leave BuSoc offers 10 weeks of full pay, paternity 2 weeks full pay and carer‟s 
leave/unpaid leave for up to six months.  Other benefits included: 
 
 Part-time/reduced hours 
 Annual hours 
 Term-time working 
 Home-working 
 Flexitime 
 Short-term adjustments 
 Maternity leave paid 10 weeks, unpaid 1 year 
 £200 return-to-work bonus after maternity leave 
 Paternity leave two weeks full pay 
 Adoption leave 
 IVF leave 
 Career breaks 
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Currently there are also 150 home-workers and 70 term-time workers.   Initially 
these options were targeted at working mothers, but increasingly more single men 
and women are taking advantage of such flexible options as well.  Such policies 
were presented by the union as examples of their achievements in terms of ensuring 
a good deal for employees, and as examples of where the union and management 
have worked in a more co-operative manner to jointly design mutually acceptable 
HR policies. 
 
v) Relocation assistance 
Relocation assistance was another issue negotiated by the union.  The union wanted 
relocation assistance to apply to everybody thus providing lower grade staff with 
greater career opportunities.  Previously, the relocation package was very generous 
for senior staff, but for lower grade workers relocation was unlikely to be a viable 
option because of the financial implications and lack of company support.  Now 
relocation assistance applies to all employees.   The upshot of this is that senior staff 
do not get the very high assistance they used to receive, as it has been spread out 
more evenly.  On the other hand, it means workers at lower grades genuinely have 
the opportunity of relocation should they so wish.  The President suggested this is 
another good example of working together to achieve mutual gains, as it helped the 
Society save money, and it has also made relocation and therefore further career 
opportunities a more realistic proposition for lower grade employees who may have 
been displaced or are seeking promotion.  As the General Secretary remarked: 
 “It‟s another example of working together with a shared objective.  BuSoc wanted to save 
money.  It was to help them to save money.  But you have got to it on the basis of what we are 
looking for.  And we spent months just working it through” (Union General Secretary). 
 
vi) Home-working 
Homeworking is described by BuSoc as an important component of their flexible 
working options, and typical homeworking roles include technology development 
and mortgage lending control.  In the late 1990s the policy was reviewed by a 
working group including corporate and operational personnel specialists, union 
officials, an insurance risk assessor, health and safety advisor and space consultant.  
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The home-working policy had to be re-designed as the previous policy was thought 
to be too vague and complicated, meaning that line managers were reluctant to 
provide homeworking contracts.  For example there were requests from employees 
who wished to work hundreds of miles from their previous office, and this created 
many problems for the business.  They have since re-designed a range of different 
homeworking contracts.  This was cited by managers and union officials as another 
good example of working together with a common goal with both a good business 
and people rationale.  For the company there was said to be a clear business 
rationale for working from home in terms of office space, as well as being seen to 
be a modern employer in terms of corporate social responsibility.  The union 
believed it made sense to give people the opportunity to work from home, when 
their job does not require them to work from the office.  This means an agreement 
can be reached where workers have a formal homeworking agreement, i.e. they 
work from home permanently, or informally, where they have the option of working 
from home on an ad hoc basis.  The union also agreed a Homeworking Allowance 
to contribute to domestic heating and lighting costs.  The development of home-
working policy was cited as a good example of where there had been extensive 
involvement of the Union President and Union General Secretary.   
vii) Healthcare 
The business has been keen to change the healthcare policy from an insurance 
scheme to a trust agreement, and this has been opposed by the union “lock, stock 
and barrel”.  Previously, healthcare was not a negotiable item, but the General 
Secretary explained that, by ending union opposition to the trust agreement in the 
short-term, he had managed to “get it added to the list”,  giving the union more 
influence over this issue in the long-term: 
As a result of that they have a made a number of quite key concessions to us.  Not least of all 
they are going to make the healthcare scheme a negotiable item.  Which means when we 
disagree we can go to arbitration.  So on the basis of doing that, they'll get what they want and 
we've actually come out with far more ability to influence the health scheme.  Far more than we 
can do today.  And its all just been done by a little bit manoeuvring here and there.  I'm quite 
pleased with that (General Secretary). 
 
He suggested that overall the sacrifice was worth it, because now they have a 
stronger position in terms of influencing future healthcare policy, and that the 
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change is crucial as before “they may [have] decide[d] just to totally ignore us 
because they are not obliged to get our signature to it”, whereas now the union can 
take the employer to Acas arbitration in the event of a disagreement, again 
underlining how powerful the ability to take the employer to Acas appears to be. 
 
 
Outcomes 
 
To summarise, it is argued that there was sufficient prima facie evidence to suggest 
that the BuSoc/staff union arrangements could be seen to meet the criteria for 
partnership.   However, given that this is a relationship which has evolved slowly 
over time, there is no direct comparison with employment relations „pre-
partnership‟.  The main benefits of the collaborative working relationship forged 
between management and the union at BuSoc can be summed up as follows: 
 
 1. Influence and regulation of decision-making 
Firstly, management and union respondents generally agreed that by working 
together on proposals and decisions, they are more able to formulate decisions 
which take into account the business case as well as the implications for - and likely 
reactions - of grassroots employees.  However, the evidence suggested that in reality 
it was much more difficult to ascertain the regulatory effect of the union in this 
particular case. The clash over the end of the final salary pension scheme, which 
was agreed to have been the most significant incident in recent years, appeared to 
demonstrate few characteristics of a partnership approach in terms of decision 
making or relationships, and casts doubts over the quality of the relationships 
between key actors at the time. 
 
2. Better employment relations 
Concomitantly, it was argued by management and union officials that a partnership 
approach leads to a generally improved quality of employment relations.  At the 
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Administration Centre under study employment relations have generally been 
calmer than in the branches, but both parties still agreed that the regulation the 
union-management relationship affords, serves to minimise employee resistance as 
policies are normally planned in detail before they are implemented.  However, 
much of negotiations regarding formal changes to HR policies and procedures 
appeared to be occurring at a very senior level.  Accordingly, most employees, line 
managers and union representatives demonstrated very little knowledge about how 
decisions about high level corporate personnel were negotiated or decided.  
 
3. Collaborative relationships 
Another outcome of the approach was said to be good collaborative relationships at 
a senior level between the senior union official and senior management.  Much 
hinged upon the dynamics of this relationship.  At the time of the research, the 
relationship between the union General Secretary and Chief Executive appeared to 
be very good.  However in this case, there was much less evidence of partnership 
behaviours and attitudes associated with a partnership approach, and evidence to 
suggest the „partnership‟ had very little depth.  
 
 
Challenges 
 
Despite the advantages many challenges remained.  These include the lack of an 
agreed common approach to employment relations, embedding a partnership culture 
throughout the organisation, representative efficacy and the resistance to adversity.  
These four themes are now examined in turn. 
 
1. Lack of agreement on a common employment relations approach 
Management and the union agreed that the current management-union agreement is 
old-fashioned. It was said to assume conflict and clashes, and to focus upon on what 
to do when talks fail, and what can and cannot be taken to Acas for arbitration.  The 
agenda was also narrow, with formal distinctions between negotiable and non-
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negotiable items.  In other words, they have a traditional recognition and procedural 
agreement.  Equally, at the time of the research it seemed highly unlikely that the 
agreement would be changed, and the Union President suggested that a new modern 
agreement was highly unlikely to be branded as a „partnership agreement‟, for fear 
of the negative response of members who may perceive the union to be in 
management‟s pocket.  To an extent there appeared to a lack of a clear approach.  
On the one hand the union endorsed a challenging but collaborative approach to the 
management of employment relations, and were particularly critical of the formal 
division between negotiation and consultation.  On the other hand, they were 
extremely weary of going down the formal partnership route for fear of appearing to 
be bought in.  This appeared to relate to union debate in the mid-1990s about staff 
association being perceived as weak, and the need to re-badge the organisation as a 
staff union to reinforce perceptions of strength and independence.  In short, working 
without a common understanding of approach appeared to be an important 
challenge.  
2. Embedding a partnership culture 
Embedding a partnership culture throughout the organisation was another challenge, 
and employee apathy and middle management resistance were both problematic. In 
addition there was  less evidence of strong workplace activism as in the NatBank 
case.  Employee apathy was a problem particularly within the context of the 
Administration Centre under study. The Individual Case Officer whose role includes 
trying to recruit at inductions, explained that younger employees now have very 
little knowledge of trade unions.  She joked that at least before they would cite the 
miners‟ strike as an example if she asked what a union was, but suggests that now 
she gets a blank “rabbit in the headlights” look when trying to recruit younger 
members.  The lack of interest was also attributed to the unitarist logic that – if 
BuSoc is such a „good employer‟ - why is there a need to join a union?   Some 
experienced employees did suggest that they believed that BuSoc was a good place 
to work, and in many respects this appeared to explain a lack of interest in the 
union, in other words a low perception of risk. This leads to the possibility that 
people are more interest in unions when they perceive greater risk.  Theoretically, 
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this would create problems for a successful union working with a good employer, as 
employees may not want to join, irrespective of how influential the union are. 
 
The Employee Relations Manager suggested that there is still a sense that being 
involved in the union could be career limiting or that an employee involved in the 
union could be viewed as “a bit of a liability” by their line managers.  There was 
employee evidence to suggests that some employees held this point of view, which 
is contrary to the mutual legitimacy associated with partnership.  As one employee 
remarked,  “I would also feel that, once you have been to the union, and its found 
out that you have been to the union, you are a troublemaker.  It would always stay 
with you that you were prepared to go and speak to the union about something”. 
This reinforces the point that there is a lack of a strong espoused vision to the 
management of employment relations, which raises the importance of promoting 
union legitimacy if strong partnership is to be achieved.  The call centre manager 
had a different explanation of the lack of interest, and that “a lot of people are just 
not interested.  They just want to come and do their job and go home”. A personnel 
consultant expressed a similar view explaining how, “in some of the larger 
departments they probably don‟t who their union rep is or who the health and safety 
person is.  Most people come in, do their job and go home”.  Responses from the 
employee focus groups suggested that there was generally a feeling that the 
employer was reasonably caring and considerate, and that jobs were secure, 
meaning that union issues are low down their list of priorities. There was a belief 
among many employees that they could “just meddle along”.  As a representative 
summed up, “I think it just rumbles along and people are complacent.  Until issues 
happen people don‟t really think about the union”.  In other words, does partnership 
require some workplace turbulence to ignite interest? 
 
A second challenge concerned line managers.  The Employee Relations Manager 
acknowledged that normally middle management were the least receptive to union 
involvement, particularly in the contact centre, and the contact centre 
representatives agreed that they had difficulties with an anti-union manager.  The 
Employee Relations Manager proposed that many managers still do not appreciate 
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the useful function the union can play.  As he commented, “Whether our senior 
managers see the union as a useful business partner as opposed to an irritation and 
an inconvenience I‟m not sure.  But I think they should see it as a useful business 
partner”.  In particular, he argued that the managers should be happy to be working 
with the staff union rather than an organisation like Amicus which he suggested 
may be less co-operative.  This is a negative rather than positive rationale.  Again, 
this means there are limits to viewing this case as a partnership. 
 
The Union Individual Case Officer speculated that often the disciplinary and 
grievance issues arise because the situations are mishandled at middle management 
level, and do not follow the formal policy agreed between senior management and 
the union.  As she explained, “I genuinely believe there is the will to get it right.  I 
think the trouble is it gets stuck in middle management.   A lot of work to be done to 
ensure that the policies that are devised and agree with the union do get carried out 
the way they are meant to”. Similarly, a Personnel Consultant felt that his role 
involves correcting issues “getting lost in translation” whereby despite top 
management commitment to certain organisational policies, there is a lack of 
support further down the line at middle management level.  Another interesting 
angle is that there was evidence to suggest that some middle managers were worried 
about increased involvement raising employee expectations too much, which they 
believed may lead to disillusionment.  This notion is illustrated by the comments 
below: 
“My concern is that they [employees] expect so much from us.   And the more we do the higher 
expectations people have.  And it‟s trying to manage peoples expectations, and get them to look 
at what the reality is.  People can forget how much involvement they have actually had” (Senior 
collections manager). 
 “If we could find a way to involve employees that didn‟t unduly raise expectations that we 
would be able to do everything they wanted us to do, then I‟d be happy to look for those.  But I 
can‟t see what it looks like.  I can‟t visualise it…I think if you raise someone‟s expectations 
that they will have a voice, well yes they have a voice, and will be listened to, but we still 
might do what we were planning to do.  And then you have a load of people who think we 
don‟t listen to them” (Call centre manager) 
 
3. Representative efficacy 
The third hurdle concerns issues of representative efficacy.  Firstly, discussions with 
the representatives highlighted a general lack of visibility of the union, and a feeling 
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that many members were primarily concerned with being part of the monthly 
member staff draw, rather than an interest in or knowledge of the union per se.  
Indeed, in the contact centres the representatives admitted that recruitment was 
extremely difficult as the environment makes it difficult to talk to employees, and 
the high staff turnover makes it difficult to keep up.  The Union President suggested 
that there was often a difficulty selling the successes of the union because so much 
happens behind closed doors, and remains completely unknown to the grassroots.  
He argued that it is difficult to advertise the success of proposals which have been 
abandoned because of union influence.  As he remarked “We might think it‟s a 
bloody good achievement, but how do we actually get the message across?  We 
don‟t.  It‟s hard.  It‟s very hard” 
 
Secondly, communication was another significant problem in particular between 
representatives and their members, but also between members and the central union.  
For example, members cannot send emails to the union through the BuSoc network, 
and the union are also unable to email members through the company email system.  
The union website is also poor, although money had been won from the DTI Union 
Modernisation Fund towards a more comprehensive and useful site.  Some 
representatives admitted seldom seeking feedback from members on issues.  Again, 
this was described as difficult especially in the call centre environment.  The 
representatives did not seem to have reliable information as to who and who was not 
a union member, and the lack of email mailing lists meant email communication is 
difficult and time consuming.  
 
There was also an admission of communication between management and the union 
failing on occasion.  The Employee Relations Manager explained that this is 
sometimes a result of the disparity between the size of the organisation and the 
resources of the union.  As he explained, 
“While we try to involve the union at an early stage, sometimes they find they get sent 
something, and it says would you read this and mind commenting to us, oh and by the way 
we‟re going to issue it two days time, and of course they have a very small team and they just 
don‟t have time almost to even read the thing, let alone make constructive comments and get 
involved in the change” (Employee Relations Manager). 
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A third issue concerns the quality of the union representatives.  The Union President 
admitted that some of the representatives were lacking in confidence, in the role for 
wrong reasons, or simply uncommitted.  He joked that there were some “people in 
the wrong post for them…they wouldn‟t say boo to a goose”.  This was a particular 
concern given that they needed confident and capable representatives to join the 
new Employee Involvement Committee structure, “otherwise it could undermine 
the entire process”.  The Union President questioned the capability of some of the 
representatives at sitting on committees with senior members of the management 
team, and admitted long-standing recruitment problems.  Recruitment problems 
were reinforced by the fact that there were long lists of vacancies in union 
publications.  Worryingly, representatives complained of often feeling “out of their 
depth” and “feeling steamrollered” when members approached them with queries.  
One representative explained how when approached by a member with a query she 
advised him to “go and speak to the union”, resulting in the bemused response, 
“but aren‟t you the union?”.  There were also representatives who were clearly 
unaware of which constituency they represented!  During the representative 
interviews it was clear that many only had a very limited knowledge of business 
issues.  The Individual Case Officer acknowledged that representatives were 
unwilling to create too much of a “rumble” to avoid any negative repercussions.  
This leads to questions of union legitimacy at a middle management level. 
 
There also appeared to be a lack of time and limited confidence of representatives. 
Several proposed that they could benefit from more time for union duties and 
training.  Others appeared to believe that „management knows best”.  Some 
representatives admitted spending little time on union business suggesting 
nonchalantly “I don‟t have time factored in for union business, it‟s just as and 
when”.  The following quote illustrates the attitude that there is not much 
representatives can do with the issue of call centre targets: 
“They just put our targets up and a lot of people weren‟t happy with it.  It‟s one of those things 
where you got to the meeting, and they‟ve probably already looked at it.  They‟ve looked at it, 
worked out whether it‟s feasible, things like that.  So sometimes, if you have members 
moaning, there is not much you can do” (Union representative). 
 
A lack of confidence is also reflected the quote below from another representative: 
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“I‟d like to think in the ideal world it‟d have some impact but they are senior management.  I‟m 
not.  They‟ve obviously implemented something.  They don‟t just implement it.  They normally 
spend ages looking into it – the cost, the money and so on” (Union representative). 
Some representatives did not like trying to recruit new members, arguing that they 
did not think people would appreciate it, or that they did not have the time to do it.  
Many did not really appear to be in touch with member opinion, describing 
difficulties “collecting and collating all the information”.  The Area Officer 
acknowledged that “there is a need to get the reps active again…they are not 
actively recruiting or taking up issues”.  This was attributed to the pressures of 
work.  Clearly, there was an urgent need to establish a stronger cadre of 
representatives to sit on committees on the new EIC. This view was echoed by a 
Personnel Consultant who suggested that the union is small, and they do not have 
many union officials, but rely on a network of lay representatives who “vary in their 
ability to promote the union in the right way”.  He suggested that they needed more 
people “selling and being able to work at the coalface”, but acknowledged that 
sometimes the problem is a lack of time for the representatives.  The union also 
admitted that often they have problems recruiting suitable constituency 
representatives because of a “career down the pan mentality”.   Two representatives 
speculated that some employees believed it was disloyal to get actively involved 
with the union as representatives because the employer was “so paternalistic”. 
 
Management and union respondents agreed that there is a need for more people who 
have a keen interest as opposed to people who were reluctantly nominated.  There 
were clearly worries about how the new structure will work in practice.  A 
Personnel Consultant suggested that there is a need to ensure the new EIC 
committee does not become too bureaucratic or “Just another committee/just 
another meeting”.  The General Secretary suggested a need to ensure the new 
committees do not just become a “whinging session” but to bring solutions to the 
table.  He suggested that representatives lack influence skills/reasoned debate in the 
problem-solving sessions so they can be ineffective and that some are doing it for 
the wrong reasons because they have a personal issue. 
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The final issue concerns the limited scope breadth and depth of representation.  It 
was accepted by management and senior union interviewees that there was a need to 
widen the scope of involvement, and it was hoped that this would be achieved 
through the creation of a new „Employee Involvement Committee‟. They admitted 
that the current focus is very much on company-wide personnel issues, and legally 
falls short of the demands of the Information and Consultation Directive.  It was 
argued that there was a need for more exchange of business information 
(performance, strategy, finances, corporate initiatives) further down the 
organisational hierarchy, and more involvement in day-to-day issues.  There was the 
hope that the new EIC would redress the balance so that the union was not 
necessarily „the General Secretary‟, again underlining the lack of a supporting 
infrastructure.  While the informal relationships are valuable it was believed there 
was a need for a less centralised arrangement that could better meet the challenges 
of succession.  It could be speculated, however, that the General Secretary has such 
a wide remit because he is the only negotiating officer not formally employed by the 
Society. 
 
4. Resistance to adversity 
There were also concerns in relation to the ability of the current structures and 
processes to deal with a major event or crisis.  There was an agreement that 
demutualization could result in a significant change in focus.  The General Secretary 
suggested that currently the business has a high cost/income ratio putting profit into 
member value rather than shareholders, and de-mutualisation could mean a harsher 
focus on cutting costs as in other financial service organisations.  He explained that 
BuSoc plan to reduce cost income ratio to 55% by 2007 and that currently “a 
£500million profit in a £120 billion organisation is not a lot”.  A similar view was 
taken by the Personnel Director who proposed that demutualization could mean that 
“gradually we‟d go from having a member base to having a shareholder base.  And 
suddenly everything would be geared towards maximising profit for the 
shareholders”.  This was also perceived to be a risk by a Team Manager in Lending 
Control: 
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“The only thing I would say is that if BuSoc ever decided to change track, the senior 
management team at the moment are committed to mutuality and the benefits it brings, but if at 
some stage in the future there was a case for changing that we could have a complete change of 
track where profit becomes the main driver.  I could see that as a potential problem”.(Team 
manager) 
Another team manager expressed a similar view: 
“We don‟t have the pressure of shareholders.  Literally whatever we earn we can plough back 
into the business, into employees, into members.  That makes a difference.   You hear of people 
who have been converted or taken over and things are never quite as nice as they were before.  
I would believe it does make a difference” (Team manager). 
 
Other concerns included succession.  Given that the structure is reliant upon the 
involvement of key figures, there were concerns that succession would be extremely 
difficult.  The Chief Executive is due to retire soon, and the Union General 
Secretary may also retire in the next few years, and there were concerns of the 
impact of the knowledge and relationships that would be lost.  This challenge has 
been acknowledged by the management and union, and efforts are currently 
underway to introduce a broader structure.  This has included the creation of an 
additional Assistant General Secretary role, to cultivate individuals capable of 
succeeding the current General Secretary. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the findings of the second case study conducted at 
BuSoc. The case is interesting for several reasons.  Although there was no formal 
partnership agreement between the staff union and the employer, there was prima 
facie evidence to suggested that the arrangement may have qualified as partnership, 
for example because of the long history of co-operative relationships between the 
employer and the staff union, and commitments similar to many of the TUC 
principles of partnership. For example there are explicit commitments regarding the 
legitimacy of the union, employment security and the quality of working life, with 
BuSoc exceeding most statutory minimum requirements.  Although the formal term 
partnership is not used, managers and union officials suggested that the relationship 
could be described as „partnership-style‟.  Employment relations have also 
traditionally been stable and BuSoc, like most building societies, has traditionally 
been considered to be an enlightened, paternalistic employer.  Mutuality also 
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appears to have partially insulated BuSoc from the stock market pressures 
experienced at NatBank, and as BuSoc has not had to make such tough decisions.  
Yet in terms of relationships, the key relationships were centralised around an elite 
core of senior union officials and the senior management team, in contrast to the 
decentralised system identified at NatBank.  Relationships between representatives 
and managers were very limited, as were relationships between employees and 
union representatives.  Indeed, the role of union representatives on a day-to-day 
basis was narrow with many admitting they spend very little time on union 
activities. 
In terms of issues and decision making, the union focus was very much on pay and 
conditions.  There was also a significant focus upon resolving discipline and 
grievance situations, although this undertaken by full-time Individual Case Officers, 
and again local union representatives had very little involvement in this, beyond 
referring a member query onto the ICO.  Union involvement in wider issues of 
organisational change was less clear.  For example, although BuSoc had committed 
not to offshore there was no evidence to suggest that this was because of a 
union/management agreement.  It may have been because the business does not 
have such intensive stock market pressure to do so, or because it may be perceived  
to contradict BuSoc‟s „ethical‟ image.  It may also be due to the fact that BuSoc is a 
domestic operation with limited experience of managing international operations.  
Of course, in reality it is likely to be a complex combination of such factors.  The 
termination of the final salary pension scheme for new employees was identified as 
one of the most important recent events, although it was suggested that this decision 
was made behind closed doors without union involvement.  
Evidence of the limitations of the structures at BuSoc is the fact that the structures 
were deemed unsuitable for meeting the demands of the Information and 
Consultation Regulations, and as such a new expanded Employee Involvement 
Committee is currently being introduced to meet these requirements.  There was 
some evidence of the union and management working together with a common goal, 
for example on the development of a new performance management system and on 
the terms of a new home working policy, but such illustrations of joint working 
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were scarce.  There was limited evidence of the problem solving approach or 
relationships which are central to partnership.  The opaque nature of the decision 
making processes meant it was very difficult to judge the amount of influence the 
union had over decision making.  A key question therefore, is to what extent would 
decisions have been the same without union input?  While at NatBank there was 
clear evidence of union influence this was not easily identifiable at BuSoc.  Of 
course, an optimistic counterargument may be that the union/management 
relationship was so good that there was no need to fire-fight problems as they arose 
as was the case at NatBank.  However, overall, the evidence of this was 
unconvincing, and relationships appeared much more arms-length, and negotiations 
appeared to be shrouded in secrecy, contrary to the partnership ethos.  An 
interesting nuance was the way union officials explained how they „hoped‟ 
management respected them and took their comments on board, whereas at NatBank 
union actors were much more confident that management did value their input.   
Despite prima facie evidence to suggest that BuSoc and BuSoc Staff Union were 
working in partnership, the findings suggest that in reality the approach to the 
management of employment relations is much more traditional than it may at first 
appear.  Reasons for this may include the fact the union did not want to be seen  as 
too close to management, or perhaps because there have been no major incidents 
such as those at NatBank which encouraged management and the union to 
reconsider and attempt to „modernise‟ their relationship. There was a lack of 
agreement on a common approach to employment relations and various 
contradictions emerged.  The Union disliked the adversarial recognition and 
procedural agreement but also disliked the notion of having a partnership 
agreement.  The Director of Corporate Personnel did not perceive the traditional 
document to be a problem, whereas the Employee Relations Manager was attracted 
by the notions of partnership.  There was also little evidence of an embedded 
partnership culture,  and many middle managers were said to hold negative attitudes 
towards the union.  Some employees believed consulting the union would be 
disloyal to the employer, while others suggested being a representative could be 
career limiting.  Other employees simply had very little interest in the union.  In 
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other words, the union appeared to lack the legitimacy associated with a strong 
partnership approach.  Representative efficacy was also poor and characterised by 
poor visibility and limited communication. Many union representatives were 
inactive, lacked confidence and were worried about how they were perceived by 
management.  The breadth and scope of representation was also limited with a focus 
on bread and butter terms and conditions, and discipline and grievance rather than 
the wider agendas associated with partnership.  Another potential challenge was the 
ability of the structure to withstand adversity, as currently this appears to remain 
untested as mutuality appears to have offered a degree of cushioning from market 
forces.  This is exacerbated by the fact the structure centres around the Chief 
Executive and the Union General Secretary, both of whom will soon retire.  To 
conclude, in terms of process, there was limited evidence to suggest that the 
BuSoc/BuSoc Staff Union arrangement could justifiably described as a genuine 
„partnership relationship‟, and as such the criticisms outlined are not necessarily 
criticisms of partnership per se. 
 
   7 
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Chapter 7: Case Study 3 – WebBank 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the third case study undertaken at the WebBank operations 
centre in the East Midlands.  The chapter begins by providing a background to the 
case organisation, and to the site under study.  This is followed by a review of 
recent employment relations at the centre, and the partnership structures.  The 
meaning of partnership in the organisation is explored.  This is followed by an 
examination of the process of partnership, specifically the nature of the relationships 
between key actors, and the way issues are handled and decisions are made.  The 
final section outlines some of the key challenges of partnership at WebBank. 
 
 
Company profile 
 
WebBank provides internet-based financial services and is a major UK e-commerce 
company.  Established in the late 1990s, the company is owned by a major 
international financial services group.  The parent company set up a new post and 
telephone based bank in 1996.  The Chief Finance Officer joined WebBank from 
Midland Bank, where he had been involved with their First Direct operation.   The 
Chief Executive was previously Operations Director and Chief Operating Officer of 
the parent company‟s banking operation before the launch in 1998.  The company‟s 
espoused aim was to create a fresh, dynamic and distinctive organisation in the 
conservative finance industry.  This is illustrated by their offbeat marketing and 
advertising strategy targeting the 20-35 year old professional market.  Products 
include savings accounts and general banking, investments and insurance.  The 
company headquarters are in the City of London, and the company has two main 
administration centres, both located in the Midlands of England.    As an e-bank, the 
company hoped that cheaper operating costs would enabled them to lure new 
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customers with attractive interest rates undercutting the high street.  At the launch, 
the goal was to attract £5 billion of customer deposits within a five- year period, but 
this target was achieved in only seven months.  New customers opened accounts by 
telephone and later the internet became the dominant medium, as the company 
aimed to reduce the overwhelming demand by allowing new customers to sign up 
over the internet only.  One of the key launch products was the WebBank Credit 
Card, introduced with a much lower interest rate than the high street banks, and this 
remains their core product today.  Since 1998 this range has expanded to include 
credit cards, mortgages, life and critical illness insurance, and investment products, 
including an online fund supermarket. Customers can manage their accounts online, 
by telephone, digital telephone and WAP-enabled mobile phones.  Recent 
innovations have included the introduction of online share dealing, TV banking, 
WB Money Manager (which enables customers to manage all their accounts from 
one place) and WB Pay, an e-mail payment service.  WebBank entered the French 
market through the acquisition of a French internet banking organisation forming 
WebBank France, but the French operation was unsuccessful and the company now 
operates solely in the UK. 
 
The company registered on the London Stock Exchange in 2000 with an initial 
public offering of a 20% share in the company, and made its first profit in 2001.   In 
2004, the operating profit was £74 million, although overall the Group made a loss 
due to the failure of their European operations. The company has recently 
experienced significant turbulence in relation to the poor performance of their 
international business, and additional uncertainty as their primary shareholder put 
the company up for sale. However, the organisation was recently taken off the 
market and the parent organisation bought the public shares delisting it from the 
stock exchange in 2006.  Currently the business accounts for over 5% UK credit 
card balances and employs over 2,500 people.   
 
WebBank espouses a „purpose and values‟ mission statement, and central to this is 
the idea of being an innovative and entrepreneurial player in a conservative 
marketplace.  They also espouse a commitment of fairness to their customers, 
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employees and shareholders as well as the communities in which they operate.  
WebBank‟s espoused purpose and values are:  
 WebBank‟s enduring purpose is to revolutionize customers‟ experience of 
financial services driven through unleashing the power of people. 
 Our core values at WebBank are honesty, integrity and respect for people. 
 We aspire to be vibrant, imaginative and fair in everything we do. 
 Our customers are the reason we exist and we constantly look to offer them 
the products and services that put them in control of their money. 
 We respect our people‟s individuality and diversity, encouraging them to 
develop their careers in a stimulating environment, in keeping with our 
values. 
 Our shareholders own the business and must be fairly rewarded for their 
investment. 
 We work co-operatively with our suppliers and business partners, choose 
those who share our values and strive for mutual trust and benefit. 
 We behave as good neighbours in our local communities and as a 
responsible citizen. 
 We respect, protect and where possible enhance the quality of the 
environment. 
 
 
The case site: Midlands Operations Centre 
 
Although the company is officially headquartered in London, WebBank has two 
main operations sites.  The main site, known here as Alpha Site, is located in the 
East Midlands.  A smaller site is located in the West Midlands and employs around 
300 staff but the focus of this study was the main centre. Traditional industries in 
the area have included mining, pottery and foundry work.  The city has a long 
tradition of aerospace, engineering, rail engineering, power generation and 
manufacturing.   The site has grown from employing just 150 to now employing 
almost 2500 people.  At launch the company only had a small number of employees 
in a city centre office, but quickly relocated to a large unit on a suburban retail park 
in 1999.  Located on an 80 hectare out-of-town business park, the estate is built 
upon a former brownfield site, formerly the location of an engineering and gas 
works.  The site consists of two main buildings affording 250,000 square feet of 
floor space, and acts as the administrative head office, operations centre, technology 
centre, and the main customer contact centre.  A particular aim when choosing the 
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location was that it should be central with the availability of a trainable workforce, 
most of whom need not necessarily come from the financial services sector; indeed 
those without financial service experience are positively encourage to apply.   This 
was thought to be important in terms of creating a new fresh culture for the bank, 
which is often described in the industry press as „trendy‟, „entrepreneurial‟ and 
„action-orientated‟.  WebBank‟s owners also cite reasons including favourable rents, 
space for expansion, and proximity to London and Birmingham as key factors in 
locating is this particular city.  As Table 7.1 reveals, employment in manufacturing 
in the city is above the national average, while financial service employment is 
below the English average.  Unemployment and long-term sickness rates are also 
slightly above average at 4% and 5.8% respectively. 
 
Table 7.1 
Industry of employment (aged 16-74 in employment) 
Industry of employment in area Local 
authority 
East 
Midlands 
England 
Agriculture; hunting; forestry 0.5 1.88 1.45 
Fishing 0 0.01 0.02 
Mining and quarrying 0.14 0.042 0.25 
Manufacturing 22.39 19.91 14.83 
Electricity gas and water 0.8 0.83 0.71 
Construction 5.78 6.86 6.76 
Wholesale and retail 16.66 18.21 16.85 
Hotels and catering 5.13 4.51 4.73 
Transport, storage and communication 6.36 6.25 7.09 
Financial intermediation 2.74 3.07 4.8 
Real estate, renting and business activities 11.67 10.41 13.21 
Public administration 3.87 4.95 5.66 
Education 7.87 7.8 7.74 
Health and social work 11.72 10.6 10.7 
Economically inactive: unemployed 4 3.27 3.35 
Economically inactive: long term sick or disabled 5.76 5.29 5.3 
Source: ONS 2006 Data source from Census 2001 
 
  WebBank 
 
 
 
 303 
WebBank offices are vast open plan spaces, with breakout areas for relaxation.  The 
environment is quite different to the other case organisations in that it is modern and 
purpose built.  A deliberate objective was only to have one floor in order to create a 
more „egalitarian‟ environment.  Despite the modern environment, this has not 
prevented a perpetual programme of refurbishment to improve the working 
environment.  In 2003, for example, the technology building was completely 
refurbished to create a more flexible working environment and encourage creativity.  
The refurbishment cost over £10 million and employed specialist design consultants 
whose other clients include Prada and Nike.  The call centre also won a recent 
industry award, and was identified as one of 12 „supermodel‟ call centres in the UK. 
The call centre space is designed around a townscape design to create 
„communities‟ by dividing up the vast space, and is also based on one floor with a 
central atrium.  There are also „den‟ spaces for quiet working, and „sanctuary‟ areas 
designed to afford some peace and quiet to relax.  Moreover, call agents do not have 
allocated desks but operate on a hot desking system.  The centre also has moveable 
walls which can be erected to create different working environments as new projects 
arise, offices are painted in bright bold colours, and walls are decorated with murals 
and modern art of local significance.   The other main difference is the high degree 
of informality with casual dress code, atrium café‟s, sofas and „chill-out zones‟, 
video games machines, plasma screens and an online „jukebox‟.  The jukebox 
system was introduced to dilute the ambient noise in the centre, and again appears to 
have proved popular, with employees able to select tracks online from their PC to be 
played across the centre. 
 
The workforce is young (most employees are under 35 and a high proportion are 18-
23), and a majority of employees are female (65%).   The centre employs a  mix of 
employees including professionals, managers and customer service agents.    The 
average age of a manager is 32.  Typical job roles in the centre include customer 
sales and service as the centre answers 12,000 calls per day.  Most customer service 
roles are telephone based dealing with customer enquiries regarding their bank 
accounts.  Some agents are also responsible for „Secure Messaging‟ which involves 
responding to email enquiries from customers.  Employees involved with SM 
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queries generally enjoy the role as it affords a break from answering phone calls.  
Most employees in the call centre work on a shift basis with variable hours 
scheduled between 7am and midnight.   Some workers work predominantly „lates‟ 
or „earlies‟ while other prefer a rotation of the two.  A specific „graveyard shift‟ 
maintains the overnight operation. Salaries are similar to the other two cases, 
ranging from £12.5k plus 10% bonus as a new customer service agent, to 15k + 
15% bonus as a sales agents, although it is not unknown for top sales staff to exceed 
£30k.  Team leader salaries are around £20k plus bonuses.  In terms of career 
progression it was evident that many WebBank employees have begun their career 
as a basic service agent, but many had progressed through the organisation to secure 
new roles in other departments, and to achieve professional qualifications in areas 
including banking, marketing and personnel.  
 
 In line with business strategy, the bank has pioneered „e-HR‟, offering a range of 
services online including electronic pay slips, holiday booking and expense claims, 
and has received rewards in this area.  Attempts have been made it make it a „fun‟ 
place to work by organising special events and parties for occasions such as 
Valentine‟s Day, Easter and Christmas.  These appeared to be extremely popular 
with the younger employees.  The workplace also has no strict uniform policy; 
indeed dress ranged from jeans and trainers to a shirt and trousers depending on 
personal preference.  Many employees contrasted this with the traditional suit and 
tie image of the banking sector.  The canteen is also contemporary and styled with 
long communal bench seating, and offering a wide range of food.  Also, because the 
centre is also the head office most employees knew who the executive team were.   
Indeed, many employees were amazed by the fact that even the top management 
would sometimes wear shorts and t-shirts to work in the summer, again suggestive 
of this attempt to create an informal and unorthodox working environment.     
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Employment relations at WebBank 
 
As a new „e-bank‟, WebBank only has a seven-year history of employment 
relations.  Nevertheless, the seven years have seen the bank grow from a small city 
centre office employing 100 people, to a massive purpose built facility employing 
thousands.    The HR slogan is “WebBank should be a great place to work”, 
although long serving employees suggested that at launch the working environment 
was very poor due to popularity of their products which resulted in a long period of 
chaos, high employee turnover and acute understaffing.  This was described by one 
manager as a period of “recruit, recruit, recruit”.  Nevertheless, employee 
responses to questions regarding WebBank as a place to work were mostly positive 
as the following statements illustrate: 
 “They try and make it a good place to work.  They‟ve built a WB culture.  It‟s not a traditional 
bank in an austere sense” 
 “As a place to work I think it‟s pretty decent.  WB as a business has got the right attitude”. 
 “I enjoy working here, the environment is good, the people, there are always prospects to move 
into other departments, you are actively encourage to do that, if you want to go forward there is 
help to do it”. 
 “It‟s alright, pretty cool…if you have a problem they do their best to sort it out.  If they can 
help you they will do.  I‟ve got no problems with it really” 
 (Employee focus groups) 
 
Despite the overall positive comments, some employees did express some specific 
concerns.  Firstly, some of the older members of staff admitted they had found 
joining an organisation like WebBank to be a significant culture shock from their 
previous employment, and were particularly resistant to changes such as the hot 
desking system, preferring to sit with a group of colleagues.  There was also the 
perception that much of the „fun‟ activities were geared very much towards the 
younger population of the workforce.  Many employees described a period of poor 
employee relations in the period 2003/4 when the company decided to terminate its 
operations in France, at a cost of €180million and a loss of 500 jobs.  The failure 
was attributed to higher than expected set up costs.  In 2003, the French operation 
lost £90m resulting in the WebBank group making an overall loss of £35 million, 
twice the loss made in 2002.   This overshadowed the relative success of the UK 
operation at the same time, where operating profit had actually doubled from £35 
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million to £70 million a year earlier, due to a surge in consumer borrowing.  The 
bank unsuccessfully sought a partner to enter into a joint venture to turn the ailing 
operation around, as the parent organisation then decided to auction its 80% 
shareholding for around £1 billion, initially attracting the interest of US operations 
such as CitiGroup and MBNA.    
 
As the Chief Executive stated in a newspaper, “No one knew who they might be 
working for, or whether they would be working”.  However, most employees 
commended the bank on their handling of the situation suggesting that 
communication was actually good, and that they received a £1000 loyalty bonus 
during that period if they stayed with the company through the period of 
uncertainty.  This context might explain why in 2003 only 37% employees agreed 
with the statement „WebBank is a great place to work‟, while in 2004 the figure had 
risen sharply to 71% (Internal document).  Other concerns included the pressures of 
targets related to performance related pay, although several employees suggested 
that performance management had improved as the company had shifted from 
quantitative indicators such as „number of sales‟ or „average time taken‟ to 
qualitative indicators e.g. „call resolved satisfactorily‟ irrespective of whether the 
call was long.  FSA regulation was another issue which frequently arose.  In 
practice, many agents found new regulations to be particularly burdensome but 
acknowledged that this was a trend which affected everybody in the industry. 
 
 
Partnership structures at WebBank 
 
The primary component of the partnership structure at WebBank is the  People 
Forum.  The People Forum was introduced in 2000, 2 years after the company was 
founded in 1998 and populated with 3 part-time employee representatives.   The 
initiative for a representative body was said to have come from management team, 
as a response to the rapid growth of the organisation.  As the HR Director 
explained: 
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“We have 2000 people.  You need a mechanism.  It‟s very difficult to consult with 2000 people 
individually!  I think we instinctively prefer as a non-union site to understand directly what 
people here wanted rather than hearing it through a union” (HR Director). 
Interestingly, by „indirectly‟ he meant external trade union representation and by 
„directly‟ he meant  non-union employee representation, unlike the typical academic 
use of such terms.  He suggested that the introduction of the Forum preceded 
European legislative requirements and “fortunately the legislation is friendly to 
what we and WBPF are doing”.  An audit suggested that forum meets the 
requirements of the EU Information and Consultation Directive.  It could be 
speculated that the People Forum was a response to the 1999 Employment Relations 
Act, which provides for statutory union recognition if there is sufficient employee 
support and came into effect in June 2000.  On the other hand, the creation of a 
representative body soon after launch may also reflect that such bodies are „the 
norm‟ in the sector, and that as such it may have been a taken for granted 
assumption that a body had to be created. 
 
At the launch of the Forum in 2000, the focus was said to be on very low level 
issues, including canteen food, mouse-mats and the poor quality of the soap in the 
toilets.  Indeed, one representative expressed embarrassment at some of the trivial 
issues he had raised with the Chief Executive.  Specifically, he suggested that an 
incident where he raised an issue regarding an out-of-order toilet to the senior 
executives as epitomising his early naivety.   This was termed by the representatives 
as the “sausages in the canteen” phase.  The forum‟s agenda was also perceived to 
be driven primarily by management but particularly by the HR team.   Employee 
representatives suggested that they tended to be consulted fairly late in the process, 
often after decisions had already been made.  In 2002 the Chief Executive was said 
to have expressed disappointment with the operation of the Forum, and proposed a 
need for serious re-evaluation.  Interestingly, at the same time Amicus launched a 
recruitment campaign, picketing outside, focusing on the policy of alleged strict 
toilet monitoring.  Again, it is worth noting that the pressure of Amicus is reflected 
in all three cases.  The employee representatives attended a conference in summer 
2002 with the HR Director in London, and had discussions with, inter alia, the TUC 
Partnership Institute and Amicus.  As one representative explained: “WebBank felt 
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they couldn‟t deal with Amicus because they were too adversarial, but they took a 
shine to the TUC Partnership Institute…feeling they were speaking the right 
language”.  Management were said to have suggested that a union would be 
culturally at odds with a young, innovative company such as WebBank, and there 
was evidence to suggest this attitude was still around. 
 
The HR Director suggested that he was ambivalent, believing that the current 
structures were sufficient, and as such a trade union was not necessary.  He did not 
suggest that the Forum was necessarily there instead of a trade union.  He explained 
how, “It‟s almost like I don‟t have an attitude to unions here, because what I think 
we need we‟ve got…I don‟t hold that we have WBPF instead of a union but 
practically it‟s true”.  He also suggested that there was no strong desire among 
employees for union recognition, but if that was to change “management would 
have to think very hard about it”.  For management, the key concern was that trade 
unions are not as committed to the success of the company as internal bodies are 
likely to be. There was also a feeling that working with a trade union would slow 
down decision-making by creating a prohibitive level of consultation.  As one senior 
manager stated, “it leaves me cold.  Such a layer of consultation it‟d be 
prohibitive”.  In a similar vein, another senior manager drew on his work 
experience in a privatised utility to explain his lack of enthusiasm for trade union 
recognition at WebBank.  He described the difficulties of working in “an 
entrenched union environment” where he found for the representatives “activism 
was their idea of a good time”, having “a relish of beating management”.   
 
In autumn 2002 the forum representatives met again with Amicus with a view to 
Amicus making presentations to employees in the New Year of 2003.  The three 
elected part-time representatives were then seconded for three months to evaluate 
the future of the employee forum.   In 2003, the representatives recognised that there 
was a real need for some external third-party support and advice.  At this point they 
became affiliated to the Involvement and Participation Association, who appeared to 
be a good source of external expertise.  It was as a result of this affiliation that the 
seconded representatives became aware of - and inspired by - the concept of 
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„partnership working‟ and presented their idea of a new non-union Employee Forum 
to the Executive team in summer 2003, under the name “Playing it Big”. It is worth 
noting that while the NatBank partnership was inspired by the TUC, at WebBank 
the IPA partnership model was the inspiration.  The core idea was that the forum 
needed to be consulted early in the process rather than after decisions had been 
made.  This involved a new system of elected full-time employee representatives 
supported by a network of part-time representatives, an allocated budget and paid 
time off for part-time representatives to carry out their duties.  The proposals were 
agreed by management.  Any employee with more than 6 months services is 
allowed to stand for election as a representative.  In autumn 2003 the three seconded 
representatives were appointed as the full-time seconded employee representatives 
in an unopposed election for a three year term. 
 
The espoused aim of the new People Forum is, “To represent the voice of all 
WebBank people, to make working life great and help drive superior business 
results” In practice, it was suggested that this meant communicating with 
employees, bridging the relationship between management and employees, and 
representing employees on collective and individual issues.  The new Employee 
Forum consists of 3 full-time representatives and 12 part-time representatives.  Part-
time representatives are allocated 4 hours per week for their duties, comparable to 
most union representatives, and tend to deal more with day-to-day issues within the 
areas which they work.   The part-time representatives generally agreed that there 
was sufficient opportunity to get additional time off for People Forum duties so long 
as they could balance their workload, although it was slightly more difficult for 
customer facing telephone staff.  The representatives were generally satisfied with 
the time off they received to do their duties. The body is funded by the employer to 
support representatives salaries, training, equipment and stationery and 
conference/travel expenses. 
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Table 7.2 
Membership of WebBank People Forum 
Members Remarks 
WBPF Chairperson Chief Executive 
Employee Chairperson Employee Rep. Elected by Employee Reps. 
Employee Representatives 1:200 employees. 3 full-time representatives. 
Management Representatives  2 from senior management posts 
Employee Vice Chairperson  Employee Rep. Elected by Employee Reps.  
HR Representative   Nominated by WBPF Chairperson 
WBPF Secretary Nominated by HR Representative 
Eligibility One year as an WB employee on a permanent contract 
 
The representatives explained their motivation to be involved with the Forum.  As 
the current Employee Chair, a former customer relations adviser, explained: 
“I was interested straight away, having been a union rep for 15 years.  And in the Navy I was a 
Welfare Rep. I‟ve always been interested in people.  I was interested straight away and got 
elected” (Employee Chair). 
Similarly for another full-time representative who previously worked in the contact 
centre: 
“About a year and a half ago leaflets were dropped round, asking people if they wanted to be 
nominated to the WBPF.  I looked at that and thought, I could really help with that!  Because 
I‟m seeing all sorts of things missing around the contact centre, that need a voice.  I thought I 
could really help. (FT Employee Representative) 
For a part-time representative from technology: 
“The reason I got involved was because…in a company like this it‟s very big and things go on 
and you think hang on I‟m not sure that‟s the way you should actually manage that. ..or you 
wonder why some people get certain benefits and others don‟t. ..A lot of people I knew shared 
these concerns so I thought, you know, I‟ll stand for election because this is what the forum is 
about” (Part-time representative). 
Another part-time representative suggested that he felt his area needed better 
representation, so he decided to stand as “the voice of Lending”.  On hearing of 
vacancies he started his campaign including having promotional t-shirts printed and 
subsequently won the election. 
 
Again, although partnership was viewed primarily in terms of the WebBank People 
Forum structures, and specifically the relationship between the forum and 
management, in common with NatBank and BuSoc there were also various direct 
employee involvement mechanisms.  These included the monthly „Life at 
WebBank‟ survey, „fireside chats‟ between line managers and employees, and 
extensive use of electronic communication.  For example, the intranet was used not 
only to cascade information but also to gather feedback, with most webpages 
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offering the opportunity to send employee responses and opinions.  There was also 
an electronic „Ask HR‟ service, where employees could contact HR directly about 
issues including pay, holidays and shifts.    
 
 
Definition of partnership at WebBank 
 
At WebBank there is no formal partnership agreement, although there is a 
„Commitment Document‟ as outlined in Table 7.3.   
Table 7.3 
The WebBank People Forum Commitment Document 
The WebBank People Forum Commitment Document 
Objectives 
 To increase the level of employee involvement in change and business 
initiatives which affect employees using effective consultation 
 To build and maintain effective relationships with all departments 
through consultation 
 To represent independently and without prejudice the interests of 
WebBank people both collectively and individually 
Primary principles 
 Joint commitment of the WBPF and WB will ensure WBs success 
 Recognition by all for legitimate roles, interests and responsibilities of 
those on the WBPF 
 Transparency between the WBPF and WB through effective 
consultation – sharing information policy consultation 
 Building trust between WB people 
 WB people have the right to be represented and have equal 
opportunities within the business 
 WB people have exceptional training and effective development 
Operating principles 
 Source from the WBPF purpose 
 Act for the good of WB people and WB 
 Stay within the overall context of WB’s strategy, support that strategy 
and contribute to WB’s game 
 Respect the WBPF principles of consultation 
Source: Internal documentation 
 
The actual term partnership was not frequently used by the management team in 
their accounts of employment relations, although interestingly, like BuSoc, the term 
is used in the employee handbook. 
 “The WebBank People Forum represents the voice of all WebBank people. Working in 
partnership with the business, the forum helps make sure that our people get the most out of 
working here.” (Internal document). 
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However, management did stress the need to work with representatives in a 
collaborative way, and stressed they were keen to avoid an adversarial style, and did 
occasionally use the language of partnership.  As the HR Director explained, “I 
don‟t experience WBPF as an adversarial group whether they are agreeing or 
disagreeing.  It‟s much more of a partnership”.  The term partnership was used 
often by Forum representatives.  This is perhaps unsurprising as they have now been 
closely involved with organisations such as the IPA who promote the idea.  One 
representative admitted that in 2002, “we‟d never really heard of partnership before 
and didn‟t know how it worked….but if gave us a glimpse of another way of 
working”.  The Forum chair attempted to define the distinction between partnership 
and non-partnership working, suggesting that it is about establishing a common 
agenda and shared goals: 
 “I think quite often, in the non-partnership arenas, there have been two agendas.  The 
management have got an agenda.  The union have another agenda.  And the two don‟t always 
match up.  So you get all sorts of conflict and time wasting.  You may end up with the right 
result or compromise, but it takes days and days, hours and hours to get that result.  With 
partnership, both sides know what they are aiming for.  They are on the track together.  Pulling 
in the same direction.  And it doesn‟t take as much time to get the right result (Employee 
Chair). 
 
This view clearly implies a predominantly unitarist understand of partnership.  On 
the other hand, another full-time representative illustrated his more pluralist view of 
a partnership approach with a Venn diagram, suggesting that the aim of partnership 
was to work on common interests in the overlapping shaded area, trying to establish 
some kind of balance between employee and business interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Venn diagram WebBank employee interests 
Source: Employee reps. diagram 
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The representatives were unconvinced by the effectiveness of adversarial 
approaches, suggesting that “an aspirational approach of working together is much 
more productive than the adversarial style.  I don‟t think the adversarialism works 
anymore”.  This view was echoed by the Employee Chair who concluded that: 
“I like the idea of partnership.  I think it makes a lot more sense.  To be partners rather than 
enemies.  I think in a partnership you are working for the same end.  You are working for the 
good of the company, employees, and customers.  It just makes sense to me to do things 
together rather than at loggerheads all the time” (Employee Chair). 
He suggested that the effectiveness of the Forum hinged upon building effective 
high-trust relationships with the management team, and that conflict and threats are 
ineffective.  As he explained: 
If we rub up managers the wrong way, they are not going to do anything with us.  You end up 
with conflict.  No good for the employees, shareholders or customers.  A threatening basis is 
not the way to do it” (Employee Chair). 
For another full-time representative working in partnership is concerned with 
fairness and trying to establish middle ground.  As she explained, “I think for me 
WBPF is all about being fair.  Fair to the business.  Fair to the individual.  There 
has to be middle ground in there somewhere.  It‟s all about fairness.” 
 
As a non-union site, respondents were asked about the difference between having an 
in-house body such as the People Forum compared to union representation.  For a 
senior technology manager with previous work experience in the utilities sector, the 
key difference between the People Forum and a trade union is that “the People 
Forum are just as wedded to WebBank‟s success as everybody else, but they 
recognise our people feeling good is a way of building success. My experience is at 
the other end of the spectrum”.  He suggested that the major benefit of the in-house 
People Forum was that the relationship was more collaborative/constructive, as they 
had a joint commitment to the goal of business success.  Like BuSoc, there were 
perceived benefits of an internal rather than external body.  As he explained, “We 
are pursuing common goals, a common vision.  Rather than diverging goals, that‟s 
the main thing”.  Yet he was not philosophically opposed to unions, stating how “If 
they assumed trade union status, and the legal weight that carried with them, 
provided people had similar attitudes and approaches I‟m sure that could also be 
successful”.  In other words, the union/non-union distinction was seen to be less 
important than the relationships and mode of working. 
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The team managers interviewed did not have much experience of trade unions,  
however, they speculated that an external union might not have a sufficient 
understanding of the organisational objectives: 
“A trade union is very much removed from WebBank.  They wouldn‟t understand what the 
culture is like at WebBank, or what WebBank are trying to achieve by doing things.    WBPF 
know what the culture is like, they know what WB is trying to achieve and have an 
understanding of where the other side is coming from.  So if they are in a meeting with a 
manager and an employee they can understand both sides.  Whereas the trade union is solely 
looking the person…without having an understanding of where the company is coming from 
(Team manager)”. 
 
There was also a lack of enthusiasm regarding trade unions from the Forum 
representatives.  For them, there was a perception that trade unions did not really 
add much value besides the ability to draw upon legal support in the event of an 
employment tribunal, and of course they cannot hold a ballot for industrial action in 
the event of a dispute.   There were also arguments regarding the actual 
representative-ness of trade unions, and concerns they are governed by complex 
political agendas, sometimes have ulterior motives and may not understand the 
organisational culture.  In addition, employee representatives also cited an example 
of a local unionised Building Society with which they had conducted benchmarking 
exercises as an example of “how not do it”.  A part-time representative reiterated 
the view that there was probably not much additional benefit from a union beside 
legal support, but that the major negative was relying on precedents from other 
organisations and a lack of flexibility.  He was also unconvinced by union claims to 
be more powerful in the current climate, for example in relation to job losses: 
 “All you can do is make sure that it‟s a fair decision.  If WB want to move to India tomorrow 
who‟s going to stop them?  No-one.  We always reckon that we‟re there for the people and to 
see that they get a fair deal.  That‟s what annoys me about the union.  Saying they can do more 
because they have more power” (PT Employee Representative). 
 
This view was echoed by another representative who was wary of the „more-power‟ 
arguments presented by the union at the last meeting, suggesting that ultimately the 
business decision is likely to be the same.  He stated how unions often argue how, 
“We will fight, we will make them negotiate, we will make them accountable…but at 
the end of the day the outcome is probably the same – or less”.  She also suggested 
that from the feedback she receives most employees are happy with an employee 
representative although some would prefer an external union representative.  Indeed, 
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there was a feeling amongst the representatives that unions cannot add much, and as 
some remarked, “I‟m not a member of a union and never have been, but I‟m not 
seeing anything they can do better apart from the tribunal stuff…I‟m not seeing 
anything different really.    Another representative was openly hostile to the idea of 
unionism, following bad experiences in the 1980s: 
 “My own personal opinion of unions?!  Shoot the bastards…I was in the AUEW in the 
80s…we went on strike to get he apprentices an extra £20 a week.  16 weeks with no pay.   The 
end result?  They shut the factory.  I don‟t think WB needs them.  I think we get to know more 
than a union would be told” (Part-time Employee Representative). 
He also argued that an advantage of an in-house system is that it provides universal 
representation. 
 “If I was a shop steward it‟d be working for the brothers and sisters.  And drumming up 
members.  And if you aren‟t paying your dues you aren‟t part of the club.  You can‟t play.” 
(Part-time Employee Representative). 
Indeed, in summer 2005 a decision not to allow Amicus recruitment officers on-site 
to conduct a recruitment campaign was taken by the forum representatives. 
 “WebBank have reneged on their commitment to give staff a choice whether they join a trade 
union or not. Given the amount of work being exported overseas, now more than ever staff 
need to have a choice of having the protection of a trade union.” (Amicus Press Release, 2005). 
 
Unsurprisingly, employees expressed mixed views regarding the benefits of a trade 
union. Some believed it was unnecessary while others suggested it may be 
beneficial.  For those in favour, they cited benefits such as enhanced legislative 
standing, as opposed to a “frivolous thing that they can get rid of if they want to”.  
As supporters commented: 
 “WBPF…it‟s a very similar thing to a union…I‟ve realised it isn‟t a union and I wish there 
was a union at WB.  And the reason they get away with not having a union is that there are lots 
of young people…they are not too clued up on unions.  Is there a reason why they don‟t have a 
union?  Is it equivalent of?  It‟s a question mark. 
 “I don‟t believe they [the Forum] have the legal knowledge if it did get to a really high end 
problem like tribunals.  A union would have that legal facility”. 
 “I don‟t know much about unions but my gut feeling tells me that an in-house forum might not 
be very objective.  Or they might get scared.  Because they work for WebBank.  Because they 
have restrictions of their own.  I‟m sure they‟d say it doesn‟t work like that…but at the end of 
the day an outside body doesn‟t have anything to lose so to speak”. 
 “I wonder how involved they will get if it goes really high up the chain…I believe, for the 
bases issues around the company it‟s really good.  But when it comes to the really serious nitty 
gritty it may not be as good 
 (Employee Focus Groups). 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 316 
 
In other words, there were some concerns regarding an employer sponsored body. 
Conversely, others cited the advantages of an in-house forum as including greater 
local knowledge and a more amicable working relationship: 
 “The WBPF have connections with the company, they‟ve got the records, can speak to people 
and know how the business works…trade unions come in and they know all the legal side and 
they are good, but they don‟t know the business side” 
 
“I think with a union, you start getting power struggles, don‟t say this to him, say this to me, 
lawyers and litigation.  It can create a larger problem than it actually solves”  
 “My preconceived notion is that it‟s all about strikes, a battle against management.  I would 
see as union as that.  Out for everything they want, whereas the forum are not like that.  They 
will help you but it‟s not about getting everybody in the call centre to strike or causing revolt or 
mutiny” 
“You think of miners, blowing the whistle, everybody out.  You had to down tools and leave 
the building…but I think with the forum there isn‟t a need for a union, it doesn‟t seem like a 
need to put pressure on the business to bring about more worker rights because the company is 
more orientated to thinking of the worker”  
(Employee Focus Groups). 
Interestingly, opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of a trade union did not 
appear to confirm traditional arguments regarding age.  For example, it may be 
expected that the young employees would have been the least interested while older 
employees might have been more engaged with union representation.  However, no 
such pattern was evident; rather there was a clear mix of views irrespective of age. 
 
Influence and managerial prerogative 
However, it was clear that management retained their „right to manage‟ under the 
partnership structure.  This is made clear in the commitment document which states 
that “consultation = both parties views are stated and heard before a decision is 
made.  The perspective of each party is understood by the other not necessarily 
agreed between them”.  The framework is based upon the IPA model of „options 
based consultation‟.    The process begins with business objectives being identified 
in terms of strategy and policy development.  The management team them identify 
various options to move the business forward and have initial discussions with 
representatives.  The consultation process starts before a decision is made,  and 
affords representatives the opportunity of feeding into the process, and to suggest 
alternative strategies.  Management then review the options and take on board the 
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input provided to devise a revised list of options.  Management then make the final 
decision, providing justification why a particular decision was made, and why the 
others were rejected.  Formal decisions are then cascaded to employees by the 
employer, with management and representatives meeting on an ongoing basis to 
discuss progress and updates.  This is summarised in  figure 7.2 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Option based consultation model 
Source: Internal documentation 
 
Accordingly, for the Employee Chair, the purpose is ensuring that there is a clear 
understanding of the rationale behind business decisions, but that managers retain 
their right to manage.  He explained that “Whatever they decide in their area, they 
are the managers, they decide in their area.   The benefit for us is in knowing the 
rationale behind those decisions”.  However he suggested that the forum had a right 
to challenge and question decisions suggesting that “The role of the rep is to 
challenge and question, the same as whether we were unionised or non-unionised.  
If we challenge and we question, and we understand the rationale then that‟s fair”. 
The HR Director also made it clear that the Forum is not a negotiating body, and 
that management and employee representatives do not necessarily have to actually 
agree on decisions.  He clarified that, “We consult with them, we don‟t negotiate, so 
we aren‟t reaching an agreement about things.  We are very clear that we as the 
company make the decision, rather than we reach an agreement with them”.  
Though this may mean there is a danger of the consultation becoming merely lip-
service, he was keen to stress that although it was not about agreeing per se, this did 
not mean that the representatives did not have any influence over decisions, arguing 
that this would mean there was no point in conducting the consultation exercise.  As 
he explained: 
Identify 
business 
objective 
Consultation 
before decision 
is made 
Decision made 
(by managers) 
Communication Implement 
business 
objective 
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 “There would be no point consulting them if what they said didn‟t influence.  They don‟t have 
a vote on the decision, but they do have influence in the decision.  We do want to be doing 
things that they support” (HR Director).   
Indeed, another senior manager argued that early involvement of the Employee 
Representatives in decision-making can actually add value, and this appeared to be 
one of the key tenets of partnership working: 
“We engage them up front to help with the design,, they‟ve got a different perspective to ours 
so it adds value.  Also being there when things are being implemented as a sounding board, a 
point people can go to with total anonymity and we can take action.  That‟s where they add 
value” (Senior technology manager). 
 
The representatives were also clear that their role was not to act in a confrontational 
or obstructive manner, but rather to voice the employee perspective on management 
proposals, and to provide feedback and constructive criticism.  For them it was not 
necessarily about changing decisions: 
 “Not that we are going to change the making of decisions.  But we are in there adding some 
sort of knowledge and gaining understanding, and passing over our understanding of what 
people will feel as well.  We are using our experience of the floor” (Employee Chair,). 
In other words, management gained insight from the coalface, while employees 
gained because their voice could be fed back to senior executives.   
 
Most employees were also supportive of a non-confrontational approach to 
employment relations, suggesting that 1970s industrial relations are no longer 
desirable.  As one employee commented, “I‟ve found you catch more flies with 
molasses than you do with vinegar”.  However, some employees were uncertain of 
how much influence the Forum had, suggesting it would be difficult to work out 
outcomes which were the result of forum input, or whether the company would have 
done things anyway.  Clearly, this issue is very similar to that experienced in union 
contexts as well, and the following quotes illustrate this ambiguity. 
 “I don‟t know if influence is the right word.  I think they have an input.  Whether they have 
any great influence I don‟t know.  Sway and influence.  They must have otherwise it‟s a 
pointless exercise…to judge something you need an empirical result to measure.  If you don‟t 
hear the results its difficult to know”  
 “I‟ve got no negative thoughts about the company, I think the company is good in itself, but as 
to what degree the Forum plays in that I don‟t know.  Whether it‟s just a good company that 
will look after you and they don‟t have to do a great deal.  They maybe don‟t need to do a great 
deal because the company‟s good anyway you don‟t know”  
(Employee Focus Groups). 
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Relationships 
Again, in order to understand the process of partnership it is useful to explore the 
realities of the relationships between the key actors.  These are now discussed in 
turn. 
Senior management-employee representatives relationships 
As mentioned earlier, the WebBank partnership is not based upon a formal 
agreement, but rather management and representatives described it a more informal 
„relational approach‟, and stressed the way people work together is more important 
that formal documentation.  As a the vice-chair explained, a good relationship with 
senior managers was more likely to lead to the objective of involvement early in the 
process: 
 “We put a big emphasis on building relationships because we felt, and again we researched it, 
that consultation at an early stage through having a really good relationship, would give us 
more influence than a lets-play-poker approach” (Employee Vice-Chair).   
Similarly, the Chair expressed a comfortable relationship with the top management 
 “I have a good relationship with the top people, but my relationship with middle managers is 
harder to crack.  I was put on a People Management Committee, which involves nearly all of 
the Executive Committee, plus a couple of others.  And I'm quite comfortable.  They'll listen to 
me.  (Employee Chair). 
A part-time representative also explained how “It is recognised by the top 
management of WebBank…they do value the input, and we are given the time and 
resources we want, to do what we want for the good of people”.  Overall, the 
evidence suggested that the relationships between the senior management 
interviewed and the employee representatives were generally good.  The Chair is 
involved in many meetings, including a monthly meeting with the Chief Executive 
and the Director of Customer Service.  Another representative has a monthly 
meeting with the People Leaders in the Contact Centre, and the IT Director.  These 
meetings typically involve a review of recent issues, business update, constituency 
reports. Guests may also attend on an ad hoc basis if there is a particular topic which 
would benefit from their expertise.   
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Senior management responses were also positive.  As the senior IT manager 
commented regarding representatives: 
 “I value them.  I recognise they can do things I can‟t do.  We‟ve formed a good relationship 
over time.  I have respect and find him useful in terms of the feedback and information we get 
from him” (Senior technology manager) 
Another manager noted that representatives who had previously been in a 
managerial role were particular helpful because they could adopt more of a “dual 
perspective”.  He had clearly experienced more „militant‟ representatives whom he 
thought actually created additional troubles.  This was one of the main reasons he 
preferred the non-union body, as he believed this was more common in unionised 
environments.  He recalled traditional 1970s unionism with intransigent shop 
stewards who are “anti-establishment” describing them as akin to “News of the 
World reporters or rogue solicitors that advertise on daytime TV” looking for 
gossip and creating trouble.  For him, this is because unions have to demonstrate 
their „successes‟ and worth in order to impress fee-paying members: 
 “If you‟ve got a body funded by individuals who are in trouble, it‟s in your nature to produce 
stats that prove you‟ve been really useful.  [The forum is] not a business that has to produce 
results and show they‟ve saved individuals from dismissal.  That‟s not what they are about” 
(Senior manager). 
 
The key limitation of these positive overall findings, however, is that relationships 
between managers and the representatives were patchy.  Indeed, the interviews are a 
„best-case scenario‟ given that senior managers with little interaction with the forum 
declined requests for interview! The HR Director acknowledged the patchy 
coverage: 
 “I think people who have worked with them tend to be positive about them.  Others who 
haven‟t will have no relationship with them, wouldn‟t get involved with them, wouldn‟t think 
of involving them, and I think there will be people for whom, if WBPF do get involved, they‟ll 
be a sense of what are they doing?  This is my job and my decision-making! (HR Director). 
Additionally, he noted that senior managers would not really „use‟ the forum 
themselves, despite the fact that formally the forum represents employees at all 
levels in organisation and that there are elected management representatives.  
Another senior manager suggested it may be useful if the forum quantified their 
interactions with employees more, to inform and convince management of the value 
they can add.  
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Representative-manager relationships 
The relationships between the forum representatives and the middle management 
(team leader/team manager population) were less good, and representatives 
suggested a need to be integrated across all levels of management, by demonstrating 
that they can add value to the process.   As the following quotes illustrate, though 
the senior relationships were perceived to be good but patchy, line manager 
relationships were not nearly as good: 
“We have a very good relationship with senior managers.  It‟s middle managers where the 
relationships are poorer.  It used to be very poor.” (PT Employee Representative). 
 “Yesterday with middle managers, who see us a threat?  I wasn't as comfortable yesterday, 
with those people as I was with the top people” (Employee Chair). 
There was a belief that representatives were often perceived to be busybodies.  
Representatives acknowledged that sometimes middle management may appear to 
be drawn in opposing directions, and view the forum as a hindrance to meeting their 
objectives.  There was also the suggestion that some middle managers were wary 
because they knew the representatives had a good working relationship with some 
of the top executives, and there may be some resentment.  As a part-time 
representative explained:  
 “Wary that we have access directly to the top. Some are just wary of the fact you talk to the 
Chief Executive.  The Chief Executive says hello to you.  And they think they are the 
managers” (PT Employee Representative). 
The Employee Chair also was also fairly despondent regarding a recent meeting he 
attended with line managers: 
 “Yesterday I was quite down about it, disappointed, but then I thought its up to them.  I need 
to build a relationship with them so they can see the benefits we can bring, and see that we are 
not there not rock the boat but to actually help them.  Not being confrontational at all.  A 
certain element of middle managers think that we are interfering really.  Its certainly not 
perfect.  But more and more people are getting educated, and seeing that we behave ourselves, 
and we that we can act responsibly for both sides” (Employee Chair). 
 
Representatives suggested there had been some progress building relationships, but 
that a lot still had to be done to build the level of trust to allow the process to 
operate effectively.  For many line managers, there was an association between the 
forum representatives and the representation of employees during the discipline and 
grievance issues.  This had led to representatives being perceived as an obstruction 
rather than as people who add value, a finding which is also common to the other 
two case studies.  There was some more positive evidence to suggest, however, that 
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some middle managers would „use‟ the forum for advice on handling a situation 
with a subordinate prior to making a decision.   Occasionally, managers personally 
sought advice from the forum regarding an issue with an employee, or pointed 
people in their direction, which they viewed as a “real accolade”.  As one 
representative mused: 
 “There are hundreds of managers and some of them value us and some of them don‟t quite 
frankly.  And it depends on the individual manager, whether we get involved and what point we 
get involved.  That‟s a journey we are on quite frankly” (Vice Chair). 
 
Representatives described a need to be seen to be „professional‟ by the management 
team in order to achieve buy-in.  This Vice-Chair suggested that often this was a 
matter of approach, for example researching and suggesting solutions, rather than 
arguing and complaining.  This was echoed by a part time representative who 
suggested that they have had to build respect by being proactive and bringing 
solutions to the table rather than complaints.   
 “We‟ve not said „no you can‟t do that‟ and left it at that.  If they hear no, it‟s „why not‟.  
What‟s your reason?  Managers don‟t want to hear „no‟.  We‟ve now got the ability to develop 
ideas, solutions and workarounds” (PT Employee Representative). 
As a full-time representative commented, ultimately it depended on the individual 
manager, and a process which needs time: 
 “Some Team Managers and People Leaders, to get their buy-in to what we actually do, and 
how we can make their job easier, is quite a difficult process…some do buy-in, but others are 
more sceptical” (FT Employee Representative,) 
She believed this was a common problem with employee forums, and suggested 
there was a need to demonstrate how they can actually add value to the process, 
making the middle managers job easier as opposed to being perceived as a nuisance.  
This was said to require further relationship building, and represented a key area for 
future development.  To this end, the representatives were planning to produce a 
document which demonstrates the benefits they can add to the process from a 
business and individual perspective.  
 
Employees and employee representatives 
Another key relationship is the relationship between employees and employee 
representatives.  The HR Director suggested that, if anything, there was a need to 
build awareness of what the People Forum do and being available to employees.  
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Team managers suggested that employees who had not actually approached the 
forum for advice would probably only have a vague notion of their purpose.  A 
representative suggested that in the early stages the representatives had very little 
credibility in the eyes of employees, because they were seen to follow an agenda set 
by management, but that things had improved. 
 “We had no credibility, always very much manager lapdogs, HR poodles.  Because they only 
ever saw us with a manager in tow.  We were almost there to legitimise it!.  The managers 
would say we are doing this, and we have consulted with WBPF”. (Vice Chair). 
 
Representatives suggested their visibility had improved over time through regular 
„awareness events‟ in the atrium.  They also wear forum rugby shirts every Monday 
so that people can recognise them and put names to faces.  They also attend 
inductions to explain their role to the „new starts‟.   
 
However, there was evidence to suggest many employees still had a limited 
knowledge of their role.  This point is illustrated by the following quotes: 
 “To be honest I don‟t know anything about the People Forum.  I know that they are elected. 
But I‟d like them to come and have a word one day and let us know what they do”. 
“Is it them who are responsible for the cheap perfume in the atrium?” 
“Is it because of them the toilets are getting decorated?”  
“They might have done something revolutionary for us but we don‟t have a clue!” 
“If you dig around you can probably find out, but you would have to proactively go and find 
out…it‟s not openly volunteered”  
“You don‟t know how much of it is the company doing alright on their own or the WBPF 
saying I think we should change that and do it this way, it‟d be better for the people.  You don‟t 
know   
“I believe they do a lot of work but it‟s not rolled out to us”  
(Employee Focus Group) 
 
 
Issues and decision-making  
 
Again, as part of a young organisation, the East Midlands centre has experience a 
rapid rate of organisational change.   In order to enhance understanding of the actual 
process of partnership, the study explored in detail how different issues have been 
handled, and how various decisions have been made.  The section begins with a 
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discussion of traditional „trade union issues‟ such as pay and working conditions, 
and then proceeds to explore some context specific issues. 
1. Pay and working conditions 
The forum is not involved in the formal negotiation of pay.  However, there was 
evidence to suggest that representatives had been involved in pay and reward 
discussions, although their role is quite different to traditional collective bargaining 
conversations.  Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that their role is in the capacity 
of an adviser as opposed to a negotiator.   At the time of the research, there were 
four main examples of where the employee representatives had been involved in pay 
and conditions discussions with management, illustrating an advisory role. 
 
i) Group Pension Scheme 
The first issue concerned changes to the WebBank pension scheme.  Historically, 
employees had to actively „opt-in‟ to join the pension scheme.  Following a recent 
check by the HR department it was discovered that over 1000 employees had never 
joined.  The HR Director commented “it seemed ridiculous, people giving up 
money”. The forum representatives persuaded management to change the wording 
on the contracts so that new employees actively have to opt out, changing the 
default option to opt-in.  This was agreed by the management team, albeit 
reluctantly as the HR Director still believed it was more logical to opt-in than to opt-
out.  The representatives also pushed management to backdate the payments to the 
time employees started as opposed to the opt-in date, at a cost of £1 million.  The 
HR Director commented how, “I‟m not saying that we definitely wouldn‟t have 
done it if they hadn‟t been involved, but they were involved and we did get that”.  
As he explained: 
 “They were supportive of that change.  Which if they hadn‟t been it might have been harder to 
get through.  There is generally a perception that people should choose to do something rather 
than choose not to do something” (HR Director.) 
This change was endorsed by the team managers who suggested that the reason 
people were not joining the pension scheme was simply because of the long and 
complicated forms required to join, and the fact that new recruits received a mass of 
paperwork before they started it probably got overlooked. 
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ii) Bonus change 
The second issue concerned a change to the bonus payment system.  
Representatives noticed many part-time employees were refusing their bonus and 
discovered this was because many were working mothers and as such were in 
receipt of family tax credits (FTCs) which they would lose if they exceeded the 
earning threshold.  The representatives argued the case that this was not in the 
interests of the business (as many employees do not have an incentive to achieve 
targets), and that it is clearly also not in the best interests of the employee to refuse 
extra pay.  As one of the representatives remarked, “how rubbish is it to say no 
thanks I don‟t want a bonus”!   Accordingly, they proposed alternative means of 
bonus reward in the form of vouchers.  Following discussions between the forum 
and the HR Reward Team, the proposal was investigated in relation to feasibility 
issues such as tax and administrative implications of operating such a system.  
Following a pilot period, the business has now implemented a system of childcare 
vouchers as an alternative bonus option, without jeopardising their FTCs, and “it 
became a standard part of what we do”. There is also the option of having bonuses 
paid into their pension plan. 
 
iii) Holiday purchase scheme 
A further example of forum input, concerns a representatives proposal to introduce a 
holiday purchase scheme, which he had heard about working in other organisations.  
Issues of additional holidays was a recurring issue, and there was a degree of 
ambiguity as to whether or not employees could take unpaid leave or not.  The idea 
was therefore to formalise and regulate an agreed process.     The scheme involves 
the employer offering employees the possibility to trade their holiday for a 
proportion of their salary up to a certain amount each year.  He carried out a straw 
poll on whether a holiday purchase scheme would be desirable within WebBank.  In 
light of initial enthusiasm, he asked for a question to be included in the monthly 
employee survey to get a more representative employee reaction.  He argued that the 
proposal could be framed both in terms of business rationale (less sickness and 
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unauthorised absence which are important issues especially in the contact centre 
environment) as well as the employee benefit.  The Reward Team investigated the 
idea in detail, including the likely administrative/IT requirements of operating such 
a scheme.  then devised some viable options and it was subsequently piloted in one 
business area.    Following the success, the holiday purchase scheme has since been 
implemented to the whole of WebBank. 
 
 iv) Pay review 
Lastly, this concerns some of the representatives joining the Reward Committee to 
discuss the nature of the reward packages, in terms of basic salary, bonus payments 
and other fringe benefits. 
 “Whether that was influencing or not, I don‟t know, we would never be involved in that 
before.  To be invited to be part of that, and for them to take into account what we were saying” 
(Employee Chair). 
The representatives viewed being invited to join such discussions as evidence of 
their success in achieving „buy-in‟ from the management team, although again it 
must be stressed there are not attending in a traditional bargaining capacity. 
 
2. Discipline and grievance 
It was clear that a key focus of forum involvement was in  the conduct of discipline 
and grievance situations. The amount of discipline and grievance cases within 
WebBank was flagged by the HR Director as one of the key issues which concerned 
him, and the most explicit manifestations of ER problems.  He suggested that there 
must be: 
 “Some kind of breakdown in the underlying contract between the individual and the 
organisation…it would be possible to you get some people who are going to be naughty, and 
therefore you are going to have to do stuff, but it does seem like something more than that” 
(HR Director). 
He expressed some concern that the amount of cases was symptomatic of 
underlying problems but acknowledged that such issues are common in call centre 
environments.  Typical issues included timekeeping, sickness, mis-selling and 
performance issues, although these issues were also common in the other cases. 
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Management and representatives suggested that in most disciplinary hearings a 
representative from the forum would normally be involved.   
 
In such cases, the HR Director described the representatives as “useful independent 
people” who could re-assess a situation following a breakdown in trust between the 
line manager and an employee.  The representatives agreed that dealing with 
discipline and grievance situations was one of their bread-and-butter duties.  They 
would often attend disciplinary hearings, and offer advice to line managers and 
employees in advance of a hearing.  The representatives were also involved with the 
modification of the discipline and grievance procedure to comply with the 
Employment Act 2002 which came into force on October 1 2004, providing 
statutory procedures which must be followed by employers and employees.  To 
illustrate, one representative gave an example of a grievance he was currently 
dealing with: 
 “Today I have an individual, 26 weeks pregnant, requested to work out of Bravo site, she lives 
two minutes from Bravo site.  They are putting her through the ringer to agree this.  The doctor 
is saying driving here and back is too much.  And the manager involved is being an arse about 
it” (FT Employee Representative). 
 
There were further examples of the forum representatives acting as an intermediary 
in a case where an employee resigned, and said she would only return if they could 
guarantee she would not have to work with a certain line manager again.  Another 
case involved performance management and compliance with FSA regulations.    A 
compromise was reached where one normally high performing employee did not 
receive her annual pay rise because of „red‟ i.e. non-compliant calls. The employee 
received „2 red calls‟ which meant she was technically not eligible for a pay rise.  
Previously agents were allowed 4 but this had been reduced to 2.  The representative 
intervened, arguing that “when you‟ve got a person like that, working their socks off 
for a whole year, and being an excellent role model that they should suffer for two 
red calls”. and the outcome was that the employee was “given a month to put 
together their development pack”, and her pay would be re-reviewed by the call 
centre manager.  
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However, frequent representative involvement in discipline and grievance 
procedures has actually created a problem.  Team leaders/managers now mostly 
associated the People Forum with discipline and grievance procedures, and there 
was evidence to suggest that this had actually contributed to a certain degree of 
negativity by team leaders who developed a view that the Forum representatives 
were interfering outsiders.  As one young team manager, who admitted little 
knowledge of unions, commented 
 “To be honest I didn‟t really like the People Forum…[at disciplinary hearings] I felt they were 
judging me, seeing whether I‟m right or wrong, trying to catch me out.  I got really 
uncomfortable to the point I wouldn‟t look forward to having a conversation with an WBPF 
rep.  They made me nervous” (Team manager).  
He qualified this by explaining how over time he had managed to build a stronger 
relationship with one of the representatives, and was no longer intimidated, and 
even going to them for advice commenting how “they are there for me as well”.   
Their usefulness was echoed by another line manager: 
 “They are there where people feel they haven‟t been treated fairly, for example at a 
disciplinary.  Most people that go to a disciplinary are blind to the problem at hand.  Or if they 
are not blind to it they don‟t see why it‟s such a problem.  So for them it‟s not a fair process.  
Even if everything is as fair as it can be.  The way they work is really interesting in that they‟ve 
got both parties interests at hand.  If they can see that, they‟ll tell the person it‟s fair, and if 
something is said that isn‟t fair, you have somebody there to support you” (Team manager). 
He gave an example where a normally conscientious individual was almost 
dismissed because of a poor attendance record.   However, after Forum intervention 
the underlying cause was discovered:  the employee believed they had been the 
victim of bullying by a manager.  Following a detailed investigation, the situation 
was resolved, with the employee reporting to a new line manager, and the 
development of an „attendance plan‟.  The team manager believed that had there 
been no Forum intervention, the employee would probably not have “opened up”, 
and would have been dismissed, and the root of the problem never identified.   Yet 
the problem remained that for many middle managers the forum was perceived to be 
a nuisance, especially with managers who have limited involvement with the 
representatives, and typically little experience of unions either.  As a team manager 
commented, “If you‟ve got managers who are quite new to the job and unsure of 
what you are doing then yeah, they feel a threat to you, they are almost a party 
scrutinising your actions”. This tension was acknowledgement by the 
representatives: 
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 “Let‟s face it, anytime they ever see us, it‟s a disciplinary so they think God, it‟s them again.  
What we‟ve got to do it to actually educate them that were are working for all WB people, and 
not just associates.  We will represent associates, line managers, team leaders, and the 
management have even got their own reps as well.  It‟s working.  Slowly!” (PT Employee 
Representative). 
 
For one senior manager the key issue was achieving some sort of balance between 
giving employees a fair hearing, but also engaging „commonsense‟ when there was 
clear evidence to suggest the employee had genuinely been irresponsible.  He 
commended the People Forum arguing that the representatives are normally 
balanced in that they can send employees who have a weak case “away with a flea 
in their ear” rather than “creating headaches with grievances that just won‟t go 
anywhere”.  He described this balanced attitude as, “I understand what you are up 
against Mr Manager, but I think this guy could be treated better than he is, and that 
happens in the majority of cases”.  A part-time representative stressed that during 
disciplinary cases it is not „us and them‟, but rather ensuring there is a fair and 
consistent hearing, and not necessarily backing-up a recalcitrant employee with a 
non-existent case.  As he stated, “We just wanted to make sure due process has been 
followed.  You can‟t go from step 1 to step 5 in one move – you just can‟t do that”. 
 
3. Managing change 
The third main area of involvement was around issues of managing change.  Two 
are particularly noteworthy: the technology restructure, and the suspension of duvet 
days in the call centre. 
 
i) Technology restructure 
Firstly, a recent restructure in the technology department was highlighted as a good 
example of joint-working between the management team and the representatives.  
There was involvement of one of the representatives in the selection process, 
discussing issues regarding the proposals, the new job roles and the selection 
procedures.  It was suggested that before this would not have happened as 
representatives described a “1/2 hour before it kicks off approach”.   
Representatives recalled an incident in 2003, during the early stages of the forum,  
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where they were informed about a major restructure with redundancy implications 
only 24 hours before it was announced to the entire business.  They suggested that 
this meant the only input they could offer was “support people and nibble at the 
edges”.  However, there were now more examples of early involvement.   It was 
suggested that employee representatives had been involved at a much earlier stage, 
at least three months in advance.  The representatives suggested the initial selection 
procedure appeared to be slightly arbitrary – and suspected some favouritism - and 
consequently pushed for a more transparent procedure.  There was a feeling that 
managers were making people redundant – favouring certain friends and colleagues 
- as opposed to focusing on job roles.  It was believed that the final selection process 
was much fairer as a result of the dialogue. Moreover, there was a sense that 
sometimes managers can devise pure process models with a logical business case 
but “forget the human side”.  It was proposed that the HR department occasionally 
focus too much on making sure that restructures and resultant redundancies are 
legally compliant, but overlook the human factors, and this was suggested their 
additional perspective is a key area where the People Forum could add value. This 
was echoed by another representative who commented how, “legality is the start of 
how we should work, not the end of how we should work”. 
 
Speaking of the most recent restructure, a senior technology manager hailed the 
benefits of the forum involvement.  He described the representatives as a useful 
sounding board, providing valuable insight into potential employee reaction.  He 
believed they acted as a useful feedback mechanism to the management team, as 
well as someone employees can talk to allay their concerns.  As a he explained, 
“They help us in the design, help us by being available to accept feedback…and a 
general sense of how things are felt by those out on the floor”.  The WBPF 
representative helped by providing comments the management team had not 
considered, and also being available to talk to those affected.  Following the option-
based model discussed earlier, the aim was to question and to propose alternatives.  
He was not part of the actual delivery mechanism, however, to ensure he was not 
perceived to be „part of management‟.  It was suggested this provided, from a 
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management perspective, a useful checkpoint and review mechanism throughout the 
entire re-organisation project.  As one representative summed up: 
 “With that restructure we were involved from day one.  It‟s alright saying, oh, the people will 
be OK.  A nice process flow.  Clockwork.  We are doing this, this is why, and this is the 
business case.  But they forget the human side.  And sometimes HR forget that.  HR need to see 
things are legal and watertight.  But they can get wrapped up in that, forgetting the human side.  
And if we get involved we can suggest that.  And if things are really bad we can suggest 
scrapping things that are really bad.  You can‟t make people redundant on Christmas Eve.  You 
just can‟t do that” (Part-time Employee Representative) 
 
ii) Suspension of duvet days in the contact centre 
WebBank had trialled a scheme of „duvet days‟ in the contact centre, in response to 
suggestions by the Forum representatives who had heard about such systems 
working successfully in other organisations.  They believed this could be a good 
idea in the contact centre environment where sickness and absenteeism can be a 
problem.  Essentially, „duvet days‟ involve four days „no-questions-asked‟ leave 
which employees can take at short notice, and are specifically designed to reduce 
„sickies‟. In practice, employees would have the ability to request last minute leave 
prior to the start of their shift, by requesting a duvet day from a fixed number 
available on a first-come-first-served basis.  In other words, they enable employees 
to take leave at much shorter notice than they would normally be expected to give.  
In November 2004 it was decided that there was a lack of capacity to accommodate 
the 4 duvet days due to high sickness in November 2004, and the average service 
level had fallen below the 60% company target.  They were also failing to meet the 
target of answering customer calls within 20 seconds.  The representative was 
consulted before they change, but had a serious concern that if the message was 
poorly communicated it could easily have been misinterpreted, making the situation 
even worse.  She highlighted that a basic factual communication of “duvet days 
have been suspended” would have created a lot of anger in an already overstretched 
and demoralised work environment in the run up to Christmas.  As she explained: 
 “By consulting with us about it he was able to put out a better message, that sat better with 
people working under pressure constantly.  It really wasn‟t a good place to be in November!” 
(FT Employee Representative). 
In other words, the representative was in touch with the general climate in the 
contact centre and was able to ensure that the decision was handled and 
communicated in a sensitive manner “by putting some context around it”.  The 
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message was therefore delivered on the basis that the suspension was with 
reluctance and only temporary, rather than a punitive response to high absenteeism.  
In this way she was able to foresee and warn the management of potentially 
negative consequences. 
 
 
Outcomes 
 
The main benefits were identified as collaborative relationships between senior 
management and employee representatives, and the regulation of decision making. 
 
1. Collaborative senior management – employee representative relationships 
Positive working relationships between management and employee representatives 
were an important outcome of the partnership working approach.   This has been 
described as an informal „relational‟ approach, based upon an agreed way of 
working based upon the „Options-Based Consultation‟ approach.  In particular, the 
good relationships between the full-time employee representatives and the Chief 
Executive appear to be central to the success of building and operating the structure 
within a relatively short period of time.   
 
2. Regulation of decision-making 
There was evidence of some strong relationships especially between the full-time 
representatives and members of the senior management team, and that benefits were 
being derived as a result of these relationships.  Management interviewees were 
positive about what they gained from forum representatives in terms of their input 
into organisational issues.  They were seen as adding value, providing new 
perspectives, and acting as a useful checkpoint on management decision-making.  
Senior managers agreed that there is a need for such a system as it allows flaws to 
be identified, allowing pre-emptive corrective action to be taken at an early stage, 
ultimately resulting in better, and more efficient, management decision-making. 
Senior managers agreed that often representatives had good judgment and 
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knowledge, and were therefore useful in identifying potential employee relations 
„flashpoints‟.  As one senior manager summed up: 
 “Because they are in at the front, we don‟t go down the road of designing something wholly 
inappropriate.  Of course nothing is perfect, but we‟ve already had input from people who have 
a different perspective. So it stops us wasting money doing things that won‟t work anyway 
(Senior technology manager). 
 
Equally, representatives have experienced increased involvement over time from 
„sausages in the canteen‟ and „fleas in the carpet‟ to being invited to provide input 
on more strategic issues and being consulted earlier in the decision-making process.  
Their involvement now spans a wide array of both day-to-day as well as more 
strategic issues.  It is noteworthy that while representatives had a degree of 
influence over the regulation of decision-making, they were not involved in actually 
making decisions per se.  Nevertheless, it was suggested that there was a generally 
calmer climate of employment relations as a result of the mechanism.  Since the 
representatives were able to predict many problems before they occur, acting as a 
feedback loop for employee opinion, as well as a cathartic outlet for disgruntled 
employees.  As the forum Vice Chair explained, “I think compared to a union we 
are very slick.  We are a lot more powerful than some of the old adversarial 
unions”. 
 
Both management and representatives emphasised that one of the differences 
between partnership and non-partnership working, is that with the former both 
parties express a joint commitment to business success, and try to moderate 
decisions with that overall goal in mind.  It was proposed that while a classic 
traditional approach is normally characterised by the business trying to maximise 
profit while the representatives try to maximise pay and working conditions, 
partnership approach operates somewhere in the middle ground.  Theoretically then, 
it is based upon a combination of both unitarist and pluralist assumptions.  In 
practical terms, this meant the forum aim was „fairness‟ as the quotes below 
illustrate: 
 “I think for me the WBPF is all about being fair.  Fair to the business.  Fair to the individual.  
There has got to be some middle ground in there somewhere, and it‟s all about fairness” (FT 
Employee Representative). 
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 “All you can do is make sure it‟s a fair decision…That‟s what annoys me about the union.  
Saying they can do more than we can because they have more power.  If WB decide tomorrow 
to move to India, who‟s going to stop them?  No-one!  We always reckon that‟ we‟re there for 
people and they get a fair deal.  We would have as much power as the unions” (PT Employee 
Representative) 
As the Vice-Chair remarked, “The issues haven‟t changed, we still get them.  The 
way we deal with them has changed”.  This is a crucial distinction as the examples 
provided earlier illustrated how the process and manner in which issues were 
handled was important as well as the actual outcome.   
 
 
Challenges 
 
However, several challenges to the effectiveness of the process were evident.  These 
included difficulties embedding a partnership culture, representative efficacy and 
resistance to adversity. 
 
1. Embedding a partnership culture 
It was evident that the closest relationship was with the HR department and that 
forum involvement was not spread equally across business units.  Indeed, there were 
still many examples where representatives are not consulted.  Again, much 
depended on the individual departments and attitudes of managers involved.  There 
was inconsistency across the business, and it was suggested by the representatives 
that managers “are not sharing best practice” in terms of consultation with the 
forum.  As the HR Director acknowledged: 
 “I need to put a continued emphasis on my team to include the WBPF, as opposed to actively 
exclude them.  When you are trying to get something done, sometimes you don‟t remember to 
talk to everybody…it‟s a frustration for me when they are not involved because I think we get 
better results when they are.” (HR Director). 
 
A related challenge was getting the buy-in of employees and raising the profile of 
the representative body.  There was still a lack of awareness among employees 
about the Forum and their role, for example in relation to their successes and 
achievements.  Many employees had a greater awareness of direct EI practices, and 
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expressed a preference for raising issues directly with their line managers, unless of 
course it was a specific complaint about their line manager.  A dilemma was present 
in that many ideas are communicated as though they were the idea of management.  
The representatives believed this allowed them to distance themselves from 
management decision-making, but resulted in employees not really appreciating 
how the forum had contributed or improved outcomes for them.  Many employees 
remembered representatives from induction sessions, and there was a general 
knowledge that they existed, but a lack of clarity over their exact role. 
 
Additionally, the HR Director expressed some concern that the forum tended to be 
used primarily by those lower in the organisational hierarchy, and especially those 
working in the call centre environment.  The forum appeared to have less interaction 
with more senior employees. Officially there are elected representatives from the 
management population but they were not particularly active, and this was identified 
as a weakness.  Several reasons may be speculated for this situation.  It could be that 
the labour process in the call centre gives rise to more issues which are subsequently 
voiced.  It was clear that the working environment is more regulated there than in 
other parts of the business where employees have more autonomy.  Alternatively, 
managers may not consider the forum to be „for them‟, or they may feel sufficiently 
confident to raise issues personally without representative assistance.  The bias may 
also reflect the fact that those working in the call centre represent a large proportion 
of the employee population.   
 
Middle management attitudes towards the forum may also be partly responsible.  As 
discussed earlier, many line managers perceived the forum to be a hindrance rather 
than an ally.  They believed that sometimes the emphasis on procedures and 
following processes clashed with the business objectives of dynamism and 
flexibility.  A typical example could be a line managers desire to change an 
employees shift to accommodate changing business needs.  On the one hand the 
manager is pressurised to resource the team effectively, whereas on the other they 
have a process which they must engage in before changes can legitimately be made. 
 “From a management point of view we do have quite a lot of buy-in.  Especially at the top and 
bottom.  It‟s the middle layer we need to infiltrate more.  They are the really important people.  
Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 336 
 
A lot of them are the decision makers on the ground.  It‟s the middle piece.  But we are getting 
there I believe” (FT Employee Representative). 
Line manager resistance and perceptions of representatives as an interference is a 
common finding across the three cases, and is consistent with the EI literature 
(Marchington et.al, 1992).  It was suggested that there was a need to demonstrate to 
middle-managers how they can actually add value, and a feeling that too often they 
are associated as advocates of employees during disciplinaries.   
 
2. Representative efficacy 
A second important challenge concerns representative efficacy.  The representatives 
believed that there was a challenge convincing employees that they are not 
management lackeys, but that this is difficult as grassroots employees are not aware 
of what goes on behind the scenes. 
 “Although we are not lackeys to the management sometimes we can‟t change decisions.  All 
you can do is make sure that it‟s a fair decision..  No-one wants to be redundant but if you can 
show the reasons why, and the mitigating circumstances, what you have done to lighten the 
impact  Might not be happy but they‟ll know we did everything we could.  If we cant‟ change 
the decision we‟ll lessen the impact.  Do everything we can.  If you have to make 2 more calls 
per hour and you are not happy with it, we‟ll at least make sure you know why”. (PT Employee 
Representative). 
 “Need to dispel any myth that we work with WB and are therefore in service to WB.  And are 
we doing what WB want us to do.  Actually we have some pretty heated debates” (PT Rep). 
 
Representative efficacy is also important in the eyes of senior managers.  Senior 
managers suggested they need more grassroots feedback via the forum, especially if 
buy-in to the concept is going to spread across the entire business.  This was a 
challenge, however, because managers acknowledged that many members of the 
management team seek value in quantifiable terms, when in reality the value added 
was very often more subtle and intangible, but nevertheless important.  There is also 
the need for representatives to find the fine line between being perceived to be 
toothless, and being perceived to be „militant‟ or „anti-establishment‟. This was a 
concern expressed by some managers.  In relation to this belief two points are 
noteworthy.  Firstly, in unitarist terms, there is the danger that managers may deem 
any representative who is particular vocal to be „militant‟ or a „troublemaker‟.  
Secondly, in pluralist terms, this could be interpreted as a measure of success 
suggesting that representatives are able to raise concerns and disagree with 
  WebBank 
 
 
 
 337 
management.  Much appeared to hinge upon the personalities of representatives and 
their ability to build a constructive rapport, as well as the previous employment 
relations and work experiences of individual managers. 
 
3. Resistance to adversity 
The third theme concerns the robustness of the forum and the ability to deal with a 
„big issue‟.  For example, the forum has been championed since its inception by a 
few key players from the management community, including the Chief Executive.  
Similarly, the Employee Chair and Vice Chair have both been involved in the 
creation of the structure since 2000.  A concern, therefore, is the impact a major 
change on some of the key characters and „champions‟ may have on the 
effectiveness of the structure.  This leads to the question of the sustainability a 
partnership hinged upon a few key characters and seconded representatives.   
 
A related issue is the ability of the forum to deal with some major difficult issue.  
As a representative explained: 
 “It‟s all nice and lovely at the minute, but we are going to hit big things.  Big things will 
happen.  Can we challenge them successfully?  And have enough information to challenge?  
That‟s my concern really” (FT Employee Representative).   
There are several reasons why a major event could give cause for concern.  As 
highlighted earlier in this chapter, the representatives are not negotiators and the 
structure is very much upon terms defined by management, and reliant upon 
employer goodwill.  This leads to the question of whether the Forum would have 
enough information - and indeed the ability to understand information - for example 
why a department is closing down.  Again, this is related to the ability of 
representatives, and unlike the NatBank and BuSoc cases they do not have union 
officials or intelligence to draw upon.  They do not have as much external support as 
unionised bodies, notwithstanding their engagement with external bodies like the 
IPA.  Representatives are increasingly involved in dealing with complicated 
casework around discipline and grievance and absenteeism.  At Nat Bank and Bu 
Soc representatives have the ability to gain specialist advice from the central union.  
However, this is not to say the representatives at WebBank have been working in 
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isolation; indeed they have forged an impressive network of contacts from whom 
they seek advice.  For example, the representatives have arranged external training 
on issues including health and safety, discipline and grievance procedures, and 
performance management, and have worked closely with the Involvement and 
Participation Association. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has presented the findings of the third case study at WebBank. This 
presents a good test of partnership for several reasons.   Firstly, WebBank does not 
currently recognise a trade union, but has developed an in-house employee forum, 
obtaining external institutional support from organisations such as the Involvement 
and Participation Association and Acas.  This makes this one of the few explicit 
studies of partnership in non-union organisations.  In addition, the route to 
partnership is interesting.  The evidence suggests that as soon as the business 
expanded management decided to push for a representative body, and it is possible 
that this reflects the norms of the sector and the fact that most of the senior 
management joined the organisation from other organisations in the same sector.  
The structure was not a response to a particular crisis as is often the case.  Though a 
range of formal structures exist emphasis was place on informality and minimising 
burdensome procedures.  This may reflect in part the cultural context: WebBank 
was launched with the objective of being a new dynamic player in a traditional and 
conservative marketplace.  Employees are young, the offices are purpose built and 
unconventional, and many do not have previous financial service experience.   
 
At WebBank the partnership model was proposed by the representatives, following 
consultations with other companies and the advice of organisations such as IPA.  
The primary component of the partnership structure at WebBank is the People 
Forum which has evolved from a part-time forum investigating „sausages in the 
canteen‟ to a structure with 16 representatives, three of whom are on full-time 
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secondment to the post.  The evidence suggested that most managers, employee 
representatives and employees were happy with the principle of non-union 
representation, regarding trade unions as overly political, inflexible and hostile.  
Partnership did not mean joint-decision making, rather, the cornerstone was early 
consultation with representatives before decisions had been made, affording them 
the ability to question, challenge and propose alternatives.   
 
Relationships between senior management and the representatives were good, with 
relationships between representative and line managers/employees patchy.  Yet line 
manager resistance could be interpreted as evidence of impact,  and as such the 
same can be said of relationships in unionised environments.  Employee 
expectations may also change over time, and there is the possibility that the forum 
could whet their appetite for „stronger‟ – whether real or perceived – union 
representation.  Sometimes it was believed there was a convergence of interests; at 
others the aim was trying to achieve some kind of balance between bank interests 
and employee interests.  Areas where representatives had been involved spanned 
across areas of pay and conditions, discipline and grievance and the management of 
change.  Though they are not negotiators, they argued that through consultation they 
were able to persuade and influence, often securing fairer outcomes for employees 
by reminding management of „the human side‟ of business decisions. A key 
question is whether, in the current climate, a union could actually deliver more.    
 
Through the process, management benefited from input into decisions and 
information regarding employee opinion and morale.  Representatives and 
employees had the opportunity to have their voice heard by the top management of 
the organisation.  The business was able to avoid making counterproductive 
decisions, while   workers benefited from decisions which had been discussed in 
detail, and were sometimes „fairer‟ than they may otherwise have been.  Of course 
several challenges remain.  These include embedding a partnership culture across 
the entire organisation, communication, and raising employee awareness.  There are 
also questions of how the structure and relationships could withstand a period of 
adversity.  The representatives also have to contend with the issue of demonstrating 
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their efficacy to both management and employees, but without appearing „too 
aggressive‟ to alienate managers, while simultaneously not appearing „too soft‟ to 
alienate their constituents.  Perhaps, the most stark finding then is how remarkably 
similar these issues are to the experiences of the two unionised case studies.  In 
short, the evidence calls into question views of non-union structures as toothless 
cosmetic institutions with little impact on the quality of employment relations, and 
not only empirically confirms the theoretical possibility of partnership without 
unions, but shows partnership without unions demonstrating a moderate degree of 
success. 
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Chapter 8:  Discussion 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the results from the NatBank, 
BuSoc and WebBank case studies outlined in the preceding three chapters.    After 
providing a reminder of some of the main challenges in the literature, the chapter 
begins by outlining the different contextual factors in each organisation.  It  then 
reviews the meaning of partnership, both in terms of official policy statements as 
well as the understandings and interpretations of organisational actors.  The aim is 
to then explore the process of partnership.  This includes an examination of the 
relationships between organisational actors, and then the way decisions are made 
and issues are handled.  The chapter then explore the outcomes of partnership from 
the point of view of organisational actors.  Finally the chapter outlines some of the 
main challenges to partnership.  The general approach is outlined in Table 8.1 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Partnership: context, meaning, process and outcomes 
 
 
 
Context 
Outcomes 
Definition/meaning of 
partnership 
 
Internal employment 
relations context Bargaining 
relationships 
(voice) 
 
Decision-making Actor perspectives 
Process 
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Context of partnership 
 
Partnership has become a portmanteau term used to refer to a wide variety of 
employment relations arrangements.  The cases presented in the thesis are in many 
ways similar: they are all based on customer service departments in financial service 
organisations, and as such the type of work undertaken is comparable, as is the 
general employee profile.  However there are important differences between the 
organisations which should be flagged.  Taking account of contextual factors is 
important in order to test how partnership plays out in different contexts, and to 
avoid acontextual deterministic assumptions about the implications of partnership.  
These will now be discussed in turn. 
 
Routes to partnership 
Firstly, the case studies represent three very different espoused routes to 
partnership: as a solution to a prolonged period of poor industrial relations; a natural 
evolution of employment relations, and a preferred approach to the management of 
employment relations in a greenfield context.  
 
i) Bad industrial relations: partnership as a solution 
NatBank is in many ways typical of the current literature whereby a formal 
partnership deal has been struck in response to both a business and industrial 
relations crisis in the late 1990s.  This culminated with a period where the business 
was losing the confidence of the City, as well as industrial action with the union 
over proposals to introduce performance related pay.  Senior figures suggested 
management-union relationships in the 1990s were typically characterised by arms-
length contact, conflict and a frequent long nights with Acas arbitration.  There was 
a realisation by senior management and union officials that the existing situation 
was untenable, and the language of partnership as espoused by the New Labour 
government, TUC and IPA was viewed as a potential solution to the industrial 
relations „problem‟.    This is similar to many cases of partnership, for example 
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Hyder/Welsh Water, Borg Warner, Legal and General, Scottish Widows and Tesco 
(Coupar and Stevens, 1998; Kelly, 2004), especially in financial services (Kelly, 
2004).  It could be suggested that such a context limits the scope for mutual gains 
(Kelly, 2004), although equally it could be argued that such a context actually 
provides an important motivation to improve employment relations. 
 
ii) Good industrial relations: partnership cements existing relationships 
BuSoc has a Recognition and Procedural agreement with the company union it has 
recognised for 30 years.  Unlike NatBank there was no specific „turning-point‟, but 
the espoused de facto partnership relationship has been built over a long time, and 
was said to have hinged upon close working relationships between union officials 
and members of the senior management team.  There is no reason to rule out this 
situation as an example of partnership, after all partnership must be viewed as a 
process and not merely as an agreement (Richardson et.al, 2004).  BuSoc Union 
have a long history of co-operative employment relations, and have never taken the 
Society to Acas or engaged in industrial action.  This could partly be attributed to 
the union‟s history as a staff association, only becoming an independent union 
affiliated to the TUC in the late 1990s.  Most studies focus on formalised 
partnership arrangements, although some authors acknowledge the possibility of 
less formal „partnership relationships‟ (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004b).  It could be 
suggested that this would provide an auspicious environment for mutual gains.  
 
iii) Partnership as a natural evolution or response to an external threat 
WebBank is an example of a non-union partnership established in 2000.  It was 
suggested that management at WebBank did not believe union recognition was the 
most appropriate option for WebBank, which it believed to be inappropriate to the 
companies youthful entrepreneurial style, and instigated the development of an in 
house representative structure in 2000.  The structure is still in its infancy, and there 
is no long shared history as there is in the other two case organisations.  Biographies 
of the Executive Team reveal they all have experience of working in unionised 
financial service organisations prior to joining WebBank, suggesting that perhaps 
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despite official greenfield status, sectoral norms may have played a part in the 
creation of a representative body as soon as the company began to grow.  Cases of 
non-union/greenfield partnerships are limited in the existing literature, again, 
presumably because they are rare. As a greenfield site WebBank could also be 
viewed as a positive environment for the development of a fresh approach to the 
management of employment relations.  It can be speculated that partnership here 
was either a response to an external threat (external union recognition/European 
consultation legislation), the traditions of the parent organisation, or a natural 
evolution of a rapidly expanding young organisation.  From the perspective of 
institutional theory, there is also the possibility that the company imitated the 
collectivist norms of the industry generally, or was influenced by perceived industry 
best practice.  In reality, the rationale is likely to have been the result of a 
combination of factors. 
 
The background to partnership in the three organisations is therefore very different, 
and reflects the heterogeneity of partnership arrangements that exist.  During the 
1990s NatBank experienced an extended period of adversarial employment relations 
whereas historically BuSoc has had a much more co-operative relationship with the 
in-house staff union.  Interestingly, during the 1990s the union at NatBank had 
begun resorting to more adversarial tactics, while at the same time the BuSoc staff 
association was changing its name to a staff union to underline their independence, 
and emphasise their role as one of challenging the employer.    WebBank does not 
have a long history of employment relations to examine, and it could be speculated 
that this would be a benefit for the organisation as it does not have any embedded 
culture or employment relations baggage to contend with (Leopold and Hallier, 
2000).  Starting fresh appeared to be a deliberate strategy of the parent organisation 
who deliberately located the business in an area where employment in financial 
services is low, although it is equally possible that certain organisational and 
sectoral norms were inherited. 
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Corporate governance 
Another important point of comparison concerns corporate governance.  As a 
mutual organisation not responsible to shareholders, BuSoc has developed a 
reputation as a paternalistic employer and has won various awards in relation to 
employment policy.  It could be speculated that this context would provide a fertile 
environment for partnership, given that shareholder pressure is often seen to be one 
of the main barriers to high-trust relationships in a liberal market economy such as 
the UK.  It is therefore interesting that they maintain a strong institutional separation 
between bargaining and consultation and have avoided a more opened-ended 
partnership agreement, although it may be speculated that the prospect of pendulum 
arbitration explains why the employer is reluctant to include more negotiable items, 
any why the union decided against a partnership agreement.  On the other hand, 
NatBank and WebBank are PLCs, with pressure to deliver short-term results to 
investors.  When WebBank was listed on the stock exchange in 2000, managers 
suggested that there was a palpable change in management style, as they now had to 
been seen to be responsible and delivering to investors.  As such, it could be 
speculated that the PLCs represent a more challenging environment for the 
development of partnership relationships, and that mutual organisations operate in 
an environment more conducive to partnership.  Equally, it could be argued that 
PLCs may be more proactive and actually work harder at HRM, because they do not 
enjoy the economic cushioning that mutuality affords, especially if they believe 
organisational performance requires good employment relations.  
 
Trade unions and IR history 
Comparisons can also be made in terms of union recognition, and the particular case 
studies have afforded the opportunity to compare partnership in three different 
contexts.  NatBank recognises an external trade union with which it has long 
relationships, and which itself is the result of a series of staff association and union 
mergers.  BuSoc recognises an internal staff union with which it has had a 
relationship since 1965, and is also the result of mergers, as the representative 
bodies merged following business mergers.  WebBank has no formal union 
recognition, but instead has opted for an in-house representative body known as a 
Chapter 8 
 
 
 
 348 
„People Forum‟, established in 2000, two years after the company was founded.  On 
this count it may be proposed that non-union arrangements may be less deep-rooted 
and that partnership is more likely to flourish in unionised contexts.  Alternatively, 
partnership may be more likely to flourish in an environment without historical IR 
baggage.  The historical background is summarised in Table 8.1 below. 
 
Table 8.1 
Chronology of partnership practices at the case companies 
Company Development 
NatBank  2005 5 year partnership agreement signed with Amicus 
 2000 5 year partnership agreement signed with Amicus 
 1997 Industrial action 
 1999 BIFU merges with NatBank Staff Union and Nat West Staff Union to form UNIFI 
 1999 UNIFI inaugurated 
 1998 Union merger discussions 
 1996 BIFU leadership changes 
 1996 UNiFI affiliates to TUC 
 1995 NatBank Staff Union renamed UNiFI 
 1995 First ever national strike 
 1993 New General Secretary elected  to head NatBank Staff Union 
 1992 First national vote for action short of a strike 
 1990s Poor industrial relations 
 Banking Insurance and Finance Union and NatBank Staff Union recognised 
BuSoc  2005 Employee Involvement Committee established 
 1999 BuSoc Staff Union affiliates to TUC 
 Staff association becomes staff union 
 1991 first General Secretary appointed 
 1990 BuSoc staff association formed following merger of BuSoc and another building 
society 
 1965 BuSoc staff union recognised 
WebBank  2005 Commitment to remain non-union 
 2003 Commitment to remain non-union 
 2003 Revised People Forum with 3 full-time seconded representatives 
 2000 People Forum founded 
 1998 Company founded 
 
Partnerships structures and formality 
The fourth dimension concerns the differences between the formal partnership 
structures.   All organisations have a wide array of representative structures typical 
of organisations espousing a partnership approach (Tailby and Winchester, 2000; 
Ackers et.al, 2004).     
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Table 8.2 
Partnership structures 
Mechanism NatBank BuSoc WebBank 
Structure Partnership framework JCNC Employee Forum 
Union    
Collective bargaining Joint consultative 
committee 
Joint consultative and 
negotiating committee 
 
Joint consultation Partnership committee JCNC Forum 
 
The representative structures are, unsurprisingly, the cornerstone of partnership in 
the three organisations (Table 8.2), although all organisations also had EI practices.  
Of course the true test is how the structures actually operate in practice.  The 
representative partnership structures were most formalised at NatBank.  This could 
be attributed to their industrial relations experience, and the fact that the company is 
part of a large multinational organisation and has earlier experience with such 
structures, for example by having to establish European Works Councils for their 
non-UK operations. The organisation also has a long history working with a large 
national trade union as well as with an internal staff union. 
 
Formal structures were less important at BuSoc, where there was a much greater 
emphasis on close relationships between key actors and no formal partnership 
agreement.  Rather, BuSoc and the Union formally retain a traditional Recognition 
and Procedure (R and P) agreement.  Management and union officials suggested the 
recognition and procedure agreement is a poor reflection of the reality of the 
conduct of employment relations within BuSoc.  For example, the formal JCNC 
negotiating body ostensibly the main negotiating forum between the union and 
management.  However, management and union officials agreed that in reality the 
JCNC seldom meets; in fact most agreements are said to be reached through much 
more informal channels.  The company is much smaller, as is the union with only 15 
staff, many of whom are on secondment from – or ex-employees of – the society.  
For example, the General Secretary is a former branch manager, the President a 
seconded senior technology manager, and the Assistant General Secretary was 
formerly Employee Relations Manager.  The smaller size and shared history could 
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explain the higher level of informality, and reliance on networks of relationships 
rather than formal structures.  They admitted that their recognition and procedure 
agreement does not reflect the „new age‟ of industrial relations, and that the 
document is underlined by assumption of industrial relations conflict rather than 
positive working relationships.  However, union reluctance to engage with a 
partnership agreement appeared to stem from firstly the availability of a powerful 
pendulum arbitration tool under the current agreement, and secondly a fear of being 
perceived to be too close to management.  At WebBank there was also a much 
greater emphasis on informal relationships and again no formal partnership 
agreement, but significant emphasis on developing an impressive array of formal 
partnership structures.  A summary of the key contextual differences is provided in 
Table 8.3 below. 
Table 8.3 
Comparison of contextual factors 
 NatBank BuSoc WebBank 
Route to partnership Conflict Evolutionary Proactive 
Corporate governance PLC Mutual PLC 
Trade unions External union Staff union Non-union 
Structures and formality Formal Informal Informal 
 
Definitions of partnership 
 
Partnership has become such a catch-all term in management and union circles, 
leading to the problem of distinguishing between partnership and non-partnership 
organisations  Clearly there is a need to establish whether the organisations under 
scrutiny qualify as prima facie partnerships.  There is an issue in the literature as to 
how we can have many case studies of partnership, when researchers cannot agree 
on what exactly constitutes a partnership organisation.  For example, IRS (1999) 
identifies Abbey National as a partnership organisation whereas a review by Kelly 
(2004) identifies the organisation as a non-partnership organisation. The most 
influential definitions have been proposed by the Involvement and Participation 
Association and the Trade Union Congress.  
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Table 8.4 
Formal definitions of partnership 
Principle/organisation NatBank BuSoc WebBank 
Joint commitment to 
organisational success 
(IPA) 
Commitment to success 
of the enterprise(TUC) 
Securing and promoting 
the long terms success of 
NatBank 
BuSoc and the Union have a 
common objective in 
ensuring the efficiency and 
prosperity of BuSoc and its 
employees 
Joint commitment to 
WB’s success 
Mutual recognition of the 
legitimate role and 
interests of all parties 
(IPA) 
Recognising legitimate 
interests (TUC) 
 
Legitimate interests of 
other stakeholders, carry 
out duties in a way that 
demonstrates mutual trust 
BuSoc acknowledges the 
Union’s duty to promote and 
safeguard the interests of its 
members…acknowledges 
the benefits of BuSoc 
employees being members 
of the union 
Recognition for 
legitimate roles, 
interests and 
responsibilities 
Commitment and effort to 
develop and sustain trust 
(IPA) 
Carry out respective roles 
and duties in a way that 
demonstrates mutual trust 
 
Trust – building trust 
throughout WB 
 
Means for sharing 
information (IPA) 
Transparency (TUC) 
Openness with information 
about the business, 
communicating openly and 
honestly 
Regular meetings with the 
union, maintain effective 
communication and 
exchange information on 
business issues 
Transparency – 
sharing information 
and organisational 
policy consultation 
Consultation, joint 
problem-solving and 
employee involvement 
(IPA) 
 
Problem-solving Both parties agree that 
effective consultation and 
negotiation are 
instrumental…use 
appropriate channels of 
communication, consultation 
and negotiation to address 
issues 
Meaningful 
consultation at all 
levels within WB. 
Policies to balance 
flexibility with 
employment security 
(IPA) 
Commitment to 
employment security 
(TUC) 
Employability and avoiding 
compulsory redundancies 
develop flexibility to 
promote commercial 
success 
Security of Employment and 
Redundancy Agreement.  
Looks at business need to 
be flexible and ensure 
employees have maximum 
protection. 
Flexibility and 
understanding of 
why change is 
required, 
encouragement of 
internal movement 
Focus on the quality of 
working life (TUC) 
 
Promoting equality of 
treatment and opportunity 
for all, and valuing 
diversity 
Fair treatment at work, 
discipline and grievance, 
equality, training and 
development 
Right to be 
represented and to 
have equal 
opportunities within 
the business. 
Exceptional training 
and development.  
Win-win (TUC) 
 
Promoting the interests of 
employees, customers and 
shareholders 
BuSoc’s responsibility to 
manage the business in the 
interests of BuSoc, it’s 
employee and customers 
 
Sharing organisational 
success (IPA) 
Recognising and 
rewarding exceptional 
performance 
Prosperity for customers and 
employees 
Sharing 
organisational 
success (bonuses 
and PRP?) 
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Table 8.4 (above) reminds us of the official formal definitions, and compares these 
with official statements of company and union policy in the case organisations.  
 
The NatBank partnership agreement was explicitly based upon the TUC Partnership 
Principles and therefore clear similarities can be seen between the terms of their 
agreement and official definitions.  At BuSoc analysis is more difficult because 
there is no explicit partnership agreement.  Nevertheless, an official version of their 
espoused employment relations approach can be deduced from various other union 
and human resource documents.  This confirms that the fact that there is no 
partnership agreement notwithstanding, partnership-style terminology is indeed 
present in various management-union documents.  The Commitment Document at 
WebBank was based partly on principles devised by the IPA, and again reflects 
many of the core ideas of partnership. 
 
It is useful to consider some of these core ideas in detail.  As Table 8.4 reveals, in 
each case there is an explicit commitment to organisational success.  There is also a 
commitment to the legitimacy of interest representation.  At NatBank this is referred 
to as the “legitimate interests of other stakeholders”, while at BuSoc there is an 
acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the union, and encouragement of union 
membership.  A similar sentiment is expressed in WebBank documentation, 
suggesting the recognition of legitimate roles, interests and responsibilities although 
not of a union per se.  The importance of trust is a emphasised at NatBank and 
WebBank but is not an explicit component of BuSoc agreements.  Information 
sharing and transparency is at the core of all three agreements.  Similarly, issues of 
consultation and problem solving are also mentioned in all organisations.  
Employment security and flexibility are outlined in detailed documents at NatBank 
and BuSoc, but at WebBank the commitment is more ambiguous, focusing more 
upon encouraging an understanding of the rationale of why change, including 
redundancy, may be deemed necessary.  Issues around the quality of working life 
are present in all cases, and generally encompass topics such as training and 
development, equal opportunities and diversity.  The notion of win-win outcomes is 
espoused by NatBank and BuSoc suggesting that the ultimate aim is to balance 
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issues of customer, employee and shareholder interests.  This is not explicitly 
mentioned in WebBank documentation.  However, in accordance with the IPA 
definition the notion of sharing organisational success is evident.  All cases express 
a commitment to recognising, rewarding and sharing organisational success.  Again, 
it is worth clarifying at that this stage, that while the process of partnership may aim 
to achieve such outcomes, it is not assumed that such notions are intrinsically an 
outcome of partnership, but merely that the process concerns an aspiration to 
achieve such outcomes. 
 
In short, it is argued that in terms of official policy statements the commitments 
outlined by each organisation are remarkably similar.  However, official policy 
statements provide limited insight into the how partnership is understood, 
interpreted, and acted upon by organisational actors on a day-to-day-basis.  It is 
therefore essential to consider how partnership is interpreted on the ground. 
 
 
Actor understanding of partnership 
 
The aim of this section is to explore how partnership is interpreted by different 
organisational actors.  At NatBank partnership was defined as a modern approach to 
employment relations centred around a core commitment to business success.  In 
practice this meant there should be a high level of dialogue between the union and 
the bank, and that decisions are considered from both a business and employee 
perspective as part of an overarching problem-solving approach.  This was 
contrasted with a traditional arms length approach, described as low-trust 
„institutionalised conflict‟,  where the union would make a claim, and the bank 
would make a counterclaim.  Central to the concept was the idea of clarifying and 
justifying the rationale behind decisions, and that discussions should start at the 
design stage,  much earlier than they may have done under a traditional approach.  
However, partnership did not mean joint decision making.  The union was not 
expected to agree with or rubberstamp all decisions; in fact disagreement was said 
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to be a healthy part of a partnership process. Union opinion on the merits of such an 
approach was divided.  The National Secretary did not perceive this to be a 
particular problem, and suggested that the term partnership is a misnomer, creating 
misguided expectations of a 50/50 relationship which he believed is unrealistic in a 
capitalist society.  Nevertheless the view was that the benefits of partnership 
outweigh the risks and as such it is worth pursuing. This belief was echoed by the 
local union representatives. 
 
At BuSoc partnership was defined more broadly as a co-operative 
union/management relationship.  The need for such an approach was said to reflect 
both the fact that they did not believe BuSoc employees supported adversarialism, 
and secondly because they believed it was a more productive approach.  The 
approach was described as one of „give and take‟ and „manoeuvring‟.  It was 
suggested that one of the key differences between partnership and non-partnership 
was the early involvement of the union in consultation processes.  The role of the 
union was described as one of constructively challenging management to try and 
ensure the fair treatment of employees.  In terms of influence, there was a 
distinction between negotiation on some items, and consultation and discussion of 
others.  Again, partnership at BuSoc did not appear to mean joint decision making 
took place, but that the union had the opportunity to persuade, influence and 
challenge decision making.  As a result, the union role was often referred to as one 
of „checks and balances‟ and as a  regulator on decision making. 
 
At WebBank, partnership was again described as a collaborative rather than 
adversarial style of employment relations.  The style appeared to combine both 
unitarist and pluralist elements.  On the one hand, partnership concerned a unity of 
interests around the common goal of business success.  On the other, when interests 
differed it concerned trying to identify some middle ground between business 
interests and employee interests.  It was suggested that low trust conflictual 
relationships do not work anymore, and that more can be achieved through high 
trust relationships.  The ultimate aim was to try an ensure decisions are as fair as 
possible for employees, but also sensible for the business.  However, management 
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retained their „right to manage‟ under their model of „option based consultation‟.  
Management stressed the forum was not a negotiating body, although this was not 
perceived to be a particular problem by employee representatives.   Rather the 
structure emphasised early consultation, opportunity to feedback, and full 
communication in the process of implementing new business decisions.    
 
Having outlined issues of context and meaning it is useful to explore in detail what 
partnership actually meant in practice. There is a need to bear in mind that 
partnership is an elastic concept, and means very different things to different people 
(Guest and Peccei, 2001), and it is therefore essential to clarify the meaning of the 
practice of partnership in the three case organisations.   
 
Firstly, there is a need to understand what actors understand by partnership, and 
what there expectations are in relation to partnership.  The dimensions suggested by 
Marchington and Wilkinson (2005) in their studies of employee involvement are  
useful in this analysis (originally developed in Marchington et.al, 1992).  This 
framework outlined in Chapter 3, but it is useful to provide more detailed 
discussion, before applying the dimensions to the empirical data.  They propose 
degree, scope, form and level as means of evaluation of employee involvement 
initiatives and these still appear relevant today.  For the purposes of partnership 
evaluation, however, three additional dimensions are suggested to be crucial: 
formality, representative level and timeliness.  The main concerns of each are 
summarised in Table 8.5 below. 
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Table 8.5 
Meaning of partnership in practice 
Degree How much influence? 
Scope What is the range of issues? 
Form What kind of mechanisms? 
Formality Are issues raised formally or informally? 
Issue level Are issues low level or high level? 
Representative level How active are officials and lay representatives? 
Timeliness How early are issues discussed? 
Source: adapted and extended from Marchington et.al. 1992 
 
Degree  refers to amount of influence over decision-making.  This can be mapped 
on a continuum with total employee/union control at one end versus managerial 
prerogative at the other.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Escalator of participation (Marchington et.al, 1992) 
 
At none of the organisations was partnership about employee control, and in all 
three cases no one thought this was realistic.  At NatBank and BuSoc the 
predominant position is best described as consultation.  At NatBank it was made 
clear that partnership did not mean joint decision-making, but concerned early 
consultation and an opportunity for union representatives and officials to comment 
on proposals, and feed back member views.  This view was shared by management, 
officials, and representatives alike.  The WebBank case would generally be placed 
lower down the escalator as the partnership at WebBank predominantly focused 
upon communication and information, with some increasing evidence of 
consultation, but normally when this was likely to be of explicit benefit to the 
Information 
Communication 
Consultation 
Codetermination 
Control 
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business, for example, seeking ideas from the employee representatives.  In this case 
there was less evidence of representatives input resulting in decisions being 
changed, and it also appeared that representative input was constrained.  An 
interesting issue is whether this is symptomatic of the relative immaturity of the 
structure, and whether this will change over time as the representatives gain 
confidence, as at the time of the research most representatives were cautious.  In 
other words, it would be dangerous to make the assumption that the reason the 
WebBank forum is lower down the escalator in terms of influence is because it is 
non-union, or that these positions are static.  At WebBank it was made clear that the 
Employee Forum was not a negotiating body, reflecting the findings from 
representatives in all three cases stressed that they were not involved in actual 
decision making per se, and that in their understanding the partnership concept does 
not mean joint decision-making.  In other words, partnership is not necessarily 
about negotiating.  However, the HR Director believed the view of the 
representatives was that they had a good amount of involvement compared to 
representatives in other similar structures whom they had encountered.  As we saw 
in Chapter 7 there was evidence from representatives which supported the notion 
that they have a good amount of influence compared to their union and non-union 
counterparts, indeed representatives argued that often the relationships in unionised 
environments were sometimes worse.  The following quote was typical: 
 “Marks out of ten compared to an average union?  I think we are on par and might be doing 
better in some cases.  Certainly when we go to conferences and tell people, they almost fall off 
their chair with some of the stuff we tell them!  They can‟t get their head around it.  We do 
shock a few people!” (People Forum Representative). 
 
Representatives suggested that over time they were being invited to more meetings, 
and frequently asserted that they believed they had a good amount of influence and 
involvement.  Involvement in the Annual Pay Review was cited as an example of a 
recent „success‟.  As the Employee Chair explained, “We were in there and I think 
we played quite a big part in that.  Whether that was influencing or not, I don‟t 
know, we would never have been involved in that before.  To be invited to be part of 
that, and for them to take into account what we were saying” (Chair, Employee 
Forum).  He suggested that this was a good example of how their role was 
expanding over time.    
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Perhaps most noteworthy is how the partnership criteria differs from the 1990s EI 
criteria.  Whereas the Marchington et.al (1992) escalator of participation places 
adversarial collective bargaining above the consultative approach of partnership, 
partnership advocates would argue that consultation should no longer be seen as 
inferior to codetermination or control, and that such approaches are no longer 
effective, desirable or sustainable in the current climate (Ackers et.al, 2004; 
Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004a, 2004b; Terry, 2003).   Indeed the same authors 
argue in more recent work that adversarial collective bargaining is now unstable 
(Ackers et.al, 2004).  However, partnership concerns problem solving and pre-
emptive consultation as opposed to  traditional negotiation, and this means that 
management retain the right to make the final decision, an approach which British 
unions have often dismissed as „second best‟ (Terry, 2003).  Nevertheless, the 
evidence suggests that it is still possible to influence decision making where strong 
partnership consultation machinery exists. 
 
Scope refers to the range of issues under discussion.  In terms of scope of issues 
three main categories arose as integral parts of the partnership process:  pay and 
terms and conditions, discipline and grievance and organisational change.  At 
NatBank the scope of issues under discussion was wide.  Union representatives had 
been involved in a wide range of consultations regarding job displacements, 
performance management and restructuring, as well as lower level issues such as the 
development of the on-site shop or the proposed refurbishment of the lavatories.  
Evidence suggests that in terms of scope the union at BuSoc is very much focused 
on specific personnel issues. Indeed, this has been acknowledged to be the case, and 
the legal team have suggested that the current structures fail to meet the Information 
and Consultation Regulations 2004 which came into force in the UK on 6 April 
2005.   Accordingly, a new broader Employee Involvement Committee is being 
introduced, recognising the need for input and representation over lower issues of 
concern to grassroots members besides pay and conditions. At WebBank the scope 
of issues often concerned day-to-day issues with an immediate and direct impact on 
employees.  There was evidence to suggest that the scope was widening over time, 
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although the agenda still appeared to be driven primarily by management.  
Representatives had been involved in reward discussions regarding the structure of 
the pay package, but were not involved in negotiating pay through collective 
bargaining as in the other two cases.  Representatives were also active in 
representing employees at disciplinary hearings.   However, representatives 
suggested that a significant difference between them and union representatives was 
that they did not have access to external legal support.   Accordingly, they could not 
offer employees legal support in the event of a tribunal, as Amicus and BuSoc 
Union could.  WebBank representatives had been involved in some change 
initiatives as well but in an advisory capacity. To clarify, there were three main 
areas of involvement: pay and conditions; discipline and grievance and 
organisational change. 
 
At NatBank and BuSoc negotiation of pay and conditions was the main area of 
union involvement.  At WebBank, pay is not negotiated with employee 
representatives.  Representatives had, however, been involved in pay and reward 
discussions, but it appeared their role was advisory, for example making suggestions 
regarding the way the pay and benefits packages were structured, and proposing the 
introduction of alternative benefits such as duvet days and a holiday purchase 
scheme. While this demonstrates some useful informal input, representatives were 
not involved in the formal negotiation of pay.  However, there was no evidence to 
suggest that representatives wanted to negotiate terms and conditions. 
 
Discipline and grievance was another key area of involvement across the cases.  
Representatives at NatBank were frequently involved in discipline and grievance 
cases.  These were typically regarding absenteeism, timekeeping, performance 
issues or long-term sickness arrangements.  At BuSoc some representatives were 
also Disciplinary Officers although this is a separate/additional role to that of Union 
Representative.  In addition, there is a structure of Individual Case Officers who are 
employed on a full-time basis to deal with individual discipline and grievance cases. 
Again, discipline and grievance was a key area of union involvement. At WebBank, 
full-time employee representatives would also be involved in such cases.  It is worth 
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noting that the management of discipline and grievance issues was important at all 
organisations. Indeed, the HR Director at WebBank suggested that the high level of 
cases is the main manifestation of IR failure at the bank.  However, from a pluralist 
perspective which accepts that employee and employer interests are not always 
aligned, this could be viewed as evidence of this non-union body taking the shape of 
its unionised counterparts at NatBank and BuSoc.  A similar statement was made at 
BuSoc, that is – despite the rhetoric of paternalistic employment practices - the 
number of grievance cases is still very high especially in the branch network. On the 
other hand, at the NatBank site grievances were said to be rare, and the number of 
disciplinaries had fallen.   
 
In terms of discussion regarding organisational change there were also variations.  
At NatBank, involvement appeared to be extensive both nationally and locally.  At 
BuSoc, it was clear that the union was more involved with national rather than local 
issues.  This had created some confusion.  Employees in the call centre, for 
example, have a non-union focus group mechanism to raise local issues with 
management.  This was not seen to be part of the union remit.  Representatives 
suggested that this had created some member confusion as to why departmental 
issues such as targets and stress in the call centre were not deemed to be “union 
issues”.  Union literature reinforced the notion that the union focused on national 
issues such as bank holiday working in the branches or Christmas opening hours.  
Given that virtually all WebBank‟s employee population work at the Administration 
Centre the distinction between local and national issues is not so relevant.   
However, there was evidence to suggest that representatives had departments for 
which they had de facto responsibility for day-to-day issues.  The focus at WebBank 
was on day-to-day issues.  The scope of decision-making is summarised in the table 
below. 
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Table 8.6 
Summary: scope of decision-making 
Issue  
Representative 
involvement 
(WERS04) 
Cited as most 
important issue 
(WERS04) 
NatBank BuSoc WebBank 
1.Terms and conditions 
(pay, hours, holidays, 
pensions) 
76% 36%    
2.Selection, development 
and staffing 
(recruitment and selection, 
training, performance 
appraisals and working 
practices) 
71% 22%    
3.Welfare 
(equal opportunities, health 
and safety, absence, 
sickness) 
66% 12%    
4.Disputes 
(discipline and grievance) 
65% 14%    
Source: Adapted from Kersley et.al, 2006 
 Some discussion 
 Extensive discussion 
 
Form of decision-making refers to the traditional distinction between direct and 
indirect participation.  In partnership organisations it would be expected that there 
would be an integration of direct and indirect representation (Tailby and 
Winchester, 2005).  Although direct voice is the most popular form of voice in the 
UK (Kersley et.al, 2005, 2006), the focus of workplace partnership is typically on 
systems of indirect representation.  Representative participation appeared to be most 
embedded at the NatBank centre.  On a day-to-day basis employees at BuSoc and 
WebBank were most familiar with direct mechanisms such as conversations with 
line managers and the company intranet, and less informed about representative 
issues.  At BuSoc many employees suspected there could be negative repercussions 
of being seen to go to the union, while at WebBank most employees proposed that 
in most circumstances they believed they would happy to discuss issues with a 
supervisor or line manager.  Employees at both BuSoc and WebBank had 
significantly less knowledge of the representative structures and appeared to 
consider the structures to be a background mechanism of little interest unless they 
needed specific help, such as assistance or advice relating to a dispute.  This reflects 
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research by Bryson (2004), which found that employees perceive management to be 
more responsive in direct voice workplaces than in workplaces with representative 
voice practices, whether union or non-union.  Indeed, his findings support HRM 
theories which suggest that direct voice can be an effective means of 
communication between employers and employees.  On the other hand, employees 
at NatBank appeared to actively engage with the union representatives with little 
fear of retribution and awareness of - and confidence in - the union representatives 
appeared to be high. 
 
Formality refers to the balance between formal mechanisms in decision-making 
such as committees and meetings, against informal mechanisms such as ad hoc 
telephone calls, lunch meetings and spontaneous chats between the actors.  The 
degree of formality varied between the cases.  At BuSoc, a great deal of emphasis 
was on informal „corridor conversations‟ between senior figures rather than formal 
structures or devolved local involvement, meaning the process was much more 
opaque than in the other two cases.  At NatBank there was a much greater emphasis 
on formal structures especially in relation to high-level issues.  However, 
representatives did stress that there was a sufficient relationship to solve issues 
locally without escalating them to union officials.  This was a deliberate strategy of 
the union officials who argued that it was their aim to nurture a cadre of competent 
and knowledgeable local representatives.  National level negotiations would focus 
on issues such as contractual changes or pay, or negotiating issues where there had 
been a failure to agree at a local level.  Informality appeared to characterise 
interactions at WebBank also, with most actors again suggesting that often issues 
would be resolved through a telephone call or ad hoc meeting as opposed to 
arranging a formal meeting.  There was, however, a system of formal meetings as 
well but the emphasis was on informality.  
 
In terms of workers raising issues with representatives, this varied between the 
cases.  At NatBank, representatives were generally well-known, and suggested that 
most employees would contact them informally during the course of the working 
day.  The situation was similar at WebBank: it was suggested that employees would 
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typically contact a representative informally.  The full-time representatives appeared 
to be fairly well known figures within the administration centre.  The case was less 
clear at BuSoc where many employees lacked awareness of their on-site 
representative, while others appeared to fear being seen talking to the representative 
by their manager.  Accordingly, it appeared that many union members would seek 
advice more discreetly from the central union helpline when an issue arose.  Union 
officials confirmed that telephone calls from members were the norm.   
 
In terms of level of issues, at NatBank partnership covered a wide range of levels 
from task issues such as call centre targets and work organisation, to wider company 
issues.  At BuSoc the union appeared to focus on high-level issues such as personnel 
policy, and did not appear to be quite as active in terms of day-to-day issues with 
the exception of discipline and grievance situations.  This created some tensions 
with grassroots members.  For example some employees and representatives 
expressed confusion, suggesting that sometimes they had raised an issue such as 
targets or morale in the contact centre, and had been told that it was “a 
departmental issue and not really a union issue”.  This was echoed by the union 
officials who believed that often such issues should be resolved in a departmental 
setting, through the various non-union structures such as team meetings and 
employee focus group sessions.  However, the view of employees was that team 
members are often reluctant to engage fully in such direct sessions for fear of 
putting their „head above the parapet‟, hence the desire to raise such issues with 
their union representative confidentially.  There was also evidence to suggest that 
these direct mechanisms were not working effectively for various other reasons.  At 
WebBank the focus was on low to medium level issues, with a great emphasis on 
day-to-day issues. The level of issues ranged from business restructures to canteen 
food.  It was suggested by employee representatives that the level of issues had been 
increasing over time but that there was “still a long way to go”. 
 
Representative level refers to the balance of involvement between local and 
centralised/senior representatives/union official level.  At BuSoc it appeared that 
most of the decision-making occurred at a high level between senior HR figures and 
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heads of business areas, and the union General Secretary, rather than locally.    The 
workplace representatives clearly had a narrow role, and limited knowledge of 
wider business issues.  Typical duties included maintaining the union notice-board 
and attending quarterly area meetings.  They also appeared to be provided with very 
modest time for their duties.  Even the most enthusiastic representatives admitted 
that their union duties had become a fairly low priority due to a high workload and 
lack of time.  Representatives frequently remarked that they were paid to do a job 
by BuSoc, and that their job had always had to and should take priority over union 
responsibilities.  The current situation is under review to meet the demands of the 
recent Information and Consultation Regulations, but there was concern from the 
union that representatives may be unable to contribute much to high-level 
discussions, thus tarnishing the reputation of the union.    This seems to confirm that 
the union are aware of the low activity of their representatives.  At both NatBank 
and WebBank there was a greater emphasis on local discussions between employee 
representatives and members/employees.  As mentioned earlier, having active local 
representatives was an explicit aim of the union at NatBank, and at WebBank – as 
an in-house forum – there is no union hierarchy to contend with so by definition the 
activities occurred at a local level. 
 
Timeliness refers to the stage at which interaction would normally take place 
regarding decision-making. NatBank representatives suggested that under 
partnership they are informed at an early stage regarding most major projects and 
developments within the centre and the Bank, normally before any decisions have 
been made. There was evidence to suggest that at BuSoc plans were typically shared 
at a later stage, and certainly local representatives would be involved at the 
implementation stage.  It was difficult to ascertain exactly when the union would be 
informed as typically this would be shared only between union officials and senior 
management, and therefore it was not so transparent.  At WebBank the timing of 
involvement was said to be earlier that it previously had been, but overall patchy 
depending on the departments and key figures involved in the project and their 
receptiveness to and enthusiasm for forum involvement.  It was highlighted that 
they would normally know at an early stage about developments in HR policy 
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because of a close relationship forged with the HR team, but that otherwise timing 
was unpredictable.  Admittedly, such comparisons are hindered by the fact that 
expectations in each organisation are likely to be different, and consequently levels 
of satisfaction may also be expected to differ.  The findings regarding the decision-
making process are summarised in Table 8.7 below. 
 
Table 8.7 
The decision-making process 
 NatBank BuSoc WebBank ‘Ideal’ partnership 
Degree High Unclear Low High 
Scope Wide Limited Moderate Wide 
Form Rep + direct Rep + direct Rep + direct Rep + direct 
Formality High Low Low Moderate 
Issue level Broad High level only Low High 
Representative level Decentralised Highly centralised Decentralised Decentralised 
Time Early Unclear Moderate/Late Early 
 
 
Actor relationships 
 
At the centre of the most commentaries on partnership is the issue of relationships, 
and in particular the notion that partnership concerns an attempt to shift away from 
adversarial zero-sum relationships towards high trust win-win/mutual gains 
relationships.  The IPA definition explicitly mentions the importance of a 
commitment to build and sustain trust and the importance of trust is also a key 
component of most academic research (Coupar and Stevens, 1998; Dietz, 2004; 
Guest and Peccei, 2001; Haynes and Allen, 2001).   
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Figure 8.3 Network of actor relationships 
 
It is therefore important to explore the nature of relationships in detail.  Several 
important relationships were identified from the cases, and these are mapped out  
above. These include (i) the relationships between senior management and 
union/employee representatives; (ii) senior management and union officials (where 
applicable) (iii) line management and the union/employee representative, and (iv) 
employees and the union/employee representative.  These relationships are now 
discussed in detail. 
 
1. Senior management and the union/employee representative 
An important relationship identified was the relationship between the senior 
management of the organisation and the employee representatives.  In all three case 
studies these relationships appeared to be healthy, but hinged upon a clear 
understanding of the understanding and expectations of partnership, as well as clear 
and coherent expectations as to what partnership was expected to deliver by all 
sides.  Senior managers at both NatBank and WebBank both highlighted where, in 
their opinion, problems have arisen because of what they viewed as „anti-
establishment‟ and „disruptive‟ representatives.  These terms were used in relation 
Representatives Management 
Employees 
Line management 
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to employees who they perceived to be creating conflict as opposed to constructive 
criticism.  In particular, senior managers expressed frustration that some 
representatives invest a great deal of time and energy defending poor performing 
and recalcitrant employees.  On the other hand, representatives argued that all 
employees deserve a fair hearing, and that if dismissal is the final outcome they are 
happy with that so long as the person has had their right to be defended.  This 
reinforces the issue that process is important as well as the final outcome.  With 
regard to the example of discipline and grievance, representatives in all 
organisations agreed that if dismissal is the result – for example where call agents 
have been abusive to customers or changed details on their personal accounts - this 
is acceptable, so long as an agreed process has been followed.  This relates to Budd 
(2004, 8) who argues that voice is an intrinsic standard,  and that “participation is 
valued for its own sake in support of both democratic and human dignity ideals”, 
and must therefore be considered separately from efficiency and equity which can 
be instrumental standards,  in that they provide the means to greater ends. 
 
On the other hand, at WebBank a senior manager suggest that a minority of 
representatives invariably inflamed rather than helped resolve situations, and 
criticised them on the grounds that their opinions were not representative of the 
majority of employees, but sometimes linked to a personal agenda or the views of a 
few „militant‟ friends.  Much appeared to hinge upon the reason employees had for 
becoming representatives.  Managers believed that in some cases representatives 
enjoyed politics, thought that being a representative was „better than working‟, or 
had a personal grievance with the organisation.  Nevertheless, at NatBank and 
WebBank the relationships between senior management and employee 
representatives appeared to be good overall.  At BuSoc, however, there was limited 
interaction between senior management and union representatives at the workplace 
level. It was clear that in order to win management respect, representatives were 
expected to contribute to the decision-making process and to challenge through 
what managers often referred to as „reasoned argument‟.  In practice this made it 
very difficult for representatives to challenge on the basis of philosophical 
opposition or moral beliefs.  To successfully persuade management, representatives 
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typically had to rely on presenting the business case for equity as opposed to simply 
an ethical case.  This leads to the question of the ability of representatives to 
persuade and challenge on these grounds. 
 
There are three issues here: informational ability, technical ability and the 
ineffectiveness of moral arguments.  Firstly, it may be difficult for the 
representatives to challenge due to informational asymmetries.  This was a 
challenge at WebBank, where some representatives explained that without third-
party support they rely on management for the majority of their information limiting 
their ability to oppose a proposal such as a departmental closure.  Secondly, they 
may lack the skills to engage in rigorous debate, or may be intimidated by managers 
as a result of potential differences in education, status or fear of retribution.  This 
was a challenge at BuSoc where several union representatives expressed concerns 
about being seen to be a troublemaker, and the potentially negative repercussions of 
this.  It appears that representatives are now required to understand complex 
business information and to question and challenge the business rationale for 
decisions.  While representatives at NatBank appeared to be comfortable with this 
as a result of the support and guidance they received from Amicus, at WebBank and 
BuSoc there was evidence to suggest that representatives were finding it more 
difficult.  This could also create a problem whereby the union representatives appear 
to be so „bought-in‟ because of their superior knowledge and could leave members 
feeling disengaged and perceiving representatives to be management poodles. 
Thirdly, it has made it difficult for representatives to challenge on the grounds that 
quite simply they believed something to be unfair.  These kind of challenges would 
often be dismissed by management as „weak arguments‟.  Opposition is more likely 
to be listened to where they identified a technical/systemic flaw or impracticality.  
For example at NatBank an ongoing dispute concerned reducing the „wrap-time‟ 
between calls from 15 seconds to 10 seconds.  This had reached a stalemate as 
management declined to accept representative claims that this was simply „unfair‟ 
as „weak‟. 
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2. Senior management and the union officials 
The second key relationship identified was between senior management and union 
officials.  At NatBank the relationship was quite strong, although one full-time 
official was still opposed to the philosophy of partnership as a matter of principle, 
but accepted the need to work within the agreed framework set out by the union.  
The Employee Relations Manager also endorsed partnership as a matter of 
pragmatism as opposed to philosophical endorsement.  However, both accepted the 
situation and the evidence suggested officials had forged good relationships with 
management figures.   However, much of the day-to-day decision-making had been 
devolved to local representatives, with the central union acting as an external 
advisor to the representatives.   A union official explained that the main exception to 
this was any contractual changes, which must be agreed with the senior union 
officials.  In other words, local managers and representatives worked closely on 
issues such as the implementation of a new IT system, while typically the FTOs 
focused on national issues such as restructuring and terms and conditions.   
 
The relationship between senior management and union officials at BuSoc was 
strong and was central to the operation of the staff union, which relied heavily upon 
informal relationships, networks and corridor conversations.  Most decision-making 
appear to involve a small elite network of key management and union actors.  As a 
non-union structure this relationship is  not applicable in the case of WebBank.  In 
short, in the two unionised cases, despite tensions and occasional breakdowns and 
conflict, both senior management and union officials appeared to have forged 
positive relationships overall. 
 
3. Line management and the union/employee representative 
A third key relationship identified was between line management and the employee 
representatives.  At NatBank, the relationships at a local level appeared to be good.  
Representatives suggested that there was generally goodwill when ad hoc time off 
was requested for union duties.  Line managers were all familiar with the union 
representatives, although knowledge of the extent of their involvement with senior 
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management was limited.  There seemed to be an acceptance on both sides that 
representatives had a legitimate role to play.   
 
At BuSoc, there was very little interaction and in turn the line manager-
representative relationship was weak.  Representatives did not all find managers 
approachable and several representative interviewees appeared to lack confidence.  
This was a particular problem in the call centre where representatives believed they 
had to deal with negative management attitudes.    Representatives suggested that as 
a result they would normally circumvent obstinate managers.  However, they 
suggested that it would normally be more difficult to get time of for union duties, 
and that often they would not be able to attend Area Council meetings, despite the 
fact these are scheduled months in advance.  Moreover, management within the call 
centre were also unwilling to support the research, despite repeated requests by the 
Employee Relations Manager and the Director of Personnel, and this appeared to be 
symptomatic of their negative attitude to the union. 
 
At WebBank, there was evidence of interaction but it was patchy and not spread 
evenly across the entire organisation.  Representatives suggested that although some 
managers were very supportive of their role but that they “were not sharing best 
practice”.  At WebBank many line managers viewed the employee representatives 
as an interference who are there to „check-up on them‟ and to ensure that process 
had been followed where a dispute had occurred.  This was because employee 
representatives would normally act as intermediaries in disciplinary hearings, in 
addition to a member of the HR team.   However, this had created a challenge for 
the representatives, who were in turn finding it difficult to build a rapport with line 
managers.  On the other hand, there was evidence in the three case that where good 
relationships did exist, sometimes line managers would actually seek advice from 
the representatives on issues e.g. options for asking an employee to change shift, or 
discussing a disciplinary hearing. At NatBank and WebBank, representatives 
appeared to be very proud and flattered when line managers would actually seek 
their advice and input. 
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In all cases the line manager level was seen to be the point where the partnership 
was most fragile.  Representatives at WebBank proposed that they had very good 
relationships at a senior level including the Chief Executive, but that middle 
management still appeared unconvinced of their legitimacy and contribution.  This 
could mean that they are treated with hostility/suspicion or that they are bypassed or 
ignored.  The Employee Chair suggested he was much more comfortable attending 
Executive meetings than he was attending some departmental-level meetings.  This 
was not to say that good relationships did not exist, or that they had not improved, 
but for all the WebBank representatives achieving line management buy-in was 
perceived to be a significant barrier.  This was also identified within the NatBank 
partnership generally, however at the case study site it did not appear to be a major 
issue, as local relationships appeared to be amicable.  Representatives and managers 
believed that at other NatBank sites relationships were not so good.  NatBank union 
officials suggested that a key difficulty with partnership was winning the support of 
what they referred to as “the marzipan layer of management”. However at the 
administration centre under study, representatives actually recruited most local 
managers as members, on the grounds that it was in the spirit of partnership for 
them to be members of the union as well.   In all three cases the need to secure line 
manager support was stressed, given that this was seen to be where day-to-day 
decisions are made which do not always correspond with corporate policy or „best 
practice‟.  It was believed that local managers frequently face contradictory 
pressures and demands in terms of delivering hard outcomes and overlooking 
agreed policy and procedure in order to achieve their own performance targets, on 
which ultimately they themselves are judged. 
4. Employees and the union/employee representative 
The fourth key relationship identified was between employee representatives and 
employees.  At NatBank the relationship was good and virtually all employees 
interviewed knew who the representatives were, and those who did not were 
confident they could find out very easily should they need to.  At BuSoc the 
relationships were very limited.  Employees did not appear to know who their union 
representative was and had little knowledge of the union generally, beyond annual 
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pay negotiations and the union monthly prize draw results.  Indeed, some 
representatives admitted they were also unsure as to which constituency they 
represented.  They also did not know who were and were not members, and several 
admitted they did not like trying to recruit.  Union officials admitted that in many 
cases representatives were not particularly suited to the role.  At WebBank the 
representative-employee relationship was also limited.  Most employees were aware 
of the existence of People Forum representatives, but most were not exactly sure of 
their role or purpose.  Those who did have some awareness typically viewed them 
as welfare officers or counsellors.  A summary of the network of relationships in the 
three cases is presented in Table 8.5 below.  It can be seen that in terms of 
relationships, the strongest appeared to be at NatBank.  WebBank also had fairly 
positive results but was limited by the fact that the relationships were patchy.  It was 
at BuSoc where the relationships appeared to be most problematic, with interaction 
only really occurring at the senior management/union official level.  In all cases 
partnership was weakest at the line manager level. 
 
 
Table 8.8 
Network of relationships in the three cases 
Relationship/Org. NatBank BuSoc WebBank 
Senior management and 
union officials 
Positive Good N/A 
Senior management and 
representative 
Positive Limited interaction Positive 
Line management and 
representative 
Patchy Limited interaction Patchy 
Employee and 
representative 
Positive Limited interaction Patchy 
 
 
Partnership relationships: from distributive bargaining to integrative 
bargaining? 
 
A defining characteristic of partnership relationships is a shift from zero-sum 
adversarial approaches towards positive sum relationships.  A useful criterion is 
therefore the extent to which this has actually been achieved in reality.  
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Theoretically, this reflects the analytical framework developed by Walton and 
McKersie (1965), and there distinction between „distributive bargaining‟ and 
„integrative bargaining‟, as this broadly reflects the key differences between zero-
sum and positive/varying-sum relationships which are central to the partnership 
debate. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, distributive bargaining has the function of resolving pure 
conflicts of interests. It serves to allocate fixed sums of resources („„dividing the 
pie‟‟) and hence often has a „„win–lose‟‟ zero-sum quality.  Tactics centre on 
developing the negotiator‟s own relative power, convincing the other party of the 
first party‟s power and resolution, modifying the other party‟s expectations, closely 
guarding information, and preventing the other side from using the same tactics.  At 
the level of interpersonal communication, distributive bargaining typically involves 
strong assertions, selective responses, using the other‟s statements tactically, and 
limited disclosure of feelings and underlying interests.  Integrative bargaining, by 
contrast, has the function of finding common or complementary interests and 
solving problems confronting both partners. It serves to optimise the potential for 
joint gains („„expanding the pie‟‟) and hence often has a „„win–win‟‟ or varying sum 
quality. Tactics centre on the exchange of accurate information, the exploration of 
underlying interests, and the use of structured problem-solving techniques.  At the 
level of interpersonal communications, integrative bargaining typically involves 
paraphrasing, active listening, minimising defensiveness, brainstorming, and 
disclosure of feelings and underlying interests.   
 
It seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that well-developed partnership 
relationships would exhibit more features of an integrative bargaining approach than 
of distributive bargaining. When analysed in this light, the approaches at NatBank 
and WebBank do appear to reflect a greater tendency towards integrative 
bargaining, although the case of BuSoc is much less convincing.  Of course, an 
important caveat is that because the non-union People Forum was not a bargaining 
body, there was no bargaining per se, but nevertheless the approach still reflected 
many of the characteristics associated with this process. At NatBank, management 
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and union actors frequently stressed the importance of understanding each others 
point of view, and trying to balance decisions from both a business and employee 
point of view.  There was emphasis on early consultation, information sharing, and 
the creation of innovative solutions to problems often characterised by a degree of 
compromise.    This included the development of solutions which had not been 
considered by management at the initial design stage, but which emerged out of the 
consultation approach.  Examples of problem solving include the decision to 
separate sales and service roles, and the decision not to impose a new lower job 
grading on long serving staff.  Similarly, at WebBank there was a commitment to 
openness and an explicit rejection of a „poker playing approach‟.  Again, though the 
forum was not a bargaining structure as such, there was still emphasis on 
considering decisions from both a business and employee perspective, the creation 
of innovative solutions to solve problems, and there were several examples where 
management had accepted representatives proposals.  Good examples of an 
integrative problem solving approach between management and representatives 
include initiatives such as the introduction of duvet days or the holiday purchase 
scheme, and in both cases these were introduced from a business case perspective. 
 
The bargaining relationships at BuSoc are much more difficult to judge for several 
reasons, not least because much was conducted in private between a few key 
individuals.  In addition it was difficult to distinguish between decisions which were 
the result of union influence, and decisions which were perhaps attributable to the 
organisations historically paternalistic stance.  For example, the business 
commitment not to offshore functions overseas did not appear to be the result of 
union pressure.  While there was evidence of joint working on issues of concern 
such as work-life balance issues and reviewing the performance management 
system, there was again limited evidence to demonstrate how the union had actually 
changed or modified decisions in a way the business would not have, had the union 
not been involved.  Indeed, it was admitted that there have not been many 
controversial issues in recent years besides the issues of pensions, and this issue was 
a textbook example of distributive as opposed to integrative bargaining.   This 
appears to reflect the union‟s core focus on terms and conditions issues which 
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concern „dividing the pie‟ rather than issues of „expanding the pie‟.  Indeed, much 
of the union agenda centred around bread and butter issues of terms and conditions, 
in contrast to the much wider scope of involvement identified in the other cases.  
With regard to pensions, the union concluded there was „little they could do‟ 
because the business was not doing anything illegal.  This contrasts with the 
approaches at NatBank and WebBank where legality was said to be the starting 
point of negotiations and not the end point. Certainly, the way this issue was 
handled does not accord with the characteristics of integrative bargaining.  Rather 
the decision was said to have been imposed without consultation, and the union 
responded by “painting management as being villains”.    Given that there have not 
been many big issues in the last five years, and that the main example of pensions 
appears to confirm a distributive approach, this does not bode well for partnership at 
BuSoc.  In addition, there was a perception among employees that engaging with 
the union could be viewed as troublemaking or disloyal, whereas at NatBank and 
WebBank the representative bodies appeared to enjoy greater legitimacy. 
 
It would seem fair to conclude that, on balance, at NatBank and WebBank an 
integrative problem solving approach appears to be the dominant modus operandi.  
This would appear to be compatible with the notion of a partnership approach.  
However, when examined under this framework, BuSoc is the least convincing 
example of a shift towards integrative style, and therefore incompatible with a 
partnership approach.   NatBank represents a case where a dominant distributive 
strategy of the 1990s appears to have been superseded by an agenda of integrative 
bargaining over a wider range of issues.  Similarly, at WebBank integrative problem 
solving style appears to be the very premise upon which the representative body has 
been based since start up, as illustrated by their espoused options-based consultation 
model.  Naturally, integrative bargaining and distributive bargaining are not 
mutually exclusive strategies, and it is possible and indeed likely that periods of 
integrative bargaining may be punctuated with periods of distributive bargaining.  
However, this is not necessarily a negative but rather a reflection of a healthy mixed 
motive partnership relationship.  As Haynes and Allen argue:  
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 “Partnership unionism represents not so much a bipolar movement from 
adversarialism to cooperation, but a movement from cooperation within a 
adversarial context to constrained conflict within a cooperative framework” 
(Haynes and Allen, 2001, 181). 
 
In other words, a healthy partnership would be expected to be characterised more by 
an integrative style than by a distributive style, whereas the reverse would be true 
under arms length adversarialism.  There is sufficient evidence to suggest that both 
NatBank and WebBank were operating within a predominantly cooperative 
framework, and this is particularly encouraging given that both organisations have 
been through significant organisational change in the last five years.  It is therefore 
the case of BuSoc that gives most cause for concern.  The evidence suggests that in 
the last five years there has only been one major issue and this decision was simply 
imposed in a decidedly non-partnership way, reminiscent of distributive rather than 
integrative bargaining. 
 
Lastly, in terms of the attitudes of actors towards each other, Walton and McKersie 
argue that a degree of trust, friendliness and respect for the others legitimacy are 
prerequisites for an integrative approach as it depends upon transparency and a 
spirit of working together.  At NatBank and WebBank senior level relationships 
were on balance very positive with evidence of information sharing, trust, and 
respect of the other parties legitimacy.  This was reflected in some of the positive 
decision making outcomes at NatBank and WebBank, whereas at BuSoc there were 
less examples and the evidence regarding relationships was less clear.  Of course, as 
Walton and McKersie (1965) note, the existence of integrative bargaining need not 
deliver integrative/mutual gains outcomes.  It is possible that an integrative 
approach could lead to falling expectations or weaker bargaining power, mirroring 
the concerns of the partnership critics.  Equally, there is no automatic reason why 
this should occur, and for this reason the following  section reflects upon the 
empirical evidence from the three banks, in terms of the extent to which they may 
be seen to balance efficiency, equity and voice. 
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Partnership and decision-making: balancing efficiency, equity and 
voice? 
 
A second criteria for the evaluation of partnership working concerns the provision 
of voice and the extent to which it achieves a regulatory impact in terms of the 
efficiency and equity criterion suggested by Budd (2004).  In other words, to what 
extent does the integrative style associated with partnership actually deliver results 
for stakeholders?  To test this, we can ask does partnership change the way 
decisions are made, and if so to what extent and what are the implications for 
efficiency, equity and voice?  The three cases will now be reviewed in turn. 
 
1. NatBank 
As a large city institution, NatBank management made clear that efficiency was the 
primary objective and that ultimately the business is owned by shareholders who 
expect a return on their investment.  However, there was evidence to suggest that 
the business efficiency objective is being regulated  to some extent by the 
partnership mechanism.  For example, outsourcing to India for cost-saving reasons 
primarily through the use of cheaper labour (efficiency) was more equitable than it 
could have been without an agreed consultative framework.  The Bank has signed a 
„Globalisation Agreement‟ outlining commitments regarding a fair and transparent 
process for the management of redundancy.   
 
NatBank also wanted all telephone staff to be encouraged to sell on calls, taking the 
efficiency view that call centres should be a profit centre rather than merely a cost 
centre but for many long-serving staff with little experience of telephony work, this 
was stressful and resulted in high turnover.  Following discussions with the union, 
the Bank reluctantly decided to re-introduce a customer service-only role, even 
though this countered their initial aim to maximise efficiency by having all call 
agents trying to sell on every call. The Employee Relations Manager suggested that 
the sales strategy represented a pure technical model which neglected the reality and 
dynamics of call centre working, and the fact that some people did not like and 
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simply were not good at selling.  This also illustrates how a decision which was 
perceived to be inequitable, had a negative impact on efficiency as turnover 
increased, suggesting a business case for equity also exists.   Accordingly, there are 
several call centres in the area and NatBank employees left to seek customer 
service-only roles at these organisations.  Hailed as an example of successful 
decision-making through partnership, the Customer Service Director still believed 
that all agents should be selling, based on a unitarist view that by not selling they 
are not promoting the company and in turn potentially damaging their job security.  
This relates to the worker/customer satisfaction mirror proposed in the new service 
management literature (Korczynski, 2002).   
 
The framework can also be used to examine a business idea to try and harmonise 
contracts from traditional 9-5 to staggered 8am-midnight pattern.  This made 
administrative sense because customers now expected to be able to call the bank at 
any time of the day, yet the core of long-serving staff only worked normal office 
hours.   The union successfully persuaded the Bank to leave long-serving staff on 
the old working hours should they so wish, by highlighting the potential damage to 
morale of long-serving staff if such a change was simply imposed (equity).  The 
Bank acknowledged that the negative impact of employee perceptions of inequity 
may counter the proposed administrative efficiencies of contract harmonisation.  
This required the Bank to re-think and return to the main issue, that is, how they 
could staff telephones in the evening to match customer demand, and decided that 
the only way to do this was by recruiting a pool of new staff on new terms and 
conditions which match business demand.  This was not the ideal situation for the 
business, which would prefer all employees to work on such a pattern, and neither 
was it the ideal situation for the union.  The union took a pragmatic view, that is that 
they are there to protect fee-paying members first and foremost, and if that meant 
protecting them at the expense of new recruits then so be it.  The Employee 
Relations Manager suggested that following discussions the final decision made 
much more sense, and that there was no need to upset the existing experienced 
workforce, and that the shortfall could be bridged by recruiting new employees to 
cover the evening shifts.   
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Another illustration of countervailing pressures is in the area of discipline and 
grievance.  Representatives suggested that pre-partnership there had been a macho 
hire-and-fire culture and a high level of formal disciplinary cases.  They proposed 
that there was often evidence suggesting that a fair disciplinary process had not been 
followed, and the cases against employees would be dropped because line managers 
had not followed due process.  Representatives suggested that this is less common 
now as under partnership the agreed process to be followed is now much clearer.  
Again, the Employee Relations Manager suggested that having a transparent process 
had helped to reduce the arbitrary treatment of employees, and increasingly the 
resolution of disputes without recourse to formal procedures. 
 
Within NatBank, voice was a prominent issue.  The local union representatives were 
active, employees generally knew who their union representatives were and support 
for the union was strong.  Representatives had taken up their posts because they 
were keen to get involved in light of the high level of organisational change the 
organisation was encountering.  There is evidence, therefore, that at NatBank the 
partnership mechanism was moderating decision-making and mitigating the worst 
effects of organisational change on employees.  In terms of the Budd framework 
there was evidence to suggest that the union was able to promote equity as a 
countervailing pressure against pure business decisions based on an „efficiency‟ 
logic, and to advance voice.  There was also evidence to suggest a business case for 
equity given that decisions which were perceived to be inequitable were actually 
inefficient due to the negative impact on morale, and the increase in attrition as 
dissatisfied staff chose to leave the organisation.  However, more equitable 
decisions appeared to represent an acknowledgement that a pure efficiency decision 
would not be in the business interest, as opposed to some moral imperative.  The 
countervailing pressures are outlined in the figure below. 
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Figure 8.4 NatBank : balancing voice, efficiency and voice? 
 
2. BuSoc 
The triad can also be used to evaluate partnership within BuSoc.  As a mutual 
building society owned by members BuSoc does not have the same commercial 
pressures to satisfy the stock exchange.  This could be viewed as a fertile 
environment for partnership or conversely as a barrier, as it may mean there is less 
pressure to proactively engage with partnership.  BuSoc have used their historical 
image as a less ruthless and ethically guided institution to its advantage both in 
terms of consumer marketing and their espoused approach to employment relations.  
Accordingly, compulsory redundancies at BuSoc are almost unknown, the Society 
has committed not to offshore BuSoc abroad, and have invested in various 
pioneering schemes concerning work-life balance, domestic violence, home 
working and equal opportunities.  The HR Director suggested that they are proud of 
being voted best UK employer by a Sunday newspaper in 2005, and that normally 
their employment policies exceed the statutory minimum arrangements.  Union 
officials agreed that BuSoc employment policy typically exceeds statutory 
regulations, and in union recruitment literature cite this as evidence of their success. 
  
Yet management suggested that the organisation was risk-averse, and would 
normally settle tribunals out of court even if they had a strong case, to avoid any 
potential damage to the ethical brand image.  Again, this does not suggest that 
management decisions are necessarily the result of union pressure, and leads to the 
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potential criticism in some cases that a focus on equity case may actually be 
inefficient.  This is not to suggest that there has not been conflict between the union 
and management in recent years.  Indeed, major disputes have occurred in relation 
to the end of the final salary pension scheme for new employees despite strong 
union opposition.  In this case, the efficiency force was clearly greater than the 
equity concerns.  Union officials opined that despite their vehement opposition there 
was little they could do as the decision was not unlawful, and was simply presented 
to them as a fait accompli.  This occurred under the leadership of the previous Chief 
Executive who the Union General Secretary suggested was strongly efficiency 
focused.  He believed the current Chief Executive had a stronger interest in 
employment relations as well as financial performance.  The Union President held a 
similar point of view, suggesting that the current Chief Executive appeared to be 
more interested in people issues as well profits.  Nevertheless, this incident cannot 
be evaluated in terms of outcome alone, especially since similar decisions have been 
taken by many other organisations in recent years.  However, in terms of voice, the 
decision was taken with minimal union involvement or consultation, suggesting that 
with this critical incident the process followed was poor .  In this case, therefore, the 
attitudes of the personalities involved appeared to be central to the process, although 
the suggestion that major decisions can depend on the whim of the Chief Executive, 
and the relationship he has with union officials appears incompatible with the notion 
of partnership. 
 
Some examples were cited where the union and management had  worked together 
but this was mostly on a minority of relatively uncontroversial issues.  For example 
they jointly devised a new performance management framework which they thought 
was fairer for employees (equity) but clearly driven by a desire to improve 
employee performance, and in turn business performance (efficiency).  Moreover, in 
2005 the union negotiated a record pay deal of which they were very proud, another 
example of where notions of equity have been a strong countervailing pressure on 
efficiency maximisation.  Union officials agreed that on balance BuSoc is a „good 
employer‟, at least compared to competitors in the same sector, and this makes it 
difficult to assess the extent to which the union is actually making a difference.  On 
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the other hand, managers suggested that a staff union was an effective medium 
suggesting that since most officials are former employees they can take a more 
balanced view of situations.  In general terms, the equity pressure as a whole was 
more prominent at BuSoc than it was in the other case organisations, and this may 
have meant there was less need for the union to adopt a proactive stance as was the 
case at NatBank.  Moreover, within this context the grassroots employee interest in 
voice was lower.  Employees were apathetic and this apathy appeared to stem from 
satisfaction as opposed to disillusionment.  As highlighted in Chapter 6, staff 
attitude surveys are normally very positive, and focus group discussions confirmed 
this, with most employees viewing BuSoc as a good employer overall.  Where 
dissatisfaction did occur, this was attributed to problems of  implementation of local 
decision-making, rather than dissatisfaction with corporate policy itself.  This 
supports arguments that workers with greater workplace needs may be more 
desirous of unions, and where workers have less needs they are less concerned with 
the union (Bryson and Freeman, 2006).  
 
Union representatives were often inactive, and had often been nominated under 
duress.  Most of the negotiation and consultation occurred at a very senior level 
between Executives and senior union officials.  Perhaps this is partly the case 
because senior union officials are the few people not employed by the Society, and 
therefore have less fear of retribution.  It is possibly  more difficult for seconded 
officials who are due to return to work after their time on union position to voice 
their true concerns, although if this was the case it would also be true in the case of 
WebBank.  BuSoc representatives had taken their roles often by default, and IR 
issues were not really of a day-to-day concern.  Employees suggested that they 
would probably take more interest in employment relations matters had there been 
more controversial incidents as in other organisations.  The union also speculated 
that while the Executive Board are committed to mutuality for the foreseeable 
future, they wondered what impact de-mutualisation would have, and how the 
employment relations climate may change.  It was proposed that the need to deliver 
results to the stock exchange could have a negative impact on the employment 
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relations culture.  While the employer was keen to promote an „ethical‟ image, the 
union was keen to avoid any perception that they were „bought-in‟ or co-opted.   
 
In sum, while the equity pressure appeared to be much stronger than at NatBank, 
there was little evidence to suggest that this was because of a partnership 
relationship between the union and management, and highlights the significant 
possibility that BuSoc may still be a good employer irrespective of the union.    For 
example, there was still evidence to suggest that when external forces did result in 
an efficiency crisis, such as the problems funding the final salary pension scheme, 
the efficiency force would prevail over equity with minimum voice afforded to 
employees or the union.  Contrary to what may have been expected, there was little 
evidence of partnership contributing to the balance of efficiency, equity and voice at 
BuSoc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.5 BuSoc: Balancing efficiency, equity and voice 
3. WebBank 
WebBank was set up in the 1990s with the aim of being different and „radical‟ in 
the conservative UK banking market, offering competitive products aimed at young, 
educated and affluent consumers.  However, management suggested that since the 
company was listed on the stock exchange the pressure to satisfy shareholders that 
WebBank is a satisfactory investment has had a significant impact on day-to-day 
operations (efficiency).  Despite a high degree of UK success, WebBank was a loss-
making business due to a combination of high start up costs but in particular the 
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failure of their overseas expansion project.  The company was supported by the 
parent company, an international financial organisation, breaking into profit for the 
first time in 2005.  In terms of voice, WebBank decided to set up an internal 
Employee Forum in preference to recognising an external trade union.  It was 
suggested that management perceived unions to be too adversarial and at odds with 
the culture of a new organisation.  Only 5 years old, the Forum is still evolving but 
appears to be run very much on terms set by management, and the representatives 
and management were both clear of the fact that it is not a negotiating body.   Most 
of the representatives did not seem to have a problem with this role.  One did, 
however, express some doubts regarding the ability of the Forum to challenge in the 
face of severe adversity: 
 “My vision of WBPF is that we need to be more challenging.  It‟s all nice and lovely at the 
moment, but we are going to hit big things.  Big things will happen.  Can we challenge them 
successfully?  Do we have information to challenge…That‟s my concern really.  You are doing 
this „business case‟ and you are telling me you need to close this department down, can I see 
those figures?  And do those figures mean anything to me?” 
 
The existence or role of the Forum was not a priority for most employees.  Many 
had limited knowledge or interest in the Forum.  At most, it was considered to be a 
counselling service, offering advice in the event of discipline and grievance cases.  
However, as was the case with NatBank, there was some evidence of the Forum 
acting as some kind of efficiency-equity arbiter.  For example, the Forum 
challenged the arbitrary selection procedures being used to decide new posts 
following an IT restructure which they believed were initially based on personalities 
and friendships rather than competence.  The Forum is also active in ensuring that 
disciplinary and grievance procedures are followed in a fair way and that due 
process is followed (equity).  Overall though, on the efficiency-equity continuum 
WebBank would be much closer to efficiency than to equity since it was very much 
involvement on terms defined and controlled by management. Even where decisions 
were ostensibly made in relation to equity, this was often underpinned by sound 
business rationale.  For example, for a period the organisation was put up for sale by 
the parent organisation.   Many employees had obvious concerns regarding their job 
security with the organisation should a takeover or merger occur.  WebBank offered 
employee £1000 loyalty bonus in return for a commitment to stay with the 
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organisation.  For some employees this was perceived to be recognition from a 
caring employer, but appears to be driven for business (efficiency) reasons, given 
that the organisation faced a potential exodus of experienced staff in light of the 
uncertainty.  In other words efficiency and equity may be complementary. 
 
There was still the general appearance that representatives did not want to be seen to 
„rock the boat‟ too much, and this was the impression given by the Employee Chair 
who advocated a softly-softly approach.  Indeed, there was a sense of vulnerability 
given that the structure has no statutory protection and could be wound up at any 
time.  As one senior manager reflected, “at some point, if they went off in a 
direction we were totally unhappy with, we would have to deal with it”. 
Nevertheless, there was moderate evidence of the forum addressing the 
countervailing forces of efficiency, equity and voice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6 WebBank: Balancing efficiency, equity and voice? 
 
To summarise, employee voice was most embedded at NatBank, and there was clear 
evidence demonstrating partnership acting as a countervailing pressure on 
efficiency-driven decisions, especially where a business case for equity could be 
argued by the union.  At BuSoc, the equity dimension appeared to have greater 
prominence with the management team than in the other organisations. BuSoc were 
keen to demonstrate – at least in public relations terms - that they were not a 
ruthless City organisation, but this did not appear to be a direct result of trade union 
pressure.  While care has to be taken when interpreting such management 
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assertions, triangulation with responses from union representatives and employees, 
did seem to confirm that this was part of the paternalistic BuSoc ethos, at least in 
recent years.  In turn, grassroots employees had less interest in voice, although a 
degree of voice was being provided through the interactions of union officials and 
senior managers.  It may have been expected that the mutual organisation would 
have provided a fertile environment for partnership.  Counter-intuitively, it appears 
that in this context of a fairly stagnant employment relations environment, there is 
actually less incentive to pursue positive partnership working, and that the 
relationship is in reality best described as „traditional‟, with the union role limited in 
scope to issues around terms and conditions, and an opaque, secretive negotiation 
and consultation framework.  Conversely, in the cases where efficiency has been 
under much more pressure, there appears to have been a greater impetus to engage 
with a more strategic approach to HRM and employment relations.  At WebBank, 
voice was being provided to some extent through the Employee Forum mechanism, 
and there was evidence of the Forum acting as a moderate countervailing pressure.   
Although the countervailing pressures remained fairly modest, this may be a result 
of the fact that the forum remains fairly new and is still evolving.  The remit of the 
forum is also increasingly widening. 
 
Actor experiences and partnership outcomes 
 
In addition to the analysis of partnership in terms of the nature of relationships, and 
the decision making processes, it is also helpful to reflect upon actor experiences 
and outcomes.  The views of management, union/employee representatives and 
employees are now explored in turn. 
 
Management 
Senior management respondents at all organisations were overall supportive of the 
principles of partnership, suggesting that partnership represents a more modern 
approach to the conduct of employment relations, and a departure from 
counterproductive adversarial relationships.  This is not to say they were evangelical 
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about partnership.  On the contrary, the general view was a pragmatic one, in that 
partnership was seen to offer a more effective approach than adversarialism in terms 
of the regulation of the employment relationship.  A Director at NatBank for 
example, expressed a unitarist philosophical perspective suggesting that ultimately 
partnership should create a coalescence of interests around the success of the 
enterprise, and that any misalignment was the result of poor communication and 
misunderstandings:  
“I don‟t want it to sound corny but for me we are all just one big team…One of the challenges 
and questions for partnership with me would be, if we are to be a great company and a great 
company to work for why do we need a third party to manage our relationships with our 
people.  That doesn‟t sound to me like a business which can be truly engaged with it‟s people.  
So that‟s my one issue, at a kind of philosophical level.  Having said that, my experience of 
partnership has been positive” (NatBank, Director of Sales and Service). 
He suggested that partnership offered a framework to work within, but that if the 
organisation was „starting from scratch‟ he did not believe that unions were a 
necessary component of partnership, as it is his belief that it is in the firm‟s best 
interest to treat employees well.  A Director at WebBank also took a pragmatic view 
suggesting that since the business had grown to employ over 2000 employees in a 
short period of time there was a distinct need for a representative structure, and he 
expressed a clear preference for working co-operatively and problem solving around 
issues of business success.  This suggests a link between establishment size and 
propensity for employee representation.  He suggested that there was a belief that 
this approach was more likely to achieved through a non-union structure.  For most 
of the managers interviewed, unions were perceived to be too adversarial insomuch 
as they restrict and inhibit business success.  A key challenge for unions, therefore, 
lies in persuading managements that they can actually add value and contribute to 
the development of a larger cake, rather than focusing merely on distributing the 
cake.  This reflects arguments in the literature that partnership is concerned with 
developmental issues as well as distributional concerns (Huzzard and Nilsson, 
2002).  It also suggests that unions are still perceived as being rooted in traditions of 
distributive as opposed to integrative bargaining.  As a senior manager at NatBank 
commented: 
 “The trade union should have a vested interest in the business remaining profitable. If it 
doesn‟t have that within it‟s make up then it‟s not representing members, because members rely 
on profitability for their own personal prosperity” (Director of Sales and Service, NatBank). 
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In short, it appeared that management actors held an instrumental view, in that they 
are positive about partnership where the trade union/representative body is seen to 
be contributing to business success, but conversely demonstrate a very low 
tolerance of unions where this is not perceived to be the case. 
Unions and union/employee representatives 
Representatives at all organisations were also supportive of the principles of 
partnership.  Union officials were also generally supportive.  The exception was one 
union official at NatBank who favoured militancy and disagreed vehemently with 
his colleagues about the merits of partnership.  All other officials interviewed across 
all organisations endorsed partnership.  One suggested that unions may have to go 
through some kind of „watershed‟ in the style of New Labour, in order to convince 
managements that they are not by definition anti-business or anti-management, but 
can contribute to increasing the size of the cake.  As he explained:  
 “There is a view that perhaps the trade union movement needs to go through some sort of 
watershed such as the Labour Party went through, whether it‟s possible or necessary.  We have 
to address issues of relevance to our people, and there is a lot to do to make us more relevant to 
the majority of working people today….demonstrating you are getting things sorted out 
through dialogue is a positive thing.  I think the role of unions has changed.  The world of work 
has changed.  Issues have changed.  Expectations have changed.  And the union movement 
needs to change. (NatBank FTO). 
 
Union officials at BuSoc were also supportive of a co-operative approach but were 
reluctant to engage with the language of partnership for fear of employee 
perceptions.  Indeed, in 1997 the union at BuSoc had actually changed their name to 
“Staff Union” as opposed to “Staff Association” in order to highlight their 
independence from the management.  It is therefore interesting that the union with a 
more adversarial background chose to engage with partnership in order to free 
themselves from a militant image and increase their legitimacy; whereas the union 
with a more co-operative history chose to avoid the language of partnership with the 
aim of reinforcing their independence from the employer.  It is important to note 
that most of the union officials at BuSoc were former employees of the society and 
it was proposed that this helped them to understand both the business rationale as 
well as the employee perspective.  During an interview with the Union President, 
who is an IT Manager on a two year secondment, he frequently spoke in terms of 
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his „managerial point of view‟ as well as his „union point of view‟.  Seconded 
representatives at WebBank were also supportive of the partnership approach and 
were critical of adversarial union strategies.  Many had experienced trade unions in 
their previous employment, and frequently recounted negative anecdotes regarding 
counterproductive union engagement.   
 
Employees 
Workers views and experiences are clearly central to the partnership debate as 
“direct evidence on the implications of partnership for workers is remarkably 
scarce” (Suff and Williams, 2005, 33).  Most employees in the three cases were  
supportive of collaborative union/management relations.  Many critically recalled 
incidents of union militancy such as the miners‟ strike, and expressed a disdain for 
such tactics.  A common criticism was that strikes are no good if the factory then 
closes down.  It was interesting that in all cases employees reflected upon the 
demands of the customer, and the perceptions of customers if the Bank workers 
were to go on strike leaving branches closed and phone calls unanswered.  
Employee focus groups in all organisations revealed very little support for union 
militancy, with most employees reflecting how “times have changed”, 
acknowledging that organisations need to be competitive  and that sometimes this 
may mean tough decisions.  Across the cases for example, employees highlighted 
how they believed that unions can no longer „save jobs‟, but stressed that the role of 
unions now was to ensure that business decisions are as fair as  they can be for 
employees.   
 
In sum, across the cases actor attitudes to partnership were generally positive.  The 
interesting finding across all actors in the case organisations was the level of 
pragmatism and realism.  Although the actors supported the partnership principles 
they did not engage with uncritical utopian ideas.  Employees and representatives 
were aware of business issues such as global competition, and the need to satisfy 
customers and shareholders. Most senior managers also acknowledged and accepted 
that unions have a job to do, and that they need to be seen meeting members 
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interests.  Few expressed hostility to unions, rather ambivalence or support was the 
norm especially where unions were perceived to be contributing to business success.  
Again, this resonates with the notion of a shift towards support for a more 
integrative approach (Walton and McKersie, 1965).  It was at a middle management 
level where tensions typically arose.  Middle managers may find themselves at the 
centre of the countervailing forces outlined, whereby they are expect to deliver 
business results on the one hand, but to be considerate and fair to employees on the 
other.   
 
Many employees did not believe that unions could save jobs in the current 
economy.  Their expectation was that employee representation existed to ensure fair 
treatment but this was not necessarily associated with a belief that 
unions/representative could or should be saving jobs.  In short, actor expectations 
were pragmatic.  For the actors partnership was about ensuring judicious decision-
making which tried to balance fair treatment of employees, with the business need 
to make a profit.  Senior managers were happy to have the input of representatives, 
especially where the challenge was presented along business lines.  Representatives 
acknowledged this, and frequently suggested how their role was now more 
complicated because they had to engage with more complicated tactics regarding 
persuasion, whereas previously they may have simply opposed decisions point 
blank, again reflecting a more integrative approach. The main challenge for 
representatives, however, is opposing a decision for moral or ethical reasons, as this 
is less likely to convince management.  A union official at NatBank suggested at 
one point before partnership he did not talk to the management team for six months 
because of an argument, but that he simply could not imagine this happening now.  
These actor views provide quite a contrast with the negative attitudes reported in the 
existing critical partnership literature, and suggest that business case arguments may 
be central to partnership. 
 
Admittedly, a radical critique by commentators such as Legge (1995) may explain 
these actors views in terms of the construction of a „new reality‟ as a result of the 
sophisticated management of organisational culture. Critics may suggest the 
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possibility that partnership has been used to shape organisational culture to the 
extent that is acts as an insidious form of control (Willmott, 1993).  Marxists may 
explain employee support in terms of a „false consciousness‟, duping employees 
into believing  for example that jobs cannot no longer be saved, and decisions such 
as off-shoring are „inevitable‟.  Partnership could therefore be viewed cynically as 
presenting a serious threat to employees.  Yet as Guest (1999) argues and Legge 
(1998) also acknowledges, workers need not necessarily have been duped. It is 
plausible that many workers may now believe that co-operation rather than conflict 
may provide a better route to securing better outcomes.  This pessimistic view also 
overstates managerial power, as normally there is “ample opportunity to contest 
decisions and shape events” (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005, 409), and to 
subvert managerial regimes (Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995, 633). 
 
 
Challenges 
 
Four main challenges to partnership were identified in the study.  These include a 
lack of agreement as to the meaning of partnership, relationship centrality, 
resistance to adversity and representative efficacy.  These will now be discussed in 
turn. 
 
Shared understanding: what exactly is meant by ‘partnership’? 
The first challenge is a coherence of purpose.  This concerns a clear understanding 
of the meaning, purpose and operation of partnership between the union, 
representatives and management.  At NatBank this was argued to be where the 
situation sometimes becomes “blurry”.  For the actors in all three cases, partnership 
was not necessarily about the union and management agreeing.  Representatives 
also acknowledged that partnership did not mean joint decision-making or co-
determination.  Yet the critical literature often criticises partnership on the basis that 
it does not lead to joint decision-making or co-management (Upchurch et.al, 2004).  
It would therefore seem unfair to judge partnership based upon a definition which 
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does not correspond with the definition and understanding of organisational actors.  
The unions/forums had to persuade and convince management rather than just 
oppose, representing a shift to an integrative problem solving approach.  The key 
method was by justifying how an efficiency-based decision or proposal  could 
actually backfire because of the potential damage if it is perceived to be inequitable, 
for example resulting in high turnover, low morale and low employee satisfaction.  
In other words, representatives had to convince management of a business case for 
more equitable decisions. The representative mechanism appeared therefore to act 
as a useful checkpoint on management decision-making. The expectations of 
partnership in the critical literature are therefore set very high and perhaps at odds 
with reality.  This thesis has argued that partnership can usefully be thought of as a 
combination of practices, processes and outcomes, and that focusing on one element 
is unlikely to be tenable.  From an academic perspective focusing on one element, 
such as outcomes, is unlikely to provide a holistic insight into the complex realities 
of partnership.  
 
Relationship centrality: embedding a partnership culture 
Assuming a coherent shared understanding and purpose between the key actors, the 
next challenge is embedding this culture across the entire organisation and getting 
the buy-in of two other important actors: middle managers and employees.  This 
issue had also been highlighted in earlier studies of employee involvement 
initiatives (Marchington et.al, 1992).  As highlighted earlier, partnership concerns a 
key relationship between representatives/officials and senior managers, but this 
creates the risk that middle managers and employees may end up disillusioned.  For 
example at BuSoc and WebBank, it was discovered that while representatives have 
a good relationship with the HR department, relationships with other departments 
are much more patchy.  This was a particular risk at BuSoc, given that the main 
interactions occurred at an elite level. Roche and Geary (2004, 382) highlight the 
dangers of elite partnerships, where partnership is a peak level agreement at the 
apex of the organisation, “in such circumstances indifference and neutral postures 
may be anticipated as the norm”. 
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Though most of the existing literature focuses on relationships between senior 
managers and senior union actors, middle management resistance was identified as 
a significant barrier to the effectiveness of partnership.  Managers at WebBank and 
BuSoc suggested that the union/employee forum was sometimes viewed as a barrier 
to them carrying out their job, for example by making it difficult for them to dismiss 
a poorly performing member of staff.  For instance a NatBank Director suggested he 
was confused as to why unions focus attention on – in his view - defending a 
minority of poorly performing „bad employees‟ at the expense of the interests of 
defending the majority of reliable „good employees‟.  Middle management were 
often said to be under significant pressure resulting in them  „taking shortcuts‟ 
which sometimes did not correspond with best practice guidelines agreed at a senior 
level.  At BuSoc the Employee Relations Manager felt some managers still viewed 
the union as an inconvenience or obstruction. On the other hand, some 
representatives still appeared to fear recrimination at BuSoc whereas at NatBank 
representatives stated that they had the confidence to manoeuvre around an 
obstructive or unhelpful manager. Indeed, full-time officials at NatBank and BuSoc 
described a similar strategy.   
 
There was less confidence among representatives at BuSoc and WebBank, although 
a personal letter from the Chief Executive at BuSoc appeared to give some people 
some confidence that the company supported the union.  However, BuSoc 
representatives described a sense of guilt that they are neglecting their own duties 
when they are busy with union activities.  This supports the notion suggested by 
Marchington (1998, 209) that partnership is not only concerned with operational 
practices but also “considered as a set of values and behaviours which are held and 
displayed by people in the partnership organisation”.  This may be described as a 
change in style towards being „partnership-minded‟.  For managers, this is likely to 
concern an appreciation of the legitimacy of employee voice, while for employee 
representatives it is likely to concern an appreciation of business concerns such as 
competitiveness.  Employee representatives often cited how their response to an 
unhelpful manager would often be “that‟s not a very partnership attitude, is it?” 
Chapter 8 
 
 
 
 394 
 
Another aspect was employee apathy towards unions and a general lack of interest 
especially when things are perceived to be smooth.  This seemed to be the case at all 
case organisations but especially at BuSoc, where there has been difficulty 
recruiting members, as well as recruiting constituency representatives.  There was 
also a lack of interest in the People Forum at WebBank.  It could be speculated that 
employees are less interested when they perceive stability at work, but become more 
interested with instability sets in, as was the case at NatBank.   In other words, 
partnership may actually be strengthened by a period of bad weather.  Clearly, 
establishing an embedded partnership culture across the organisation and the 
various actors is essential if the key management-representative relationship is to be 
robust, and this is likely to require the buy-in of both line managers and employees. 
 
Resistance to adversity 
This relates to the sustainability of the structure over time, following major 
incidents within the organisation, and the extent to which the robustness of the 
partnership has been tested.  This could be a change of key personalities, a major 
organisational or union incident e.g. merger, or even a change in government.  For 
example at BuSoc there was clear concern that so much involved a few key players, 
and as such there was limited ownership of the partnership process, which was not 
widely embedded.  Indeed, most union activity in this case occurred at a very senior 
level between top union officials and divisional directors.    It would therefore be 
unclear what would happen if the key players left the organisation.  A good example 
of this is the departure of the current Chief Executive who is expected to retire soon.  
Moreover the current General Secretary has been in post for over 15 years, and has 
not yet been challenged, but there was a concern that if he was not re-elected or 
decided to stand down, a large well of knowledge could disappear from the union 
overnight.  A major organisational incident could be demutualization of the Society, 
or a decision to do something opposed by the union e.g. off-shoring.  Overall, the 
climate has been smooth in recent years and the resistance to adversity has not been 
tested. The Union President suggested that in a sense this was a concern, arguing 
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that it is difficult to fully evaluate the union-management relationship after a period 
of relative stability.  
 
The same is true of the representatives at WebBank, in that there are concerns 
regarding what would happen if the management and representative figures 
involved in setting up and operating the forum were to stand down or leave the 
organisation.  Employee representatives also admitted that as yet the structure 
remains „untested‟ given that there has not yet been a major incident.  At NatBank 
again this could concern a change in key figures.  Indeed, during the course of the 
research, the full-time officers working with NatBank changed as the result of a 
union merger to form Amicus.  Also, how will big incidents in the future be handled 
e.g. redundancies – which Guest and Peccei (1992) suggest is one of the best tests of 
involvement initiatives - and to what extent will management follow agreed process.  
Again, industry analysts have speculated that NatBank may merge with an 
American bank at some point in the future.  A change of key personalities could 
again be a challenge.  For example, the Managing Director and Employee Relations 
Manager both changed during the course of the study.  Ultimately, how would a call 
centre closure impact upon the partnership at NatBank, and how acceptable would 
partnership then be?  
 
In short, partnership is not a static phenomenon, but rather a living, evolving 
process which changes over time.  As such, partnership is likely to experience 
turbulence and the key issue is how the process copes with changes such as a 
change in actors or external organisational pressures, which will determine the 
acceptability and durability of partnership working.  Just as structural engineers 
design tall buildings to sway in extreme weather conditions, the partnership process 
must also be able to flex in order to endure external pressures, and to avoid failure, 
and ultimately total collapse. 
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Representative efficacy 
Representative efficacy concerns the effectiveness of representatives in the eyes of 
both management and employees/union members.  As highlighted earlier, 
managements at NatBank and WebBank raised concerns regarding representatives 
who they viewed to be „anti-establishment‟ or „have a chip on their shoulder‟.  It 
was clear that management valued arguments based on business rationale rather 
than „as a matter of principle‟.  This requires very different skills which not all the 
representatives possessed.  This had also created a problem for representatives in 
that management were unlikely to be convinced by moral arguments, but were more 
interested in hard business reasons for not implementing changes, such as a likely 
negative impact on efficiency.  Management were less interested in equity 
arguments based on a sense of „fairness‟ or „doing the right thing‟.  Adopting the 
language used by Budd (2004) management often had an instrumental interest in 
equity where it was likely to have negative repercussions on efficiency.   
 
It was argued by management that oppositional representatives could destabilise the 
process by creating conflict, but on the other hand complacent representatives could 
also destabilise the process because they could lack credibility in the eyes of their 
members.  This supports the arguments made by Ackers et.al (2004), that while 
strong union and non-union partnerships may offer two fairly stable arrangements, 
the alternatives of adversarial unionism without partnership, or weak non-union 
partnerships are likely to be less tenable. Like a see-saw, a delicate balance has to be 
struck in order to win and sustain the respect and credibility in the eyes of both 
management and employees (Terry, 2003).  In the eyes of their members, 
representative views may not match membership views due to additional insight 
they have through embargoed information, and this could create tensions which 
undermine the legitimacy of the process.  Representatives may experience isolation 
from grassroots members due to extra information, seeing the bigger picture, thus 
encountering the danger of being seen to be co-opted especially when decisions are 
not good.  Representative awareness of financial and market information could be 
interpreted as brainwashing.  There is also the inability of representatives to 
demonstrate their value if much of the interactions are occurring behind closed 
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doors.  The Union could easily be perceived to be doing nothing if things are going 
smoothly and blamed when things go badly.  As the President at BuSoc Staff Union 
commented regarding their involvement in initiatives “if things go badly we get 
blamed, and if they go well we‟ll get no thanks for it!”.  Achievements are not 
always visible to staff. 
 
Under partnership, representatives have the dilemma of proving independence and 
strength in a context of confidentiality, and there is the risk this could create a 
chasm for the union.  Sophisticated manoeuvring and „corridor conversations‟ are 
not seen at the grassroots level whereas adversarial confrontation is much more 
visible.  Indeed, a Director at WebBank suggested this is the very reason he was not 
keen on unions because he believed they had a greater need to flag their „successes‟.  
Representatives at both WebBank and NatBank were conscious of the need to 
ensure that employees do not perceive them to be „in management‟s pocket‟.  In 
short, there is a need to demonstrate value to members and management need to 
understand this (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004c).  This is not to say that employees 
are keen to know the detail of decisions, but rather that they need to have trust in the 
union and/or their representatives.  At NatBank most employees reflected that they 
did have a trust in their representatives, despite not knowing exactly what they were 
doing.  However, there was a lack of visibility at BuSoc and WebBank, making it 
more difficult to establish trust.  Representatives and managers acknowledged that 
employee expectations rise over time. 
 
It is difficult to demonstrate the success of pay negotiations when members do not 
understand the full context of negotiations. There is a clear need to maintain the link 
between employees and representatives.  It can also be difficult for representatives 
when they had knowledge of confidential decisions.  There is also the possibility 
that there is a difference between seconded and non-seconded representatives.   It is 
possible that it is more difficult for seconded representatives to gain as much respect 
given that they do not work on the shop floor, and this could create some problems.  
Representatives are now unable to oppose decisions simply because they do not 
agree with them, as they may have done in the past.  Members often do not see the 
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heated debates that occurred.  There were now cases where representatives believe 
employee views are misguided or unrealistic, meaning a need to avoid a gap 
between the workforce and members.  Unions cannot just oppose proposals in the 
current environment.  Again, there is a need to compare the outcome of the decision 
with the alternative as opposed to the ideal e.g. mitigation and cushioning (Pfeffer, 
1994).  The new role of representatives requires skill and knowledge on their part. 
This was very limited at BuSoc, and WebBank representative also felt they could 
benefit from more training.  If representatives are seen to be too soft members may 
not re-elect them.  If they are too confrontational, they could undermine the process 
in the eyes of managers.  Unions (and non-union bodies) need to prove themselves 
and demonstrate that they add value both to management and workers, and this is 
not easy.  It was believed by NatBank representatives that flagging union 
„successes‟ for workers would be seen to be out of the spirit of partnership, and 
reminiscent of adversarial industrial relations.  Some managers appreciated that 
partnership may make it more difficult for unions to demonstrate their value, as 
much of the discussions are low key and therefore not obvious to employees.  
Representatives were required to satisfy members, while at the same time 
management expected a greater degree of engagement with business goals.  
Confirming the propositions of Ackers et.al (2004), managers were positive where 
representative/union behaviour was believed to be „adding value‟ to the 
organisation, but highly intolerant of behaviour which was not seen to be adding 
value.  Again, as relationships evolve, it is likely that they will change as they 
mature, and in particular there is the possibility that representatives may gain more 
confidence and raise their game. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has compared and contrast the results from the NatBank, BuSoc and 
WebBank case studies outlined in the preceding three chapters.    The chapter began 
by outlining the different contextual factors in each organisation.  There was 
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evidence that the routes to partnership varied, with partnership identified as a 
solution to an IR crisis at NatBank, a history of good industrial relations at BuSoc, 
and a natural evolution or planned industrial relations approach at WebBank.  This 
highlights the heterogeneity of partnership arrangements that exist, and the 
limitations of the deterministic literature which seem to assume that partnership 
organisations are homogeneous when this is clearly not true.  Indeed, the 
organisations also differed in terms of corporate governance as well as their IR 
histories, recognition of trade unions, and partnership structures.  This would 
suggest that neglecting contextual differences could lead to a very short sighted 
view of partnership.  
 
On reviewing the meaning of partnership, however, both in terms of official policy 
statements as well as the understandings and interpretations of organisational actors, 
there is a greater degree of common ground suggesting that the three cases qualified 
as prima facie cases of partnership, as many of their policies resonated with TUC 
and IPA definitions of a partnership approach.  Actor interpretations of partnership 
were also similar, with core concepts agreed to include a modern approach to 
employment relations characterised by problem solving, early consultation and 
dialogue, and a dual commitment to both organisational success and the fair 
treatment of employees.  Importantly, in no case was partnership seen to concern a 
process of joint decision making between management and union/employee 
representatives.    
 
Yet despite agreement regarding the principles of partnership the process of 
partnership varied between the organisations.  At NatBank the degree of 
involvement was high, covering a wide scope of issues at both strategic and 
operational levels.  The structure was also centralised with emphasis upon local 
decision making.  At WebBank degree of involvement was lower although the 
scope was widening and appeared to be improving over time.  In addition, although 
the structure has often been focusing on operational issues there was evidence of 
increasing involvement in more strategic issues.  BuSoc was the most problematic 
case of partnership.  Both the degree and timeliness of involvement were unclear 
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due to the fact that the structure was highly centralised around a few key players.  In 
terms of scope the agenda appeared to be dominated more by high level personnel 
issues, and limited union involvement in day-to-day operational matters which were 
also of concern to members.     
 
Actor relationships also varied.  In all three cases much centred around establishing 
good relationships between senior management and union/employee representatives 
and this has generally been successful at NatBank and WebBank, though at BuSoc 
there was limited interaction between senior management and union representatives 
at the workplace level.  In both unionised cases the relationships between senior 
management and union officials was identified to be strong, and similarly it was the 
line management and union/employee representative that was identified to be 
patchy in all three cases, although again the worst in the case of BuSoc.  Employee 
and union/employee representative relationships appear to be strongest at NatBank, 
fairly positive at WebBank, and weakest at BuSoc where many staff did not know 
who their representatives were. 
 
In terms of relationships and consultation, it has been argued that a strong 
partnership would be characterised more by an integrative problem solving style 
than by distributive style.  Consultation at NatBank and WebBank did provide 
evidence of a more integrative style, where the emphasis was on openness, 
transparency and problem-solving.  Relationships at BuSoc were more difficult to 
judge, but there was less evidence of joint problem solving, with the core of union 
activity still concerning distributive issues such as terms and conditions, and fewer 
examples of the union and management proactively working together to solve a 
problem.  This is somewhat counterintuitive as it was believed that the relationships 
may have been less positive in the two organisations which had experienced major 
change in the last five years (NatBank and WebBank), but the converse appears to 
be true.   
 
In terms of the outcomes of decision making processes, NatBank demonstrated clear 
evidence of voice being articulated and of efficiency and equity being moderated by 
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the voice process.  There was also evidence of this, albeit to a lesser extent, in the 
case of WebBank.  Less evidence of this process was available in the case of BuSoc, 
as there was little evidence to suggest that business decisions such as opposing 
offshoring, exceeding statutory employment legislation or ending the final salary 
pension scheme had been moderated through consultation and negotiation (voice).   
Nevertheless most management actors in each company were in favour of the 
principles of partnership, suggesting that it represented a modern approach to 
employment relationships, and that adversarialism was no longer appropriate.  Most 
union officials and all union/employee representatives supported partnership.  The 
main exceptions were one full time official at NatBank who opposed the philosophy 
of partnership, and the union officials at BuSoc who supported the notion but 
rejected the language of partnership.  At WebBank a preference for a co-operative 
approach was echoed by all the representatives.  Employee interviews are also 
important, as traditionally these are conflated with union views in industrial 
relations research.  Interestingly, virtually all employees interviews supported 
collaborative management/union relations, and many were highly critical of militant 
tactics, suggesting that unions have to accept that businesses need to make a profit, 
and militancy can often exacerbate rather than improve bad situations.   
 
Finally, several challenges were identified in the study.  The first was an agreement 
regarding what it actually meant by partnership, and the extent to which there was a 
shared view of what working in partnership did and did not mean in order to avoid 
false expectations.  The second challenge was embedding a partnership culture 
across the organisation, and overcoming middle management resistance and 
employee apathy.  In all cases there was the question of the sustainability of the 
structure over time, and the extent to which it could resist a period of severe 
adversity.  Fourthly, a great challenge concerns ensuring the representative body 
and representatives are perceived to be effective by employees and managers.  
Clearly representatives are expected to walk a tight rope whereby managers view 
them a credible and constructive, while their members view them as challenging and 
influential.  If the balanced is tipped too much in one direction support of 
management or employees may be lost and this could undermine the process.  A 
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major problem for representatives is demonstrating the effectiveness, in terms of 
influence, of a low key relationship whereas with an adversarial strategy it is 
arguably much easier to demonstrate contribution to members because of the higher 
level of visibility. 
 
To conclude, this chapter has rejected simplistic for/against arguments regarding 
partnership, and demonstrated how the reality is significantly more complex, not 
least because much depends upon the context and meaning of partnership, and the 
way partnership is operationalised in practice.  This study has revealed that although 
actors may agree on the principles of partnership this reveals little about the way 
partnership is actually enacted.  As such the study has revealed important 
differences in terms of the way partnership actually operates, the relationships 
between actors, consultation processes, and the nature of decision making.  Despite 
these differences the study also found that most organisational actors supported the 
principles of partnership, and that in practice the challenges to partnership which 
were identified actually held resonance in all three cases.   
 
This chapter has compared and contrasted the findings in terms of context, meaning, 
process and outcomes of partnership in the three cases.  The final chapter reviews 
these findings in lighting of the existing partnership literature, and draws out some 
of the main conclusions of the study.  It then considers the implications of the study 
for practice, before proposing some avenues for further research.   
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the conclusions of the study and suggest 
some implications for practice and avenues for further research.  Before this, however, 
it is useful to provide a brief recap of the previous chapters.  Chapter two outlined the 
abundance of literature examining partnership working, and highlighted how the 
debate has become polarised between advocates on the one hand suggesting mutual 
gains for all stakeholders (Kochan and Osterman, 1994), and critics on the other, 
arguing that partnership enables management to reassert control, and offers little for 
unions or workers (Taylor and Ramsey, 1998; Kelly, 2004). More recently, typologies 
of partnership arrangements have begun to emerge, suggesting different possible 
trajectories and outcomes, contingent on various factors.   Nevertheless the bulk of the 
literature on the prospects of partnership working in Britain remains decidedly 
pessimistic (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004b), and seems to have reached a dead 
end (Tailby and Winchester, 2005).  However, paradoxes and contradictions remain, 
highlighting the need for further empirical research.  Chapter 3 justified how, because 
the interest was on meaning and process, a qualitative research approach was deemed 
essential, and outlined the case study approach that was taken.  The purpose of 
Chapter 4 was to demonstrate the value of a study of partnership in financial services 
and to provide an overview of the external environment in which these organisation 
operate.  Chapters 5, 6 and 7 presented the comparative case study data, following the 
thematic structure of context, meaning, process, outcomes and challenges of 
partnership.  Chapter eight presents a discussion of the results from the case 
organisations, and offered a comparison of some of the key similarities and 
differences.  Accordingly, the thesis has attempted to enhance understanding of 
partnership, and to transcend the stalemate critics/advocates debate. 
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Limitations of existing literature 
 
This study has sought to counter some of the limitations of the existing literature.  
Firstly, studies explore different types of arrangements ranging from formal 
partnership agreements to informal partnership relationships.  This leads to the risk 
that researchers are actually comparing very different situations under the partnership 
umbrella (Roche and Geary, 2002).  Studies also examine partnership in different 
sectors with very different product and labour market conditions, as well as different 
industrial relations traditions.  Researchers employ different methodologies, though 
typically surveys and single snapshot case studies are common but comparative case 
studies are rare (Kelly, 2004).  Informants are typically trade union officials and 
managers, with few studies giving much weight to the views of employees, which is 
surprising given that partnership is supposed to concern employee voice (exceptions 
include Munro, 2002 and Suff and Williams, 2004).  In addition, the debate is 
inextricably linked to philosophical issues regarding industrial relations frame of 
reference (Fox, 1974), as there is a strong ideological dimension to partnership (Stuart 
and Martinez-Lucio, 2004b; McBride and Stirling, 2002).  Unsurprisingly, many of 
the pessimistic studies are written from a critical industrial relations tradition, which is 
now purely pessimistic following the „death of socialism‟.  Theoretically, radicals are 
likely to have philosophical reservations on the feasibility of capital and labour 
working together towards a common goal, the ethos which underpins partnership.  
Such a worldview is arguably incompatible with partnership, and in turn could explain 
the invariably pessimistic prognosis of such commentators (see for example Danford 
et.al, 2004; Kelly, 2004).  In short, despite the voluminous literature, further academic 
research was essential. 
 
 
Strengths of this study 
 
In an attempt to transcend the polarised debate and address the limitations of the 
current literature, the thesis is valuable in many respects.  Firstly, the study focused on 
one sector with similar product and labour market conditions, allowing comparisons 
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to be made between organisations operating within similar constraints.  Moreover, the 
finance sector is academically interesting as well as numerically important in the UK 
economy.  The sector is profitable: in 2006 the British banks reported earnings of 
£33bn and London-based HSBC alone reporting profits of £11.9bn.  The sector also 
employs over 1 million people, and generates a turnover equal to 14% GDP.  The 
industry also has a long history of non-union employee representation as well as trade 
unionism; indeed union density has remained high at around 50% in the 1990s (Gall, 
2001).  Moreover, despite a general image of being conservative and paternalistic 
(Upchurch et.al, 2006), or alternatively as „docile‟ and „strike-free‟ (Gall, 2001), 2005 
witnessed ballots for strike action at Lloyds TSB and HSBC.  In addition, the finance 
sector has experienced significant change and restructuring, with recent large-scale 
job losses at Abbey, Lloyds TSB, Clydesdale and Yorkshire Bank (EIRO Online).  
The sector therefore offers an excellent context for the study of partnership for several 
reasons.  Firstly, despite the rise of private service sector employment, industrial 
relations research is still biased towards manufacturing and public service 
employment, when arguably service work is likely to be more indicative of the future 
of work in the UK.  Secondly, the industry has an established history of collective 
employee representation, with relatively high union membership compared to other 
private service sector organisations. 
 
This study has also presented comparative case studies which are relatively scarce in 
the British literature, but have proved useful in the USA (Kelly, 2004).  This allowed 
a variety of circumstances to be examined which varied in terms of route to 
partnership, history, IR background and corporate governance.  This is important 
given that partnership remains a nebulous and contested concept, and the 
acknowledgement in the recent literature that there may be different trajectories of 
experience (Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2004; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004a, 2004b).  
The study has also explored a non-union example of partnership which is again rare in 
the literature.  The thesis has also examined the process of partnership, and unravelled 
what partnership actually means in terms of the regulation of employment relations.  
This is useful given that most of the existing literature has tended to focus more 
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narrowly on outcomes, and in particular, the opportunities partnership offers for trade 
union renewal (Terry, 2003).  Yet as Stuart and Martinez-Lucio (2004) argue: 
 “Partnership is not just about outcomes, or its potential for trade unions.  
Partnership is a development that represents the emergence of a new approach 
to employment relations that attempts to reconfigure the form and content of 
management-union relations…it raises broader questions about the regulation of 
employment relations” (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004a, 11). 
 
Accordingly, in order to understand more about the form and content of management-
union/non-union representative relations – or what Roche and Geary (2002 refer to as 
the organisational micro-politics - the study explored in detail what partnership means 
in terms of decision-making as well as relationships between the key actors.  
Moreover, the study has advocated a pluralist approach, suggesting that that an 
inherent conflict of interest does not mean that all workplace issues involve conflict 
(Marxism), but neither can all workplace issues be structured as a shared interest 
(Unitarism).  Rather, employment relationship conflict is best regarded as „mixed 
motive‟, with both conflictual and shared interests (Kochan, 2000).  Employees want 
their employer to be successful, but employee interests of higher wages, employment 
security and excellent working conditions, may clash with employer objectives of 
improving efficiency and minimising costs.  The objective is achieving a stable 
„negotiated order‟ from the expression of competing interests, by „institutionalising 
conflict‟, by establishing an effective process of bargaining and consultation between 
actors (Batstone, 1984; Blyton and Turnbull, 2004).  In contrast to the 1970s 
pluralism however, which was dominated by trade unions, collective bargaining and 
joint regulation, new pluralism is characterised by a mix of of union and non-union 
representative bodies, formal and informal structures, and a range of consultation, 
bargaining and negotiation.  The structures and processes may have changed, but the 
aims of facilitating voice and institutionalising conflict remain the same. 
 
As Stuart and Martinez-Lucio (2004b, 423) argue, employers and workers encounter 
simultaneously the pressures of economic efficiency and social justice.  The key 
concerns are the “the systems of regulation that attempt to address these issues of 
economic and social distribution”, through, for example, statutory government 
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regulation and collective employee representation.  For pluralists, because of the 
inherent conflict of interest it is unwise to rely upon managerial goodwill, and equally 
it is not enough to rely on economic markets as proposed by neoclassical economists.  
This view can be contrasted with the Marxist view that a deeper class conflict exists, 
and that pluralist concerns for regulation are superficial.  To aid analysis, the study 
draws on a framework proposed by Budd (2004). It is proposed that there is a need for 
a different way of evaluating partnership outcomes based upon the extent to which 
they contribute to the moderation/accommodation of the competing employment 
relations objectives of efficiency, equity and voice.  In this way, the study avoids the 
use of crude employment relations outcomes – such as pay levels or job losses - as 
simple „indicators‟ of the success or otherwise of partnership working.  In order to 
understand issues of context, meaning and process a case study approach was deemed 
essential.  Having summarised the rationale for the research, the following section 
outlines the main findings of this study in terms of the context, process and outcomes 
of partnership. 
 
Context of partnership 
 
The first issue concerns the context of partnership.  Heery (2002) suggests that 
partnership is unlikely to hold any single consequence for actors. Rather, partnership 
is a process contingent on political, economic, organisational and regulatory forces 
(Martinez-Lucio and Stuart, 2005), and it is therefore useful to explore varieties of 
partnership (see for example Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004b). The three cases 
presented allowed comparisons to be made across four main dimensions: route to 
partnership; governance; unionisation and formality.  The key findings will now be 
outlined in turn. 
 
1. Does the route to partnership matter?   
Often, partnership agreements have arisen out of industrial relations crisis 
(Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002, 2004a), and this may limit the scope for mutual gains 
(Kelly, 2004).  On the other hand, where partnership has not arisen as a direct 
response to conflict but has evolved in more positive circumstances, there may be a 
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greater scope for mutual gains.   Specifically, in the case of WebBank - a greenfield 
site with a very short industrial relations history - it could be speculated that, given 
that there was no industrial relations baggage or embedded cultures which needed to 
be changed, (Hallier and Leopold, 2000), forging partnership would be easier than in 
an organisation with a long history.  In particular, employees with limited experience 
of participation may welcome any attempt to increase involvement (Marchington and 
Wilkinson, 2005).  Certainly there was evidence to suggest that to an extent this was 
the case, in that there were fewer expectations which needed to be changed, unlike the 
case at NatBank where there was some resistance from union officials despite an 
official pro-partnership union stance.  However, despite the long IR history at 
NatBank and BuSoc, most actors endorsed a partnership approach.  Indeed, at BuSoc 
the long history of co-operative employment relations appeared to offer a fertile 
environment for partnership.  Overall, it seems that history is not an insurmountable 
barrier to partnership.  It also difficult to predict how the relatively young structures at 
WebBank will evolve, especially as the representatives gain confidence and 
experience, and in turn it is likely that expectations of actors will change over time. 
 
2. Can partnership be achieved in liberal market economies? 
Critics suggests that it is difficult to forge a sustainable partnership in a liberal market 
economy due to the framework of corporate governance which puts a premium on 
short-term performance, quick decision-making and shareholder value, over the 
potential interests of other stakeholders (Sisson, 1995; Heery, 2002, Hutton, 1995).  
As Konzellman et.al (2005) state: 
“In liberal market-based systems such as the US and the UK…managers are 
required to pursue shareholder interests above those of labour, which often 
forces them to break implicit (psychological) contracts with labour in the interest 
of short-term shareholder value” (Konzellman et.al, 2005, 5) 
In other words, organisations which have a dominant external shareholder such as 
PLCs may be constrained in their ability  to commit to initiatives such as partnership 
(Konzellman et.al, 2006).  Theoretically then, BuSoc would provide a more hospitable 
environment for partnership than NatBank and WebBank, given that it is insulated 
from the fluctuations and pressures associated with stock market pressure and 
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membership due to its mutual status.  To an extent this may be true: BuSoc union 
officials and employees generally viewed the firm as a „good employer‟ especially 
compared to other companies in the sector.  On the other hand, this is not to say that 
BuSoc did not make controversial decisions without union support, such as the end of 
the final salary pension scheme for new employees in 2002.  On the whole, however, 
most actors believed that the insulation mutual status affords did appear to be 
advantageous in enabling BuSoc to take a more stakeholder-oriented approach 
(Kochan and Rubenstein, 2000), both in terms of providing competitive products to 
customers and relatively favourable conditions for employees.  However, there was 
little evidence to suggest that this was as a result of trade union engagement.  More 
cynically perhaps, industry commentators have suggested that although mutuality 
currently fits well with business strategy, further moves by „carpetbaggers‟, i.e. 
account holders who push for mergers and conversions in order to qualify for a cash 
windfall or shares, remains a risk in the future.  Union officials expressed concerns 
regarding the impact of potential demutualization in the future on employment 
relations, as there was a belief that mutuality was acting as an important buffer.  On 
the other hand, managers at NatBank and WebBank admitted that pressure to satisfy 
the stock market and employees is very difficult, but equally this pressure appeared to 
have provided a stronger motivation to engage with partnership, than was the case at 
BuSoc.  In short, it can be concluded that the framework of corporate governance in 
the UK does provide some significant challenges for partnership, but that 
nevertheless, a degree of amelioration is still possible, and indeed that the external  
pressures can actually act as a catalyst to improve employment relations and to take a 
more strategic approach to HRM. 
 
3. Can there be non-union forms of partnerships? 
The partnership literature focuses almost exclusively on partnerships between trade 
unions and management, or what Dietz et.al (2005) refer to as a “union-only ghetto”. 
This is surprising given that, inter alia, the CBI, CIPD, IPA and DTI definitions of 
partnership do not suggest that a union presence is an essential component of a 
partnership agreement.  Admittedly, some theoretical and empirical acknowledgement 
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of the potential of non-union partnerships has begun to emerge (Ackers et.al, 2004; 
Badigannavar and Kelly, 2005; Butler, 2005; Dietz et.al, 2005; Upchurch et.al, 2006) 
but remains limited.  Evidence on the efficacy of non-unions structures is mixed with 
Knell (1999) concluding that there are negligible differences between union and non-
union partnerships and IRS (2000) even concluding from their study that non-union 
partnerships appeared to be more „deep-rooted‟ than union structures.  On the other 
hand, research into non-union employee representation has often been pessimistic 
concluding that they are toothless institutions (Blyton and Turnbull, 1994; Butler, 
2005; Gollan, 2001,2002,2003, 2005, 2007; Terry, 1999)  However, given that trade 
union organisation and collective bargaining has declined significantly since 1980 - 
indeed in the private sector coverage of collective bargaining has fallen from 17% in 
1998 to 11% in 2004 (Kersley et.al, 2005) - and the impact of the European 
Information and Consultation Regulations, understanding of employment relations in 
non-union environments is essential.  This study revealed that the non-union 
partnership at WebBank did appear to be significantly more constrained than 
agreements at NatBank offering some support for the pessimists (Upchurch et.al, 
2006).   Nevertheless, the difference between the bodies at BuSoc and WebBank was 
less clear cut, other than the former had formally negotiable terms and conditions, and 
recourse to legal action and external arbitration.   
 
In the terms of Marchington and Wilkinson (2005) the WebBank Employee Forum 
was more of an information body than a consultation/negotiating body, but did appear 
to be evolving into a more consultative body.   However, it did also have an important 
role in terms of the management of discipline and grievance. As Haynes (2005) 
warns, there is a tendency to compare union and non-union voice, rather than non-
union voice against no voice.  For example, Upchurch et.al (2006, 407) describe a 
non-union structure where “much information was provided by management on 
workplace change” but criticise the structure on the grounds that employees were not 
always able to “persuade and invoke change”, despite their own survey evidence 
which suggested that 58% employees thought the employer was good at keeping 
people up to date with proposed changes, and 58% suggested the employer provided 
everyone with the chance to comment on proposed changes (Upchurch et.al, 2006, 
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400).    Two responses can be made to such conclusions. Firstly, surely management 
provision of information regarding workplace change is better than no information at 
all, and indeed their own questionnaires reveal the majority of employees were 
satisfied with the amount of information received.  Secondly, it is unlikely that 
employees in both union and non-union environments will always achieve what they 
want, but this does not mean that the process has been in vain, even if the final 
outcome is the same.  Accordingly, it is argued that the WebBank structure 
demonstrates a substantial degree of success, thus supporting suggestions that non-
union representative voice combined with direct voice may offer an effective voice 
regime (Bryson, 2004).   It is noteworthy that the structure is still young, and the fact 
that most actors appeared to be satisfied and did not express a desire for union 
recognition.   It is also important to remember that ineffective union structures also 
exist, and limited effectiveness of BuSoc union at a workplace demonstrates this.  
Clearly further research is required which investigates the efficacy of non-union 
partnerships, given that the UK appears to have shifted towards a multi-channel 
system, characterised by both union and non-union representation (Gospel and 
Willman, 2003). 
 
4. Should partnership be formalised?   
The literature is inconclusive in relation to the formality of partnership, with 
Oxenbridge and Brown (2004) arguing that informal partnerships can be more 
successful than informal partnerships, and Heaton et.al (2002) concluding the 
opposite.  The case studies presented here, suggest that both formal and informal 
aspects are important to a successful and enduring partnership.  Actors frequently 
cited the importance and value of cementing strong informal relationships, and 
understanding how to „play‟ the politics of partnership.  Clearly, formal structures 
alone are insufficient to create a robust partnership, as this is unlikely to facilitate the 
attitudinal and behavioural change required. On the other hand, over-reliance on 
informal relationships is also a precarious strategy.  This was illustrated by the 
situation at BuSoc where the union appeared to be in a vulnerable position due to the 
fact the partnership was dominated by close relationships between a few key 
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management and union players, leading to questions of sustainability and succession.  
On the other hand, the relationship between BuSoc and the BuSuc Staff Union has 
been in existence for over thirty years thus demonstrating some degree of stability. 
 
 
 
 
Requirements for enduring partnership 
 
Having discussed the contextual factors, the next section raises three important points 
from the study, drawing on the propositions of Haynes and Allen (2001).  They 
suggest three requirements for an enduring partnership. Firstly, the need for clear 
expectations of partnership and the rules of engagement (see also Stuart and Martinez-
Lucio, 2004).  Secondly, the importance of process, and the extent to which the 
partnership process accommodates sometimes divergent interests.  Thirdly, actor 
perspectives on partnership and the extent to which outcomes can be considered to be 
mutually beneficial.  These will now be discussed in turn.  
 
1. Definitions, expectations and the rules of engagement 
Haynes and Allen (2001) argue that there is a need for clear expectations regarding 
roles and behaviour to foster sufficient levels of trust which are essential to enduring 
partnerships (see also Cooke, 1990; Dietz, 2004; Guest and Peccei, 2001).  Before 
considering the understandings of organisational actors it is useful to review the 
perspectives of academic commentators.   
 
Among researchers, there is a lack of clear definition of what partnership actually 
means (Ackers and Payne, 1998; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Terry, 2003), as well as 
little guidance on how to recognise a genuine example of partnership or non-
partnership (Dietz, 2004).  Arguably, this may reflect a polarised way of looking at a 
messy world, when the reality is likely to be less clear cut.  This creates problems 
with the selection of case study organisations,  and raises questions of whether 
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researchers are actually comparing „like with like‟ mentioned earlier.  This is crucial, 
otherwise the evidence may not be of partnership failing as such, but rather 
„partnership‟ providing a label for concession bargaining or old style collective 
bargaining, and pseudo-participation masquerading as partnership (Roche and Geary, 
2002).   
 
Typically, academic definitions suggest a notion of reciprocity (Martinez-Lucio and 
Stuart, 2002) and “co-operation for mutual gain” (Tailby and Winchester, 2005), 
coupled with the notion of proactive decision making.  Given the inherent ambiguity, 
the thesis has highlighted the need to clarify the meaning of partnership in the UK and 
the influential definitions of the TUC and IPA were used to confirm that  NatBank, 
BuSoc and WebBank all  represented prima facie cases of partnership (IPA, 1997; 
TUC, 1999).  Interestingly, while NatBank had followed the TUC model, and 
WebBank had been inspired by the IPA model, at BuSoc the approach was more ad 
hoc and haphazard.  The thesis has also proposed that partnership can be thought of 
more usefully as a mix of certain practices and processes.  Practices typically centre 
around a structure of representative participation, while processes concern 
consultation, decision making and actor relationships.  It also proposes that associated 
outcomes such as sharing success, flexibility and employment security are matters for 
empirical investigation, rather than integral components of partnership per se. 
 
For organisational actors, partnership also requires a clear understanding of purpose 
and the rules of engagement (Cooke, 1990; Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004) yet 
intriguingly, the understanding of partnership held by the actors in the cases did not 
always correspond with the interpretation adopted by the critical commentators in the 
academic literature.  It is quite possible that the expectations of armchair academic 
theorists do not match the expectations of workers and trade unionists.  Critics often 
denounce partnership on the basis that it does not offer unions „joint-decision 
making‟, „joint-governance‟ or „co-determination‟.  For example, one study concludes 
that there was “extant managerial hostility to any notion of joint-decision-making” 
(Danford et.al, 2004, 185).  Upchurch et.al (2006) also criticise a partnership in the 
finance sector on the grounds that it did not deliver “equal dialogue” or “economic 
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and industrial democracy”, reflecting their view that a broader issue of an inherent 
class conflict exists.   
 
With regard to the present case studies, it is difficult to see how this can be presented 
as a justifiable criticism of partnership for two reasons.  Firstly, the actors in these 
case studies did not believe that partnership meant co-determination of decisions.  
Partnership was viewed as problem solving and as a means to promote information, 
consultation and dialogue at an early stage, but in all cases management and 
representatives unanimously agreed that within a partnership framework management 
retained their right to manage, and indeed to make the final decision. This was not 
perceived to be a particular problem; indeed workers and employee representatives 
believed that on balance they did benefit from partnership working, and were 
generally positive about the outcomes, arguing that decisions were often better as a 
result.  Secondly,   it is difficult to gauge  whether the situation would have been 
different without a partnership approach, i.e. with a traditional approach, and this is 
often overlooked by the critics who stress the need for negotiation and not „just‟ 
consultation which they dismiss as second best  (see for example Upchurch et.al, 
2006).  There has been a shift away from negotiation to consultation in the UK for 
many years (Cully et.al, 1999; Brown et.al, 2000; Oxenbridge et.al, 2003; Terry, 
2003), and there is a danger of comparing consultation under partnership with a 
romantic historical view of trade unionism.  As Brown et.al (2000) remind us, union 
influence has declined over the past twenty years on both pay and non-pay issues, 
with the exception of health and safety where strict legislation applies.  Similarly, 
Terry (2003) points out that shop stewards are “no longer joint architects of 
organisational policy”, with or without partnership.  As he asserts: 
“The concept of „joint regulation‟, long seen as the normative cornerstone of 
British industrial relations, clear evidence of unions‟ capacity to influence the 
policies and practices of employers, has to be set aside” (Terry, 2003, 460). 
 
Despite this, Heery (2006) found that union officers still view information and 
consultation as less central to their job than bargaining, reflecting their continued 
aspiration for joint regulation (452).  However, both researchers and actors need to 
have a clear understanding of what is meant by partnership, and what exactly it is 
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expected to achieve.  This study has proposed that often the expectations of academic 
theorists or some trade union officials may not necessarily correspond with those of 
organisational actors, and that in particular employee views are seldom taken into 
account. 
2. The importance of process: mutual legitimation of interests? 
It is also argued that existing studies often overlook the process of partnership, and 
this is important if the extent to which partnership contributes to a mutual legitimation 
of interests is to be evaluated. In other words, does partnership change the way 
decisions are made?  As Guest and Peccei (1992) argue in relation to downsizing, the 
actual process of decision-making is important as well as the final outcome.  Critics 
including Gall (2001) and Kelly (2004) highlight redundancies in organisations 
espousing partnership as evidence of the failure of partnership.  However, as Dietz 
(2004) argues “one need not express surprise when large scale redundancies take 
place under partnership…the issue is how they are handled”.  Given that “structure 
does not equate with process” (Boxall and Purcell, 2003, 171) and “good processes 
matter more than institutions” (Guest and Peccei, 1998, 9) there is a need to 
investigate the process of partnership in detail.   As Freemen and Medolf (1984) 
argue, the efficacy of employee voice depends upon the way employers and 
employees interact, in other words the process of decision-making.  The issue is 
whether voice achieves a regulatory impact (Hyman, 2005), or the „power to 
persuade‟ (Greenfield and Pleasure, 1993).  Roche and Geary (2002) have also 
highlighted a need to understand more about the micro-politics of partnership 
working.  To this end, there was evidence of the partnership process exerting a 
moderating effect over decision making, particularly where a „business case for 
equity‟ could be made, resulting in decisions which accommodated the views of 
representatives/employees to a greater degree than they may otherwise have done. 
 
In relation to the analytical framework proposed by Walton and McKersie (1965), it 
has been proposed that a strong partnership would be characterised more by an 
integrative approach than it would be by  a distributive approach (see also Haynes and 
Allen, 2001).  When analysed in this way, the approaches at NatBank and WebBank 
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appear to be more successful than at BuSoc. At NatBank and WebBank there was 
evidence of attempts to identify common interests, brainstorming to identify solutions, 
and an emphasis on trust and transparency.  Actors regularly spoke in terms of 
problem-solving approaches, and there was evidence of them devising innovative 
solutions through the process of dialogue.  At BuSoc, the process was led by the chief 
negotiator, information was less free flowing and the union focus was on establishing 
and defending their „position‟.  This led to the possibility that the „good employment 
relations‟ may be a result of employer paternalism and goodwill as opposed to 
partnership between management and the Bu Soc Union.  The scope of union activity 
was also very limited, with a focus on terms and conditions, whereas in the other two 
cases the scope was much broader with evidence of the partnership operating at 
multiple levels.  In other words, the bargaining relationship at BuSoc displayed more 
characteristics of traditional distributive bargaining than of the integrative bargaining 
style associated with partnership.  In terms of attitudinal structuring, the importance of 
actor relationships, attitudes and behaviours was evident in all three cases.  There was 
evidence to suggest that at BuSoc relationships remained much more „tactical‟ and 
defensive; whereas at NatBank and WebBank relationships were more open.  Indeed, 
at both NatBank and WebBank relationships had improved significantly over the last 
five years, especially between representatives and senior management, and 
particularly in relation to the legitimacy of the other party. 
 
Of course outcome is important as well as process, but to achieve a more holistic 
understanding outcomes are best explored in context.  This was an advantage of the 
critical incident technique, as it allowed specific issues to be identified and 
investigated in great detail. Accordingly, employing the analytical framework 
proposed by Budd (2004), there was evidence to suggest that as a result of voice and 
dialogue, union/ employee representatives were often able to moderate decisions to 
mitigate the worst effects for employees at NatBank and WebBank.  To illustrate, in 
Figure 9.1 management may have proposed an efficiency-oriented decision to make 
100 compulsory redundancies (D1).  Traditionally, the union may have opposed the 
redundancies on philosophical grounds.  However, at NatBank for example, the union 
and management team worked together to reach an agreement regarding redundancy 
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policy.  This includes firstly discussing alternatives to job losses such as 
redeployment/relocation, minimising the number of losses, generous voluntary 
payments, career counselling and extensive notice period.  The mitigation of the pure 
efficiency decision is reflected by arrow D2.    The research revealed that moderation 
and mitigation appeared to be the dominant characteristics of decision-making under 
partnership.   While the ideal decision for the union may have been D3 (no job 
losses), partnership may enable a compromise to be struck.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1  Moderating efficiency, equity and voice at NatBank 
 
The framework can also be used to illustrate the dynamics of discipline and grievance 
at WebBank.  High turnover and discipline cases were highlighted by senior managers 
at WebBank to be a significant problem especially in the call centre environment.  A 
key area of involvement for the Forum was acting as an intermediary in disputes 
between employees and line managers.  A team manager recounted an incident 
involving an employee who developed a poor attendance record.  It was believed that 
after several warnings an efficiency-oriented decision would need to be made to 
dismiss the employee.  The team manager admitted that he was slightly bewildered 
and disappointed by this, as the employee concerned was a consistently high 
performing member of staff, and therefore decided to ask a People Forum 
D1              D2                                                      D3 
MODERATING 
VOICE 
EFFICIENCY                     EQUITY 
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representative to try and find out what was wrong.  It transpired that the employee had 
a poor relationship with her line manager, and believed that she had been the victim of 
bullying.  After investigation, the team manager transferred the employee to another 
team, and the employees attendance record improved significantly.  The team 
manager believed that had there been no opportunity for forum intervention a high 
performing employee would probably have been dismissed, and the root of the 
problem never identified.  In other words, management may have dismissed the 
employee following several warnings, on the grounds that it was the most efficient 
decision (D1).  However, it was believed it was better to invest some time to ascertain 
the underlying cause and to try and resolve the situation.  This resulted in a decision 
which was both efficient for the organisation as a high performing was retained, but 
also more equitable for the worker, as she was able to air her grievance and did not 
lose her job as a result of a relationship breakdown (D2).  Indeed, the ostensibly 
efficient decision (D1) may actually have been inefficient given that an experienced 
and popular employee may have been dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2 Moderating efficiency, equity and voice at WebBank 
 
The same regulatory effect could not be identified in the case of BuSoc.  It was 
suggested that in the previous five years employment relations had generally been 
good with few major controversies.  The main recent incident was identified as the 
end of the final salary pension scheme to new entrants.  This has become a significant 
D1              D2                                                      D3 
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issue among mutual organisations, as spiralling pensions costs are seen to be eating 
into their ability to compete with their banking rivals.  Increasing subsidies for the 
funds is controversial as often the main beneficiaries are executives.  In 2001, the 
society took the decision to close the fund to new employees (D2).  A more drastic but 
efficient decision may have been D1 (close the scheme to all staff).  D3 represents a 
more equitable but less efficient approach of the employer increasing their 
contributions and lump some payments to help the fund.  Yet there was little evidence 
of the decision being regulated by the union.  Indeed the decision was said to have 
been imposed without consultation.  So while the decision may have been D2 (end 
final salary scheme to new members) and not perhaps the more drastic D1 which was 
the course of action taken by Kent Reliance and the Newbury Building Society at a 
similar time, there was little evidence of this being a result of union involvement.  
This is indicated by the dashed arrows in Figure 9.3.  In 2006, D2 remains the case 
although other organisations such as Clydesdale Bank and Co-operative Bank have 
recently opted for D1.  At BuSoc the union have since agreed to increases in 
employee contributions in return for lump sum payments by the employer, but the 
future of the pension fund remains uncertain and is still a significant concern for the 
union.  Again, such decisions must be placed in context.  It is worth noting that of the 
92 FTSE 100 firms which have final salary pension schemes, almost all are closed to 
new members and only one firm has closed the scheme to existing members as well.  
Nevertheless, some actuaries have predicted that final salary schemes will be „history 
by 2012‟ (The Guardian, 02.08.06).  Accordingly, it would be disingenuous to 
criticise BuSoc and BuSoc Union on the grounds of the pensions outcome alone, 
given that it reflects the trend in other financial service sector firms as well as the 
FTSE 100 overall.  Despite this caveat, it is argued that there is still evidence of poor 
process, as the decision was simply imposed unilaterally by management, with 
negligible union involvement.  This underlines the complex relationship between 
process and outcomes, in that poor process need not necessarily result in poor 
outcomes and vice versa. 
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Figure 9.3 Efficiency, equity and voice at BuSoc 
 
In other words, two of the cases demonstrated evidence of „partial success‟ in many 
instances with the voice process appearing to moderate decisions.  The same could not 
be said in the case of BuSoc, with the most important decision in recent years being 
made without consultation, and limited evidence to suggest that more positive 
decisions were actually the result of union engagement as opposed to employer 
goodwill.  The Budd framework is therefore useful in illustrating how – and whether - 
voice moderated countervailing pressures between efficiency and equity.  However, 
an important caveat must be raised in relation to Budd‟s call for „balance‟: what 
exactly is meant by balancing the objectives of the employment relationship.  The 
phrase appears to suggest some kind of stable equilibrium and raises concerns 
therefore as to whether this is actually achievable (Estreicher, 2005; Adams, 2005; 
Estreicher, 2005; Hyman, 2005), thus mirroring many old 1970s debates around 
pluralist IR (Fox, 1974; Clegg, 1975; Hyman, 1978).   It is not surprising that radical 
scholars such as Hyman are dismissive, as Budd acknowledges “critical industrial 
relations views the labour problem as inherent in capitalism and seeks to replace it 
with worker ownership and socialism” (p.103).  For liberal pluralists, on the other 
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hand, the ideas are highly attractive and provide a useful framework for analysis 
(Bamber, 2005).  However, it is proposed that balance may not be the most 
appropriate term; indeed it is difficult to imagine what a balance would look like in 
reality.  Adams (2005, 115) proposes a slightly modified objective, “optimality within 
minimally accepted bounds…societies should attempt to optimise efficiency, equity 
and voice – but the result might not be an equal weighting of all three objectives”.  In 
other words, the aim should be to achieve sufficient levels of voice and equity 
compatible with high levels of efficiency.  This reflects the argument of Howells 
(2005) that, in reality, fairness is likely to be the „junior partner‟, with fairness in the 
service of competitiveness rather than the other way round.  It is therefore unlikely to 
be an equal measure of each.  Admittedly, Budd (2005) acknowledges these 
criticisms, and suggests that „balance‟ need not necessarily be thought of as an equal 
weighting between the three components, but rather as “the search for arrangements 
that enhance one or more dimensions without undue sacrifices in other dimensions” 
(p.196), and that they should be viewed more as a „regulative ideal‟, even if it is never 
realised.  He comments that „respect‟ could be an alternative to „balance‟, but suggests 
this creates a new question of how much respect is enough?   
 
In many respects such arguments again reflect the controversies surrounding 
pluralism which existed in the 1970s, and related concerns in relation to whether the 
pluralist ethic even requires or implies a balance of power (Fox, 1974; Clegg, 1975, 
315).  Although power inequalities were a key concern for „radical pluralists‟ such as 
Fox, the existence of a power balance was not a particular belief of liberal pluralists 
such as Clegg who argued that “the pluralist ethic does not postulate a balance of 
power”.  As Budd (2004) acknowledges, the fact that a balance of power does not 
exist does not mean it is not a worthy aspiration.  This study, however, prefers the use 
of the terms „accommodation‟ or „moderation‟ as it is believed that these are the most 
compatible with the liberal pluralist view of the employment relationship.  This does 
not imply that their ought to be an equal weighting which new pluralism simply 
cannot offer, and arguably old pluralism never offered either.  In short, partnership is 
believed to represent an attempt to make the employment relationship less 
imbalanced; but not an attempt to make the employment relationship balanced.  
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It is argued that the framework proposed by Budd is a useful heuristic device when 
exploring the subtle processes of partnership, though it inevitably simplifies complex 
relationships.  Studies such as those by Kelly (2004) which rely on raw quantitative 
indicators such as the number of redundancies or pay differentials, overlook the 
qualitative aspects such as the way the process was handled, and clearly this is also of 
great importance to workers.  They also fail to address the impact of wider 
environmental factors.  This reflects problems experienced in establishing a link 
between HRM and performance due to problems in establishing causality, 
inconsistency of HR practices applied, variations in the proxies used to measure high 
commitment HRM and performance, and the reliance on self reported scores from HR 
managers (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005).  There is therefore evidence to support 
the arguments of Findlay and McKinlay (2003) that  it is from the process of 
partnership itself - the benefits of both influence over management and real 
involvement in governance processes - that employees may stand to gain from 
partnership. 
 
3. Actors experiences and  partnership outcomes : mutually beneficial? . 
Practices must be seen to be beneficial for managers, unions and employees if the 
partnership is to be enduring (Haynes and Allen, 2001), but, again, this need not 
necessarily mean an equal distribution of benefits for all actors (Clegg, 1975).  The 
study found that on balance, management, union and employee actors were all in 
favour of a collaborative partnership approach.  Management demonstrated a degree 
of pragmatism, and appeared to value the additional input they received through 
dialogue and the facilitation of organisational change.  For unions this is optimistic, 
given that in the two unionised organisations many senior managers acknowledged 
that unions „added value‟  because of their knowledge of what was happening on the 
shop-floor (Terry, 2003).  Union officials and representatives also valued the 
additional resources they had been provided under partnership, as well as the 
increased access to information and key management figures.  This supports findings 
by Roche and Geary (2002) and is inconsistent with studies which predict that 
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partnership will necessarily lead to the subordination of unions; indeed at NatBank it 
had actually revitalised workplace union organisation.  Across the cases, employee 
opinion – which is often overlooked - suggested that they believed that adversarialism 
was no longer an appropriate union strategy.  Indeed, many employees were critical of 
adversarial tactics, and suggested they were no longer relevant or useful.  Radicals 
may attribute this to „false consciousness‟ (Legge, 1995) but there is no reason to 
suggest that employees are „cultural dopes‟.    Moreover, although employees all 
agreed that voice is important, in the case of WebBank they did not necessarily want 
union voice, while at BuSoc and NatBank most employees were opposed to 
adversarial unionism.  This is consistent with surveys in the US and UK which 
suggest that while workers want voice, they do not necessarily want union voice 
(Bryson, 2004).    Research has suggested that though workers still have a belief in 
collective action with their colleagues, they do not necessarily see a union as central 
to this (Diamond and Freeman, 2001).  This contrasts with the critical findings of 
studies such as Danford et.al (2004) which suggest a deterioration in the quality of 
working life, and “the anti thesis of mutual gain” (p. 28).  Overall then, the positive 
actor responses offer a stark contrast to the critical responses in much of the existing 
literature.   
 
Critics of partnership often express disillusionment and conclude that partnership has 
failed to meet expectations especially in terms of gains for unions and employees.  
They frequently selectively quote the remarks of Guest and Peccei (2001, 231) that 
“the balance of advantage is skewed towards management” as evidence of the 
inherent „failure‟ of partnership (see for example Kelly, 2004; Smith and Morton, 
2006).  Smith and Morton (2006) for example use this statement to support their 
argument that partnerships serve to “entrench employer power”. Interestingly, this 
statement is often taken out of context given that Guest and Peccei also state how 
“taken overall…the results can be seen as a positive endorsement of the concept of 
partnership…evidence of a balance of advantage for management…is not in itself an 
argument against partnership” (Guest and Peccei, 2001, 231).  They argue that in the 
cases where the gains were skewed a high trust partnership had yet to emerge.  It is 
not then evidence of the failure of partnership per se, but rather a problem with the 
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way partnership has been operating, and even the most ardent partnership enthusiasts 
acknowledge that without a coherent and integrated approach, partnership need not 
automatically and unambiguously lead to mutual gains (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). 
Indeed, it is somewhat fatalistic to argue that partnership necessarily leads to 
managerial dominance and weakens unions, given that irrespective of partnership 
management-union relationships are stacked in favour of the latter over the former 
(Wills, 2004), given the change in power relations since 1979.  In short, it is argued 
that perhaps the benchmarks for success set by critics are often set so high it is easy to 
conclude that partnership is ineffective. As Stuart and Martinez-Lucio (2004b, 422) 
point out: 
 “The expectations – both in terms of hopes and fears – generated by the term 
[partnership] mean that it has become all too easy to set it up as a „straw-debate‟ 
with the aim of knocking it down” (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004b, 422). 
 
For example, in their study of partnership in a non-union retail firm, Badigannavar 
and Kelly (2005) judge the effectiveness of partnership on the basis of the extent to 
which it „meets‟ the TUC‟s six principles of partnership, and pass judgement 
accordingly, before concluding that “the partnership is quite precarious as well as 
ineffective” (Badigannavar and Kelly, 2005, 1543).  It is also noteworthy that despite 
the fact that some positive empirical findings are often reported in the data of critical 
writers, such findings are duly overlooked when they draw their pessimistic 
conclusions. Even the most critical studies such as Upchurch et.al (2005, 12) report 
that “it is clear that the Partnership Council has been a useful forum for agreeing 
integrative concerns through consultation”. Clearly, employing an ideal type or 
aspirational model as an analytical framework against which to judge outcomes is 
setting a very high barrier for success.  After all, even the IR optimists only suggested 
that partnership may allow unions to re-enter the mainstream of employment relations 
(Ackers and Payne, 1998); they did not argue that employment relations would be 
completely recast overnight.  What is more difficult to judge, however, is what may 
have happened in organisations without the partnership dialogue.  It is conceivable 
that the situation may actually have been much worse.  As Pfeffer argues: 
 “One should compare programmes not with some ideal but with the situation 
that would exist in their absence.  In other words, just because a programme 
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does not solve every problem or move the organisation all the way, particularly 
initially, to where it wants and needs to be does not mean that it is a failure.  A 
programme fails when it produces either no sustained change or else change that 
it is dysfunctional and ineffective.  Some remediation of problems in managing 
the employment relation is certainly better than nothing at all (Pfeffer, 1994, 
206). 
Indeed, several benefits were found in the three cases confirming other studies, 
including increased legitimacy of the representative body, improved decision-making, 
constructive collaborative relationships and improved employment relations generally 
(Guest and Peccei, 2001; Roche and Geary, 2002; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004).   
 
Yet in the terms used by Kelly (2004), none of the case studies could possibly be 
described as labour-parity (i.e. high product demand, tight labour market and high 
union density) which he suggests is a prerequisite for genuine co-operation, and – as 
he predicts of financial services partnerships - would best be described as employer-
dominant.  Yet it would be unfair – and inaccurate - to characterise the partnerships as 
little more than union compliance and employer dominance. Upchurch et.al (2005, 
18) report that 4/5 of employees in their study believed their representatives put 
forward their views at meetings, 3/5 believed they were effective, and 2/3 believed 
management sometimes/frequently asked for their views, yet the authors conclude 
“partnership had proved relatively ineffective for employee voice”.  For reformists, 
however, what really matters is the extent to which partnership delivers some benefits 
to employees, as well a wider benefits to the economy and society as a whole.  There 
is therefore a need to reconsider the benchmarks for success, and perhaps more 
attention needs to be paid to the expectations and perceptions of the actors 
themselves, and not those of armchair theorists. 
 
The evidence from this study suggests that the primary advantage of partnership was 
that actors believed often decisions were more palatable as a result of the partnership 
process, and this is clearly very important. As Dietz et.al (2005) contend: 
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We would argue that the litmus-test for all partnerships – unionised or not – is 
the quality of the joint problem solving processes in the terms we suggested 
earlier: of giving significant influence to employees over organizational decision-
making early in the process…and in delivering regular, acceptable mutual gains 
for all parties (Dietz et.al, 2005, 302) 
 
Admittedly, the partnerships may not actually have balanced the objectives of the 
employment relationship in terms of efficiency, equity and voice (Budd, 2004).  
Moreover, the gains of partnership may not have flowed equally to employers, 
employees and unions.  But this is not sufficient reasoning to dismiss the concept of 
partnership, else we risk throwing the baby out with the bath water.  Concepts of 
mutuality and balancing may be useful in an aspirational sense, but the reality is likely 
to be less impressive than this ideal in a capitalist society.  It may be partly due to the 
“inappropriateness of „mutuality‟ as a device for conceptualising the employment 
relationship under partnership regimes”, and that a reality of genuine mutuality is 
rare (Suff and Williams, 2004). Again, there are perhaps better thought of as a 
regulative ideal (Budd, 2004), and this wholly compatible with a pluralist conception 
of the employment relationship, where the aim is one of levelling the playing field.  It 
also underlines the danger of conflating partnership (defined as a combination of 
practices and processes) with employment relations outcomes, which need to be 
considered separately.  These reservations notwithstanding, partnership facilitated 
dialogue and voice, which promoted more considered decision making, and the 
moderation of business decisions and often mitigated the impact on employees.  When 
judged in this light, the partnerships at NatBank, BuSoc and WebBank demonstrate a 
modicum of success.  
 
 
Challenges 
 
Despite the positive overall conclusions, significant challenges to enduring 
partnerships remain, but these do not provide arguments against partnership per se.  
As Geary and Roche (2004) note, partnership needs to be institutionalised to a 
significant degree, taking root at multiple levels and operating consistently over time.  
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They argue that partnership must operate at multiple levels including day-to-day 
decision-making.  Embedding partnership at all levels was found to be a challenge in 
all case organisations, with representatives frequently citing inconsistencies in 
approach, reflecting findings by Marks et.al (1998), Heaton et.al (2002) and Dietz 
(2004).  This was normally attributed to the second challenge identified, a lack of 
middle management engagement with the concept of partnership working. 
 
Middle management may perceive partnership policies as at odds with reality, 
restricting autonomy, slowing down decision-making, or promoting policies which 
they believe are fine in theory but difficult to effect in practice.  They may also have a 
lack of skills, disdain for HR work and competing priorities.  This can lead to 
inconsistencies in application, making it difficult to embed a partnership culture 
(Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005).  WERS04 reveals that management are more 
supportive of unions where they believe they contribute to business performance 
(Kersely et.al, 2004), but even instrumental support for unions may not be enough to 
form enduring partnership relationships, if it is not underpinned by a wider social 
legitimacy.  As Boxall and Purcell remark: 
 “Few voice systems and positive union-management relations will exist, or exist 
for long, unless they are valued in their own right as legitimate and morally 
necessary activities irrespective of their performance outcomes.  They have to 
have social legitimacy”(Boxall and Purcell, 2003, 182). 
 
Representative efficacy was another significant challenge.  As Terry states “success 
in consultation is perceived to rely on force of argument and technical competence 
rather than on muscle” (Terry, 2003, 493), and this may be difficult where 
representatives have traditionally criticised rather than engaged.  This may create a 
gulf between representatives and their members.  It is also more difficult for 
representatives to know what to support.  While it is relatively easy to know what to 
support in terms of pay and conditions it is less easy to know what to support 
regarding changes to work organisation (Terry, 2003).  There is also a delicate 
balancing act to be struck by representatives between being perceived to be „too 
strong‟ or „too weak‟ (Ackers et.al, 2004).   If representatives are perceived to be too 
challenging, they may lose employer support, and employees may also disapprove of 
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„old-style tactics‟.  On the other hand, if representatives are not challenging, 
employers may not get the feedback and input they require, and employees are likely 
to view the representatives as co-opted and question their value.  This supports the 
propositions of Ackers et.al (2004) that both overly adversarial approaches and weak 
partnership approaches are not sustainable in the long-term.  Nevertheless, the 
example of WebBank suggests the possibility that moderately weak non-union 
partnerships may actually be sustainable.  It still seems reasonable to suggest, 
however, that  strong and high-trust partnership is most likely to be sustainable in the 
long term.  (Guest and Peccei, 2001; Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004).  This supports 
the findings of WERS04, that management are more likely to be supportive of trade 
unions where they believe they make a positive contribution to business performance 
(Kersely et.al, 2006). 
 
As mentioned earlier, regulatory context is often cited as a barrier to sustainable 
partnerships in liberal market economies such as the UK (Heery, 2002; Deakin et.al, 
2002, 2004, Turnbull et.al, 2004). There was some evidence to support that 
occasionally, despite the rhetoric of partnership, decisions would be imposed on the 
grounds that they are deemed to be „essential for financial reasons‟.  For example at 
NatBank outsourcing to India was deemed essential in order to remain competitive, 
while at BuSoc the decision to close the final salary pension scheme was unilaterally 
imposed, and deemed essential to avoid further losses. It was also found that 
union/representative arguments were more likely to convince managers that a decision 
made business as well as ethical sense.  However, there are limitations to this 
criticism, as there is no prospect of the UK adopting old-style EU corporatism, and 
indeed such styles may be fading there too.  
 
Lastly, concerns must be expressed regarding the resistance of partnership to 
adversity, particularly in a voluntarist environment.  Partnerships should not be seen 
in terms of a static agreement (Stuart and Martinez-Lucio, 2004b) but must be able to 
stand of test of time (Gall, 2001) and this is difficult to predict.  Cooke (1990) 
suggests that to function co-operative frameworks have to have processes to deal with 
challenges and threats, as well as positive developments.  Challenges are likely to 
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include a change in key actors/partnership champions, or a major conflict or 
organisational decision.  This requires a commitment to the legitimacy of the actor 
contributions, and an acceptance of the inevitability of some conflict over divergent 
interests.  As Haynes and Allen (2001, 181) comment “partnership unionism 
represents not so much a bipolar movement from adversarialism to co-operation, but 
a movement from co-operation within an adversarial context, to constrained conflict 
within a co-operative framework”.  In other words, parties need to accept the 
inevitability of some conflict arising within a healthy partnership.  This pluralist 
perspective was generally accepted in the unionised environments of NatBank and 
BuSoc.  At NatBank the partnership appears to have weathered the storm of the first 
five years, and the agreement has been renewed for another five years.  At BuSoc 
there had been few tests in the last five years besides the issue of pensions, and on this 
particular issue partnership failed.  In the non-union case of WebBank, however, 
management demonstrated a much more unitarist perspective, and should a major 
dispute arise the ability of the structure to survive remains to be seen.  As such, it 
remains untested.   Streeck (1992) expresses concerns regarding voluntary 
partnerships for three reasons: asymmetry of power; union views only legitimate 
when they serve market functions and maintaining „good behaviour‟.  In other words, 
how effective can the representatives be if they are perceived by management to be 
obstructive or out of line with the business interest.  In this respect the case of 
WebBank would present the most precarious partnership.  Partnership advocates, 
however, would argue that voluntary arrangements can be sustainable with sufficient 
strategic integration (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, it would appear that the impact of partnership on employment relations 
in Britain is considerably more complex than the existing literature suggests. On 
balance, the thesis offers some support for the advocates, as well as some support for 
the concerns expressed by the critics.  In particular, the thesis has argued that there is 
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a need to understand more about the context and process in addition to the difficult to 
measure outcomes, if the realities of partnership working and a comprehensive 
understanding is to be achieved.  To this end, it is argued that the views of the critics 
are too fatalistic and defeatist, and of little use to ordinary employees and managers 
looking for a way to improve the quality of their employment relations.  It also 
suggests that different trajectories of experience are possible, and indeed likely.  
There is also a need to re-think exactly what partnership means, and what it is 
expected to achieve and assess accordingly.  The thesis has also demonstrated the 
value of exploring the process of partnership as well outcomes, and Budd (2004) 
offers a useful framework for doing this.  There is also a need to compare the actual 
outcomes in real contexts of decision making shaped by partnership, and to compare 
outcomes not just with the „ideal‟ outcome, but with the other possible alternatives.  
As these cases demonstrate, several decisions were better than they could otherwise 
have been for staff, and the partnership approach had resulted in several compromises 
to the benefit of employees by mitigating the impact of decisions.  Representatives 
also benefited from increased legitimacy.  There was evidence to suggest that without 
the partnership dialogue decisions may have been more focused on short-term 
efficiency, with scant regard for the equity outcomes.  Interestingly management 
acknowledged that decisions based solely on „profit-maximising‟ and „efficiency‟, i.e. 
bad HRM,  are often inefficient because they are met with staff resistance and union 
opposition, whereas compromises which may appear to be less efficient and slower 
are actually moreso because of greater legitimacy and acceptability.  In other words, 
managers expressed that often there was a sound business case for equity.  Partnership 
is unlikely to „balance‟ the objectives of the employment relationship, but it is quite 
possible that the outcomes were more balanced than they would have otherwise been, 
and this is a central component of the pluralist ethic.  Moreover it is difficult to 
imagine what a balance would actually look like (Clegg, 1975).  Partnership may not 
lead to the development of three stakeholder organisations, but rather three 
organisations which were more stakeholder-oriented than they may otherwise have 
been.  There was also little evidence of support for a more militant/adversarial 
approach in this context.  In addition, there is evidence to suggest that an effective 
partnership encourages management to think more strategically and long term, in 
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relation to their HRM and employment relations policies.  When judged in this light, 
the cases of NatBank, BuSoc and WebBank demonstrate various degrees of success, 
although of course significant challenges remain if partnership is to become an 
enduring model of employment relations regulation in the UK.  As with other forms 
of participation, “initiatives are probably more limited than the enthusiasts claim, but 
more constructive than the critics admit” (Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005, 415). 
 
 
Implications for practice 
 
The findings of the research also raise some important implications for the key actors 
involved in partnership working. 
 
Trade unions are increasingly required to demonstrate the value they can add in 
the eyes of both employers and employees.  Although critics argue that the risks of 
partnership are so high that it may be „partnership and perish‟ (Tailby et.al, 2005, 3),  
this study proposes, however, that the viability of a more heroic militant route is 
highly questionable.  Rather, trade unions need a different approach if they are to 
prove they can actually add value.  The study found that many employees no longer 
support adversarial strategies, and the WebBank case reveals how many workers are 
happy with non-union voice mechanisms, and are questioning what a union can add.  
Others were more overtly negative and viewed unions as outdated and the organisers 
of strikes.  This echoes quantitative studies which suggest that employees appear to be 
doubting the effectiveness of union voice (Bryson, 2004), and relates to the paradox 
of unionised worker satisfaction, where union members are consistently found to be 
more dissatisfied than their non-member counterparts (Guest and Conway, 2004).  It 
is possible, however, that unions raise member expectations and political 
consciousness but may be perceived to be failing to deliver against such expectations, 
making workers more aware of problems, and therefore more likely to report them 
(Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  Even if it is true it still presents a challenge for unions. 
In sum, suggestions that employees favour direct rather than representative voice, 
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perceive non-union voice to be more effective than union voice, and that union 
members are the most dissatisfied, make very bleak reading for unions.    
 
Accordingly, this study suggests that unions need to adapt to the new realities of 
work, and to re-think their approach, if they are to secure the support of employers, 
employees and government.  Just as Labour re-invented themselves in 1997 as a party 
which claims to be aware of the needs of both the business community and workers, 
the union movement needs to consider how they can re-invent themselves as useful 
parties in the eyes of both employers and employees. Trade unions need to ensure that 
they offer sufficient training and support for representatives to take up the new 
challenging roles, so they are capable of engaging in consultation and not merely 
opposing or criticising.  Representatives are increasingly required to challenge on the 
grounds of business case, and this requires different skills and approaches.  The 
evidence suggests that unions do have an advantage through their knowledge and 
external intelligence.  Unions may benefit from exploring how they can best share this 
knowledge with, and between, union representatives.  They also need to improve 
communication with and recruitment of a new generation of never members, free-
riders, and in particular younger workers.  Raising the profile of trade unions at 
universities and colleges and increased use of the internet to raise awareness and 
service members may be two avenues for this.  Websites such as 
www.worksmart.org.uk suggest that unions are shifting in this direction.  Unions must 
also engage with the reality of the heterogeneity of channels now available to British 
workers and employers, as various combinations of union/non-union and 
direct/indirect are now increasingly possible.  Overall, the findings lend support to the 
argument that partnership may be pursued by management with or without trade 
unions (Ackers et.al, 2004). The NatBank case illustrates that unions can gain 
significant benefits from a strong partnership relationship.  In short, the findings 
starkly disagree with the pessimistic views shared by Darlington, 1994; Fairbrother, 
1996 and Kelly, 1998.  For unions, it may be the case that they need to learn to 
demonstrate strength through flexibility by „bending like the willow‟, as a traditional 
macho approach appears incompatible with the current multi-channel environment. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
435 
Employers have little to fear from partnership. However, if the representative body 
is to function effectively they need to accept the legitimacy of the representative body, 
and acknowledge the right of the body to question and to sometimes disagree.  
Employers may be concerned that partnership may lead to sub-optimal decisions, for 
example engaging with a union which appears to defend the lowest performing 
employees, or compromising on decisions.  Yet the evidence suggested that in the 
long-term this was not the case.  The representative bodies agreed that on occasions 
decisions regarding discipline and grievance are fair, so long as employees have the 
opportunity to have a fair hearing.  From their perspective, the priority was ensuring 
that due process was followed, and that it was „felt fair‟, even though the final 
outcome may have been the same.  There were also several examples where employer 
compromises may have been deemed suboptimal.  However, in reality, often 
management suggested that the strategic decision making which partnership 
encouraged, allowed them to identify decisions which were actually more efficient in 
the long term. Employers need to recognise that attempts to constrain the 
representative body too much is likely to result is a structure which is mutually 
detrimental rather than mutually beneficial.  If management treat partnership as a sign 
of union weakness and attempt to exploit the situation, or conversely if the union 
views a management preference for co-operation as indicative of management 
weakness, the structures and relationships are unlikely to be effective (Bryson and 
Freeman, 2006).  Rather, weak „fig leaf‟ partnerships will deliver little for employers, 
unions or workers.  Moreover, the commitment to employee representation and 
collaborative working must extend far beyond the executive team or the HR 
department to have any real impact.  In particular it is essential to get the „buy-in‟ of 
the line managers who are actually managing people on a day-to-day basis, as this was 
identified as one of the main barriers to effective partnership working, resonating with 
earlier studies into employee involvement initatives (Marchington et.al, 1992). 
 
Employees need to be more engaged with representation. The danger is that 
partnership becomes an arcane elite-level process of little relevance to workers, as 
was illustrated in the BuSoc example.  The lack of interest may also mean that elected 
representatives are standing for the wrong reasons, again acting as a barrier to the 
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construction of effective partnership relationships.  Effective communication between 
the actors is key.  The study suggested that most employees did not want information 
forced upon them, but rather that they were generally kept up to date, and knew how 
to access further information should they require it.  The study also supports the 
notion that employees increasingly want co-operation not confrontation, where the 
union works with management to improve the workplace and working conditions, as 
opposed to a focus solely on defending workers (Bryson and Freeman, 2006).  
 
 
Implications for future research 
 
Considerable scope for further research into partnership remains.  The following may 
provide interesting avenues for further research studies in terms of both methodology 
and research questions: 
 
1. Longitudinal studies 
This study has offered a snapshot of partnership at a particular point in time in these 
organisations.  Of course, additional context has been obtained through secondary 
documentation and historical accounts of respondents, but it would be interesting to 
observe a partnership relationship over time.  It is argued that partnership is not static 
but constantly evolving, and exposed to different pressures and tensions over time. To 
this end further contributions could be made through longitudinal studies. There is 
evidence of this occurring, for example the studies of Sportasia by Dietz (Dietz et.al, 
2005). The could trace shifts in the partnership process and actor reactions over time.   
 
2. Sector 
The present study has focused on partnership working in the financial service sector.  
It is argued that this provides a valuable contribution given that the financial service 
sector accounts for a significant proportion of employment in the UK, as well as the 
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fact that studies into manufacturing traditionally dominate IR research.  However, 
further contributions could be made by exploring partnership in other sectors. 
 
3. Comparative case studies 
The comparative case studies used in this study, could complement the surveys and 
single case studies which characterised the British partnership literature.  In particular 
paired-comparisons between partnership and non-partnership firms in the same sector 
could be useful.  Perhaps a useful framework would be to compare union partnerships 
and union-non partnerships, and non-union partnerships with non-union firms without 
partnership. 
 
 
Potential focus of future research 
 
In terms of the specific focus of future research, the following may be instructive. 
 
1. Worker view 
Further research could aim to clarify more the worker view regarding partnership, and 
avoiding relying on trade unionists as proxies of employee views.  Indeed, this study 
has revealed a need to understand more about the views of workers, as the evidence 
herein suggests that these may not always correspond with the views industrial 
relations theorists assume they hold.  Arguably researchers have tended to conflate 
trade union views with employee views.  More empirical evidence would therefore be 
useful and perhaps there is a need for some large scale quantitative studies into 
current employee attitudes to trade unions in particular, and employee representation 
generally. 
 
2. Understanding process 
The study has also highlighted the need to know more about partnership as a process, 
rather than just the content of agreements, or the raw outcomes.  The study revealed 
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the more subtle facets of partnership, described as being „partnership-minded‟ or 
operating or having a „partnership style‟.  It also highlighted how issues of process 
and outcome are often conflated.  Given the complexity of partnership,  there is a need 
to understand more about the context, motives and drivers for partnership.  This 
includes issues such as actor choice, and relationships within and between actor 
groups. As Stuart and Martinez-Lucio (2004b) argue “poor outcomes do not in 
themselves act as a simple basis for evaluating the process (p.423). This study argued 
that such approaches are limited, given that partnership is about more than just 
outcomes, indeed reconfiguring the conduct of employment relations.  Moreover, 
good processes do not automatically lead to good outcomes as a result of the various 
contextual factors, such as economic conditions or corporate strategy, which may also 
influence outcomes. 
 
3. Non-union partnership 
Given that the majority of British workplaces no longer recognise trade unions, much 
more research is needed into the characteristics and efficacy of non-union 
partnerships, especially in light of the Information and Consultation Regulations (see 
for example Badigannavar and Kelly, 2005; Dietz et.al, 2005).  The evidence from the 
WebBank case suggests that non-union partnerships can actually make a difference, 
and it would therefore useful to glean additional empirical evidence regarding 
partnership in non-union contexts. 
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Direct Line:  01509 228842 
                      Email: s.johnstone@lboro.ac.uk 
                  http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/bs/ 
14 November 2003 
 
{Address omitted} 
 
Research into partnership between employers and employees 
 
Dear {Name omitted}, 
 
I am currently conducting research into partnership between employers and 
employees as part of my doctoral studies at Loughborough University Business 
School.  The study is supervised by Professor Adrian Wilkinson and Dr Peter Ackers. 
 
At this stage I am keen to speak to organisations with knowledge of the partnership 
approach to conducting employment relations, and am approaching you in that 
regard.   I believe it would be very valuable to understand more about partnership 
issues within {name omitted}.  Discussions would cover such issues as: 
 
 the participation infrastructure within {Name omitted} 
 the rationale behind the current infrastructure 
 the nature of specific participation processes 
 the outcomes/effectiveness of participation processes 
 
I envisage that the interview would take around one hour, arranged at a time 
convenient to you.  Participants will be provided with a summary of the key findings 
of this phase of research.  I also appreciate that this is a busy time of year and 
therefore interviews could be scheduled in January 2004.  If you require any further 
information please do not hesitate to get in touch.  I do hope you would like to be 
involved in the research, and look forward to hearing from you soon. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Stewart Johnstone 
Doctoral Researcher 
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14 November 2003 
 
Trade Union Congress 
Congress House 
Great Russell Street 
London WC1B 3LS 
 
Research into partnership between employers and employees 
 
Dear Mr Coats, 
 
I am currently conducting research into partnership between employers and 
employees as part of my doctoral studies at Loughborough University Business 
School.  The study is supervised by Professor Adrian Wilkinson and Dr Peter Ackers, 
who were also speakers at the LSE/CIPD Voice and Value conference. 
 
At this stage I am keen to speak to key organisations with knowledge of the 
partnership approach to conducting employment relations, and am approaching you 
in that regard.   I believe it would be very valuable to understand more about the 
opinions of the TUC on partnership issues.  I envisage that the interview would take 
around one hour, arranged at a time convenient to you.  I appreciate that this may be 
a busy time of year and envisage, therefore, that interviews could be scheduled in 
January 2004.  I am also willing to provide a summary of my key findings from this 
phase of the study to participants. 
 
If you require any further information please do not hesitate to get in touch.  I do hope 
you would like to be involved in the research, and look forward to hearing from you 
soon. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Stewart Johnstone 
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{Name omitted}  Interview, 4th December 2003 
 
Exploratory Interview Guide 
 
 
 Collective bargaining under partnership: how is pay now agreed 
 Working definition of partnership 
 Specific issues ((sensitive))rationalisation e.g.call centres, and 
(innocuous)family-friendly working, health and safety) 
 Rationale and the role of specific external factors (e.g. political climate) 
 History of industrial relations within   {name omitted} (from staff 
association days) 
 Background to the   {name omitted} partnership 
 Current participation infrastructure within  {name omitted} 
 Rationale behind the current infrastructure 
 The outcomes/effectiveness of participation processes 
 ER Manager‘s career history – how he became involved in the 
partnership process – role in the partnership process 
 How much have things actually changed under partnership 
 How does  {name omitted} compare to others in the banking sector vis-
à-vis employment relations 
 Thoughts about the future of the {name omitted} partnership 
 European works councils and information and consultation directive 
 The current state of partnership 
 Involvement and support of external agencies 
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       http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/bs 
       email: s.johnstone@lboro.ac.uk 
 
Ref: NW/EE 
 
 
 
Research into Employment Relations in Financial Services 
 
I am conducting research into employment relations within the UK financial sector and {name 
omitted}  have very kindly agreed to assist with the project.  This is an independent academic 
study being conducted at Loughborough University Business School, under the supervision of 
Professor Adrian Wilkinson, Professor of Human Resource Management and Professor Peter 
Ackers,  Professor of Industrial Relations. 
 
The study aims to explore issues including: 
 
 employee participation mechanisms within {name omitted} 
 relationships between management, {name omitted} representatives and employees 
 topical issues and the nature of decision-making processes 
 the overall climate of employment relations within {name omitted} 
 future challenges and prospects 
 
Employee opinions and experiences are central to this research.  I am therefore keen to hear 
the views of {name omitted} employees.  To this end, I would like to invite you to assist with a 
short research interview.  I envisage that discussions would take around one hour and all 
interviewees are guaranteed both anonymity and confidentiality.  If you have any specific 
questions regarding the study please do not hesitate to contact me by email.  I do hope you 
are able to assist with the research and I look forward to meeting you very soon.   
 
 
Stewart Johnstone 
Doctoral Researcher
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1. Senior Management/Management Interviews (December 2004) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND   (give information sheet) 
 
 
 Greetings/thanks/purpose of the interview/recording and confidentiality 
 
 Personal introductions (job-title, role, time with the organisation, brief 
biography. 
 
 Background information to the company (initial interviews) 
 
 Background to recent developments/challenges in the finance sector 
 
 Brief background to employment relations within [Company]. How 
would you describe the style of employment relations? 
 
 The nature and scope of specific participation infrastructure within [Company] 
(explore direct structures and indirect structures in place – initial interviews 
only) 
 
 
2.  PARTNERSHIP  (if unfamiliar substitute ‘employment relations approach’) 
 
 
 Personal understanding (if any) of partnership employment relations/main 
principles of partnership approach/principles 
 
 Background to the partnership/ER approach within [company] 
 
 Rationale for the partnership/ER approach within [Company] 
 
 Who was/is involved (internally/externally) with partnership/ER approach 
 
  Any personal involvement with the partnership/ER process? 
 
3.  PROCESSES: RECENT ISSUES AND DECISIONS     (use arrow prop) 
 
 Identification of specific ‗key issues‘ and challenges within [Company] over 
the past 5 years?   
 
 What were they? What happened? How were they handled?   
 
 How were the decisions actually made? What was the outcome?  Was it 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory?  Were any lessons learned? 
 
 Does the way decisions are made depend on the issue/circumstances? 
 
 
 
4. PROCESSES:  HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 Management-representative relations 
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 Management-employee relations  } relate back to specific issues 
 
 Employee-representative relations 
 
 Have relationships changed over time? How were they before? How are they 
now? 
 
 Attitude to trade union(s).  Are they stronger/weaker than before? Examples. 
 
5. OUTCOMES  
 
 Effectiveness of the current infrastructure (representative perspective) and 
why 
 
 Effectiveness of the current infrastructure (employee perspective) and why 
 
 Overall effectiveness of the participation current infrastructure and why 
(personal view) 
 
 Any barriers and obstacles to effectiveness? Examples. 
 
 Overall opinion on the current employment relations climate within [Company] 
 
 Overall do you think employees have enough say? 
 
 How do you think employment relations within [Company] compare with 5 
years ago?/Then/Now/Examples 
 
 How do you think employment relations within [Company] compare other 
organisations within the industry? 
 
 How do you think employment relations compare to a non-partnership firm? 
 
6. CURRENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 Current and future developments in relation to partnership/ER within 
[Company] 
 
 How likely to survive/conduits for survival 
 
 Future prospects and challenges faced by [Company] 
 
 Any further issues not already discussed? 
 
 Closing comments/thanks 
 
Note: try to get different perspectives on the same critical incidents 
 
Appendix B 
 
 
 
2. Employee Representative Interviews (December 2004) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND (give information sheet) 
 
 Greetings/thanks/purpose of interview/recording and confidentiality 
 
 Personal introductions (job-title, role, time with the organisation, brief 
biography.  
 
 Brief background to employment relations within [Company]  Describe? 
 
 Role of the employee representative 
 
 The specific participation infrastructure within [Company] (discuss direct 
structures and indirect structures in place) 
 
2.  PARTNERSHIP 
 
 Understanding of partnership employment relations/ main principles of 
partnership approach/principles 
 
 Rationale for the partnership/ER approach within [Company] 
 
 Background to the partnership within the company 
 
 Who was involved (internally/externally). any personal involvement with 
the partnership/ER process) 
 
 
3.  PROCESSES: RECENT ISSUES AND DECISIONS  (give arrow prop) 
 
 Identification of specific ‗key issues‘ within [Company] over the past 5 years? 
 
 What were they?  What happened?  How were they handled?  
 
 How were the decisions actually made? What was the outcome?  Was it 
satisfactory or unsatisfactory? 
 
 What was the role of employee representatives in the process 
 
 Views on trade unions.  Are they stronger/weaker as a result? Examples. 
 
4. PROCESSES: RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 Management-representative relations 
 
 Management-employee relations  { refer back to specific issues 
 
 Employee-representative relations 
 
5. OUTCOMES  
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 Overall effectiveness of the current participation infrastructure (personal view) 
 
 Effectiveness of the current infrastructure (management perspective) 
 
 Effectiveness of the current infrastructure (employee perspective) 
 
 Any barriers and obstacles Examples 
 
 Overall opinion on the current employment relations climate 
 
 Sufficient employee voice? 
 
 How do you think employment relations within [Company] compare with 5 
years ago? Then/Now/Examples 
 
 How do you think employment relations within [Company] compare other 
organisations within the industry? 
 
 How do you think employment relations within [Company] compare with non-
partnership organisations? 
 
 
6. CURRENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 Current and future developments in relation to partnership/ER 
 
 Future prospects and challenges/How stable/Likely to survive? 
 
 Any further issues not already discussed? 
 
 Closing comments/thanks 
 
 
 
Note: try to get different perspectives on the same critical incidents 
 
 
{END OF INTERVIEW}
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3. Employee Interviews (December 2004) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  (give info sheet) 
 
 Greetings/thanks/purpose of the interview/recording and confidentiality 
 
 Personal introductions (job-title, role, time with the organisation, brief 
biography, any personal involvement with the partnership process) 
 
 Brief background to employment relations within [Company]  Describe? 
 
2.  EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION 
 
 What do you understand by employee participation? 
 
 To what extent do you think it is important to involve employees at the 
workplace? Why/why not? 
 
 What systems are there for involving employees in decision making within 
[Company] 
 
 The specific participation infrastructure within [Company] (discuss direct 
structures and indirect structures in place in more detail) 
 
 Any knowledge of ‗partnership‘ employment relations? (If yes, probe further) 
  
 
3.  PROCESSES: ISSUES AND DECISION-MAKING  (give arrow diagram) 
 
 
 Identification of specific ‗key issues‘ within [Company] over the past 5 years? 
 
 What happened?  How were they handled? What was the outcome? 
 
 
4. PROCESSES: RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 Management-representative relations 
 
 Management-employee relations  } refer back to issues identified 
as e.g‘s 
 
 Employee-representative relations 
 
 Views on the role of trade union(s)   Are they stronger/weaker? Examples. 
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5. OUTCOMES     
 
 
 Overall effectiveness of the current participation infrastructure (personal view) 
 
 Effectiveness of the current infrastructure (management perspective) 
 
 Effectiveness of the current infrastructure (employee perspective) 
 
 Any barriers and obstacles 
 
 Overall opinion on the current employment relations climate 
 
 Sufficient ‗employee voice‘ 
 
 How do you think employment relations within Company compare with 5 
years ago?. Then/Now/Examples 
 
 How do you think employment relations within [Company] compare with other 
organisations within the industry/other workplaces with which you are familar? 
 
 
6. CURRENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 
 Current and future developments in relation to partnership 
 
 Future prospects and challenges/How stable?/Conditions for success? 
 
 Any further issues not already discussed? 
 
Note: try to get different perspectives on the same critical incidents 
 
 
 
{END OF INTERVIEW} 
08 December 2004 
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NatBank partnership agreement 
 
1. Roles and 
responsibilities 
 
NatBank to manage the 
business balancing the 
interests of employees. 
Customers and 
shareholders 
 
AND for Union to 
represent and promote 
interests of employees 
while recognising those of 
other stakeholders 
Bank commits to: 
 
Developing a business strategy and 
direction which recognises and respects the 
interests of employees along with other 
stakeholders 
 
Enabling Union to influence the 
implementation of business strategy and 
plans by sharing these with union during 
development 
 
Implementing business decisions in a fair 
and consistent way 
 
Communication openly and honestly with 
our people and being the first to inform 
them about business plans/decisions 
Union commits to: 
 
Acknowledging the legitimate interests of 
other stakeholders when seeking to 
challenge and influence business 
decisions 
 
Seeking out viable solutions to individual 
and collective employee issues 
 
Maintaining confidentiality 
 
Respecting NB’s right and responsibility 
to communicate with its people first about 
issues affecting them when these are not 
in the public domain 
2. Behaviours 
We will carry out our 
respective roles and 
responsibilities in a way 
that demonstrates mutual 
trust and respect 
Openness with information about the 
business 
Acknowledging and facilitating the unions 
role to promote the interests of its members 
Listening to alternative views with an 
intention of problem solving 
Realism, practicality and pragmatism 
Constructive and effective communication 
with our people 
Respecting the confidentiality of business 
information 
Shared agendas to promote the long-
term success of the business 
Co-operation and problem solving 
Realism, practicality and pragmatism 
Constructive and effective communication 
with members 
3. Accountability 
We will ensure all 
participants in 
NatBank/Union 
discussions understand 
their responsibilities and 
the issues, and are able 
to add value 
Clearly setting out the type and scope of 
business change and other consultations 
Ensuring representatives have the authority 
to make and implement agreements 
Ensuring reps understand the spirit in which 
we undertake our discussions 
Supporting and promoting decisions once 
made and agreed 
 
Developing representative structures with 
NB which continue to reflect the changing 
nature of the business 
Ensuring that, within Unions structure, 
reps have the authority to make and 
implement agreements 
Ensuring reps understand the spirit in 
which we undertake our discussions 
Supporting and promoting decisions once 
made and agreed 
4. Excellence 
We will develop and 
promote high standards of 
performance and 
professionalism to secure 
the success of NatBank 
and the people who work 
here 
Demonstrating professional management 
and leadership 
Valuing the diversity of all our people and 
helping them to fulfil their potential 
Recognising and rewarding exceptional 
performance 
Dealing with underperformance in a fair but 
firm manner 
Building on what we do well and supporting 
best practice 
Recognising business goals and 
objectives 
Demonstrating support for the principle of 
continuous improvement in handling the 
concerns of employees 
Constructively providing feedback on 
performance  systems and ideas for 
improvement 
Supporting best practice 
Recognising that NB will differentiate 
reward in line with performance 
5. Flexibility 
We recognise that 
success depends on 
meeting customer needs.  
We will work together to 
promote commercial 
success, taking account 
of the interests of 
Enabling our people to balance the 
demands of work and home when 
responding to customer requirements 
Working together across the Group while 
acknowledging that different markets will 
drive different needs 
Equipping our people with wider skills and 
where appropriate. 
Considering the needs of customers 
when representing the interests of 
employees 
Recognising that NB operates in a 
number of markets requiring different 
terms and condition of employment 
Recognising that flexibility and the 
development of skills is key to operating 
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employees and the quality 
of their working life 
in FS. 
6. Employability 
We will work together to 
ensure that wherever 
possible compulsory 
redundancies will be 
avoided 
Providing career counselling and 
outplacement support 
Investing in training and coaching 
Creating a climate which encourages self-
development 
Opportunity to develop skills 
Helping to develop a culture focusing on 
employability 
Proposing viable initiatives to support our 
people through change 
Providing wide-ranging training resources 
to members/reps 
